By Ben Aris in Berlin, Intellinews, 1/31/25

Could Gazprom’s Nord Stream undersea gas pipelines, partially destroyed by saboteurs in September 2022, eventually be restarted? The idea of reconnecting Europe to the giant Russian Yamal gas fields has been introduced as a possible bargaining chip in the widely expected ceasefire talks between Russia and Ukraine. While political optics of such a deal are terrible, for the struggling European economies it is an economic no-brainer.

Denmark’s energy agency ordered the operator of the Nord Stream pipelines to cap the severed ends of the three destroyed pipelines this week to preserve their integrity, making it possible, in theory, to patch the holes created in a series of explosions in September 2022 and lift the pipes to the surface for repairs.

The idea of restarting Russian gas deliveries to Germany is clearly in the air and favoured by some in the German political firmament. Leader of Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland party (AfD) Alice Weidel told a party conference this week that “We will put Nord Stream back into operation, you can count on it!’ as the right have (correctly) identified the end of cheap Russian as being a major cause of the collapse of the German economy.

That has not gone down well with Ukraine’s supporters. The Baltic states have been adamant that all Russian gas imports should end. Polish President Andrzej Duda the same week that Germany “should not be tempted” to resume Russian supplies just because its economy is struggling; Germany’s economy has contracted for two years in a row and is predicted to shrink again this year. Rather than repair the €10bn pipeline that is capable of supplying 40% of Europe’s gas needs, Duda said that Nord Stream should instead be “dismantled.”

Detractors argue that resuming Russian gas deliveries threaten Europe with energy dependence, but also frame it as a military threat as the money it generates funds Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war machine. Russia’s Gazprom earned some €6.5bn from gas exports to Europe last year.

The loss of cheap Russian gas has been disastrous for Germany leading directly to its deindustrialisation as heavy industry has had to close down due to the soaring cost of gas and energy. The end of gas imports came just as the government decided to shutter its six powerful state-of-the-art nuclear power plant (NPP) in the midst of one of the worst energy crises this century in 2022 that turned Germany from a net exporter of energy into a net importer. That has put pressure on the rest of the EU, as Germany’s neighbours are forced to supply Germany with power under EU rules that have driven up costs in those countries as well. Sweden and Norway in particular are now suffering from power price inflation and have frozen plans to increase power links with Germany to cap exports capacity so they can use more of their domestic production capacity to meet their own domestic demand.

The upending of Germany’s energy security has led to the biggest collapse in German living standards since the Second World War and a downturn in economic output comparable to the 2008 financial crisis.

The downturn is having political consensus too. The funding of the war in Ukraine – Germany has been Ukraine’s most generous EU backer – has put intolerable strain on Germany’s finances that was already in a budget crisis after budget spending bumped up against borrowing limits imposed by the constitution by the so-called Schuldenbremse, or “debt brake” that limits government borrowing. At the end of last year, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced that Berlin has run out of money for Ukraine and will drastically reduce its contributions after this year. Tensions over money and wrangling over a €3bn aid package for Ukraine has already led to the collapse of the ruling coalition and German policy is in limbo as the country waits for a new government in a general election slated for February.

The quality of German life was already falling before the war started but has been made much worse by the various shocks the conflict has unleashed. The failure to protect German industry from the energy price spike may turn the 2020s into “a lost decade for Germany,” according to a recent paper published by the Forum for a New Economy, the Spectator reports. The economic malaise is fuelling the rise of the far-right AfD that won several key regional elections in November and is currently ranked second in popularity after the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU).

And Russia’s gas business is still doing well, despite the setbacks. Gas production rose 7.6% in 2024 y/y to around 685bcm, according to comments by Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak on January 30. This year Russia expects to increase gas production again. Pipeline gas exports also increased last year by 15.6% to over 119bcm, while LNG exports were up by a more modest 4% to 47.2bcm (21.2mn tonnes).

Despite the myriad sanctions on Russia, Europe bought 22.6bcm (17mn tonnes) of LNG from Gazprom in 2024, mostly via terminals in France, Spain and Belgium. Taking LNG and piped gas together, Russia’s export to Europe were up 20% year on year to about 50bcm – around a third of pre-war export volumes. This year imports of piped gas may fall after Ukraine walked out on a gas transit deal with Russia, but delivered via the one remaining route, TurkStream that runs through the Black Sea, continues to rise, as does shipped LNG deliveries.

