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The Bell: Economic Constraints on Russia’s “Special Military Operation”?

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The Bell is a non-establishment Russian media outlet.

The Bell, 4/25/22

In this week’s newsletter, we’ll review the economic impact of the first two months of fighting in Ukraine, and discuss two key questions: how long can the Kremlin continue to afford its ‘special military operation’ and can the Russian economy hold out? The Russian Ministry of Defense recently announced new military goals that suggest the so-called ‘special military operation’ could go on for much longer than many first thought.

Not just Donbas

The acting commander of Russia’s Central Military District Rustam Minnekayev laid out Friday the aims of the second stage of Russia’s ‘special military operation’. His words amounted to the first official confirmation that Russian forces are seeking to take direct control of land outside the eastern Ukrainian region of Donbas. The ‘new aims’ include:

  • Full control over Donbas;
  • A land corridor to Crimea;
  • A possible land bridge to Transnistria, a breakaway region of Moldova.

The second and third points from Minnekayev’s statement are significant. “This [control over Donbas] makes it possible to establish a land corridor to Crimea, and also to influence Ukraine’s vital [military] facilities and the Black Sea ports where agricultural and metallurgical products are delivered,” Minnekayev said, according to state-owned news agency ТАSS.

Up until Minnekayev, Russian officials have said nothing publicly about seeking a land corridor to Crimea – something that means taking permanent control over the city of Kherson and the southern part of Ukraine’s Zaporozhye region. During March peace talks in Istanbul, the question of a “land corridor” (as opposed to the status of Donbas) was not raised, a source close to the negotiations told The Bell at the time.

The third point is even more radical. “Control over southern Ukraine opens another route to Transnistria, where we are also aware of the oppression of the Russian-speaking population,” Minnkayev said. President Vladimir Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov refused to comment on Minnkayev’s words, referring journalists to the Defense Ministry.

Russian control of a route to Transnistria would leave Ukraine completely cut off from the Black Sea. Economically, it would close Ukraine’s main export channel and cut off all maritime trade. From an operational point of view, it’s impossible for Russia to achieve this without taking Mykolaiv and Odesa (Ukraine’s biggest port city with 1 million inhabitants). It implies that Russia wants control of the entire Ukrainian coastline: from the Dnieper estuary in the East to the Dniester in the West (on the border with Moldova).

What do we know about the current situation?

Statements by officials and publicly available data means we can state the following:

Donbas. Currently, Russia’s most significant public goal is the “complete liberation of Donbas”. In pursuit of this, Russian troops are fighting alongside units from the separatist People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. Russia formally sees these areas as independent nations. In the open countryside around Luhansk, Russian forces have taken control of Izyum. However, in the more urban landscape of the Donetsk Region, which has been fortified by the Ukrainian military since 2014, progress is less clear: at present, barely 50 percent of the region is controlled by Russian forces. For the moment, the main hot spots appear to be Popasna, Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, which block Russia’s path to the Ukrainian strongholds of Kramatorsk and Slavyansk.

The thinking behind Russia’s current deployment is clearly informed by the major encirclements of the Second World War: Russian forces want to surround some of the largest and best-trained units of the Ukrainian army by striking from north and south. State-owned news agency Sputnik, for example, reported this plan with reference to Ministry of Defense information. The problem, of course, is that Ukraine (which is starting to take delivery of heavy weaponry) is well aware of Russian intentions.

At the start of this week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that the “battle for Donbas” was already underway. However, the operational reports from both sides suggest that a large-scale Russian offensive has yet to properly begin.

Southern Ukraine. At present there is a de facto land corridor linking the annexed Crimea peninsula with Russia’s southern Rostov region. Since the start of March, Russian forces have held the Ukrainian city of Kherson and strategic points in the lower Dnieper at Kakhovka (Kherson Region) and Enerhodar (Zaporozhye Region). The battle for control of the eastern part of this corridor led to the fierce fighting around Volnovakha in March, and there is on-going fighting at Polohy and Huliaipole. The corridor includes Mariupol, Ukraine’s largest port on the Azov Sea, which is almost entirely under Russian control.

