By Peter Rutland, The National Interest, 10/18/24

On September 24, the Center for Strategic and International Studies released a seventy-two-page report, The Russia-Ukraine War: A Study in Analytic Failure. It indicts the U.S. policy community for failing to predict the likely outcome of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. [https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-ukraine-war-study-analytic-failure]

The report was written by Elliot Cohen and Phillips O’Brien, with an introduction by Hew Strachan (the authors also discussed the report in a panel that is available on YouTube.) The authors are distinguished military historians. However, they are not Russia specialists and have not written extensively about the Ukraine war. Critics argue that Cohen and O’Brien are not neutral observers but have an ideological axe to grind—that is, a desire to discredit critics of full-scale support for Ukraine’s war effort.

 The vast majority of observers were caught by surprise by Putin’s invasion. Even though U.S. intelligence documented the build-up of Russia’s forces in the weeks and months before the invasion, it was just too hard for most analysts (the present author included) to imagine that Putin would unleash a devastating land war on his neighbor.

Nevertheless, Putin did start the war. He must have thought that he could achieve his goals at a cost worth paying. Cohen and O’Brien want to know why most American and European analysts failed to understand Putin’s intentions.

Cohen and O’Brien examined 181 publications from twenty-six think tanks, including half a dozen outside the United States and nineteen newspapers and magazines. They also held three workshops with some of the experts involved.

They found multiple factors contributed to the intelligence failure.

Most of the analysis came from just ten to twenty experts working in think tanks inside the DC beltway. Few of them had military experience, nor were they trained as historians. Most of them had degrees in political science but were not professional academics. Since the end of the Cold War, political science departments have stopped hiring people with expertise in Russian area studies, and there are virtually no specialists in the Russian military in U.S. universities (outside of the military academies). 

Cohen and O’Brien noted that these analysts focused on the Russian military. None of them had done any serious research into the Ukrainian military, despite the fact that a war had been raging there since 2014. Most attention focused on defending the NATO member Baltic countries from a Russian invasion, as in a 2017 RAND study that predicted Russia would overrun the region in thirty-six to sixty hours.

The analytical community seems to have internalized many of the assumptions prevailing in the Russian military that they were studying: that it had 1) reformed itself into a professional force, 2) become skilled in electronic warfare, 3) perfected a new doctrine of hybrid war, and 4) accumulated significant combat experience in Chechnya, Georgia, and Syria.

In general, military analysts tend to focus on counting concrete objects (soldiers, tanks, aircraft, etc.) rather than analyzing more abstract factors, such as training, leadership, logistics, and willingness to fight. Analysts looked at the force ratios in the Military Balance: ten to one in aircraft, four to one in tanks—and concluded that Ukraine did not stand a chance. Cohen and O’Brien could also have noted that Russia has a long tradition of bungling the opening phase of a war, only to pull together and win in the end—from Operation Barbarossa in 1941 through the invasion of Hungary in 1956 to the Georgia War in 2008.

The analysts were also prone to draw the analogy with the 2003 Iraq War: an aerial blitzkrieg followed by maneuver warfare that would overwhelm Ukraine’s defenses. “Russia’s Shock and Awe” was the title of a Foreign Affairs article published two days before the invasion. Extrapolating from the U.S. experience in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, it was believed that Ukraine would be occupied by Russia and then mount an insurgency.

This pessimism about Ukraine’s capacity to resist influenced the U.S. policy response. In 2017, some analysts were arguing against arming Ukraine with anti-tank missiles. In January 2022, just one month before the invasion, Foreign Policy published a piece titled “The West’s Weapons Won’t Make Any Difference to Ukraine.” This strain of thought meant that, to some extent, the United States “self-deterred” in the face of Putin’s apparent readiness to use force. Other factors influenced the decision not to send advanced weapons, such as the fear they would fall into Russian hands.

The “remarkable degree of consensus” is another example of groupthink. Conformity shows that you are an accepted member of the guild, and the opinions of outsiders are not to be trusted. The mainstream media’s role exacerbates this problem: they returned to the same pool of experts who demonstrate their authority by expressing certainty about what is happening. Cohen and O’Brien cite Philip Tetlock’s Expert Political Judgment in helping to understand how people explain away errors in their analysis, such as citing random developments (e.g., Putin ignoring military advice) that prevented what “should” have happened from taking place.

