By Gary Saul Morson, New York Review of Books, February 2025

Review of Paul Robinson’s Russian Liberalism.

“The Russian liberal,” wrote the nineteenth-century philosopher Pyotr Chaadayev, “is a thoughtless fly buzzing in the ray of the sun; that sun is the sun of the West.” From Chaadayev’s day to the present, Russians have regarded liberalism as an elitist, alien Western import, at odds with ordinary people’s basic values. Its two brief moments of influence—from the revolution of 1905 to the Bolshevik takeover in November 1917, and from Mikhail Gorbachev’s proclamation of perestroika and glasnost until the presidency of Vladimir Putin—ended in illiberal regimes and the discrediting of liberal ideas.

When Gorbachev assumed power in 1985, and especially after the USSR collapsed in 1991, it seemed as if Western liberalism would at last triumph. Political pluralism, human rights, and a decentralized economy became the order of the day even in Russia. Why, then, did everything change under President Putin? And why have Russians so thoroughly rejected liberal culture and politics? In the 2016 elections—fraudulent, to be sure—Russian liberals failed to elect a single delegate to the Duma. The historian Benjamin Nathans reports that Russian liberals routinely drink toasts to “the success of our hopeless cause.”

Something similar happened after the October Manifesto of 1905 transformed Russia into a constitutional monarchy. When the Romanov dynasty collapsed in March 1917, legal power passed to the Duma and its initially liberal leaders until the Bolsheviks seized control eight months later. By the end of 1917 the feared Cheka—the first version of the Soviet secret police—was in operation. Why was liberalism so incapable of preserving the power it inherited?

History is written not only by the winners but also about the winners and their principal opponents. When I studied Russian history in graduate school, the period from the Decembrist revolt of 1825 until the Bolshevik takeover was depicted as a struggle between the monarchists and the revolutionaries, with only the briefest mention of liberals. The central documents of Russian liberalism—the essay anthologies Problems of Idealism (1903) and Landmarks (1909)—escaped consideration. Yet there was a significant Russian liberal movement, whose importance extends beyond Russian history. For one thing, some Russian thinkers, especially from the 1890s to 1917, found new and perhaps useful ways to defend core liberal values. For another, the failures of Russian liberal movements may tell us why Western assumptions about liberalism’s universal appeal so often prove counterproductive.

The historian Pavel Miliukov, the leader of the liberal Kadet (Constitutional Democratic) party from its founding in 1905 until its ban by the Bolsheviks in 1917, embraced a liberalism that resembled its Western counterparts. Heavily influenced by English utilitarianism and Auguste Comte’s positivism, he presumed that just as the same physical laws prevail everywhere, so do the same historical laws. All societies are bound to develop liberal democratic institutions, an idea that again became familiar almost a century later in Francis Fukuyama’s meditations on “the end of history.” In his splendid new book on Russian liberalism, Paul Robinson cites Miliukov’s comment that “civilization makes nations, as it makes individuals, more alike.” The socialist Alexander Herzen, along with Russian radical populists, had maintained that Russia could forge a path of its own that avoided Western bourgeois society, but Miliukov, along with many Marxists, insisted that history allows only one path: Russia had to obey “the laws of political biology.” The forms of civilized political life, Miliukov famously explained, “are as little national as are the use of the alphabet or the printing press, steam or electricity…. When a new era of history knocks at the door, it is useless to place restraints and delays in its path.”…

Read full article here.

YouTube link here.

By Arnaud Bertrand, Twitter, 2/15/25

This is beyond insane: Keith Kellog, Trump’s special envoy for Ukraine and Russia, confirms that Europe will NOT have a seat at the table in the negotiations to end the war.

When asked at the Munich Security Conference “Can you assure this audience that Ukrainians will be at the table and Europeans will be at the table?”, his response was: “the answer to that last question is no.” By “last question”, he meant whether Europeans will be at the table.

Later on in the conversation, he was asked to confirm this: “So the Europeans […] you don’t think should be at the table directly?”. His answer again was “I’m from the school of realism, I think that’s not going to happen”, and that he understood hearing this might be “like fingers on a chalkboard, may grate a little bit but I’m telling you something that’s really quite honest.”

He was very clear though that he still expected Europeans to provide security guarantees and abide by the deal: “you have to understand, when you sign up for these security guarantees, that is an obligation and the reason I say that and I challenge many people that are out there, right now, 2014 Wales declaration, all the NATO allies, 2% of GDP, 20% of that was modernization, there are still 8 nations who’ve not even gotten to that number, okay? So when we get to it make sure you check your 6 as they say that the obligation is upon YOU when WE make these commitments.”