There was growing discussion last week in Russia about the political future of these acquisitions. In particular, there was extensive coverage in Russian state-owned media of a “people’s gathering” calling for the small Rozovsky district of Ukraine’s Zaporozhye region to be added to the Donetsk People’s Republic. The deputy head of the Russian parliament’s committee on CIS affairs Konstantin Zatulin suggested Thursday the creation of a new “Tavriya province” and this idea – recreating Tavriya from Kherson region and parts of Zaporozhye and Crimea – was subsequently backed bySergei Tsekov, senator for Crimea and a member of the committee for international affairs. Ukrainian officials claim that plans are in place to stage a May referendum on the creation of a ‘People’s Republic of Kherson’.

Does Russia have the money to continue the ‘military operation’?

Yes. Under the current sanctions, Russia has the funds to continue the ‘special military operation’ for at least two years without any cuts to social spending, economists told The Bell. Speaking on condition of anonymity, an economic analyst at one foreign bank said: “We have plenty of direct financial resources to continue [the special military operation], the only question is how much people are willing to endure.”

Russia’s finances are being managed by capable officials, according to an oil and gas analyst from a major U.S. company. Problems, including for the military, are more likely to arise from difficulties in buying parts — rather than from a lack of money.

Oil and gas revenues. If you assume a base case scenario in which there is no Western energy embargo on Russia, then the average annual price of Russia’s Urals crude is expected to be $70-75 per barrel. This figure takes into account the ‘Urals discount’ (currently an enormous $40 per barrel as a result of a boycott of Russian crude), and a reduction in imports. That figure would enable the Kremlin to continue funding all its activities – including military activities in Ukraine and the indexation of social benefits – for at least two years without difficulty, a leading analyst at one of Russia’s biggest banks told The Bell.

Exports of oil and oil products will drop about 11 percent (to 1 million barrels a day) in 2022 and total Russian oil production will fall by up to 8 percent, according to the head of a Kremlin-connected think tank. However, the rising price of Urals crude – up at least 10 percent even allowing for the discount to Brent – means the money generated from energy exports will increase. Natural gas prices are expected to stay high for years to come, a source told The Bell, with average prices likely about double the level of 2021.

The budget. Prior to the ‘special military operation’, Russia’s finances were in good shape: there was a surplus of more than 500 billion rubles in 2021, the equivalent of about 0.4 percent of GDP. The 2022 budget is based on an extremely pessimistic average price of $44.2 for Urals crude, and an average exchange rate of 72.1 rubles to the dollar (as of April 22, the actual rate was 75.5 rubles to the dollar).

Russia can even cope with a small budget deficit – if it did occur, the Finance Ministry would likely dip into the National Wealth Fund (as it did during the pandemic). At the start of this month, the fund had liquid reserves worth 9.7 trillion rubles ($130 billion). The Central Bank has cautioned that it won’t “mirror” spending from the fund with the sale of foreign currency, but there would be little impact on inflation from this due to currency controls, a source told The Bell.

Russia’s ability to finance its military adventures in Ukraine is determined by revenue, the structure of expenditure and the ability to deal with any deficit. But there is room for maneuver. For example, it would be possible to avoid a sharp reduction in non-military spending by increasing the deficit. “Without borrowing, Russia’s reserves are worth 6-7 percent of its GDP, an amount quite sufficient to support increased military expenditure and cushion the fall in other spending for at least two years,” one economist told The Bell.

Under a more extreme scenario (for example, a European oil embargo or oil cartel OPEC increasing production), there could be a significant drop in oil and gas revenue. If this happens, the government could cut-back on social spending (like halting pay rises for civil servants or replacing index-linked pensions with one-off payments). Alternatively, it could cut-back on investment.

