Ukrainian forces are struggling to hold their positions in the eastern city of Pokrovsk and nearby Myrnohrad, where Russian troops are intensifying their offensive in what could become Ukraine’s most serious battlefield setback in months, Germany’s Bild newspaper reported.
According to Bild, Ukrainian officers described the situation as “critical”, saying Russian forces had captured about 80% of Pokrovsk and were closing in on the remaining Ukrainian positions. “Putin is now throwing all his forces at this region. The situation is extremely dire,” one senior Ukrainian officer told the publication. “We’ve lost 80% of the city… The guys in Myrnohrad are in an even worse situation; they’re effectively surrounded.”
Military sources cited by Bild said between 300 and 1,000 Ukrainian troops remain encircled near Myrnohrad, struggling with limited supplies and evacuation options. Russian forces have reportedly broken into Pokrovsk’s city limits and are pushing to complete the encirclement, despite Kyiv’s official claims that Ukrainian units are holding their ground.
“The Ukrainians’ garrison surrounded in Myrnohrad now occupies about 42 sq km. In my estimation between 300-1000 Ukrainian troops remain in the pocket but the condition of these men is likely very poor considering the inability to get supply in or medevac out,” military blogger Ayden posted on X.
According to the report, Russia is also gaining the upper hand in the drone war. Ukraine has deployed a record number of drone units along this section of the front, but Russian forces have greater resources. Russian drones are reportedly patrolling Ukraine’s main supply routes, and, thanks to a larger number of long-range unmanned aircraft, are able to penetrate several kilometres deeper into Ukrainian territory. This allows them to “hunt Ukrainian drone operators with near impunity,” The Economist explained.
It remains unclear whether Russia can sustain this tempo of attacks. However, the anticipated collapse of the Pokrovsk defence suggests that Russian forces have found a formula that works, the publication said.
The battle for Pokrovsk — a strategic transport hub in the Donetsk region — has been raging for more than a year. Its loss would mark a major symbolic and tactical defeat for Ukraine, potentially opening the way for Russian advances deeper into Donbas and dealing a blow to Ukrainian morale ahead of winter.
Western analysts, including those writing for The Economist, note that Russia has gained a technological edge in drone warfare on this front, deploying greater numbers of long-range drones that can target Ukrainian logistics routes and operators.
A collapse in Pokrovsk’s defence could also have political repercussions, bolstering Moscow’s leverage in any future peace talks and testing US President Donald Trump’s stated ambitions to broker an end to the war, according to a BBC report.
Ukrainian officials have not confirmed the extent of territorial losses, but local reports suggest the situation on the ground remains fluid and extremely tense.
***
Russian commander details advances in key city of Kupyansk
Russian forces have advanced further in the battle for the encircled city of Kupyansk in Ukraine’s Kharkov Region, according to the commander of an assault unit involved in the operation.
Russian President Vladimir Putin said last month that some 10,000 Ukrainian servicemen had been surrounded in Kupyansk and Krasnoarmeysk (Pokrovsk) in Russia’s Donetsk People’s Republic. Kiev has not responded to Putin’s call for the blocked forces to surrender. Ukraine’s Vladimir Zelensky continues to deny the dire situation on the ground.
In a video published by the Russian Defense Ministry on Saturday, the commander of the 121st Regiment of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, call sign Lavrik, said that his unit “continues its mission to liberate the western part of Kupyansk from the Ukrainian military.”
On Friday, his troops took control of Lesya Ukrainka Street, with mopping up operations ongoing in three other nearby streets, he said.
At least ten Ukrainian soldiers who tried holding on to their positions in the area were eliminated, according to Lavrik. Kiev’s troops entrenched in a strip of forest on the southern outskirts of Kupyansk have also been struck, he added.
“We are moving forward. Our spirits are high,” the commander said.
The Russian Defense Ministry said in a separate statement on Saturday that its forces “continue to destroy the encircled enemy grouping” in Kupyansk.
Zelensky, who previously denied any encirclement and accused Moscow of exaggerating its progress on the battlefield, claimed on Thursday that Ukrainian troops had been able to advance by more than a kilometer within Kupyansk. He did not say where exactly the gains were made.
Kupyansk has been a major contested logistics hub in the conflict’s northeastern front. Russian forces claimed partial control of the city in September, publishing a video of its servicemen in the center near the administration building, stadium, and TV tower.
Lavrik said on Thursday that he expects the full capture of Kupyansk by the Russian military within a week.
An especially damaging example of Washington’s lack of strategic empathy or even basic consideration regarding another major country has been its belligerent display of power and contempt toward Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Most analysts who examine the onset of this “second cold war” have concentrated on the rising Russian–Western tensions over Ukraine, especially since that country’s U.S.-backed Maidan Revolution in 2014.
The focus on Ukraine during the post-2014 period is understandable, given that a full-scale proxy war between NATO and Russia over Ukraine’s geopolitical status is now taking place and alarming threats are being hurled from various capitals. But the deterioration of relations with Moscow on the part of the United States and its key European allies began long before 2014 and has involved issues not directly related to Ukraine. Moreover, policymakers in Washington deserve most of the blame for the onset of the second cold war, an outcome that is doubly tragic because it was so unnecessary.