Publicly, Germany has ended the import of Russian gas and the CDU leader Friedrich Merz, who is very likely to take over from Scholz in the upcoming elections, has called for all Russian gas imports to end. However, embarrassingly, Germany continues to be the biggest importer of Russian gas via the backdoor imports routed through French and Belgium ports among other alternatives. Despite the fighting-talk, Europe remains hooked on Russian gas.

Currently, Europe is still consuming half of Russia’s annual gas production. Although the volume of piped Russian gas has fallen dramatically over the last two years, the volume of Russia’s LNG exports to Europe have doubled in the last two years and are currently at an all-time high and still rising. Ukraine’s supporters wanted to include an LNG ban in the sixteenth package of sanctions under debate at the moment and due to be enacted in February, but that idea has already been dropped as unworkable, according to reports.

The Danish energy agency decision to cap the four strands of the Nord Stream 1 & 2 pipelines creates the possibility that the damaged pipes could relatively easily be patched, pumped dry and lifted to the surface for repairs at some point. The one strand that survived the 2022 bombings in September 2022 is still pressurised and could in theory be turned back on tomorrow to deliver a badly needed 25bcm of gas to the EU – half as much again as Ukraine was delivering until it turned off the spigot on January 1.

The idea of restarting Russia’s gas deliveries has been in the air for a while now. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Scholtz held their first phone conversation in two years in November to talk about the war. Not much was agreed, but amongst the points raised, Putin said that he was willing to restart gas deliveries to Germany through the working pipeline if there was an acceptable Ukrainian ceasefire deal.

Moon of Alabama, 1/31/25

At the time of writing the above I did not know that the idea for this campaign came from RAND, the Pentagon’s think tank which often proposes strategic ideas. In a commentary about Russian/North Korean and Chinese cooperation published on October 11, three days before the start of Zelenski’s campaign, a RAND analyst wrote:

What Should the United States Do?

Given the differences in the objectives of Russia, China, and North Korea, the United States should be mounting major information operations against these three countries to highlight their differences and fuel distrust among them.
…
[T]he United States should recognize that North Korean military advisors are supporting Russian use of North Korean military supplies in occupied areas of Ukraine.
…
This new cooperation between Russia and North Korea is hardly a signal of a budding long-term alliance and U.S. information campaigns could help speed its demise.

Just three days later the Military Intelligence of the Ukrainian army, headed by General Budanov, started to ‘leak’ claims to the Ukrainian press about North Korean troops in Russia.

Since launching the first rumors of 1,500, then 3,000 North Korean soldiers in Russia the CIA trained head of the Ukrainian military special service General Budanov increased the number from hot air to 11,000 North Korean soldiers.

But even NATO denied to have any knowledge of such a force.

As I summarized at that time:

Shortly after RAND proposed a U.S. information operation campaign around the theme of North Korean soldiers in Russia the Ukrainian military intelligence service under CIA trainee Budanov started to spread rumors of North Korean soldiers soon to fight on the Russian side. The numbers claimed by Budanov have since steadily increased. South Korean intelligence, also associated with the CIA, and U.S. media have joined the campaign. The chair of the House Intelligence Committee is milking the campaign to make political points.

Evidence that was supposed to support the claims has been exposed as being fake. The whole story is thus based on nothing but ‘intelligence’ rumors which are following a RAND proposed script. Don’t fall for it.

The story continued to grow through repetition. Media quoted each other with each adding bits of bullshit from their usual ‘security sources’. What failed to turn up though was evidence.

After being repeatedly questioned about the lack of evidence for their claims, Ukrainian politicians presented their solution:

Today the Ukrainian Minister of Defense, Rustem Umerov, has given a hint how Ukraine will handle this issue (machine translation):

Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov confirmed the words of the head of the National Security and Defense Council’s Center for Combating Disinformation, Andriy Kovalenko , that the first “small-scale fighting” had already taken place between the Ukrainian Armed Forces and North Korean soldiers, and the Koreans had suffered losses.
…
Umerov also said that the Russian Federation disguises Koreans as Buryats, so the dead and prisoners must be identified before Ukraine calls the number of enemy losses.