As long as Russia can sell its oil and gas, there will be sufficient resources to keep the economy afloat, according to an energy analyst at a U.S. company. Despite the restrictions imposed since February, Russia increased oil supplies by tanker to Europe in April to 1.6 million barrels a day, compared with 1.3 million barrels a day the previous month.

How is the economy faring?

Central Bank chief Elvia Nabiullina warned last week that the economy will enter a period of “structural transformation” (i.e. a real crisis) in the second or third quarter of this year.

For the moment, there is little indication of a coming storm. Nationwide indicators in March showed no sign of a decline in economic activity. This is largely because manufacturers have stocks of parts and raw materials, according to analysts at the Central Banks.

Businesses will start running into problems in May or June, said Natalya Zubarevich, a regional expert at Moscow State University. “All companies are desperately seeking alternatives in terms of [suppliers] of components and markets. It is unclear how quickly they will find them, but it’s unlikely to be done in a month. May-June is the time when the reserves run out,” she told The Bell.

Nor is the macroeconomic situation disastrous: huge inflows of foreign currency from exports go hand-in-hand with a sharp reduction in imports, so the balance of payments is positive, Zubarevich explained. “Sanctions are a long play. It won’t spark a collapse tomorrow. Degradation, and the emergence of shortages, will be gradual,” she said.

Meanwhile, household incomes have fallen due to inflation, Zubarevich added. In March, annual inflation jumped to 16.7 percent from 9.2 percent in February; as of April 15, it was at 17.6 percent, its highest for 20 years.

What happens next?

A recession is likely to be of “transformational, structural character” and it’s difficult to say when it could end, according to Central Bank analysts. “The persistence of supply shocks means this recession could be very deep and the timeframe to exit extended,” they wrote.

Anything requiring high-tech goods could be particularly badly affected. Not even localization will replace many unique components (this process was described by economist Oleg Itskhoki in a March interview with The Bell). The first threats are to car manufacture and the electronics industry, Central Bank analysts believe. Indeed, the reluctance of foreign businesses to operate in Russia might prove more damaging than formal Western sanctions.

Russia’s potential for economic growth will also decrease as efficiency falls because of a partial switch to less sophisticated, lower quality and more expensive imports.

The Central Bank analysts expect a “structural transformation” of the Russian economy will come in four phases: 1) adaptation; 2) adjustment to new conditions (by the end of the year) involving a the return of “shuttle” small businesses and an increased role for intermediaries in foreign trade; 3) “reverse industrialization” of the economy, i.e. industrialization based on the development of less advanced technologies; 4) the conclusion of the structural adjustment and a new economic balance based on less sophisticated technologies.

Yulia Starostina, Sergei Smirnov, Peter Mironenko

Translated by Andy Potts, edited by Howard Amos

The Bell is a weekly newsletter in English, twice-daily in Russian. We give you the essential insider view on Russian politics and business in a 5 minute read.

AMERICAN DISSENT ON UKRAINE IS DYING IN DARKNESS: Robert Scheer Interviews Professor Michael J. Brenner

Professor Michael Brenner

https://www.kcrw.com/culture/shows/scheer-intelligence/american-dissent-on-ukraine-is-dying-in-darkness

Popular Resistance, 4/16/22

As the death toll in Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine continues to rise, there have only been a handful of Westerners publicly questioning NATO and the West’s role in the conflict. These voices are becoming fewer and further between as a wave of feverish backlash engulfs any dissent on the subject. One of these voices belongs to Professor Michael J. Brenner, a lifelong academic, Professor Emeritus of International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh and a Fellow of the Center for Transatlantic Relations at SAIS/Johns Hopkins, as well as former Director of the International Relations & Global Studies Program at the University of Texas. Brenner’s credentials also include having worked at the Foreign Service Institute, the U.S. Department of Defense and Westinghouse, and written several books on American foreign policy. From the vantage point of decades of experience and studies, the intellectual regularly shared his thoughts on topics of interest through a mailing list sent to thousands of readers—that is until the response to his Ukraine analysis made him question why he bothered in the first place.