Moscow’s acceptance not only of Germany’s reunification but of a united Germany’s membership in NATO signaled the potential for an entirely new era in Russian–Western relations. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact military alliance confirmed the Kremlin’s new, much less aggressive political and security orientation. Any lingering doubt about the possibility of warmer relations should have vanished at the end of 1991, when the USSR itself dissolved and a noncommunist Russia became the principal successor state.
Robert M. Gates, who served as secretary of defense in both George W. Bush’s administration and Barack Obama’s administration, candidly describes in his 2014 book, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, some of the serious U.S. policy missteps. Gates recalled that in one of his early reports to Bush, “I shared with him my belief that from 1993 onward, the West, and particularly the United States, had badly underestimated the magnitude of Russian humiliation in losing the Cold War and then in the dissolution of the Soviet Union….” In an even more candid comment, Gates added: “What I didn’t tell the president was that I believed the relationship with Russia had been badly mismanaged after Bush 41 [George H. W. Bush] left office in 1993.”
Saying the bilateral relationship had been “mismanaged” is putting matters gently. Indeed, even during the elder Bush’s tenure, hawkish elements within the U.S. policy hierarchy worked hard to sabotage a Western rapprochement with Russia. The elder Bush’s secretary of defense, Dick Cheney, suggested that the United States not be content with the collapse of the Soviet Union, but work to fragment Russia. Fortunately, the president and some other key advisers, most notably Secretary of State James Baker and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, opposed such an openly confrontational approach. Instead, they soothed Moscow and led Kremlin leaders to believe that Washington would not make any move to expand NATO beyond the eastern border of a united Germany. How sincere they were about easing Moscow’s security concerns remains uncertain to this day.
In any case, President Bill Clinton’s administration adopted a noticeably less accommodating stance toward Russia. This phase of Washington’s Russia policy was characterized by a lack of strategic empathy and tone deafness. Key policymakers, such as Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, and Czech-born U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright, were thoroughly marinated in the Cold War era’s anti-Soviet conventional wisdom. They transferred their ingrained hostility toward the USSR to a newly democratic Russia with scarcely any hesitation.
Albright and her supporters were exceptionally receptive to requests from anti-Russia figures in Poland, the Baltic republics, and other Eastern European countries to join NATO—especially after she became Secretary of State in 1997. It was hardly a secret that Boris Yeltsin’s administration (and most other Russians) would regard NATO expansion into Central and Eastern Europe as an extremely hostile act. Indeed, Yeltsin warned Clinton about the danger of a negative reaction from both his country’s population and political elite during a private summit discussion.
Instead of heeding Yeltsin’s warning, Clinton submitted a treaty to the U.S. Senate approving the addition of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to the alliance. NATO expansion was underway. Meanwhile, Washington and its European allies also were beating up on Serbia, Moscow’s principal remaining political ally in Eastern Europe. As former U.S. ambassador to Moscow Jack Matlock points out, Russian public opinion shifted from being strongly favorable toward the United States to being strongly hostile during the 1990s because of such actions.
Clinton’s successor, George W. Bush, endorsed subsequent phases of NATO expansion, ultimately bringing the rest of the former Warsaw Pact countries into a U.S.-led, blatantly anti-Russia military alliance. There were other, more mundane military measures that also antagonized Moscow. Gates specifically stated that “U.S. agreements with the Romanian and Bulgarian governments to rotate troops through bases in those countries” constituted a “needless provocation.” Indeed, the “rotations” soon were so continuous as to constitute de facto permanent U.S. garrisons in those two countries—something that U.S. officials had repeatedly assured Moscow informally was not Washington’s intention.
Not content with the level of provocation that the multiple rounds of NATO expansion had caused by incorporating former Warsaw Pact members and establishing an ongoing U.S. military presence in those new Eastern European members, Bush then proposed to offer Georgia and Ukraine membership in NATO. By that time, though, Moscow’s objections to U.S. policy were becoming loud and emphatic. Even some longtime key U.S. allies, most notably France and Germany, balked at adding corrupt and politically volatile Georgia to NATO. They also argued that it was at the very least premature to suggest bringing Ukraine into the fold. Indeed, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s February 2007 address to the Munich Security Conference should have made it quite clear that the Kremlin would not tolerate NATO membership for either Georgia or Ukraine.
Moscow then exploited a clumsy bid in August 2008 by Washington’s Georgian client regime to suppress the de facto independence of two secessionist entities: South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia responded to Georgia’s ill-advised military offensive by sending Russian troops pouring into that country. The Kremlin’s action was a milestone confirming that Moscow would no longer passively accept further NATO expansion. Putin’s use of force in Georgia should have made it clear to all concerned that his warnings were not a bluff.
Instead, the United States and its NATO allies continued to ignore or dismiss such indicators. Recklessly, they next proceeded to assist anti-Russia factions in Ukraine to overthrow the elected, pro-Russia government in Kiev and install an obedient pro-NATO replacement. Russia responded by seizing the strategically crucial Crimea peninsula from Ukraine and supporting separatist Russian speaking populations in Ukraine’s Donbas region. Moscow also sent a modest contingent of its own troops into the Donbas to back the secessionist factions. The Western powers embraced an escalatory strategy of their own, both by imposing severe economic sanctions on Russia and by supporting Kiev’s increasingly brutal crackdown on the Donbas rebels.