So to sum up, the US position is that Europe should stay out of negotiations that will fundamentally affect their security architecture – yet bear the primary responsibility and cost for the negotiations’ outcome.

And on top of that, it’s quite clear from previous Trump declarations (like here: https://nypost.com/2025/02/10/us-news/trump-says-ukraine-has-essentially-agreed-to-allow-the-us-access-to-500b-in-rare-earth-minerals/) that the U.S. will be looking in the deal to take control of Ukraine’s rare earth minerals as payment for the military aid it has provided, leaving presumably nothing to Europe.

I’ve repeatedly warned that Europe was fast walking towards its own century of humiliation if it continued on its current path. I think it’s now pretty damn clear that we’re very much there already.

If this goes through, this would possibly be unprecedented in European history – never before, to my knowledge, has Europe’s security architecture been redrawn without any European power at the table. Even during Europe’s darkest moments – including the Mongol invasions, the Ottoman expansions, or the Yalta Conference – European powers always had some voice in negotiations affecting their future.

To be clear, the primary culprit here isn’t the U.S. or Trump: any student of history knows that we live in a deeply unfair world where, as ancient Greek historian Thucydides wrote 2,500 years ago, “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” As such the blame lies almost entirely on us Europeans, or more precisely on our immensely incompetent leaders. And I want to stress this last point: they are literally incompetent on a millennia scale, given that they’ve managed to reduce Europe to a position that lacks any historical parallel, where it’s expected to simply accept and implement whatever security arrangements others decide for it.

Trump himself does what’s best for the U.S. – “America first”, remember? – and to be fair to him the Biden administration left him with a pretty bad hand. It’s crystal clear that Russia won in Ukraine, despite all of NATO’s efforts, and as such the U.S. very much risked coming out of it looking like the loser that it objectively is.

Faced with this, Trump’s strategy clearly is to reframe this defeat into an “art of the deal” victory by securing U.S. access to Ukraine’s natural resources while offloading the costs and responsibilities of the post-war security arrangement onto Europe. Meanwhile Europe, which has failed to develop any meaningful strategic autonomy over the past decades (in fact it’s moved in the opposite direction), finds itself with little leverage to prevent this.

In fact, European “leaders”, in their treasonous meekness, are already signaling that they’ll resign themselves to their fate. Mark Rutte, NATO’s Secretary General, for instance enticed Europeans not to complain about the situation (“to my European friends, I would say, get into the debate, not by complaining that you might, yes or no, be at the table, but by coming up with concrete proposals, ideas, ramp up (defense) spending”, https://voanews.com/a/europe-will-not-be-part-of-ukraine-peace-talks-us-envoy-says-/7976497.html).

And Keir Starmer, invited by Macron at a “crisis summit” in Paris to discuss the situation, said that his primary goal in the meeting would be “to ensure we keep the US and Europe together. We cannot allow any divisions in the alliance to distract from the external enemies we face.” (https://theguardian.com/world/2025/feb/15/europe-will-not-take-part-in-us-russia-talks-ukraine-kellogg).

I let you appreciate the perfect illustration this provides of the very mindset that has led Europe to this unprecedented position of weakness – responding to diplomatic humiliation with calls for even more subservience.

So what could Europe do? After all, it is true that they have very little leverage, mainly due to the fact that they are “protected” by the very power that decided to put them on the menu instead of at the table.

One idea could be to out-Trump Trump, and to angle for a deal where the U.S., not Europe, ends up the loser. They could for instance finally tell the truth about what led to the war in the first place, namely NATO expansion pushed by the U.S., as well as the U.S.-led coup in Ukraine in 2014, and dissociate themselves from this, just the way Trump is very conveniently trying to dissociate himself from his own country’s previous policies.

They could make it clear that they reject any deal that gives the U.S. access to any of Ukraine’s resources, and signal to Russia that they’re open to a different kind of security architecture in Europe – one that doesn’t rely on U.S. leadership or NATO. After all, if Trump can say he’ll make deals with Putin, why couldn’t Europe do the same?

They could also reach out to China, which has already made it very clear that it opposed a deal in Ukraine without Europe at the table (https://reuters.com/world/china-calls-all-stakeholders-ukraine-war-be-peace-process-2025-02-15/) and which is anyhow much better positioned to negotiate with Russia than Trump is.

We could end up with a Europe freed from American tutelage for the first time since 1945, establishing a new multipolar equilibrium with China and Russia – turning Trump’s attempt to exclude Europe into the very catalyst that finally enables European strategic autonomy.

But this would require a level of strategic thinking that current European leaders have consistently shown themselves incapable of. Instead I’m afraid they’ll continue their current path of attempting to maintain the façade of transatlantic unity even as they’re being openly humiliated.