In an email with the subject line “Quittin’ Time,” Brenner recently declared that, aside from having already said his piece on Ukraine, one of the main reasons he sees for giving up on expressing his opinions on the subject is that “it is manifestly obvious that our society is not capable of conducting an honest, logical, reasonably informed discourse on matters of consequence. Instead, we experience fantasy, fabrication, fatuousness and fulmination.” He goes on to decry President Joe Biden’s alarming comments in Poland when he all but revealed that the U.S. is—and perhaps has always been—interested in a Russian regime change.

On this week’s “Scheer Intelligence,” Brenner tells host Robert Scheer how the recent attacks he received—many of a personal, ad hominem nature—were some of the most vitriolic he’s ever experienced. The two discuss how many media narratives completely leave out that the eastward expansion of NATO, among other Western aggressions against Russia, played an important part in fueling the current humanitarian crisis. Corporate media’s “cartoonish” depiction of Russian president Vladimir Putin, adds Brenner, is not only misleading, but dangerous given the nuclear brinkmanship that has ensued. Listen to the full discussion between Brenner and Scheer as they continue to dissent despite living in an America that is seemingly increasingly hostile to any opinion that strays from the official line.

Moscow Times: Ex-Crimea Prosecutor Poklonskaya Slams Russia’s Pro-War ‘Z’ Symbol

Natalia Poklonskaya

Moscow Times, 4/20/22

As some may recall, Poklonskaya was known in some Russian media as the Crimean cutie after Crimea’s reunification with Russia, a move she celebrated. Her speaking out in any way in opposition to Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine is significant. – Natylie

Natalia Poklonskaya has issued a harsh criticism of the pro-war Z symbol that has spread across Russia, the latest anti-war comments from the former Crimean prosecutor and onetime Russian lawmaker.

The Latin letter — first seen displayed on Russian military vehicles entering Poklonskaya’s country of birth — has come to symbolize the public’s support for Russian troops. The Z has been prominently displayed on buildings, flash mobs organized at schools and universities, merchandise sold online and even on the Russian Easter cake known as kulich.

“This letter Z symbolizes tragedy and grief for both Russia and Ukraine,” Poklonskaya, who had staunchly supported Moscow’s annexation of Crimea, said in an interview with a popular YouTube channel Tuesday.

The comments sparked widespread criticism, including from Poklonskaya’s immediate boss at Russia’s state agency for international outreach, Rossotrudnichestvo, where she is deputy director after serving a tumultuous term in Russia’s lower house of parliament.

Rossotrudnichestvo head Yevgeny Primakov on Wednesday said the letters Z and V are “symbols of the very liberation of Ukraine from the obvious evil of terrorists and bandits.”

“What I am saying is that it is dangerous to blindly worship any symbols — history does not like that,” Poklonskaya wrote in response to the criticism.

Poklonskaya’s break with Russia’s official line that it is carrying out a “special military operation” to “de-Nazify and demilitarize” Ukraine is practically unheard of for a sitting official.

Last week, she referred to Russia’s invasion of her native Ukraine as a “catastrophe.”

“People are dying, houses and entire cities are destroyed [leaving] millions of refugees. Bodies and souls are mutilated. My heart is bursting with pain.”

“My two native countries are killing each other, that’s not what I wanted and it’s not what I want,” she said in a video address to an international forum.

Earlier in April, Poklonskaya said Ukrainian society has “changed” in the eight years since the war with pro-Russian separatists broke out in the east and that Ukrainians “would not greet Russia with flowers.”

“Ukraine is not Russia,” she told a popular YouTube blogger.

Poklonskaya, 42, was a prosecutor in Ukraine until 2014, when she resigned and was appointed prosecutor general of annexed Crimea. She was elected to the lower-house State Duma in 2016, but did not seek re-election in 2021.