Russian–Western relations gradually but inexorably deteriorated thereafter and then utterly plunged in February 2022 when Russia expanded its invasion of Ukraine, while NATO members began to give huge quantities of military hardware and economic aid to Kiev. The confrontation between Russia and NATO took the form of a proxy war with disturbing potential for escalation into a direct conflict, making the second cold war even more dangerous and volatile than the original.
Examining the early stages of the West’s post-Cold War confrontation with Russia underscores how easily it could have been—and should have been—avoided. Policymakers in the Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama administrations deserve history’s harshest judgement for sheer ineptitude in the arena of foreign affairs. [Not sure why the Biden administration was not included in this list for dismissing Russia’s last ditch attempt at avoiding war by requesting negotiation with Washington and NATO on Russia’s legitimate security concerns in December of 2021. – Natylie]
Many Western economists and pundits have concluded that the future prospects for the Russian economy are grim. Unimpressed by Russia’s resilience in the face of “bone crushing sanctions”, impending economic collapse is seen as a way to strengthen the Ukrainian hand at the negotiating table. To some, it is a strategic victory that will lead to regime change and, if all their dreams come true, the breakup of the Russian Federation.
Pers Hogan used an apt anecdote to frame his negative forecast. Clinton asks Yeltsin to describe the Russian economy in one word and he responds “Good/Khorosho”. When asked to expand on that, Yeltsin says “Not good/Ne Khorosho”.
The “not good” is foreboding. It includes lackluster GDP growth (but still in the plus column), daunting interest rates (even with recent tweaks downward), inflation (even with slight improvements), and disastrous demographics (despite massive incentives to have babies). Then, the doomsday recipe of economic isolation, military support at the expense of social, and limited economic diversification.
3 of 4 cars Chinese in this courtyard
The “good”, not much, but drafting off of the “not good” catastrophic worker shortage, there has been a dramatic increase in salaries. This is true even in poorer regions like the Altai Republic that went from $405 in March 2022 to $831 in July 2025.
To bolster an argument for a more nuanced vision of Russia’s future, it is helpful to apply a “yes, but” addendum. This is justified by the Russian character that is rooted in patience and a predilection to perezhit (live through it). Closing in on four emotionally hard and costly years of the SMO, the key “yes, but” is that for the first time in post-Soviet Russia real money is going to the regions (home to 91% of the population). This includes private investment (the money the West rejected) and Federal government support.
Manzherok Skate Park
Some Federal support is related to National Projects that predate the SMO. However, there is an increased emphasis on accountability and results. In July, Prime Minister Mishustin announced that President Putin was expanding the Altai Republic’s Federal social-economic development plan until 2030 providing over $12 million annually for schools, medical facilities etc.
Incentives for people to enlist are so impressive that in depressed regions like Altai they are economic development drivers. Signing bonuses are 1,460,000 r. (almost 2 years of the new, improved local avg. monthly salary). Those in the battle zone receive a minimum of 210,000 r a month (over 3 times the avg. salary). In addition, their children receive free and guaranteed places in kindergarten, free school lunch, university tuition, and no credit or tax payments while serving. Plots of land are waiting for those who return and need them.
The following is an example of other economic activity and its impact on Manzherok, a Village in the Altai Republic. Located in Southern Siberia bordering Mongolia and China, the Republic is home to 200,000 people, 1/3 of them are Altai. Famous for its natural beauty, it has been referred to as the Switzerland of Russia and some believe it is a gateway to the Buddist/Hindu spiritual kingdom Shambhala. (Full disclosure, I live in Manzherok)
Sunset fishing on the Katun River
This case requires an asterisk because Manzherok, pop. 2,000, is the epicenter for the development of domestic tourism in Russia. The foundation for this began over a decade ago when Sberbank (the largest bank in Russia) took over a failing ski resort project. German Gref, Sber CEO, described his epiphany, “The Manzherok project is a poor asset we inherited and we tried to sell for eight years. We couldn’t.. We could create a new growth point in our country…and create a highly competitive resort, making it the best resort in the world.”
More attractions….More Impressions Manzherok Resort
At a Sber investors conference Gref expressed his plan to repatriate $10 Billion that Russians spend at ski resorts abroad, “While Europe is closed, we will name Courchevel Manzherok and everyone will come to us”. Thus, a massive public private partnership was formed with the Russian Government.
Sber Resort at night
Limited diversification
Domestic tourism is not much of a thing in Russia. The Russian summer vacation tradition is the dacha, visiting relatives, or staying home. According to the Levada Center in 2018 only 12% of respondents visited a Russian destination as a tourist, in 2024 it was 19%. Better, but money and lack of infrastructure, beyond Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Sochi, continue to be constraints.