Despite being caught off guard, the analytical community has shown little willingness to admit they were wrong or discuss how to avoid being wrong again. On the contrary, after February 2022, most analysts plowed ahead, making predictions about the course of the war with the same assurance that they had explained why Putin was not going to invade Ukraine. For example, in January 2023, Foreign Affairs polled 73 experts on whether Ukraine will eventually have to make territorial concessions to Russia—a fairly wide range of views, with a majority disagreeing. However, what was striking was that forty-four experts reported a confidence level of seven out of ten or higher, while only fifteen reported a level of four or below.

For all our belief in the rationality of human behavior, leaders often act willfully and miscalculate their chances of success. Professor Richard Ned Lebow of King’s College London found that the country that started the war lost 80 percent of the wars since 1945. Bettina Renz, an expert on Russian military teaching in the UK, argues that it is unrealistic to expect experts to come up with a more accurate forecast of what would happen in the fog of war. The bigger problem, she argues, was that the West, dazzled by the annexation of Crimea in 2014, bought into the image of Putin as a master strategist. Western opinion careened from dismissing Russia as a basket case to seeing it as an all-powerful foe.

In an appendix, Cohen and O’Brien discuss three historical examples where conventional wisdom misread the likely outcome of a pending war: the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, Italy joining the Axis powers in 1940, and the Iraqi army facing U.S. troops in 1990. University of Chicago political scientist Paul Poast argues that the analytical failure over Ukraine is not an outlier: wars are inherently hard to predict, both in their onset, what happens once they begin, and how they end.

It is important, however, to keep a sense of perspective. Even though Russia failed in its main objective to topple the government in Kyiv, it did succeed in occupying a vast swathe of Ukrainian territory—27 percent of the country’s land at the peak, now down to 18 percent. That is an area of 42,000 square miles, about the same size as Virginia. If the war ended today, future historians would regard it as a victory for Russia.

Reuters, 10/15/24

KYIV, Oct 15 (Reuters) – Four-fifths of Ukrainians said they supported a new law banning Russia-affiliated religious groups in a survey released on Tuesday, as Kyiv seeks to root out a branch of the Orthodox Church accused of cooperating with Moscow, which is waging war on Ukraine.

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), which counted 6% of the respondents as followers, has for years faced accusations that it is a tool of Moscow’s influence in Ukraine and that some of its clergy cooperate with Russian intelligence.

The church denies these allegations and maintains that it officially broke off all ties to the Russian Orthodox Church, previously its parent church, in May 2022 – three months after Russia invaded Ukraine.

In August, Ukraine passed a law that bans the Russian Orthodox Church on Ukrainian territory and says that a government commission will assemble a list of “affiliated” organisations whose activities are not allowed.

Lawmakers said the process of banning the UOC would be long and complicated as each UOC parish is an individual legal entity and will have nine months to decide whether it wants to leave the church.

Most Ukrainians are part of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, a separate church founded in 2019 to be independent of Moscow and recognised by the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, widely regarded as the spiritual leader of Orthodox Christianity.

Russia’s invasion has already driven hundreds of UOC parishes to switch to the OCU, sometimes causing tensions in rural communities with one church.

The poll, conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, found broad support for the law across all regions of Ukraine that remain under Kyiv’s control. Even in the more Russophone east, over 70% of respondents supported the ban.

Overall, 16% of Ukrainians said they opposed the ban, while another 4% were unsure, with 80% in favour.

Throughout the war, Kyiv has highlighted the national security risks it says the Church poses.

Dozens of UOC clergy have been arrested and tried on charges including treason and cooperating with Russia. The UOC says it is the victim of a witch hunt.

Ukraine has traded a number of UOC clergy for Ukrainian prisoners of war held by Russia during the war. One unidentified clergyman accused of working for Russia was swapped for 28 Ukrainian soldiers.

Lawmakers in Estonia and the Czech Republic have also raised concerns this year about Moscow’s influence through the Russian Orthodox Church in their countries.

RT, 10/31/24

The Ukrainian military has reportedly instructed soldiers to avoid using the term “retreat” in communication with the press, according to a reporter from RFE/RL, the US state-run foreign media network.

In an interview with Kiev’s Radio NV, on Wednesday, Vlasta Lazur shared insights gathered from recent conversations with Ukrainian troops and their commanders.

