The Bell, 7/25/22

What’s going on

In June, the state-run VTsIOM pollster carried out a closed survey of Russians’ feelings about the ‘special military operation’ (as Russia officially describes its war). The survey, called ‘SMO: Problem Zones’, was discussed at a meeting within the presidential administration in late June, a Kremlin source told The Bell. The survey was also reported by Italy’s Corriere della Sera at the weekend, while Meduza uncovered the answers to one question last week.

The key findings from the survey:

• The most striking result is the equal split in answers to the question of whether it is more important for Russia to continue pursuing its military activities in Ukraine or enter peace talks. Each option attracted 44 percent of respondents, while a further 12 percent could not answer the question.
• Another question about the future of the operation went like this: “Some believe that the military operation in Ukraine must end as soon as possible. Others believe that the fighting should not stop now. Which point of view is closer to you – the first or the second?” Here, a majority supports the continuation of the war – 57 percent versus 30 percent, with the remainder unable to answer.
• The proportion of survey respondents who gave positive answers to a question about their support for the ‘special operation’ was 70 percent. This figure has remained consistently high throughout the campaign: the lowest number (65 percent in support) was reported on the day after the war began. Seventeen percent said they did not support the SMO and a further 13 percent were unable to answer.
• The 18-24 age group is least likely to support the ‘special operation’, with 37 percent ‘inclined not to support’ and 38 percent ‘inclined to support’ it. In the 25-34 group, these figures are 26 and 50 percent, respectively. Loyalty increases with age: there is 79 percent support among over-45s and 84 percent among the over-60s.
• Support for the ‘special operation’ is highest among those who describe themselves as active TV viewers (81 percent against 11). Among active internet users, support for the war drops to 45 percent (and opposition rises to 33 percent).
• It was not possible to identify trends among different wealth categories: among those who said their financial situation was ‘good’, support for the ‘special military operation’ runs at 75 percent; among those in a ‘poor’ financial situation, the figure is 61 percent.
• Another question read: “Some people believe that due to the economic and humanitarian sanctions imposed on Russia by the West, it is essential to unite around the president and support him even if you do not entirely agree with him. Others believe that even under sanctions there is no need to rally around the president and support him. What do you think?” This question has been posed twice: in late April and on June 21. This time, the figure that agreed with the need to support the president fell from 81 percent to 75. In the youngest age group, those figures were 67 and 43 percent, a drop of 24 percentage points. In the 25-34 age group, the number who saw no need to rally around the president rose from 19 to 26 percent.

Can we trust these numbers?

Since the outbreak of the war, analysts in Russia and the West have debated the extent to which we can trust sociological data from Russia given the state’s effective monopoly on polling and the current wartime conditions. This question is even more pertinent when most polls produce numbers favorable to the Kremlin. There is no clear answer: it’s obvious that a significant proportion of the answers are insincere and polling technology can be steered towards numbers that favor the authorities, but it is not clear to what extent this distorts the findings.

Sociologist Grigory Yudin urges us to remember that the presidential administration is the client for these VTsIOM polls: “The results of these surveys are regarded as a reflection of the will of the people, so VTsIOM will highlight those results that strengthen its client’s position and not show any that are disadvantageous to the customer”. At the same time, Russians themselves believe that these polls are conducted by the state and tailor their answers accordingly. “People are well-attuned to the atmosphere: direct questions about ‘support’ are seen as a requirement to show loyalty. VTsIOM is also aware of this, and therefore asks indirect questions, asking about which scenario seems more favorable to respondents right now. These questions are less pressured and give more problematic answers, so VTsIOM does not publish the results.”

One of the more striking conclusions we can draw from this poll is the generation gap. Young Russians are more minded to halt the war, and their view of the president in the light of the war and sanctions is steadily becoming less positive. A clear split between the generations has emerged on all key policy questions of recent years, Yudin adds. “Putin’s core support comes from the older generation, who have lived through various crises in their middle age.” Independent sociologist Alexander Prokopenko sees this generational split as an important factor: the stability and sustainability of autocratic regimes largely depends on the younger part of the population.

Why the world should care

It’s hard to evaluate specific figures from the VTsIOM poll and during war or large-scale crises, sociology tends to change rapidly. However, it is possible to draw some unequivocal conclusions from the survey – support for Vladimir Putin and his actions is relatively low among young people, and it is falling fast.