Hikers on their way to Sofyski Glacier
Despite terrible roads and no hotels, the Altai Republic was a summer destination for neighboring Siberian regions. The season was short from the middle of June to the end of July. It attracted nature lovers who were fine sleeping in tents so they could raft down the Katun River, climb the Belukha Mountain and take long hikes to pristine glaciers, waterfalls, and lakes for cold water plunges. University students never forgot their days exploring the Ukok Plateau and other ancient wonders marking home to some of the Earths first people.
Archeologists lifting the legendary Princess of Ukok, a 5th Century BC Mummy
Manzherok’s celebrity pre-dated Sberbank marketing. Surrounded by mountains and overlooking the Katun River rapids, it is home to the only warm water lake in the Republic. it was immortalized in two films by director/ writer Vasily Shukshin and by pop star Edita Piekha’s 1966 hit “Friendship is Manzherok” honoring the 1966 Soviet-Mongol Friendship Festival that took place there.
At the dawn of the 21st century, only abandoned buildings remained of the furniture factory that once supported most of the villagers. There was no indoor plumbing. Andrei, a young man in his early 20’s who lived with his mother in a beautiful spot on the river bank, was the first to invite tourists to stay in a primitive shed in 2000. The other villagers were shocked and against, one sued but Andrei fought back and won.
Abandoned Manzherok Furniture Factory. It is now a Sber Resort Headquarters
Today, the majority of villagers have some form of housing on their property to generate income. Others provide banya or driving services, sell fresh produce from their gardens or souvenirs. Some work at the Sber Resort or in an ever expanding number of stores and restaurants. A small but growing group have opened stores or restaurants.
In addition to 5 and 3 star hotels, the Sber “Manzherok” Resort now has 13 chalets. Each one was designed to reflect the art and culture of a neighboring Central Asian country. During peak season the chalets are listed for up to $5,700 a night. There are currently six ski lifts, 50 km of trails, night skiing, and a panorama restaurant on top of the mountain.
Manzherok Resort Phase Two
Gref recently described his vision forward, “It will be the largest ski resort in Russia with 250 km of trails. There are 870 snow-making guns, 100% of the trails are covered with snow. The ski season will be 151 days with 2.5 million cubic meters of snow = 1.5-2 m of snow on each trail. That means in April girls can ski in bikinis.” Sber has already spent $1.5 Billion and Gref expects they will at least double that number to realize their future plans that include an amusement park (Siberian Disneyland).
The government is an essential partner in this process. Prime Minister Mishustin has been the point man for two major projects. Sber is primary financer for the small airport to expand into an international airport capable of accommodating 1.2 million passengers (it was built to accommodate 100,000 and is currently handling 400,000). The government will fund 20 km of four lane highway leading to and through the Village to the Resort. Both of these projects are scheduled for completion by 2028.
Camp Coffee Manzherok’s first coffee shop started by 2 women from Moscow
Economic Isolation
July, peak tourist season and the month critical to many of the new small business owners, messages started to appear in the Village chat. The Resort was closing for a week and the only road in and out was closing for two days from the North and one day to the South. A day later came an announcement that the Internet may break down so you better get cash in case you need to buy something. Subsequent messages scolded everyone to clean up their yards and take pride in our fine Village. Hunker down and explain all this to the tourists staying in your guest house or mini hotel. Government at all levels was buzzing, excited, and honored and expected residents to feel the same.
Residents and tourists dunk in the Katun River
The Resort was hosting the International Ecology Forum, the first such event in Russia. Why Manzherok? Sber’s Deputy Chairman of the Board explained that respecting the environment was a key aspect of their development plan. It was also clear from his explanation, “It’s here that you can experience pristine nature, which has a unique energy and allows you to recharge your batteries”, that inviting five Prime Ministers and two high ranking officials from Central Asian countries, Byelorussia, and Armenia was a great marketing strategy. Mishustin served as Russian host.
Several days before the event an army of security personnel descended on the Village and were posted on every dusty road. One day a sidewalk was closed until a bomb squad could check out an abandoned blue plastic bag that turned out to be garbage.
The highway through downtown Manzherok
The dignitary’s airport arrivals were live-streamed. They traveled along the empty highway in black limousines through the middle of the Village and up the hill to the Resort. Beyond the devasting reports presented, important discussions and cooperation agreements were made targeting specific issues such as animal, water, and tree preservation. One example, Kazakhstan will help restore Manzherok Lake.
The importance of what they were talking about up on the mountain made it possible to appreciate the helicopter circling the Village throughout the night and forget the inherent contradiction of a ski resort location for an environmental conference. A rare evening of hope for the environment and a reminder that Altai has some street cred fighting to defend it.
A helicopter circling during the Forum
It was in Altai that the perestroika environmental movement was born when locals stood in front of the tractors to stop the Soviet government from building the Katun Hydroelectric Dam. More recently, the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, that was announced at the September Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting, was originally supposed to transit through the sacred Altai Ukok Plateau, a UNESCO heritage site. It was rerouted in response to local and international protests.
Villagers
No one in the Village is against development but they expected to be the caretakers of their land. Tension between local people and a big corporation moving in are to be expected. In this situation the problem was exacerbated when Gref gave an interview and said “Today, everything related to Manzherok zone is under our control.” And worse, he referred to people’s homes as “Shanghai” (the old scruffy, poverty ridden Shanghai) and “kibitki” (gypsy tents).
