YouTube link here.

USAID Funded Censorship, Smears of Americans (Excerpt)

By Lee Fang, Substack, 2/4/25

…The sprawling agency [USAID] has financed groups that have engaged in smear campaigns and efforts to silence prominent American dissident voices…

But most troubling, the foreign assistance agency has financed a network of groups in Ukraine that have spread unsubstantiated claims that American voices in favor of peace negotiations with Russia are agents of the Kremlin.

American government entities face restrictions on spreading such propaganda against domestic targets. The foreign nexus of USAID provides a convenient loophole. American grants and contracts flow, often through third-party intermediaries, to a network of foreign recipients, which can push to silence American journalists and politicians through outside advocacy.

In Ukraine, USAID, through its contractor Internews, supports a network of social media-focused news outlets, including New Voice of Ukraine, VoxUkraine, Detector Media, and the Institute of Mass Information. These news outlets have produced a series of videos and reports targeting economist Jeffrey Sachs, commentator Tucker Carlson, journalist Glenn Greenwald, and Professor John Mearsheimer as figures within a controlled “network of Russian propaganda.”

The influence of these outlets extends far beyond the borders of Ukraine. VoxUkraine, for instance, is an official fact-checking partner to Meta and helps the social media giant censor so-called disinformation. Detector Media similarly produces English-language disinformation reports widely circulated through western media.

Despite branding as independent outlets, these organizations are heavily reliant on USAID…

Full article available here. (I have a paid subscription to Lee Fang’s Substack, so I think this full article may be behind a pay wall for non-subscribers. You can read his in-depth article from April of 2024 on this topic for free at Real Clear Investigations. – Natylie)

The above video episode was posted on 1/23/25

“Russian News, voiced into English. Here you will see Russian political news, statements and speeches of the President of Russia, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, the Minister of Defense of Russia, the representative of Russia in the UN Security Council, as well as political news and analytical programs recorded directly from Russian television.”

https://www.youtube.com/@Russian_News_Ch/videos

By Andrew Korybko, Asia Times, 2/4/25

Trump’s confirmed interest in Ukraine’s critical and rare earth minerals is being interpreted by some as beneficial for President Volodymyr Zelensky amid uncertainty about the new US president’s commitment to Ukraine. One of the points from Zelensky’s so-called “Victory Plan” calls for letting his country’s allies to extract its minerals.

New Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently warned about the strategic advantage that China derives from its control over the world’s rare earth mineral supply chain so he might have influenced Trump’s views on the issue in relation to Ukraine.

US Senator Lindsey Graham raised awareness of Ukraine’s rare earth riches during his trip there last June, after which he claimed that Ukraine was sitting on US$10-12 trillion worth of such wealth.

Trump 2.0’s foreign policy focus on more muscularly containing China in all ways predictably predisposed him to appreciate the abovementioned point from Zelensky’s “Victory Plan.”

The problem, though, is that the bulk of Ukraine’s critical mineral wealth is under Russian control while Ukrainian forces continue to retreat.

At the same time, US Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia Keith Kellogg’s suggestion that Ukraine needs to hold long-delayed elections was seen as reflecting Trump’s interest in brokering a ceasefire, after which martial law can be lifted, the elections could be held, and a new Ukrainian government can then begin peace talks.

This expectation contrasts with what Trump said a few days later about his interest in Ukraine’s (largely Russian-controlled) rare earth mineral deposits and the attendant possibility for proxy escalation of the war.

Instead of abandoning his efforts to freeze the Ukrainian conflict by doubling down on military aid in the hope that Zelensky’s forces can then recapture these deposits from Russian control, which could perpetuate the proxy war and thus derail his foreign policy agenda, Trump might instead try to cut a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

One of the conditions that Trump could make for coercing Ukraine into withdrawing from at least some of the territory that Russia claims as its own might be for Putin to sell some of these rare earth and other critical minerals to the US.