Buryats are a Mongolic people in Siberia who are part of the Russian Federation. Many of them have joined the well paid ranks of Russian forces. Umerov’s plan was thus obvious:

As soon as some Buryat soldier of Russia will turn up dead, the Ukrainian military will present him as a disguised North Korean soldier. Some black and white photos will be found of a similar looking person in North Korean uniform …

“There is your prove. Now send soldiers and weapons.” will Umerov say.

There have since been several attempts by Ukrainian special services to reinforce their media campaign. Russian passports from dead Russian soldiers were presented as ‘fake documents’ carried by ‘North Koreans’. They even captured a Buryat:

On Oct. 28 (local time), Jonas Ohman, head of the Lithuanian NGO Blue/Yellow, which provides aid to Ukraine and its military, informed local media outlet LRT, stating, “The first encounter between a Ukrainian unit we support and North Korean soldiers occurred on the 25th in Kursk. To my knowledge, all of the North Korean soldiers, except for one, were killed. The surviving soldier was found carrying identification as a Buryat.”

Other ‘evidence’ included hand written letters, allegedly by North Korean soldiers, written in South Korean type and style.

Even Wikipedia had to admit:

As of January 2025, there has been no independent confirmation of the Buryat Battalion’s existence [,allegedly consisting of soldiers from North Korea,] outside of Ukrainian sources.

The nonsense of this scheme has become too obvious.

Now the CIA, with the help of the New York Times, is shutting it down.

The ‘North Korean soldiers’ are leaving the battlefield the same way they came – ever unseen.

North Korean Troops No Longer Seen on Front Lines Fighting Ukraine (archived) – New York Times, Jan 31 2024
North Korea sent its best troops to aid Russia in its war against Ukraine. But after months of suffering severe losses, they have been taken off the front line.

North Korean soldiers who joined their Russian allies in battle against Ukrainian forces have been pulled off the front lines after suffering heavy casualties, according to Ukrainian and U.S. officials.

The North Korean troops, sent to bolster Russian forces trying to push back a Ukrainian offensive inside Russia’s borders, have not been seen at the front for about two weeks, the officials said after requesting anonymity to discuss sensitive military and intelligence matters.

Well – that sentences is formally correct. But it would be even more precise to say that ‘North Korean troops have not been seen at the front – since ever.’

The CIA/NYT can’t go there (yet). They still add to the stupid claims:

Many of the soldiers are among North Korea’s best-trained special operations troops, but the Russians appear to have used them as foot soldiers, sending them forth in waves across fields studded with land mines to be mowed down by heavy Ukrainian fire.

Well, where are the pictures and videos of North Korean troops ‘sent forth in waves’ and ‘mowed down by heavy Ukrainian fire’?

In a war where every ground move is surveilled by dozens of drones how come there is not even one video that shows evidence of such a scene?

For now the RAND/Ukraine (dis-)information campaign of ‘North Korean’ soldiers fighting Ukraine has been shut down. U.S. ‘officials’ however keep the door open to relaunch it at a convenient time:

The American officials said the decision to pull the North Korean troops off the front line may not be a permanent one. It is possible, they said, that the North Koreans could return after receiving additional training or after the Russians come up with new ways of deploying them to avoid such heavy casualties.

Maybe a month, a year, or ten from now we will be again told about these imagined ‘enemies’ from North Korea which unite with Russians to ‘fight us’.