By Anatol Lieven, Responsible Statecraft, 2/18/25

European summits are not usually the stuff of poetry, but the latest one in Paris was worthy of Horace: Patrturiunt montes; nascetur ridiculus mus — “Mountains will be in labour; and give birth to a ridiculous mouse.”

President Macron of France called the summit in response to what he called the “electroshock” of the Trump administration’s election and plans to negotiate Ukraine peace without the Europeans. The result so far however appears to have been even less than a mouse — in fact, precisely nothing.

Macron presumably hoped that the leaders of the other major European states would rally behind his own proposal of French and European peacekeeping troops for Ukraine (an idea already categorically rejected by Moscow). Keir Starmer of the UK did indeed make such an offer, only shortly afterwards to say that no European guarantee of Ukrainian security would be credible without what he called a US “backstop.”

Since Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth had already publicly ruled out any such U.S. guarantee, Starmer thereby implicitly admitted that his offer of British troops was empty. British parliamentarians have also demanded a vote on the dispatch of British troops. In the meantime, on leaving the Paris meeting, Chancellor Olaf Scholtz of Germany said that a discussion of European troops for Ukraine is “completely premature” and “highly inappropriate” while the war is ongoing. Prime Minister Donald Tusk of Poland (one of Ukraine’s strongest supporters) ruled out Polish troops altogether:

“We do not plan to send Polish soldiers to the territory of Ukraine. We will … give logistical and political support to the countries that will possibly want to provide such guarantees in the future, such physical guarantees.”

Macron has also emphasized something that makes much more sense: namely that the Europeans need to build up not only their own armed forces, but also the military industries that supply them. In an interview with the Financial Times, he said that:

“We must also develop a fully integrated European defense, industrial and technological base. This goes far beyond a simple debate about spending figures. If all we do is become bigger clients of the US, then in 20 years, we still won’t have solved the question of European sovereignty.”

This is indeed extremely necessary — though it is clear that Trump expects that higher European military spending will be spent on U.S. weaponry, and is prepared to bring pressure to bear to make sure this is the case. But Macron’s interview also brought out the acute difficulty of such European integration. He urged European countries to buy the SAMP-T air defense system, which he said is better than the U.S. Patriot missiles system that several countries are presently using.

For all I know, he may be right about that; but it is surely no coincidence that the SAMP-T is made in France and Italy. The real proof of Macron’s commitment to the integration of European military industries would be if — for example — he agrees to give up production of France’s Leclerc main battle tank in favor of buying Germany’s Leopard tanks for the French army.

The UK exemplifies this problem. With one of the very few professional fighting armies in Europe, it is critical to any independent European defense. But while it has excellent soldiers, its weapons systems have been plagued with breakdowns and deficiencies, largely because the wider British industrial base is now too limited to support an efficient military sector. On the other hand, precisely because British industries have shrunk so far, military industry is critical to maintaining what is left of British technological expertise. Give this up to the Germans? Really?

The kind of radical increases in military spending being demanded by the Trump administration and advocated by Macron and Starmer will also require some combination of increased taxes and savage cuts to social welfare, health and infrastructure budgets, at a time when these are already under intense pressure from economic stagnation, and as a result the discontent of ordinary people is rising steeply.