Putin might agree to this depending on how far Trump is able to coerce Ukraine into withdrawing. There’s also a pragmatic argument in favor of this arrangement in that it could form a trust-building measure for the US one day, allowing the EU to partially resume some Russian gas pipeline imports.

The purpose would be to restore a degree of Russia and the EU’s pre-conflict economic interdependence, albeit this time under US supervision, as a reward for Russia complying with a ceasefire.

Russia requires capital and technology to fully exploit the rare earth deposits that are now under its control, both of which could be provided by the US, with the first possibly involving the return of some seized Russian assets so long as they are invested in this endeavor.

If successfully implemented, then this proposal could lead to more creative diplomacy of the sort suggested at the end of this analysis here for depriving China of Russia’s enormous resource wealth, which aligns with Trump’s foreign policy goals.

Ukraine wouldn’t be left completely in the lurch, however, since other smaller rare earth mineral deposits still remain under its control. These could be given to the US in exchange for continued military aid, even if the latter is curtailed compared to its height under the Biden administration in the run-up to summer 2023’s ultimately doomed counteroffensive.

If Trump reached an agreement with Putin on the Russian-controlled deposits, then Zelensky would have little choice but to agree to this deal.

Far from the full military support that he expected to receive in pursuit of recapturing those lost deposits, Zelensky would only end up with whatever the cost-conscious Trump administration determines is the absolute minimum that the US considers that Ukraine requires for keeping the peace.

This is the best outcome for those on all sides who truly want peace, but it will require substantial political will from both the US and Russia, along with the US coercing Ukraine into agreeing – none of which at this juncture can be guaranteed.

YouTube link here.

By Ted Snider, Antiwar.com, 2/3/25

A leaked document has given us a first glimpse at Trump’s peace plan for Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian online newspaper Strana, U.S. officials handed the plan to European diplomats who then passed it on to Ukraine.

The existence of the plan has not been verified, and Andriy Yermak, head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, has said “no ‘100-day peace plan’ as reported by the media exists in reality.”

If the plan is real, if it is being put on the table by the Trump administration as a finished product that, if rejected, will lead to more sanctions on Russia and more weapons for Ukraine, as Trump has threatened, then the war will go on, and Trump’s promise to quickly end the war will vanish in a puff of delusion. But if the plan is put on the table as a starting point for negotiations, then there is hope. And there is suggestion that it is a starting point.

Here is an item by item analysis of what each side may consider acceptable in the plan and what each side may insist on negotiating further.

The process begins with an immediate phone call between Trump and Putin followed by discussions between Washington and Kiev. That the plan may be intended as a starting point for negotiations is suggested by the fork in the schedule that negotiations will continue if common ground is found or pause if it is not. Further negotiations would lead to an Easter truce along the front line, an end of April peace conference, and a May 9 declaration of an agreement.

Russia has said that the Istanbul agreement could still be “the basis for starting negotiations.” In June, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin set out a peace proposal based on the Istanbul agreement, but adjusted for current territorial realities. Putin’s proposal had four points. Ukraine must abandon plans to join NATO, they must withdraw from the four annexed territories, they must agree to limits on the size of their armed forces, and they must ensure the rights of ethnic Russians in Ukraine.

The alleged Trump plan can be evaluated by comparison to Putin’s proposal and to recent statements made by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

1. Ukrainian troops must withdraw from Kursk at the time of the April Truce

This would be acceptable to Russia who would insist on Ukrainian troops leaving its territory.

For Ukraine, this would be a difficult concession, not because of the withdrawal but because of the timing. Aside from the strategically catastrophic hope that the Kursk invasion would divert Russian troops away from the Donbas, the point of taking Russian territory was to use it to barter for the return of Ukrainian territory. Giving up the bargaining chip before the negotiations begin would nullify Ukraine’s hope of using it to force the return of more of its land.

2. Ukraine must end martial law and hold presidential elections by the end of August and parliamentary elections by the end of October

This could be a bitter pill for Zelensky. Recent polling has shown that Zelensky could well lose that election.