Posted by b on January 31, 2025 at 14:48 UTC | Permalink

Russia Matters, 2/3/25

1. “Russia is close to achieving a decisive edge on the energy front of the Russo–Ukrainian war,” argues Theresa Sabonis-Helf of Georgetown University. According to Sabonis-Helf’s estimates in War on the Rocks, Russian attacks have damaged Ukraine’s electrical grid so much that it has become 70% reliant on three complexes of nuclear reactors. “These reactors are increasingly threatened by the instability of the grid itself and could become unsafe to operate, forcing a shutdown and grid collapse,” she warns. Moreover, with Ukraine having submitted to heightened oversight by IAEA, “the decision to shut down its nuclear plants if the perceived risk becomes too high may not be entirely its own,” this Georgetown University professor observes in her data-rich commentary. “We now find ourselves in a moment in which a slow war of attrition could come to an abrupt end, resolved by the triumph of cold and darkness,” she warns.
2. The seizure of Velyka Novosilka, which has been described as a “most important fortified area” of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Donetsk region, underscores the effectiveness of a tactic that Russian forces have been employing to take towns: using its personnel advantage to attack relentlessly, gradually trapping Ukrainian forces in a pincer movement and forcing them to retreat to avoid encirclement, according to NYT’s Constant Méheut. Russia’s seizure of this eastern Ukrainian town “followed a familiar pattern: relentless infantry assaults, devastating casualties, collapsing Ukrainian defenses and their eventual retreat” with the battlefield dominated by drones, and armor playing a minimal role, according to the Economist’s article on this battle, entitled “Amid talk of a ceasefire, Ukraine’s front line is crumbling.” “It would not be accurate to claim that the Russians don’t know how to fight,” Maj. Ivan Sekach of Ukraine’s 110th Brigade, acknowledged in an interview with NYT.

Note: “Frank discussion” is diplomatic speak for “they argued.” – Natylie

Intellinews, 1/30/25

Russian forces have begun withdrawing from Syria, with two cargo vessels, the Sparta II and Sparta, departing from the port of Tartus on January 30, carrying significant military equipment.

The Russian withdrawal follows what appears to be failed negotiations with Syria’s new interim President, Ahmed al-Sharaa, who formally took the position late on January 29. Al-Sharaa has reportedly demanded the extradition of former President Bashar al-Assad, who fled to Moscow in December following the collapse of the Baathist regime. Russia reportedly refused the demand to return the former Syrian leader. 

Dmitry Peskov has declined to comment on the specifics of any deal between the two sides and the departure from Tartus of the Russian military, which now needs to access Russian ports via Istanbul’s Bosphorus or around the Nordic countries.

The Russian foreign ministry later wrote: “During a frank discussion of the entire range of issues in Russian-Syrian relations, the desire to continue to build bilateral multifaceted cooperation based on the principles of traditional friendship and mutual respect between Russia and Syria was emphasised.”

The two bases were crucial to the Russian presence in the region but are also key logistical nodes for its wider operations in the region and Africa.

A Russian delegation, including two presidential special representatives – Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and Alexander Lavrentiev – met with the new Syrian administration in Damascus on January 28.

Recently released verified footage showed columns of Russian vehicles moving north towards the port following the “frank discussions between the two sides.”

This marked the first such meeting since Assad’s departure. They met with Sharaa (previously wanted by the US for a $10mn bounty) and interim government members, including Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani and Health Minister Maher al-Sharaa.

Russia’s Foreign Ministry stressed continuing bilateral cooperation based on “traditional friendship and mutual respect.”

“The importance of the Syrians themselves resolving their internal problems through the establishment of a sustainable political process within the framework of an inclusive dialogue with the participation of the entire spectrum of political forces was emphasised,” it said.

The ministry also indicated a potential willingness to provide “necessary assistance in post-crisis reconstruction” while maintaining that Syria’s internal issues should be resolved through “inclusive dialogue with participation from all political forces.”

The situation puts at risk Russia’s significant military presence in Syria, including the naval base in Tartus and the Khmeimim air base near Latakia.

While Russia could theoretically seek new bases in Libya, such moves could face opposition, with Turkey already reportedly moving Syrian fighters into North Africa.

The withdrawal appears to present two possibilities: either Russia has found the new regime’s conditions unacceptable, or the military withdrawal is a temporary measure during negotiations.

Based on the Foreign Ministry’s carefully worded statements, Russia appears unwilling to extradite Assad but may be open to discussing other forms of cooperation.