Villagers are replacing their ancestral homes (2 “kibitki”)
A former Sber manager became Mayor and spent most of his time trying to push local deputies to support Sber’s wish list for the Village General Plan for development. The pot kept getting sweetened with gifts like a garbage truck, playgrounds, school bus, skate park etc. Everybody drove a hard bargain but in the end Sber got a lot of land but the Villagers got what they needed which was to save the last local wild place and outlawing 5 story buildings.
Villagers are replacing their ancestral homes (2 “kibitki”)
Another card was played at the Federal Level establishing zones equivalent to eminent domain (complex territorial development-KRT) in the US. But, so far, they appear to know where the lines are. Both KRT and the four lane highway construction have been designed to avoid all houses. Beyond a few million dollar buyouts on the mountain everyone has been assured their property rights will be respected. No one feels assured and even if the homes are safe, it is clear that beyond a few horses, cows, and goats that continue to roam the riverbank, the Village of Manzherok, as it was long loved, is gone.
A neighbor and her goat
The Governor has made creating a welcoming business and investment climate the number one priority. This is shared by some of the people moving in. It is called progress. A non-resident who is in charge of land issues explained, “There is going to be development, there are going to be tall buildings, tile, cement, lights that’s development, you can’t stop it. You are going to have to get used to noise, and lights, and tons of people.” Change is hard and the bar keeps getting raised. The Ministry of Finance RF is pitching the idea of making the Republic a gambling zone. The Governor thinks it is a good idea, “I understand all the concerns of our residents. But the days when the gambling business was synonymous with crime…are long gone. Now it’s a civilized part of the entertainment industry generating significant budget revenue.”
Conclusion
How quickly and smoothly Russia can reorient its economy and how desperate the West is to hinder this process are the key questions. The transition for the automobile market has been stunningly fast with China going from 2% of the market in 2019 to 60% in 2024.
A Villagers first time on skates at the Sber Resort
Developing domestic tourism is a long term process. There is currently an import substitution project for ski resort equipment since the first generation of the Resort’s ski lifts came from Europe. Not only does it require building massive amounts of infrastructure that has been catastrophically ignored in the regions, but you must change habits and inspire people to vacation beyond the dacha. Another challenge for the Manzherok ski resort is that 300 km away there is Sheregesh that has legendary snow, a hip vibe, has had girls skiing in bikinis for years, and they are also building an airport.
The view from the Sber Hotel Restaurant
Still, early indicators are promising. In the first 8 months of 2025 domestic tourism was up 5% in Russia. In Manzherok, growth with a 55% increase in winter visitors to the Resort (327,000). For the Republic overall, also good news. In the first 6 months of 2023 income from accommodations was $22,825,000 and in 2025 it was $56,087,500. This is only what is officially reported. You hear complaints from hosts that they have fewer people this year but competition is fierce with dozens of new guests houses, motels, and hotels springing up.
The Governor is pleased, in the first eight months the tourist business generated 1.5 billion rubles in taxes, two times greater than last year. The Republic’s budget revenue increased by 2.2 billion rubles in September. Still, the whole thing is a huge bet with a lot of moving parts beyond sanctions. How much marketing do you need to do to get Moscovites and foreigners excited about spending their holiday in Siberia?
No one expects the sanctions to end when the shooting does. No one expects the world to go back to where it was in that millisecond shared post-Soviet euphoria when a peace dividend was assumed. Living through it is no longer enough, the people in Manzherok and beyond want to thrive and they have enough skin in the game to want to be part of the development process. No one is sacrificing for the status quo.
A guest essay from friend-of-Racket and former “Moscow Times” editor Matt Bivens, who writes at The 100 Days.
A big noise was heard in the dark forest, and a roar echoed. All the animals ran to the boyar, the Bear. Large animals came. Small ones came. Captain wolf came, showing his sharp wicked teeth, and greedy eyes.
Then came the beaver, that visiting merchant. He, the beaver with the fat tail. The noble weasel arrived. Little princess-squirrel arrived. Came the church clerk-fox, that treasurer. Then the filthy peasant-rabbit, poor rabbit, grey rabbit. The hedgehog-tax collector came, all huddled up, how he bristles …
All to the bear then bowed, and the bear told his story, crying: Judge how I have been wronged! I had an old shoe, of woven basket, torn, for many years it lay unused. Gray geese flew over it one day, they took it and tore it to shreds, then scattered the pieces in the open field.
How am I to endure this bitter wrong? Who will comfort my brave heart? Aren’t we going to declare a war on birds?
And they went to war, and went to war, and bravely led the army. That’s fighting there in the distance!
— from Rimsky-Korsakov’s Opera “The Tsar of Saltan”, playing this fall in St. Petersburg’s Mariinsky Theater
MOSCOW — The U.S. State Department said not to come here. They have a Level 4 warning against Russia travel, which is the fastest they can hyperventilate.
The warning cites free-floating peril associated with the war in not-so-distant Ukraine, “the risk of harassment or wrongful detention,” and the American government’s “limited ability to help” if you get in trouble. It concludes in bold-face:
Do not travel to Russia for any reason.