Elections would be welcomed by Russia who see Zelensky’s government as intransigently hostile and anti-Russia. This would legally transfer hope for regime change to Ukrainians.

3. Ukraine must declare neutrality and promise not to join NATO. NATO must promise not to expand to Ukraine

Ukraine was willing to abandon its NATO hopes in Istanbul. Though accepted by Kiev as inevitable, it would now be a painful concession. In the absence of NATO membership, it would be a hard sell to Ukrainians that the war after the Istanbul talks was worth the devastation.

For Russia, this point is key, and there can be no negotiations without it. It would be the key accomplishment to get the two sided promise that Ukraine will not ask for membership and NATO will not offer it.

4. Ukraine will become a member of the EU by 2030

This item is acceptable to both. EU membership will be necessary for Zelensky to present to Ukrainians as something that was worth fighting for. Ukraine is now free to pursue its ambitions to turn west and join Europe.

Though Russia had concerns in 2014 with the EU’s Association Agreement with Ukraine because of its implied integration of Ukraine into the European security and military architecture, Putin has long left EU membership on the table for a postwar Ukraine, and that was specifically agreed to in the Istanbul agreement.

5. Ukraine will not reduce the size of its armed forces and the U.S. will continue modernizing the Ukrainian armed forces

While Ukraine will welcome this, it may not be enough. Russia will have a hard time with this one.

This is like “the Israeli model” that then Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett says Putin and Zelensky were both open to in the early days of the war. But, in the absence of NATO, Zelensky has been adamant about U.S. supported security guarantees. And, already by Istanbul, Russia was demanding limits on Ukraine’s armed forces. At the very least, modernized Ukrainian weaponry would have to be defensive with a cap on firing into Russian territory.

6. Ukraine refuses military and diplomatic attempts to return the occupied territories but does not officially recognize Russian sovereignty

This item goes not far enough for Russia and too far for Ukraine. Zelensky has accepted that “De facto, these territories are now controlled by the Russians. We don’t have the strength to bring them back.” So, he will accept not attempting to return the occupied territories militarily. He has also insisted that Ukraine would never officially recognize Russian sovereignty over those lands. But the added clause, that he will not attempt to return them diplomatically, may be going further than Zelensky has been willing to go. In the case of Crimea, he has reserved the right to try to bring territory back diplomatically.

For Russia, the de facto recognition of the territory it occupies will likely be enough. In his proposal, Putin insisted on the complete withdrawal from the territories while saying nothing about Ukraine officially recognizing Russian sovereignty over them. However, though Russia may be willing to negotiate over Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, they are less likely to accept only the lands east of the current front without it including all of the Donbas.

7. Some sanctions on Russia will be lifted, including EU bans on Russian oil

This item will likely be acceptable to Ukraine, especially since temporary duty on sales of oil will be used to restore Ukraine. It will likely be acceptable, at least as a starting point, for Russia.

8. Parties that support Russian language and peaceful relations with Russia can participate in Ukraine’s elections. State actions against the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and Russian language must cease

Though difficult for Zelensky and some forces in Ukraine to accept, protection of language, religious and cultural rights is the second key Russian demand along with NATO.

9. The idea of a European peacekeeping force is to be discussed separately

The recognition that security guarantees is both key and difficult for both parties is realistic. Neither side will agree to a European security force: Russia because it goes too far; Ukraine because it goes not far enough.

If this plan is a final draft whose rejection means negotiations end, then the war will not end. But if Trump’s plan is intended as a starting point to negotiations – the most difficult of which may be the security guarantees – then there is hope.

Ted Snider is a regular columnist on U.S. foreign policy and history at Antiwar.com and The Libertarian Institute. He is also a frequent contributor to Responsible Statecraft and The American Conservative as well as other outlets. To support his work or for media or virtual presentation requests, contact him at tedsnider@bell.net.