“I spoke with a soldier on the Pokrovsk front,” Lazur said. “He said, ‘We received orders to use the words ‘offensive,’ ‘victory,’ ‘moving forward,’ and ‘driving out the enemy’ when communicating with journalists. But I can’t say the word ‘retreat’ or that the enemy has breached our defenses.’”

Pokrovsk, in Russia’s Donetsk People’s Republic, has been a major scene of fighting in recent weeks.

Lazur noted that the restrictions reflect deeper communication issues within Ukraine’s military hierarchy. “Everyone lies to each other. Local commanders are afraid to report to generals or higher-ups any problems, or that they do not have enough people, or that they are not able to carry out a task,” she added.

According to her, reports based on reality are often withheld from the top command as commanders fear disciplinary actions or job loss.

One soldier reportedly joked about the situation: “Maybe we should say that we are advancing on the Dnieper?” The Dnieper River is located to the rear of Ukrainian forces, underscoring the irony felt by some on the ground who sense a disconnect between official statements and the realities of their positions.

“Everyone lies to each other. Local commanders are afraid to report to generals or higher-ups any problems, or that they do not have enough people, or that they are not able to carry out a task. Even if such reports are founded in reality, they are afraid to send them, for fear of getting fired,” Lazur said.

These revelations coincide with comments by Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky, who acknowledged that Ukrainian forces might need to “retreat” when significantly outnumbered. Despite mobilizing over a million people since the escalation of conflict in 2022, Ukraine’s government faces severe manpower and logistical challenges. Recent revelations from lawmakers highlight over 100,000 cases of desertion, and they expect to call up an additional 160,000 troops in the coming months.

As Kiev contends with battlefield pressures, the internal limitations on reporting may underscore an attempt to manage public perceptions about the conflict’s progress.

Russian forces have made major advances in Donbass over the past several months. One Ukrainian general has blamed shortages of munitions, battle fatigue, and poor command and control.

By Faustine Vincent (Kyiv, Ukraine, special correspondent), Le Monde, 10/16/24

At first, all that can be seen from the Ukrainian Parliament, guarded by a checkpoint, are the neoclassical columns of the facade, redecorated in the Ukrainian colors of yellow and blue. Access to the chamber itself, an ultra-sensitive area of Kyiv, is even more restricted. Le Monde was granted exceptional access. After passing through a series of gates and staircases, you enter under high windows protected by sandbags, then along a marble railing, also fortified, in front of which two paintings of the Madonna and Child are displayed. Heavy engraved doors then open onto a room of ancient woodwork, bristling with Ukrainian and European flags, and topped by a spectacular glass dome. It was here, in the heart of the Rada, the Ukrainian Parliament, that MPs converged at the start of the invasion in February 2022, despite the risk of attack.

None of them have forgotten the madness of those early days, when the Russians were at the gates of the capital. “We were voting in a hurry, eyes glued to the air, fear in our stomachs, because we expected a missile to hit the glass dome at any moment,” said Oleksandr Merezhko, MP for the parliamentary majority, Servant of the People, and president of the Foreign Affairs Committee. “But maintaining these sessions was crucial to show the world that Parliament was standing and that the institutions continued to function despite the war.”

The Rada immediately became a symbol of resistance, but also the embodiment of Ukrainians’ fight to defend their nation and the values of democracy in the face of Moscow, determined to discredit and destroy their state, whose independence Vladimir Putin has always considered an artificial creation. Contrary to public fears, the MPs did not flee en masse. The level of confidence in this institution soared to over 50%, according to several studies – an unprecedented level.

How to keep it going?

More than two and a half years later, the threat has receded since the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Kyiv region in April 2022, although enemy drones are still regularly intercepted in the vicinity of Parliament. But the war is still here, with its trail of obstacles, obligations and restrictions.

No more elections are in sight. Martial law has postponed the presidential election indefinitely. The legislative elections, originally scheduled for October 2023, have also been canceled. The absence of elections is no longer debated in the country, as many understand that with over 6 million refugees, 3.7 million displaced, 20% of territory occupied by the Russians and constant bombing, they would be neither safe nor democratic. But the challenge is unprecedented for Ukraine: How can it keep going over the long term and keep democracy alive despite the war and the impossibility of renewing its representatives?