Seventeen grim-sounding bullet points follow. If you do go to Russia, State says, you should, among other things:
Prepare a will …
Discuss a plan with loved ones regarding care and custody of children, pets … funeral wishes, etc.
Leave DNA samples with your medical provider …
Make funeral arrangements!
I seriously doubt a primary care doctor would know what to do with my “pre-travel DNA samples.”
State Department’s travel advisory scale.
‘Do not travel to Russia for any reason.’
But Americans are traveling here every day. There are no direct flights anymore, and international sanctions have closed European and American airspace to Russian airlines. But Turkish Air among others has stepped up eagerly, and Istanbul Airport is humming with activity.
We had many reasons to travel to Russia. We needed to reconnect with friends and loved ones, and tend to various family matters. My older daughter wanted her fiancé to meet her Ukrainian-Russian grandparents, and to see the places she remembered fondly from her kindergarten days, when I worked in Russia as a journalist (before I came to my senses and went to medical school).
As a card-carrying member of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, I also wanted to meet with like-minded international physicians, to discuss, yes — nuclear war, the prevention of. And I wanted to take Russia’s temperature. It’s a place I know well but hadn’t visited for some years.
There were downsides to such a trip. One was leaving coastal Massachusetts at my favorite time of year. (Sailboat season!) Another was anxiety among family and friends, who have a media-nurtured fear of all things Russian. When I telephoned my father about our planned trip, I could hear my mother in the background call out, “Don’t get captured!”
Don’t get captured? Did we need to worry about that?
Amnesty International does say more than 20,000 ordinary Russians have been arrested and fined, and many dozens at least have received long prison terms for voicing anti-war criticism. We were just tourists visiting family, not anti-government activists. But there are no guarantees: Two years ago, a young woman from Los Angeles — a ballerina from Siberia, with American-Russian dual citizenship (just like my wife and daughters) — went for a visit home to Russia, and at passport control was interrogated about her views. Her phone was searched, and she was charged with treason (!) over a Venmo donation of $51.80 to a New York-based charity raising money for Ukraine. She was convicted, and sentenced to 12 (!) years. (She was released in April as part of a prisoner swap.)
Then there were the drone attacks. All summer, there were multiple Ukrainian-sponsored drone attacks on St. Petersburg’s Pulkovo Airport — the same airport we’d fly in and out of. One day after I left in September, Pulkovo was shut down for a full day by another large drone attack. My wife followed a few weeks later — the same day Russia shot down 46 drones headed for Moscow alone.
The only difference between these drones and terrorist car bombs are that the drones fly, and are apparently guided to target by sleeper agents of Operation Goldfish, who were trained by the CIA and spread throughout Russia.
(As an aside: imagine if American airports, residential buildings and other infrastructure were attacked by flying car bombs, month after month — even as, say, Iran bragged publicly about having secret “Operation Goldfish” sleeper agents spread through our country to guide the bombs to their targets. Would our government also start locking people up over $51 Venmo donations to the wrong people?)
This was all context for our planned trip, and it gave us pause. But by late summer, the geopolitics, which had been awful for years, looked cautiously promising. Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump had just met cordially in Alaska. It seemed a window for safe and hassle-free travel.
Since we were introducing the fiancé to Russia — and also don’t know what the future holds — we decided to treat ourselves to the full tourist experience. We would attend the Rimsky-Korsakoff Opera mentioned above, a meandering collection of Alexander Pushkin’s fairytales that revolves around the imaginary city of Tmutarakan. We’d go mushroom hunting in the woods outside of St. Petersburg, indulge in a full-day Russian banya (steam sauna) complete with the traditional massage-by-whackings-with-oak branches, ride the elegant overnight sleeping car train to Moscow, explore the Tretyakov and Hermitage museums, and have feast after feast — in fancy Russian restaurants, in Georgian restaurants, and best of all at home with the in-laws, where everyone oohed and aahed and took photos of the home-cooked Ukrainian fare, from borshch to blini.
Shashlyk (a.k.a. shish kebob) and Georgian wine at my in-laws’ dacha (country house). Photo by Matt Bivens.
Spoiler alert, it was a wonderful trip, and no one was “captured.” I won’t bore you with most of it. Instead, I hope to reacquaint you with ordinary Russian people at this moment in time. As I pondered this idea, I remembered a 1949 classic by the novelist John Steinbeck, “A Russian Journal.” I occasionally thought of this slim book as we took our Red Square selfies, or struggled to talk politics over dinners with friends. Then, on the last day of our trip, with a pleasant jolt of recognition, I saw my own long-lost copy on my father-in-law’s bookshelf.