By Gordon Hahn, Russian & Eurasian Politics, 2/2/25

U.S. President Donald Trump is apparently intent on achieving peace at a rapid pace, having set a 100 day window for accomplishing this exceedingly complex political task. Aside from such a time table’s lack of realism, there are other factors that will render it soon out of date. Primary is the deteriorating state of the Ukrainian army’s capacity to hold back the powerful Russian armed forces now arrayed against it. The front may suffer a catastrophic collapse before Trump’s presumed deadline, giving Russia an even greater upper hand in talks.

The collapse of Ukraine’s defense fronts along all or nearly the entire line of combat – which stretches from Kherson just north of Crimea to the east, then north through Donetsk to Kharkiv and Sumy – appears imminent. Some fronts may hold longer but are unlikely to survive 2025. All last year, Russian territorial gains and, for the most part of the year, Ukrainian casualties have increased with each passing month, as I predicted would be the case over a year ago (https://youtu.be/P_MJi5H6HKU?si=rxRiaE0EglSgbclw at the 1:00:45 mark). The territorial advance now is accelerating at an ever more rapid pace and could lead to major breakthroughs to the Dnepr (Dnieper) River at any time now.

At the same time, the state of the Ukrainian military is disastrous. The military mobilization passed and being carried out this year with such a debilitating effect on the economy and society is failing to replace current losses at the front with completely inexperienced recruits with low to no morale (www.youtube.com/watch?v=r8yMTGKURYU). There are reportedly no more volunteers, and by spring some Ukrainian officials report the situation will be irretrievable. Moreover, almost all new recruits are old or unmotivated, The Economist reports (https://ctrana.one/news/475629-nekhvatka-soldat-v-vsu-stanet-kritichnoj-vesnoj-the-economist.html).

Commanders at the front, such as commander of the drone battalion of Ukraine’s 30th mechanized brigade, confirm that the 2024 mobilization has been an absolute failure, and there are now too few men to replace battle losses (https://ria.ru/20250113/mobilizatsiya-1993456847.html?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fdzen.ru%2Fnews%2Fstory%2F1af5d353-85ec-5374-a9d8-e07753fbda13). The mobilization that does occur is carried out by harsh, frequently violent measures. Verkhovna Rada deputy Aleksandr Bakumov from Zelenskiy’s own ‘Servants of the People’ party declared in session that mobilisation in Kharkiv Region is coerced, resembling filtration of Ukrainian population (referring to practice of detaining, beating, and torturing citizens of occupied areas in an ostensible search for fighters and collaborators), with exits from the city blockaded by ‘recruitment’ press gangs and lawyers of mobilized men get beaten. Small businesses are undergoing mass closures because of lack of workers willing to go outside for fear of being pressed into the army. Others have reported falsification of data to justify recruitment (https://ctrana.one/news/478468-v-verkhovnoj-rade-zajavili-o-bespredele-ttsk-v-kharkove-video-vystuplenija.html and https://x.com/leonidragozin/status/1881280945644605814). There are numerous reports and videos of violence being used by recruitment gangs. In addition, many men are fleeing the country in greater numbers in order to avoid Ukraine’s desperate and draconian  forced mobilization measures, sometimes at great risk to their lives and to sociopolitical stability. Most recently, Western governments have reportedly been pressuring Kiev to extend the mobilization to the age cohort of 18-25, which would bring a near catastrophic demographic collapse to a population already depleted by some 30 percent because of war deaths and emigration (https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-war-biden-draft-08e3bad195585b7c3d9662819cc5618f). Even the recrutiment centers themselves are attempting to avoid the draft. When Rada deputies proposed closing the personnel shortage by creating a brigade from among the mobilization gangs, the chairman of the mobilization centers claimed there were not enough of them to form a full brigade (https://ctrana.one/news/475129-v-ttsk-objasnili-pochemu-nelzja-vsekh-ikh-rabotnikov-poslat-na-front.html). Low numbers of volunteers and failed mobilization are creating distortions in force structure. ‘Zombi-brigades’ or ‘paper brigades’ are partially-manned units merely called brigades in order to impress Western donors and facilitate corruption for commanders who seize the salaries designated for non-existing personnel (https://ctrana.one/news/476359-bezuhlaja-raskritikovala-komandovanie-vsu-za-situatsiju-s-brihadoj-anna-kievskaja.html).