As Vladimir Putin starts his gas war, Europe faces a difficult winter

Vladimir Putin has unleashed his most potent economic weapon against Europe: the threat of halting or restricting gas supplies. However, this gas war is no blitzkrieg, but a battle of attrition. After a week and a half of anxious waiting, Nord Stream 1 finally resumed operations – but at 40 percent capacity. This leaves Russia with plenty of wiggle room when it comes to applying future pressure – and clears the way for Gazprom to record increased profits against the odds and generate serious problems for Europe this coming winter.

What happened

Since the start of the war it has been clear that if Russia has any significant economic weapon against Europe, it would be gas. Most European countries are not hugely dependent on Russian oil and Europe itself decided to stop buying oil from Russia this spring. But the EU cannot wean itself off Russian gas so easily, while Russia has scope in its budget to risk some of its gas revenues: even in 2021, amid record prices in Europe, gas exports to Europe represented only a quarter of its total oil-and-gas revenues.

Moscow deployed its gas weaponry for the first time in mid-June. On June 14, Gazprom announced it was reducing the flow through Nord Stream to 60 percent of its planned capacity, followed by a further cut to 40 percent just one day later. The reduction was blamed on delays in the delivery of a turbine being serviced at a Siemens plant in Canada. While sanctions were lifted from the turbine in question, the gas pipeline operated at a reduced capacity for the following month. When, on July 11, it was closed completely for 10 days of planned maintenance, Europe was left to wonder whether the taps would re-open at all. On July 21, the gas pipeline began working once more, but at the same 40 percent of capacity. Putin warned that further repair work was scheduled and made clear that Europe should not count on receiving a full gas flow for the foreseeable future.

What’s the Kremlin’s plan?

Gas market players surveyed by Goldman Sachs at the start of the week (The Bell studied the investment bank’s report) never seriously believed that Nord Stream would stay closed after July 21. They correctly anticipated a restart at 40 percent of capacity, explaining the logic behind this for Russia:

• First, cancelling all deliveries via Nord Stream would deny Russia any flexibility in its future decisions – after all, the only way to go from zero is up.
• Second, cutting Europe off from Russian gas would ultimately hit the country’s budget.
• And third, halting the pipeline would force Gazprom to mothball its production capacity, which is unwelcome if not disastrous. From a technical standpoint, there is no way to redirect gas intended for Europe toward other markets, Goldman Sachs explains in its report.

Independent energy expert Sergei Vakulenko explains Russia’s strategy thus: On the one hand, it demonstrates legal responsibility (‘We are fulfilling every obligation that we can given the force majeure situation that Europe along with Ukraine has created’) and does not completely sever trade relations with Europe, making it easier to restore them when the situation returns to normal (as the Russian side seems to expect). On the other hand, Russia continues to generate substantial revenues. All of this continues at a level that does not prevent Europe from falling into an energy crisis this winter.

The ultimate aim, as in any war, is to inflict enough pain on the opposition to force it to change its policies; in this instance, to force Europe to abandon its support for Ukraine and renew its relations with the Kremlin, Vakulenko concludes.

How will Europe survive the winter?

Closing Nord Stream would have been a catastrophe, but limiting gas flows to 40 percent still leaves Europe with serious problems. At this rate, Russian gas exports to Europe by the end of 2022 will fall from 150 billion cubic meters a year to 50 billion, an international oil and gas analyst calculated for The Bell.

Europe’s supply-and-demand situation on the gas market is ‘hanging by a thread’, James Henderson, head of the gas program at the Oxford Institute of Energy Studies, told The Bell. The EU’s gas storage facilities are currently 65 percent full, a figure that should reach 80 percent by Nov. 1 – but Henderson warns that this will not be enough in itself. If Russia cuts off the gas closer to winter, those storage facilities cannot compensate. This is because they are normally used to supplement the flow of imported gas.

“If pumping continues at 20-40 percent the situation will remain manageable only if the winter is not too cold,” said Henderson. A cold winter could increase demand by 20-30 billion cubic meters for a half-year, and if Russian supplies stop, Europe’s industrial production will begin to slow. Based on this figure, the European Commission’s latest recommendation is to reduce demand by 15 percent.

Both business and the general population in Europe have yet to feel the full increase in gas prices – actual retail prices for gas and electricity in many countries remain lower than the exchange prices, an analyst from an international company added. In the second half of the year, the increased price burden will steadily shift onto consumers and he believes this will bring a very severe price shock to businesses and civilians alike.