Jacques Baud: The Military Situation in the Ukraine—An Update

By Jacques Baud, Postil Magazine, 4/11/22

Jacques Baud is a former colonel of the General Staff, ex-member of the Swiss strategic intelligence, and specialist on Eastern countries. He was trained in the American and British intelligence services. He has served as Policy Chief for United Nations Peace Operations.

The Operational Situation

As of March 25, 2022, our analysis of the situation confirms the observations and conclusions made in mid-March.

The offensive launched on February 24 is articulated in two lines of effort, in accordance with Russian operational doctrine:

1) A main effort directed toward the south of the country, in the Donbass region, and along the Azov Sea coast. As the doctrine states, the main objectives are—the neutralization of the Ukrainian armed forces (the objective of “demilitarization”), and the neutralization of ultra-nationalist, paramilitary militias in the cities of Kharkov and Mariupol (the objective of “denazification“). This primary push is being led by a coalition of forces: through Kharkov and Crimea are Russian forces from the Southern Military District; in the center are militia forces from the Donetsk and Lugansk republics; the Chechen National Guard is contributing with engagement in the urban area of Mariupol;

2) A secondary effort on Kiev, aimed at “pinning down” Ukrainian (and Western) forces, so as to prevent them from carrying out operations against the main thrust or even taking Russian coalition forces from the rear.

This offensive follows, to the letter, the objectives defined by Vladimir Putin on February 24. But, listening only to their own bias, Western “experts” and politicians have gotten it into their heads that Russia’s objective is to take over the Ukraine and overthrow its government. Applying a very Western logic, they see Kiev as the “center of gravity” (Schwerpunkt) of Ukrainian forces. According to Clausewitz, the “center of gravity” is the element from which a belligerent derives his strength and ability to act, and is therefore the primary objective of an adversary’s strategy. This is why Westerners have systematically tried to take control of capitals in the wars they have fought. Trained and advised by NATO experts, the Ukrainian General Staff has, predictably enough, applied the same logic, focusing on strengthening the defense of Kiev and its surroundings, while leaving its troops helpless in the Donbass, along the axis of the main Russian effort.

If one had listened carefully to Vladimir Putin, one would have realized that the strategic objective of the Russian coalition is not to take over the Ukraine, but to remove any threat to the Russian-speaking population of the Donbass. According to this general objective, the “real” center of gravity that the Russian coalition is trying to target is the bulk of the Ukrainian armed forces massed in the south-southeast of the country (since the end of 2021), and not Kiev.

Russian Success or Failure?

Convinced that the Russian offensive is aimed at Kiev, Western experts have quite logically concluded that (a) the Russians are stalling, and that (b) their offensive is doomed to failure because they will not be able to hold the country in the long term. The generals who have followed each other on French TV seem to have forgotten what even a second lieutenant comprehends well: “Know your enemy!”—not as one would like him to be, but as he is. With generals like that, we don’t need an enemy anymore.

That being said, the Western narrative about a Russian offensive that is bogged down, and whose successes are meager, is also part of the propaganda war waged by both sides. For example, the sequence of maps of operations, published by Libération from the end of February, shows almost no difference from one day to the next, until March 18th (when the media stopped updating it). Thus, on February 23rd, on France 5 [TV station], the journalist Élise Vincent evaluated the territory taken by the Russian coalition as the equivalent of Switzerland or the Netherlands. In reality, we are more in the area of Great Britain.

As an example, let us observe the difference between the map of the situation on March 25, 2022, as published by Ouest-France:

… and as published by the French Ministry of the Armed Forces:

In addition, it should be noted that Ukrainian forces do not appear on any map (presented in our media) of the conflict-situation. Thus, if the map of the French Ministry of Armed Forces gives a slightly more honest picture of reality, it also carefully avoids mentioning the Ukrainian forces encircled in the Kramatorsk cauldron.