The large number of desertions from the Ukrainian military, a phenomenon wholly ignored in the Western media for three years, were revealed finally in November to have exceeded 100,000 since the war began (https://apnews.com/article/deserters-awol-ukraine-russia-war-def676562552d42bc5d593363c9e5ea0). This would amount to perhaps more than 10 precent of the Ukrainian army at its present size, given Zelenskiy’s recent claim it numbers 800,000 (https://t.me/stranaua/183652). Moreover, more than half those desertions occurred in the first ten months of 2024 alone (https://apnews.com/article/deserters-awol-ukraine-russia-war-def676562552d42bc5d593363c9e5ea0). This is already desertion on a massive scale and includes mass desertions (https://www.ft.com/content/9b25288d-8258-4541-81b0-83b00ad8a03f; https://ctrana.one/news/476730-zhurnalist-bojko-rasskazal-o-problemakh-v-vsu.html). Military blogger Yurii Butusov, Servants of the People deputy Maryana Bezuglaya, and others reported late last year on the desertion of an entire 1,000-man brigade trained in France immediately upon their arrival at the front. This may have been a case of a commander’s unsuccessful attempt to form what are called ‘zombi-brigades’ (https://ctrana.one/news/476748-jurij-butusov-zajavil-o-massovom-dezertirstve-v-brihade-vsu-anna-kievskaja.html and https://ctrana.one/news/476359-bezuhlaja-raskritikovala-komandovanie-vsu-za-situatsiju-s-brihadoj-anna-kievskaja.html). Indeed, military personnel have questioned the recent practice of creating new brigades when existing ones are woefully undermanned, apparently suspecting the corruption scheme lurking behind this practice (https://ctrana.one/news/474755-v-vsu-objasnili-zachem-sozdavat-novye-brihady-vmesto-popolnenija-sushchestvujushchikh.html). One Ukrainian commander told a Polish newspaper that sometimes in battle there are more deserters than killed and wounded (https://t.me/stranaua/180095).

Desertions are one symptom of lax discipline and especially low morale increasingly plaguing the Ukrainian army. Commanders are reporting that 90 percent of their troops on the frontlines are new, coercively mobilized men (https://ctrana.news/news/475190-v-vsu-sejchas-vojujut-v-osnovnom-zhiteli-sel-horodskim-lehche-sprjatatsja-ot-ttsk.html; https://t.me/rezident_ua/25314 (video); and https://ctrana.one/news/476730-zhurnalist-bojko-rasskazal-o-problemakh-v-vsu.html). Sources in the Ukrainian General Staff report similarly (https://ctrana.one/news/476708-kuda-ischez-million-ukrainskikh-soldat.html). Thus, desertions are accompanied by unauthorized retreats, which are increasing in frequency. For example, hundreds ran from battle at one point last autumn in Vugledar (Ugledar) before it fell (www.ft.com/content/9b25288d-8258-4541-81b0-83b00ad8a03f). Vugledar was once a solid stronghold, which in 2023 Russian forces stormed tens of times with no results. Ukrainians soldiers are refusing to carry out operational orders because they amount to suicide operations and are beginning to surrender as whole units, in one case nearly a full battalion (e.g., 92nd Combat). Indeed, refusals to follow orders or undertake counteroffensive measures are increasing. In one recent case, the Azov Brigade’s chief of staff, Bogdan Koretich, accused a Ukrainian general of such poor command that he was described as being responsible for more Ukrainian war dead than the Russians, forcing his removal (www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/06/24/7462293/). At lower levels, commanders are being fired in large numbers (https://strana.news/news/467266-itohi-852-dnja-vojny-v-ukraine.html). One reason for the disintegrating discipline and morale is that there is no relief for troops, as there is no long term‚ demobilization or time away from the front other than that coming from episodic brief rotations of troops—a consequence of insufficient troop numbers. Soldiers and their relatives have been lobbying for well over year for a law on demobilization that would routinize long rotations for troops to visit home, but no such law is visible on the horizon. Such would likely lead to a fatal troop shortage and the Ukrainian army’s full rout on the battlefield.