European politicians are aware of this. On Wednesday, speaking about negotiations with Canada to lift sanctions on equipment for Gazprom, Germany’s Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock said: “If we don’t get the turbine, we won’t have gas. Then we won’t be able to support Ukraine because instead we will be busy with popular uprisings.”

What risks does Gazprom face?

None. Every expert approached by The Bell agrees that increased gas prices will fully compensate for any reduction in Gazprom’s exports. Russian gas expert Marcel Salikhov assumes that the cost of gas exported via the pipeline will rise by 50-60 percent over the course of 2022, enabling Gazprom to post a 15-20 percent increase in profits even after making allowance for the strengthening of the ruble and the decline in domestic demand for gas.

Why the world should care

Gas is the last economic weapon available to Vladimir Putin. The president himself understands full well that within as little as three or four years this threat will lose its potency – so while it exists, he will have no hesitation in using it to the fullest extent. This winter, Europe will have to pay for its support of Ukraine.

State Duma pursues a complete ban on “homosexual propaganda”

In the fifth month of the war, having dealt with the independent media, ‘foreign agents’ and opposition to the war, the Russian authorities remembered their antipathy toward the LGBT community. State Duma deputies from the Communist Party and the LDPR introduced a bill for a complete ban on “propaganda of non-traditional sexual relationships” and “denial of family values”. The current ban only affects “homosexual propaganda” aimed at under-18s. Immediately after the bill was launched, leading tennis player Darya Kasatkina became the first major athlete to come out as gay – and sparked a scandal on state TV.

• The law banning “propaganda of non-traditional sexual relationships among minors” came into force in Russia back in 2013 and carries fines of up to 200,000 rubles ($3,000) for individuals or up to 1 million rubles ($15,000) for businesses (which can also be liquidated if found to be breaking this law). But in the context of the current conflict with the West, Duma deputies fear this is not enough. Six deputies from the Communist Party, A Just Russia and the LDPR are proposing a total ban on “gay propaganda”.
• The bill’s authors propose to regard “promotion of non-traditional values” – i.e. any publication or statement LGBT relationships or identity – in the same light as distributing pornography or inciting ethnic hatred. The draft bill does not include any new level of legal responsibility, but one of the deputies spoke of the need to introduce criminal liability for violations. Meanwhile, the bill specifically calls for a list of all movies that “promote LGBT” and stripping them of their distribution licenses.
• One of the bill’s authors is Communist Party deputy Nina Ostanina. Journalists immediately recalled how, in spring 2011, Ostanina was part of a group of Russian opposition figures who met with then-U.S. Vice President Joe Biden on his visit to Russia. Others at that meeting included, for example, Boris Nemtsov (killed in 2015) and Garry Kasparov (who emigrated long ago and adopts a radical anti-Putin position). After that meeting, Ostanina said that she complained to Biden about electoral violations, discussed the fall of authoritarian regimes and presented the U.S. president with a copy of the communist newspaper Pravda.
• Sources told Meduza and the BBC Russian service that this particular bill will not pass into law, since no United Russia deputies are involved. But this does not mean we will not see a new ban. At the start of July, State Duma speaker Vyacheslav Volodin directly called for a ban on the “propaganda of non-traditional values”. According to Meduza, United Russia is already drafting its own equivalent legislation.
• Ironically, on the day that the bill was introduced, Russia faced its most notable ‘coming out’ of recent years. In an interview on YouTube, Russia’s top female tennis player (ranked No. 12 in the world) Darya Kasatkina announced her homosexuality, talked about her girlfriend and added that she was considering changing her citizenship. This is the first time ever that a Russian athlete at this level has come out.
• Two days later, Kasatkina was discussed on a recently launched scandal-seeking talk show on Match TV, a national sports channel owned by Gazprom. The host devoted 45 minutes to Kasatkina in the company of State Duma representatives and veteran athletes. The participants concluded that Kasatkina came out in an attempt to curry favor in Spain, where she lives, and gain Spanish citizenship. They added that homosexuals in general – and Kasatkina in particular – “revel in dragging people into the dirt”.
• After the broadcast, Match TV’s chief tennis correspondent Sofya Tartakova, who is also Kasatkina’s PR agent, called the program “a freak show for tongue-tied deputies, pseudo-experts and people seeking their five minutes of fame”, adding that no active tennis player would have any further contact with Match TV. In response, the channel removed the journalist from the airwaves.