In fact, the situational map, as of March 25, should look more like this:

The Situation as of March 25, 2022. [“Poussée principale”= main thrust;

“poussée secondaire”= secondary thrust]. The bone-shaped, blue area marks the location of the mass of the Ukrainian army (in reality, this “massed” Ukrainian army is split into several smaller cauldrons). The red-lined arrows show the overall offensive of the Russian army. The orange-lined arrows show the thrust of the Donbass forces. The red dotted line shows the maximum advance of Russian coalition forces.

Moreover, Ukrainian forces are never indicated on our maps, as this would show that they were not deployed on the Russian border in February 2022, but were regrouped in the south of the country, in preparation for their offensive, the initial phase of which began on February 16th. This confirms that Russia was only reacting to a situation initiated by the West, by way of the Ukraine, as we shall see. At present, it is these forces that are encircled in the Kramatorsk cauldron and are being methodically fragmented and neutralized, little by little, in an incremental way, by the Russian coalition.

The vagueness maintained in the West about the situation of the Ukrainian forces, has other effects. First, it maintains the illusion of a possible Ukrainian victory. Thus, instead of encouraging a negotiation process, the West seeks to prolong the war. This is why the European Union and some of its member countries have sent weapons and are encouraging the civilian population and volunteers of all kinds to go and fight, often without training and without any real command structure—with deadly consequences.

We know that in a conflict, each party tends to inform in order to give a favorable image of its actions. However, the image we have of the situation and of the Ukrainian forces is based exclusively on data provided by Kiev. It masks the profound deficiencies of the Ukrainian leadership, even though it was trained and advised by NATO military.

Thus, military logic would have the forces caught in the Kramatorsk cauldron withdraw to a line at the Dnieper, for example, in order to regroup and conduct a counteroffensive. But they were forbidden to withdraw by President Zelensky. Even back in 2014 and 2015, a close examination of the operations showed that the Ukrainians were applying “Western-style” schemes, totally unsuited to the circumstances, and in the face of a more imaginative, more flexible opponent who possessed lighter leadership structures. It is the same phenomenon today.

In the end, the partial view of the battlefield given to us by our media has made it impossible for the West to help the Ukrainian general staff make the right decisions. And it has led the West to believe that the obvious strategic objective is Kiev; that “demilitarization” is aimed at the Ukraine’s membership in NATO; and that “denazification” is aimed at toppling Zelensky. This legend was fueled by Vladimir Putin’s appeal to the Ukrainian military to disobey, which was interpreted (with great imagination and bias) as a call to overthrow the government. However, this appeal was aimed at the Ukrainian forces deployed in the Donbass to surrender without fighting. The Western interpretation caused the Ukrainian government to misjudge Russian objectives and misuse its potential of winning.

You don’t win a war with bias—you lose it. And that’s what is happening. Thus, the Russian coalition was never “on the run” or “stopped” by heroic resistance—it simply did not attack where it was expected. We did not want to listen to what Vladimir Putin had explained to us very clearly. This is why the West has thus become—volens nolens—the main architect of the Ukrainian defeat that is taking shape. Paradoxically, it is probably because of our self-proclaimed “experts” and recreational strategists on our television sets that the Ukraine is in this situation today.

The Conduct of Battle

As for the course of operations, the analyses presented in our media come most often from politicians or so-called military experts, who relay Ukrainian propaganda.

Let’s be clear. A war, whatever else it is, is drama. The problem here is that our strategists in neckties are clearly trying to overdramatize the situation in order to exclude any negotiated solution. This development, however, is prompting some Western military personnel to speak out and offer a more nuanced judgment. Thus, in Newsweek, an analyst from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the American equivalent of the Direction du Renseignement Militaire (DRM) in France, noted that “in 24 days of conflict, Russia has carried out some 1,400 strikes and launched nearly 1,000 missiles (by way of comparison, the United States carried out more strikes and launched more missiles on the first day of the Iraq war in 2003).”