Parliamentary representatives are beginning to falter. Exhausted after 32 months of conflict and high-tension work, they are condemned to remain in office for as long as the war lasts, as stipulated by the Constitution, under the once again critical gaze of the population. “To be frank, Parliament has become quite a depressing place,” said Oleksandr Zaslavskiy, director of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, a Ukrainian think tank that has been working on the Rada for 25 years. “Being a member of parliament today means working 24 hours a day, under pressure, without vacations, and being hated by everyone. Some even get messages from soldiers telling them they’re coming back to kill them.” This resentment is fueled by repeated scandals, such as that of MP Yuri Aristov, who was seen in a luxury hotel in the Maldives in July 2023 under the pretext of a business trip.

The list of dissatisfactions among representatives continues to grow. Martial law has forced them to drastically restrict their travel abroad, which is now subject to the approval of Rada president Ruslan Stefanchuk. Access to the media has also been restricted since the introduction of the “telemarathon,” a major tool in the information war waged by the Ukrainian authorities, which broadcasts the same information on several channels, and from which opposition MPs claim to be excluded. “The authorities are taking advantage of martial law to curb freedom of expression,” said Mykola Kniazhytskyi, an MP for European Solidarity, the party of former president Petro Poroshenko and Volodymyr Zelensky’s great rival. To remain visible and address the public, the 56-year-old MP expresses himself on TikTok and has launched his own YouTube channel.

‘Be careful about democracy’

But since the beginning of the invasion, the entire Parliament has been marginalized. “Almost all power is concentrated in the hands of the head of state and the Presidential Office, which he controls,” said the Warsaw-based Center for Eastern Studies in a study published in August. Kniazhytskyi has warned Zelensky. “He has to be careful about democracy, otherwise our allies won’t give us any more money. But compared to Putin, he’s very democratic,” said the opponent. “Criticism and political debate have returned to parliament, but the exercise remains delicate as Russia seeks to exploit divisions. It’s a difficult balance,” said Kniazhytskyi. “I have to talk to you openly, but I also have to be careful, because we have to stand united against Putin.” The war has also created some strange situations. Some MPs now represent a region that came under Russian occupation. Others have seen their electorate flee abroad, or elsewhere in the country.

Opponents are not the only ones voicing concern about the scale of the difficulties. The unease is even greater among the representatives of Servant of the People, who have a majority in Parliament. The landslide victory in the 2019 parliamentary elections of the party founded by Zelensky had brought to power these men and women devoid of political experience, with very diverse profiles. Today, many of them want to resign and return to their former lives. Especially as their salaries have remained virtually unchanged at around 40,000 hryvnias (€880), including allowances.

“The elected members of Servant of the People were probably the least prepared to deal with all this,” said Zaslavskiy. In January, the party’s leader, Davyd Arakhamia, announced that he had received 17 requests for resignation and anticipated “a major crisis” in Parliament. However, according to several sources, these resignations had not been put to the vote by the Rada president, preventing any departures.

Stefanchuk told Le Monde he denied this, asserting that, “so far, I haven’t received a single request,” apart from those, at the start of the invasion, from MPs of the former pro-Russian opposition party The Opposition Platform – For Life, which was banned in June 2022. And if these resignations were to reach him? “We currently have the lowest number of MPs since Ukraine’s independence. This is an essential factor for them not to resign,” said Stefanchuk. “I’m sure that the MPs have understood their historic mission at this crucial time for the country.”

Unexpected allies

Since the start of the invasion, the number of MPs has fallen to 401 out of 450 seats – 28 have lost their mandates or resigned, two have been killed, and the remaining seats were already empty since the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of part of the Donbas in 2014. The priority is clear: Everyone must stay in their posts. According to political analyst Ihor Kohut, a deal has reportedly been struck with the resigners to convince them to stay. “This is a huge challenge in terms of democracy, since their mandate has expired,” said the expert. “But they have to stay until new elections are held, and nobody knows when that will be possible!”

In the meantime, the presidential party is making sure it doesn’t lose a single vote. The Servant of the People MPs still hold the majority with 233 seats, but gathering the 226 votes needed to pass legislation on their own has become almost impossible. Since the beginning of the invasion, they have only managed to do so 17 times out of 5,200 votes, according to a study by the independent organization Chesno, which specializes in political transparency. “They were never in full strength to vote,” said analyst Oleksandr Salizhenko. Others also refuse to support their own camp.