However, perhaps the main problem in the Ukrainian army, as in the rest of Ukrainian state and society, is corruption. It is endemic and omnipresent in arms production and procurement, mobilization (draft evasion by bribe), purchasing of leave and absence from the front, and manning brigades. One Ukrainian Defense Minister told a journalist that the problem is catastrophic“ (https://ctrana.one/news/476708-kuda-ischez-million-ukrainskikh-soldat.html). Independent Rada deputy Anna Skorokhod claims that only 15 percent (!) of servicemen on the personnel roles are serving at the front, with large numbers either non-existent (dead souls) in service or having bribed their way into hiding somewhere in the rear (https://ctrana.one/news/476708-kuda-ischez-million-ukrainskikh-soldat.html). 

This is how Ukrainian officers describe the mass-scale of corruption in the army. Ukrainian army captain: “Due to false reports about the presence of personnel, the commanders of the directions receive false information. And they operate with ‚dead souls‘, developing combat plans. For example, somewhere the Russians have broken through a section of the front, the commander gives an order to a certain brigade to send a battalion with an attached group to reinforce. In fact, the battalion has been gone for a long time, its number is no more than a company — some have bought off their way to the rear or deserted. As a result, there is nothing to close the breakthrough, because of the threat, the flanks of neighboring brigades begin to crumble.”

Ukrainian Armed Forces General Staff source: “If we take how many Russian troops we have at the front on paper, then if the Russians have an advantage in numbers, it is less than twofold. But that is on paper. In practice, the situation is different. Let’s imagine a separate section of the front. According to the papers, there are 100 people on our side, and 150 on the Russian side. That is, the enemy’s advantage is insignificant. With such numbers, it is quite possible to keep the defense. But during a real battle, the situation is radically different. At most 40 of our 100 people participate in it. And often even less. The rest are deserters, who simply refuse to fight, and the like. And Russians have 140-145 out of 150 people going into battle. In total, the advantage has already more than tripled. Why does this situation exist? Our army was initially based on a core of volunteers, ATO veterans, and highly motivated soldiers who went into battle without coercion and took the initiative. Russians had a big problem with motivation from the very beginning. But they worked on this issue and gradually created their own military-repressive system of coercion. And it works by sending soldiers into battle and stopping cases of insubordination and desertion. We did not create anything like this. And I doubt that we are even capable of creating such a system. Our state system is too weak and too corrupt for this. And now that the volunteers have died, died of injury, or simply burned out, and the army is being replenished with fake conscripts who have close to zero motivation, there are no ways to force them to fight. A separate problem is the quality of the command staff and the combat management system. There are also very big failures here, because many experienced commanders died and worthy replacements do not always come after them.” (https://ctrana.one/news/476708-kuda-ischez-million-ukrainskikh-soldat.html).

This is a state of corruption, low morale, and incapacity reminiscent of the late, recently collpased Syrian army of Bashir al-Assad.

This sort of Ukrainian army along with its collapse comprises multiple threats to both the Maidan regime and the Ukrainian state beyond that posed by the advancing Russian army. I wrote some time back: “With the front collapsing and the army on the verge of dissolving, Zelenskiy’s post-Maidan regime is deeply divided and in danger of dissolution, which could bring state collapse, internecine warfare, and widespread chaos” (https://gordonhahn.com/2024/12/10/the-second-great-ukrainian-ruin-revisited/). The troops of a collapsed Ukrainian army will become a force that can sow chaos and/or be marshalled by a military or civilian leader towards the execution of a coup and perhaps a neofascist revolution or by peripheral and local figures to establish separate fiefdoms. Recall that during the Maidan demonstrations, leaders in Lvov and elsewhere first broached the idea of separating from then Yanukovych-controlled Ukraine. After the Maidan revolt and Yanukovych’s overthrow, it was Crimea and Donbas that moved towards separatism. Trump and his counterparts in Moscow, Kiev, and Brussels will need to make peace expeditiously in order to achieve a peace that avoids the long standoff and prospects for a new war in Ukraine that will be inherent in any unilateral, Russian imposed peace and Ukrainian capitulation and/or conquest as well as the danger of state collapse that could precede a Russian all-out victory. Indeed, it appears only Trump’s rapid peace can preempt the Ukrainian army’s full rout and collapse and save what remains of the Ukrainian state.