Why the world should care

The man behind the latest ban on LGBT propaganda, Vyacheslav Volodin, is one of those senior officials whose stock has been rising since the start of the war. He speaks even more radically than Putin himself (ex-President Dmitry Medvedev is another striking example of this). A complete ban on gay propaganda can be seen as an attempt at further political prestige. As long as the war continues, the number of repressive measures that are not directly related to the conflict will also increase.

By Connor Echols, Responsible Statecraft, 7/25/22

When news broke that Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi will visit Taiwan next month, China responded how everyone expected it to. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijiang condemned the visit, saying it would “severely undermine China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” and “gravely impact the foundation of China-U.S. relations.”

“If the U.S. were to insist on going down the wrong path, China will take resolute and strong measures to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity,” Zhao added. (Those “strong measures” could include a military response from Beijing, according to U.S. sources who spoke with the Financial Times.)

But few would have predicted that the Pentagon would take Beijing’s side. As President Joe Biden told reporters Wednesday, the Defense Department thinks the visit is “not a good idea right now,” a nod to growing tensions in the Taiwan Strait.

The unusual point of agreement highlights the dangers of Pelosi’s trip, according to experts who spoke with Responsible Statecraft. From Beijing’s perspective, Washington has been gradually shifting the goalposts on Taiwan toward explicit support for Taipei’s independence, a red line for Chinese officials. And a visit from a top U.S. politician would only make things worse.

“[Chinese officials] see it through the lens of how their own political system works,” said Shelley Rigger, a political science professor at Davidson College and a leading expert on Taiwan. “What they’re seeing is that the U.S. is sending the number three in their national hierarchy to Taiwan. How is this not a statement or an affirmation of Taiwan statehood?”

Pelosi waved off concerns about the trip Thursday, saying that the Pentagon was “afraid our plane would get shot down, or something like that, by the Chinese.” 

The speaker also downplayed Beijing’s concerns about a potential shift in U.S. policy. “None of us have ever said we’re for independence when it comes to Taiwan,” she argued. “That’s up to Taiwan to decide.”

America’s favorite diplomatic fiction

The challenge revolves around one of Washington’s most confusing yet successful strategies: the “One China Policy.” Since 1979, the United States has recognized the government in Beijing as the sole legitimate Chinese government while acknowledging — but never endorsing — Beijing’s view that Taiwan is an integral part of China. This requires a careful balancing act known as “strategic ambiguity” whereby Washington implies that it would defend Taiwan from an invasion but never says it outright. So far, this policy has stopped either side from crossing a point of no return (namely, Beijing invading Taiwan or Taipei declaring full independence).

If you find that a bit hard to follow, you’re not alone. The policy is flexible by its nature and has looked different over the years, with U.S. officials dialing public support for Taiwan up or down depending on how close each side is getting to the other’s red lines. But that complexity has been remarkably effective, allowing Taiwan to transform into a full-fledged democracy with a strong economy.

Despite increased tensions, experts say that U.S. policy is still best understood through the lens of strategic ambiguity. In the minds of American officials, any changes to Washington’s approach are simply a reaction to Beijing changing the status quo.

But, as Asian security expert Van Jackson noted, China “probably holds a mirror image of that view.” With growing calls from China hawks to abandon strategic ambiguity, officials in Beijing have become increasingly concerned that Washington is all in for Taiwanese independence. (Biden seemingly confirmed those concerns in May, when he said the U.S. had made a “commitment” to defend Taiwan before walking it back shortly after.) From China’s perspective, Pelosi’s visit would represent “a huge retreat from commitments the U.S. has made” to Beijing in the last few decades, according to Rigger.

“Politicians don’t appreciate the gravity and the risk of messing around in this policy area,” she said.

Little room for error

The last House Speaker to visit Taiwan was Newt Gingrich, who stopped through Taipei on his way back from a trip to China in 1997. As Jackson explained, the stakes of that trip were much lower than today.

“[W]e were deep into a project of integrating China into global capitalism,” he told Responsible Statecraft in an email. “We were on strategically very good terms with Beijing, which provides a cushion against instability.”