To make up for the missing votes, Zelensky’s party has found some unexpected allies: the MPs of the former pro-Russian party Opposition Platform – For Life. These representatives, liable to be prosecuted for treason, have formed two new factions: Platform for Life and Peace, and Restoration of Ukraine. Zealous, these 39 MPs vote massively in favor of the laws proposed by the majority.

Their informal alliance with Servant of the People is above all pragmatic. “They want to show their loyalty, survive in their political environment and not lose the business they otherwise own,” said Salizhenko. However, this loyalty has its limits: When the law on decolonization and changing Russian names to Ukrainian was put to the vote, none of them took part. “They abstain wherever Russia’s interests are at stake,” said the analyst.

Despite his exhaustion, Merezhko is hanging in there. This former professor of international law, who also had no political experience before his arrival at the Rada, is convinced that the “great sacrifice” made by the MPs is essential for the survival of the Ukrainian state. “One day, people will be grateful to us.”

Reuters, 11/6/24

Summary

-Kremlin takes cautious stance after Trump claims victory

-Russian sovereign fund floats reset with Trump

-Foreign Ministry says Moscow has no illusions about Trump

-Medvedev says Trump is probably bad news for Ukraine

MOSCOW, Nov 6 (Reuters) – The Kremlin reacted cautiously on Wednesday after Donald Trump was elected U.S. president, saying the U.S. was still a hostile state and that only time would tell if Trump’s rhetoric on ending the Ukraine war translated into reality.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 triggered the biggest confrontation between Moscow and the West since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis when the Soviet Union and the U.S. came close to nuclear war.

Trump’s re-election caps a remarkable comeback four years after the Republican was voted out of the White House and ushers in a new American leadership likely to test democratic institutions at home and relations abroad.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Trump had made some important statements about wanting to end the Ukraine war during his campaign, but only time would tell if they led to action.

“Let us not forget that we are talking about an unfriendly country, which is both directly and indirectly involved in a war against our state” (in Ukraine),” Peskov told reporters.

Peskov said he was not aware of any plans by President Vladimir Putin to congratulate Trump on his victory and that relations with Washington were at an historic low.

“We have repeatedly said that the U.S. is able to contribute to the end of this conflict. This cannot be done overnight, but… the U.S. is capable of changing the trajectory of its foreign policy. Will this happen, and if so, how … we will see after (the U.S. president’s inauguration in) January.”

Russian and U.S. diplomats say relations between the world’s two largest nuclear powers have only been worse during the depths of the Cold War. Russian officials from Putin down said ahead of the election that it made no difference to Moscow who won the White House, even as Kremlin-guided state media coverage showed a preference for Trump.

The Russian Foreign Ministry said Moscow had no illusions about Trump, noting that there was what it called a bipartisan anti-Russian position among the U.S. ruling elite designed to try to contain Russia.

“Russia will work with the new administration when it ‘takes up residence’ in the White House, fiercely defending Russian national interests and focusing on achieving all the set objectives of the special military operation (in Ukraine),” the ministry said.

“Our conditions are unchanged and are well known in Washington.”

Kirill Dmitriev, the influential head of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, struck a softer note, saying a Trump victory could be a chance to repair ties.

“This opens up new opportunities for resetting relations between Russia and the United States,” added Dmitriev, a former Goldman Sachs banker who has previously had contacts with the Trump team.

WAR IN UKRAINE

Trump, 78, has promised to swiftly end the war in Ukraine, though he has not explained exactly how he would do that.

Putin has said he is ready for talks, but that Russia’s territorial gains and claims must be accepted, something that the Ukrainian leadership has rejected as an unacceptable capitulation.

Russian forces are advancing at the fastest pace in at least a year in Ukraine and control about one fifth of the country.

That includes Crimea, which Moscow annexed from Ukraine in 2014, about 80% of the Donbas – a coal-and-steel zone – and more than 70% of the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions.

Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said on Wednesday that Trump’s win would probably be bad news for Ukraine, which relies on Washington as its top military backer.

“Trump has one useful quality for us: as a businessman to the core, he mortally dislikes spending money on various hangers–on,” said Medvedev, now a senior security official.