Russia Matters, 2/18/25

1. Senior American and Russian officials agreed on Feb. 18 to establish high-level teams to work toward ending the war in Ukraine and finding a path toward normalizing relations, in the most extensive bilateral negotiations in more than three years, according to NYT. After the 4.5 hours of talks, U.S. Secretary of State Rubio described a three-step plan for what the U.S. and Russia planned to do next, NYT reported. First, he said, both countries would negotiate how to remove restrictions placed on each other’s embassies in Moscow and Washington. In addition, he said, the U.S. would engage with Russia about “parameters of what an end” to the Ukraine war would look like. “There’s going to be engagement and consultation with Ukraine, with our partners in Europe and others,” Rubio was quoted by NYT as saying. And finally, he said, Russia and the U.S. would explore new “historic” partnerships, both in geopolitics and in business.¹
   1. After the talks, Trump’s national security adviser Waltz suggested Ukraine’s government would have a say, calling it “common sense” that “if you’re going to bring both sides together, you have to talk to both sides,” according to CBS. “We are absolutely talking to both sides,” Waltz said.
   2. After the talks, Trump’s envoy Witkoff said the U.S has consulted Zelenskyy and Macron, and that the EU was “going to have to be at the table at some point because they have sanctions as well that have been imposed.” But the Russian foreign ministry ruled out a role for Europe in the Ukraine talks and demanded NATO rescind an open-ended 2008 invitation to Kyiv, as it said Moscow was “categorically opposed” to a European peacekeeping deployment, NYT reported.
   3. After the talks Ushakov, Putin’s foreign policy adviser, said the discussions were “not bad,” NYT reported. Ushakov said the exact date of the meeting between Putin and Trump has not yet been determined, but it is unlikely to be next week, according to TASS.
   4. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov stated that the parties “not only listened, but heard each other,” according to Republic.ru. Lavrov also announced that Russia-U.S. consultations on Ukraine would now be held regularly. Lavrov also said  that he was unaware of a reported U.S. peace proposal for Ukraine that includes agreeing to a ceasefire, holding elections and signing a final peace deal. The so-called “three-stage peace plan” was allegedly proposed by both the United States and Russia, Fox News White House correspondent Jacqui Heinrich reported, citing unnamed foreign diplomatic sources.
   5. The Russian Foreign Ministry said: “agreements were reached on establishing a dialogue to agree on ways to resume cooperation in the economy, including energy, space and other areas of mutual interest.” “The parties agreed to resume communication channels on other international issues, taking into account the special responsibility of Russia and the United States in matters of peace and security as nuclear powers,” the ministry said.
   6. Russian deputy foreign minister Grushko said the Kremlin was “categorically opposed” to European troops deploying to Ukraine “no matter what their role is.” He added that such a move would be “a step towards escalation,” according to FT.
   7. Kremlin spokesman Peskov said any deal should “take into account the possibility of disputing Zelenskyy’s legitimacy” after the Ukrainian president’s term expired last year, according to FT.
   8. Pro-government Russian political analyst Markov claimed that the talks produced “no results” and that “all assessments are abstract,” according to Republic.ru. He noted that a Putin-Trump meeting has not been scheduled and that “it cannot yet be said that Russia and the U.S. are moving closer.”²
2. “A strong transatlantic relationship remains as critical today as it has for the past 75 years,” but “the way the transatlantic partners confront common challenges must change,” according to a newly-released report by the Belfer Center Task Force on Building a European Pillar within the Transatlantic Relationship, which is co-chaired by Ivo Daalder, Camille Grand and Daniela Schwarzer.³ “For Europe—and for NATO—the territorial defense of the continent will be the top priority for years to come,” the task force’s report, entitled “Transatlantic Bargain: The Case for Building a Strong European Pillar,” argues. “Under a new and sustainable transatlantic bargain, Europeans need to augment their defense capabilities and contributions significantly to take much greater responsibility for the defense of the continent.” As for the United States, it “needs to proactively help Europe build a strong and capable European pillar both by advocating better burden sharing and facilitating a shift in responsibilities to Europe, and reducing roadblocks to European defense investment and collaboration with U.S. defense industry,” according to the report, which was published as the Munich Security Conference took place. One of MSC’s Feb. 15 panels featured Ian Bremmer, Fiona Hill, Dmytro Kuleba, Meghan O’Sullivan and David Sanger; and focused on “Adversarial Alignment.” See a summary of this panel’s analysis and recommendations below.*
3. “If Europe wants to be at the negotiating table rather than being on the menu, it is time to act with unity and clarity, rather than continuing to act surprised, divided and embarrassed,” Camile Grant writes in a commentary for ECFR. First, Europeans need to make clear that their support for Ukraine is not conditioned on continued U.S. support and can be increased.⁴ Second, Europeans need to clarify what they are ready to offer in terms of security guarantees, such as deployment of troops to Ukraine. Finally, “Putin, who probably celebrates his new status as a special negotiation partner of Washington, has not shown any signs of an openness to compromise or closing a deal soon. This creates an opportunity for Europe to shape—even partially—the terms of the deal,” according to Grand.⁵

***

Summary of February 18th Meeting of American and Russian Diplomats in Saudi Arabia

By Brian McDonald, Twitter, 2/18/25

Lavrov & Rubio agree to create negotiation groups on Ukraine and a mechanism to ease tensions in US-Russia relations (Reuters).

🕊️ Three-stage peace plan on the table: Ceasefire ➡️ Elections in Ukraine ➡️ Final agreement (Fox News).

💼 Economic ties back on the agenda – Russia & US agree to cooperate on investment & energy prices post-settlement (Reuters).

🏛️ Embassy staffing to be restored in Moscow & Washington – a major thawing move (Rubio).

📢 State Dept: One meeting won’t solve Ukraine, but Riyadh was an “important step forward.”

💬 Zelensky fumes – says talks without Kyiv are just bilateral Russia-US agreements, not peace talks.

🔮 Trump & Putin both believe Zelensky’s re-election chances are slim (Fox News).