This time around, the room for error is a lot smaller. “The context for a Pelosi visit in 2022 is radically different,” Jackson added. “We’ve replaced a posture of détente with rivalry.”

Though they’re unlikely to say it publicly, even Taiwanese officials seem wary of the trip, according to Rigger. When she asked people in Taiwan’s foreign ministry if the visit was dangerous, they were evasive, saying “things along the lines of, ‘well, that is a very perceptive question.’” But underlying that evasiveness is a fear of upsetting Taipei’s most important foreign partner.

“Your survival depends upon making someone happy and stroking the ego of various American politicians,” Rigger said, “[so] you’re not going to say ‘we don’t want this kind of love.’”

So the main question for many observers is the following: How can the Biden administration mitigate the impact of Pelosi’s visit? One step is to distance itself from the visit by not sending Pelosi on a military plane, which would make the exercise look “like a military operation,” according to an official who spoke with Politico. 

Another is to do more to incorporate Chinese concerns into U.S. strategy, starting with an open mind about how Beijing views the situation, according to Rigger.

“I would just encourage people to consider another possibility, which is that […] PRC leaders are sincere when they express the concern that things, especially in Taiwan, are turning against China,” she said, noting that Beijing views the challenge as existential. “So everything that the U.S. does to respond to what it perceives as Beijing’s increasing aggression just reinforces that fear that the U.S. is about to encourage Taiwan to bust a move.”

YouTube link here.

“With bombs falling all around, embattled videographer Jon Farina visited with the abandoned poor and elderly at ground zero of the Russia-Ukraine war. An exclusive mini-documentary.” – Matt Taibbi

By Fred Weir, Christian Science Monitor, 7/20/22

It took nearly 100 days of subsistence in a dank basement while mechanized armies clashed back-and-forth in the streets above them before Alyona Lyashova fled the devastated city of Mariupol with her husband and two children.

For them, the final straw was news, in early June, that the bodies of over 200 of their neighbors had been pulled from the ruins of a nearby building. “Our city smelled of death, and all around were the graves of our neighbors,” she says. “The buildings were blackened and ruined. There was no water, electricity, or phone service. Nothing for us. Even though the fighting seemed to be over, it was impossible to even think of staying there.”

Ms. Lyashova and her family left for the nearby Russian city of Rostov, using an evacuation service organized by the Russians, where they joined thousands of other Mariupol residents who were promised accommodation, food, temporary documents, and distribution to more permanent places around the country that would grant jobs, homes, and, if they wished, a fast-track to Russian citizenship.

While precise figures are difficult to come by, about 12 million Ukrainians are thought to have been displaced by the war, and as many as 5 million have left the country. Most have headed west, to European countries that have flung open their doors to take them in.

But about 2.3 million Ukrainians, mostly from the war-torn and Russian-speaking east, have arrived in Russia since late February, according to the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations. Though the Ukrainian government, backed by the United States, alleges that many Ukrainians have been “forcibly deported” to Russia and subjected to various kinds of abuse, several war refugees, including Ms. Lyashova, and the volunteers who work with them, offered different accounts at an aid center run by the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow in mid-July.

Although most of those who seek refuge in Russia hail from the Russian-speaking parts of eastern Ukraine, it would probably be a mistake to view their choice as “voting with their feet” in some neo-Cold War sense, experts say. For many, Russia is just an enduring fact, familiar and relatively safe, and it’s possible for them to blend in easily.

“Almost every family in Ukraine has close friends or relatives in Russia. So many come to Russia because they have people here who can help,” says Mikhail Chernysh, an expert with the official Institute of Sociology in Moscow. “It’s not ideological. There can be political disagreements within families, even quite bitter ones, but they still help each other. … Russia is big, it has demographic problems, and many regions have serious labor shortages. I know the logic sounds strange, but an influx of friendly population is welcome in many parts of the country. Russia has the capacity to receive them, offer opportunities, and it’s nothing to do with politics.”

“It’s just where they perceive safety lies”

Ms. Lyashova and her family actually wanted to go to Germany, where her godmother lives, and they heard conditions for Ukrainian refugees are optimal. But they headed east, not west, for one simple reason.

“My husband, Eduard, is of military age. Under present Ukrainian laws, he would not have been allowed to leave the country, and might have been drafted,” she says. “Our top priority is to stay together as a family, no matter what. So, we came to Russia. We still hope, maybe, to go to Europe, but for now we’ve found good conditions. We’re swimming with the current.”