While the West likes to “soften up” the battlefield with intensive and prolonged strikes, before sending in ground-troops, the Russians prefer a less destructive, but more troop-intensive approach. On France 5, the journalist Mélanie Tarvant presented the death of Russian generals on the battlefield as proof of the destabilization of the Russian army. But this is a profound misunderstanding of the traditions and modes of operation of the Russian army. Whereas in the West, commanders tend to lead from the rear, their Russian counterparts tend to lead from the front—in the West they say, “Forward!” In Russia, they say, “Follow me!” This explains the high losses in the upper echelons of command, already observed in Afghanistan—but it also tells of the much more rigorous selection of staff-personnel than in the West.

Furthermore, the DIA analyst noted that “the vast majority of the airstrikes are over the battlefield, with Russian aircraft providing ‘close air support’ to ground forces. The remainder—less than 20 percent, according to U.S. experts—has been aimed at military airfields, barracks and supporting depots.” Thus, the phrase “indiscriminate bombing [that] is devastating cities and killing everyone” echoed by the Western media seems to contradict the U.S. intelligence expert, who said, “If we merely convince ourselves that Russia is bombing indiscriminately, or [that] it is failing to inflict more harm because its personnel are not up to the task or because it is technically inept, then we are not seeing the real conflict.”

In fact, Russian operations differ fundamentally from the Western concept of the same. The West’s obsession with having no fatalities in their own forces leads them to operations that are primarily in the form of very lethal air strikes. Ground troops only intervene when everything has been destroyed. This is why, in Afghanistan or in the Sahel, Westerners killed more civilians than terrorists did. This is why Western countries engaged in Afghanistan, the Middle East and North Africa no longer publish the number of civilian casualties caused by their strikes. In fact, Europeans engaged in regions that only marginally affect their national security, such as the Estonians in the Sahel, go there just to “get their feet wet.”

In the Ukraine, the situation is very different. One only has to look at a map of linguistic zones to see that the Russian coalition operates almost exclusively in the Russian-speaking zone; thus, among populations that are generally favorable to it. This also explains the statements of a US Air Force officer: “I know that the news keeps repeating that Putin is targeting civilians, but there is no evidence that Russia is intentionally doing so.”

Conversely, it is for the same reason—but in a different way—that the Ukraine has deployed its ultra-nationalist paramilitary fighters in major cities, such as Mariupol or Kharkov—without emotional or cultural ties to the local population, these militias can fight even at the cost of heavy civilian casualties. The atrocities that are currently being uncovered remain hidden by the French-speaking media, for fear of losing support for the Ukraine, as noted by media close to the Republicans in the United States.

After “decapitation” strikes in the first minutes of the offensive, the Russian operational strategy was to bypass the urban centers, and to envelop the Ukrainian army, “pinned down” by the forces of the Donbass republics. It is important to remember that the “decapitation” is not intended to annihilate the general staff or the government (as our “experts” tend to understand it), but to sunder the leadership structures so as to prevent the coordinated maneuver of forces. On the contrary, the aim is to preserve the leadership structures themselves in order to be able to negotiate a way out of the crisis.

On March 25, 2022, after having sealed the cauldron of Kramatorsk which denied any possibility of retreat to the Ukrainians and having taken most of the cities of Kharkov and Marioupol, Russia has practically fulfilled its objectives—all that remains is to concentrate its efforts on reducing the pockets of resistance. Thus, contrary to what the Western press has claimed, this is not a reorientation or a resizing of its offensive, but the methodical implementation of the objectives announced on February 24.

The Role of the Volunteers

A particularly disturbing aspect of this conflict is the attitude of European governments that allow or encourage their citizens to go and fight in the Ukraine. Volodymyr Zelensky’s call to join the International Legion for the Territorial Defense of Ukraine, which he recently created, has been greeted with enthusiasm by European countries.

Encouraged by the media that present a routed Russian army, many of these young people head off, imagining they are going—literally—on a hunting trip. However, once there, disillusionment is high. Testimonies show that these “amateurs” often end up as “cannon fodder,” without having any real impact on the outcome of the conflict. The experience of recent conflicts shows that the arrival of foreign fighters brings nothing to a conflict, except to increase its duration and lethality.