I took it down, and read Steinbeck’s opening account of how he and his photographer colleague Robert Capa conceived their collaboration in the late 1940s, while sitting in a New York hotel bar drinking absinthe-and-crème de menthe cocktails, and complaining about the sad state of international affairs:
Willy, the bartender, who is always sympathetic, suggested a Suissesse, a drink which Willy makes better than anybody else in the world. We were depressed, not so much by the news but by the handling of it. …
Willy set the two pale green Suissesses in front of us and we began to discuss what there was left in the world that an honest and liberal man could do. In the papers every day there were thousands of words about Russia … by people who had not been there, and whose sources were not above reproach. And it occurred to us that there were some things that nobody wrote about Russia, and they were the things that interested us most of all. What do the people wear there? What do they serve at dinner? Do they have parties? What food is there? How do they make love, and how do they die? What do they talk about?
Good questions then and today.
For anyone skeptical about a non-hostile examination of Russia amidst the carnage of Ukraine: Steinbeck the author, Willy the bartender, and many others were open to such an inquiry in 1949 — when the Soviet Union was ruled by Josef Stalin (!), had just taken over Czechoslovakia in a surprise coup, had blockaded West Berlin, and had detonated its first atomic bomb; while the Chinese Communist Party had just driven the nationalists out to Taiwan, and Senator Joseph McCarthy’s Red Scare and the U.S. war in Korea were just a year away.
For anyone still indignant, and angrily aware that far more than 1 million young men on all sides have been killed or maimed in a war Russia alone chose to launch; or, for that matter, that Russia’s recent drone attacks on the Ukrainian power grid have imposed nationwide blackouts; I can only say that I deplore the suffering everywhere — we have family on all sides of the conflict — and the war could end tomorrow if Lockheed Martin and RTX (Raytheon) America stopped fueling it and negotiated a NATO-free Ukrainian future.
Poland’s prime minister Donald Tusk just couldn’t resist an opportunity to bait the Germans and rub it in just how humiliated they are now. And not once but twice: First, when one of the Ukrainians suspected of executing the September 2022 terrorist attack on the Nord Stream pipelines – the “world’s largest offshore pipeline system” and as vital a piece of German infrastructure as has ever been built – was recently arrested in Poland, Tusk could have simply kept quiet.
But where would have been the fun of that? Instead, the Polish prime minister made a point of holding an aggressive press conference and also using X to tell Berlin to, in essence, go and jump in the Baltic.
Tusk declared that extraditing the Ukrainian state terror suspect is not in Poland’s national “interest,” and that, anyhow, the real scandal about Nord Stream is not that it was blown up but that it was built. In other words: Dear Germans, we do not give a damn about your property, rights, or judicial procedures; on the contrary we expect you to feel ashamed for ever having dared construct a perfectly legal and useful pipeline that we in Warsaw didn’t like. And dare not notice, by the way, that we had a direct commercial interest in the Baltic Pipe competition that – oh coincidence! – went online just when Nord Stream exploded.
Then, a few days later, the Polish leader felt the need to add insult to insult: After a Polish court had obediently – and illegally (so much for that famous rule of law in EU-Nato-land) – denied the German extradition request, Tusk just had to gloat, letting his X followers know that “the case is closed.” Obviously, Tusk is a raving nationalist – under that cheap, career-facilitating EU varnish – and he also has an interest in impressing the Polish public with his tough talk. Yet the real issue is, of course, that he – rightly – perceives no cost to this behavior: Berlin will take it.
And that despite the fact that what wasn’t said but implied, at least for anyone not yet fully zombified by the West’s mainstream “cognitive warfare,” was, of course, even worse: Poland won’t extradite a suspected Ukrainian terrorist because that terrorist did what Warsaw considered the right and profitable thing to do and, thus, helped his group of seven do.
Then, a few days later, the head of Poland’s spooks Slawomir Cenckiewicz felt the itch to make things even clearer: He told the Financial Times that from the Polish point of view going after the Nord Stream bombers “doesn’t make sense, not only in terms of the interests of Poland but also the whole [Nato] alliance.” Oops. Slawomir, we get it: as a likely accomplice you are personally affected in this case. But are you really sure you had permission to not only basically admit Poland was in on the terror job against the German “allies” but other NATO members, too?
But let’s be fair and acknowledge Warsaw’s discomfort. Indeed, as the Ukrainian criminals who blew up a vital part of Germany’s infrastructure were very likely also working for and with Poland, handing one of them over to the German victims of the worst eco-terror attack in European history would be a trifle harsh and ungrateful as well as really inconvenient, too: What if the rudely discarded deep-sea tool from Ukraine were to start spilling the beans – or, perhaps, pirogi – once he faces German interrogators? Plea deal anyone?
Tusk and Cenckiewicz’s weird, panicky announcements, let’s be precise, are not only so needlessly offensive toward the Germans – EU fellow members and NATO allies, no less – that they could have been produced by the infamous Kiev School of anti-diplomacy itself. The Polish prime minister and his master spook also displayed a truly brutish legal nihilism, because, under the pertinent European Union agreement, Poland does not, actually, even have a formal right to refuse an extradition by citing national “interest” (or NATO interest – whatever that is supposed to be – for that matter).
Maybe it should have, the sovereignists among us might say, but that’s not how the EU rolls and that is not what the agreement says that Poland has an obligation to follow. According to the 2002 “Council Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures between Member States,” refusing an extradition request is only permitted “when there are reasons to believe […] that the said arrest warrant has been issued for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on the grounds of his or her sex, race, religion, ethnic origin, nationality, language, political opinions or sexual orientation, or that that person’s position may be prejudiced for any of these reasons.” In short, it’s all about the rights of the suspect, which Germany is certainly not threatening here. And there is not a word about national interest.