But it was rough to start. Arriving at the border, Ms. Lyashova and her husband were aggressively questioned by Russian FSB security police for about 20 minutes, she says, before being allowed to proceed.

“Everyone was getting interrogated. It was 2 a.m. My children couldn’t sleep. We were met by volunteers who were helpful, but it was not a pleasant experience,” says Ms. Lyashova. “I think the FSB were trying to find out my attitude toward Ukrainian nationalism. But I’m not political. I’m a mother. I’m against the war. I want peace, and I told them so. My husband, Eduard, was a railway worker for 15 years and never had anything to do with the military. So, they let us go.”

The family stayed with distant relatives in Rostov for several days before heading on to Moscow, where church volunteers helped them to get temporary documents, and Eduard found a job in his profession as a mechanic. Ms. Lyashova says she has seen no help from Russian state institutions, but that most people they’ve met along the way have been very kind.

The Russian Orthodox Church is one of many organizations, public and private, that have recruited volunteers, collected donations, and set up facilities to aid the new flood of refugees. The Russian Red Cross says it has set up 130 reception points in 57 regions, and mobilized hundreds of volunteers to help refugees with everything from immediate needs to long-term settlement. As for the latter problem, the Kremlin appears to have turned implementation over to regional governments, who are obliged to take in a certain quota of refugees and put them up in hotels, sanitariums, and summer camps, until more permanent arrangements can be made.

Danil Makhnitsky, a political activist associated with the liberal-nationalist New People party whose mother’s family lives in Ukraine, has set up a volunteer organization that now works in 16 Russian regions and claims to have helped 15,000 new arrivals with food, clothing, temporary accommodation, and transportation.

“We have no connection with government, it’s all person to person. And we are just one of many groups doing this,” he says. “There are so many people coming from the war zone, and they all need help of every possible kind. Once they get past the border process, it’s mainly volunteer groups like ours who are there to help them. The federal government still doesn’t have a single central agency to coordinate this work.”

(Experts and volunteers do note that many of the problems encountered by more than a million refugees from the troubled Donbas who poured into Russia when the conflict first erupted eight years ago, including difficulties obtaining documents and legal status, have since been addressed by the Russian government.)

Mr. Makhnitsky says it’s not a mystery that many, especially in eastern Ukraine, would choose to flee to Russia. Three decades of independent Ukraine did little to instill a Ukrainian identity among people who had lived in Russian-led states for three centuries, he says. Of course large numbers of Ukrainian-minded people have headed westward to escape the danger, but lots of others opt for Russia, which is nearby and – he insists – welcoming.

“These are basically Russian people,” he says of the refugees he works with. “They may carry Ukrainian passports and even be ethnically Ukrainian, but they are culturally and linguistically indistinguishable from Russians. It’s not a political choice, it’s just where they perceive safety lies.”

“People with broken destinies”

Nina Milovidova, the head of the church-run Moscow refugee center, says that when they started in early March they were seeing about 15 people per day, mostly from the separatist republics of Luhansk and Donetsk, many of whom already had Russian passports. Now the flow has swollen to around 250 daily, and they are mostly people with Ukrainian passports from places like Kharkiv, Kherson, and the Donbas war zone.

She says the center has about 500 volunteers working with Moscow-area arrivals, and since March they have raised over 200 million rubles ($3.6 million) to cover costs of everything they provide, including translation, legal assistance, psychological support, job-seeking, and other services.

“We try to greet each person with warmth. It’s very painful. These people are in trouble. They don’t seem angry – at least I have not encountered aggression – but they are people with broken destinies, who are in distress. We try our best to help,” she says.

Ms. Milovidova believes the majority would prefer to return to their homes one day. But some, especially those with close relatives, are planning to stay in Russia. Mr. Makhnitsky says his impression is that about half the refugees he meets would rather remain in Russia, while a quarter – mainly older people – hope to return to their native places if there is a prospect for peaceful life, while another quarter want to move to Europe or beyond.

For those who plan to remain in Russia, President Vladimir Putin made things much simpler in early July by issuing a decree that entitles any Ukrainian to apply for Russian citizenship and receive it within three months.

“It’s becoming really easy,” says Rimma Mulkidzhanyan, a Moscow lawyer who works pro bono with refugees. “A Ukrainian citizen need only obtain temporary residence in Russia, which is a fairly simple procedure, then apply for citizenship. … The government seems quite serious about expediting this, and it looks like it can work quickly in most cases.”

Several of the refugees interviewed for this story said prospects for returning depend upon whether the Russians will rebuild the shattered towns and cities they have fled from, and create prospects for a decent life. Few seem to care whether the government will be Russian or Ukrainian.

“Who am I? Well, I was born in Ukraine, so I am Ukrainian. But I am from the Donbas, and we’ve always been something different, not Russian, not Ukrainian,” says Ms. Lyashova. “I don’t know. I want to live in peace, with my family, to see my children grow up. If Mariupol is restored, of course we’ll go back there. It’s so hard to say anything right now. We just want to survive.”

By Prof. Paul Robinson, Canadian Dimension, 7/21/22

Years ago, I was an exchange student in the Soviet Union. Margaret Thatcher was prime minister of Britain, and Ronald Reagan president of the United States. The Soviets were fighting a war in Afghanistan. Martial law was in place in Poland. Soviet-Western relations were hardly what one might call “good.” And yet, one could go to the USSR as a student. There were numerous direct flights. Politicians and diplomats retained a degree of decorum in their language. And arms control agreements functioned reasonably successfully. Despite mutual hostility, both sides made an effort to keep doors open.

Compare that to today. Following the invasion of Ukraine in February, Western states have almost entirely severed relations with the Russian Federation. A student today who tried to go to Russia would find it very difficult, if not impossible. Even the most benign cultural ties have been cut. Meanwhile, Western states are sending a steady stream of heavy weapons to Ukraine, encouraging it to wage war against Russia to the bitter end. The current state of Russian-Western relations makes the Cold War look like an era of mutual love and respect.

The harsh policies enacted by the West against Russia have come at a heavy price. Sun Tzu said that if you know your enemy and know yourself, you will never be defeated. But how can one know another country if you make it impossible for people to travel or do research there? One cannot. Meanwhile, the West’s economic sanctions have arguably hurt the West more than they have hurt Russia, stoking inflation, while higher energy prices mean that Russia is earning more money from oil and gas than ever before.

One would imagine that states would only endure such costs if especially important interests were at stake. But, harsh though it may sound, Ukraine’s fate, while a matter of extreme importance for Ukrainians, isn’t desperately significant for the West. Russia’s original demands—that Ukraine become neutral and accept the loss of Donbass and Crimea—while undesirable from a Western perspective, were not exactly existential threats. The extreme nature of the West’s response to Russia’s actions requires some explanation.

One possible reason why Western leaders have responded as they have is that they believe in a modern version of the domino theory. One might imagine the logic to be that if Ukraine falls, the Baltic states will follow, and before one knows it, the Soviet flag will once again be flying over the Reichstag. It may be that some people believe this, and indeed American and NATO officials have parroted this line. But the scenario outlined above is as farfetched as the original domino theory. The Russian army is struggling to defeat the Ukrainians. It is hardly going to be able to invade western Europe and defeat NATO. The Russian threat is overblown.

That said, it could still be that the West’s response is justified by the need to uphold what some like to call “the rules-based international order.” The Nuremburg Tribunals in 1947 established the principle that waging aggressive war is the supreme international crime. It requires a firm response.

But if a commitment to the rules of the international order were really what drove our political leaders, they would have behaved very differently over the past 30 years. Russia is undoubtedly waging aggressive war against Ukraine. But Western states have done likewise on multiple occasions, most notably the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003. Were Canada, for instance, truly driven by concerns relating to the fundamentals of the international system, it would have imposed on the United States and the United Kingdom the same sanctions it has now imposed on Russia. It did not. That doesn’t mean that we don’t care about those fundamentals, but breaches of them do not per se provoke a tough political response. Something else is at play.

At this point, one might appeal to values and institutions. Following the line of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, some claim that the war in Ukraine is a decisive battle of democracy versus autocracy and that the very future of liberalism and democracy is at stake.

This idea doesn’t stand up to serious scrutiny. The Russians have consistently shown themselves to be indifferent to other states’ political systems. Moreover, almost nobody in Russia considers Ukraine a democracy, especially since the current Ukrainian state owes its existence to a violent coup back in 2014. The idea that the Russian government fears Ukrainian democracy completely misrepresents how Russians view both Ukraine and themselves.