It may seem ironic that Tusk also once served as President of the European Council and is, in general, an EU creature through and through. But then again, trampling on EU laws – and others, too – is, of course, the true hallmark of the “elite” Eurocrat. It’s called the Von der Leyen Stay-Out-of-Jail Privilege.
Meanwhile, a high Italian court has also refused to extradite yet another suspected Ukrainian terror Nord Stream suspect. Italy, too, is a humble NATO foot soldier and obedient US vassal, of course. And Ukrainian officials and media are preparing a fresh defense line to fall back on when the Baltic sludge will really hit the fan: After years of brazenly, shamelessly lying in our faces Kiev-style and pretending they had nothing to do with the terror attack, they are currently explaining that it wasn’t a crime at all but a “legitimate” act of war. Oh, really now? Even by that very belated, inconsistent, and embarrassingly transparent “logic,” war against whom, if we Germans may ask: Your constant bankroller and NATO member Germany?
And what has Berlin had to say? Very little, as in, really, nothing. Oddly enough, the German establishment – the same that claims to want to play a “leadership role” in Europe, again – left it to the Foreign Minister of Hungary to articulate a common-sense response. Taking to X, Peter Szijjarto confronted Tusk him with the absurdity and recklessness of his own words: “According to” Donald Tusk, “blowing up a gas pipeline is acceptable. That’s shocking as it makes you wonder what else could be blown up and still be considered forgivable or even praiseworthy. One thing is clear: we don’t want a Europe where prime ministers defend terrorists.” The Hungarians, of course, know a thing or two about both sensitive pipelines and Ukrainian subterfuge and lawlessness among “allies.” But, unlike Berlin, Budapest won’t take it all lying down.
What are Germans to think about their own government that can’t find such words? Just words! Not even to speak about the sanctions that the Polish government actually deserves. The more so as Tusk publicly slapping Berlin in the face is not an exception but merely yet another instance of long-standing Polish policy. For those who have forgotten, after the Nord Stream terror attack, we were first told by our Western establishment politicians, “experts,” and media that Russia was to blame. That that idea made no sense at all didn’t matter. Sort of as with the current Great Drone Scare.
Then, finally, that big, fat, and very, offensively obvious lie was replaced by a smaller, slightly less idiotic one: Ukraine did it, and Ukraine alone. That Ukraine did it is probably still true, although recent revelations in Denmark have put the US front and center again. But, in any case, Ukraine alone? Definite, industrial-strength, offensively obvious BS.
And that’s what brings us back to Poland (and not only, of course). By the summer of last year, Polish attempts to obstruct the German investigation of the Nord Stream attacks became so obvious that even the Western mainstream press noticed. The Wall Street Journal reported that the “Nord Stream revelations” were igniting disputes between Berlin and Warsaw.
After all, not only were German prosecutors finally homing in on the obvious – though not the sole – perpetrators from Ukraine, they also had to face the fact that the terrorists had used Poland “as a logistical base.” And some German officials were still patriotic enough to dare think and even say – though under cover of anonymity – the obvious: Poland was deliberately stalling their investigation, first, for instance, by absurdly claiming that the Ukrainian terrorists had been mere innocent tourists, then by refusing to hand over evidence and letting – more realistically, helping – a suspect escape (the same one they are now not extraditing, as it happens).
Polish officials, meanwhile, openly told their German counterparts that, in their view, those who had detonated Nord Stream deserved not prosecution but medals. Then as well, Tusk, too, had nothing better to do than add insult to injury, as German investigators put it, publicly ordering the Germans to “apologize” – for the temerity of building pipelines, obviously – and “keep quiet.”
Here’s the Polish deal the Germans got: I, Warsaw, help the Ukrainians, who also fleece your taxpayers, blow up your pipelines and promote your deindustrialization, and you, Berlin, in return, shut up and apologize to me. As a bonus I regularly slap you in the face in public. Fair? And, insane as it is, up until now, the German answer has been: “Jawohl! And can I have some more, please?”
Berlin emerges in this story as a deliberately helpless victim of both a massive terror attack by Ukraine – an ultra-corrupt state it is still insisting on shoveling cash into and for which it risking a (direct) war with Russia – and its so-called “allies,” including probably not only Poland but also the US and perhaps Britain and Norway as well.
We often hear that the US and its vassals provoked the Ukraine War to inflict a crippling defeat on Russia and turn it into a helpless object of American geopolitics. That is all true. The irony is that Germany is the country they actually ended up crippling the most. And with Germany’s consent, from Olaf Scholz’s hapless grin to Friedrich Merz’s thunderous silence.
For the US, devastating Germany is, of course, plan B: Plan A, defeating Russia, has not worked, but as one dogma of US strategy in Eurasia is to never allow deep cooperation between Berlin and Moscow, taking down Germany will also do for Washington. Poor Germany: “Friends” like these, and yet, its “leaders” can’t stop looking for enemies in Moscow.