A final explanation of Western behaviour lies in the moral realm—the sense that Russia’s military methods are beyond the pale. Media stories repeatedly use words like “barbaric” and “brutal” to describe Russian military operations. The physical destruction of Ukrainian towns, and the concomitant loss of civilian life are evidence of this barbarity.

Yet Western armies act much the same way when military necessity demands it. The destruction inflicted by the Russians on towns like Mariupol is no different than that inflicted by the Americans on cities like Fallujah, Mosul, and Raqqa. Western leaders have shown a complete lack of concern over the past eight years for the civilians killed by Ukrainian shelling in Donbass. The death and destruction wrought by the Russians in recent months clearly exceeds the latter by many degrees. Nevertheless, the selective nature of Western moral indignation suggests that moral objections don’t lie at the heart of our response to what Russia has done. So what is going on?

In his 2010 book Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War, Richard Ned Lebow argues that the primary cause of wars, past and present, is not matters of security, or the pursuit of profit, but rather issues of status, which one may fit within the broader category of honour. What holds for war holds for international relations more generally. Honour in its many manifestations—status, prestige, face, credibility, esteem, self-esteem, the desire to avoid shame, and so on—plays a decisive role in politics. Hegel noted that international disputes were often “struggles for recognition.” This is indeed the case. The international hegemon—the United States—demands recognition of its supremacy. Others push back and demand recognition of their autonomy. The mutual refusal of recognition strikes at each side’s sense of worth—i.e. their honour—so producing conflict.

Honour comes in many forms—internal (one’s sense of one’s own worth) and external (others’ recognition of one’s worth), absolute (one has it or one does not) and relative (one’s position relative to others). Status is external and relative. It is a matter of where others rank you. Zoological and medical studies suggest that status-seeking is a biological imperative—irrespective of material conditions, low status is associated with high stress and a shorter life span. Low rank (external honour) impacts one’s sense of self-worth (internal honour) producing anxiety and a resulting desire to achieve the recognition one lacks.

The problem, however, is that rising to the top of the pile doesn’t provide security. Quite the opposite. From the top, the only place one can go is down. In his book The Human Zoo, Desmond Morris noted that baboons have a simple strategy to deal with this. The moment even a semblance of a challenger appears, the top baboon stomps down hard on him with disproportionate force, pour encourager les autres, as it were.

And so it is in human affairs. States seek status, and those who have risen to the top (which means the United States and its Western allies) feel a need to put anyone who might challenge them firmly in their place. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is such a challenge. Ever since the Maidan revolution of 2014, the West has determined that Ukraine lies within its own sphere of influence. By arguing otherwise, Russia is challenging the West’s honour. The West feels that it must respond or lose face.

In duelling cultures, to which international relations may to some degree be compared, gentlemen don’t fight duels with people of lower social status. A challenge does not have to be met. One can brush it off as beneath contempt. The fact that the West has chosen not to do so in this instance is revealing. It demonstrates that the West feels insecure in its hegemonic status. It is aware that as economic power shifts to the east, political power is shifting with it, and as a result its relative status is declining. It cannot let the challenge pass—thus the vehemence of the response.

Tough policy serves two purposes. First, it suppresses challengers, protecting external honour. Second, it makes people feel better about themselves, protecting internal honour. The ancient Greeks referred to hybris as the feeling of superiority one gets as a result of humiliating others. The easiest way to go up in relative terms is to push others down. Tough measures and harsh rhetoric against Russia serve this purpose, giving us that pleasurable feeling of our superior worth that is the mark of hybris. We might imagine that we have moved on since ancient times, but the same psychological processes continue to propel our actions.

Hybris is dangerous. The Greeks recognized this, noting that hybris produces a negative, often violent, reaction from those who resent being pushed down. Just as the West cares about its status, so too do others, including the Russians. For them, this is also a struggle of recognition, and as such linked to a fundamental psychological need. Consequently, it is unlikely that they will back down.

The shifting balance of international power means that we may expect a prolonged period of status anxiety in the West. It can respond in two ways—accept the loss of status, however uncomfortable that may feel, or resist it through hybris and attempts to suppress challenges wherever they appear. The first option will allow a peaceful transition to a new global system. The second will drag out the process and make it decidedly messier, without altering the ultimate outcome. If the West’s policies towards Russia are anything to go by, it appears that our leaders have rooted firmly for option number two.