Moreover, the arrival of several hundred Islamist fighters from the Idlib region, an area under the control and protection of the Western coalition in Syria (and also the area in which two Islamic State leaders were killed by the Americans) should arouse our concern. Indeed, the weapons we are very liberally supplying to the Ukraine are already partly in the hands of criminal individuals and organizations and are already beginning to pose a security problem for the authorities in Kiev. Not to mention the fact that the weapons that are being touted as effective against Russian aircraft could eventually threaten our military and civilian aircraft.

The volunteer proudly presented by the RTBF on the 7:30 p.m. news of March 8, 2022 was an admirer of the “Corps Franc Wallonie,” Belgian volunteers who served the Third Reich; and he illustrates the type of people attracted to the Ukraine. In the end, we will have to ask ourselves, who gained the most—[in this case] Belgium or the Ukraine?

Distributing weapons indiscriminately could well make the EU—volens nolens—a supporter of extremism and even international terrorism. The result—we are adding misery to misery, in order to satisfy the European elites more than the Ukraine itself.

Three Points Deserve to be Highlighted by Way of Conclusion

1. Western Intelligence, Ignored by Policymakers

Military documents found in Ukrainian headquarters in the south of the country confirm that the Ukraine was preparing to attack the Donbass; and that the firing observed by OSCE observers as early as February 16 heralded an imminent outbreak in days or weeks.

Here, some introspection is necessary for the West—either its intelligence services did not see what was happening and they are thus very bad, or the political decision-makers chose not to listen to them. We know that Russian intelligence services have far superior analytical capabilities than their Western counterparts. We also know that the American and German intelligence services had very well understood the situation, since the end of 2021, and knew that the Ukraine was preparing to attack the Donbass.

This allows us to deduce that the American and European political leaders deliberately pushed the Ukraine into a conflict that they knew was lost in advance—for the sole purpose of dealing a political blow to Russia.

The reason Zelensky did not deploy his forces to the Russian border, and repeatedly stated that his large neighbor would not attack him, was presumably because he thought he was relying on Western deterrence. This is what he told CNN on March 20th—he was clearly told that the Ukraine would not be part of NATO, but that publicly they would say the opposite. The Ukraine was thus instrumentalized to affect Russia. The objective was the closure of the North Stream 2 gas pipeline, announced on February 8th, by Joe Biden, during the visit of Olaf Scholz; and which was followed by a barrage of sanctions.

2. Broken Diplomacy

Clearly, since the end of 2021, no effort has been made by the West to reactivate the Minsk agreements, as evidenced by the reports of visits and telephone conversations, notably between Emmanuel Macron and Vladimir Putin. However, France, as guarantor of the Minsk Agreements, and as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, has not respected its commitments, which has led to the situation that the Ukraine is experiencing today. There is even a feeling that the West has sought to add fuel to the fire since 2014.

Thus, Vladimir Putin’s placing of nuclear forces on alert on February 27 was presented by our media and politicians as an irrational act or blackmail. What is forgotten is that it followed the thinly veiled threat made by Jean-Yves Le Drian, three days earlier, that NATO could use nuclear weapons. It is very likely that Putin did not take this “threat” seriously, but wanted to push Western countries—and France in particular—to abandon the use of excessive language.

3. The Vulnerability of Europeans to Manipulation is Increasing

Today, the perception propagated by our media is that the Russian offensive has broken down; that Vladimir Putin is crazy, irrational and therefore ready to do anything to break the deadlock in which he supposedly finds himself. In this totally emotional context, the question asked by Republican Senator Marco Rubio during Victoria Nuland’s hearing before Congress was strange, to say the least: “If there is a biological or chemical weapon incident or attack inside the Ukraine, is there any doubt in your mind that 100% it would be the Russians behind it?” Naturally, she answered that there is no doubt. Yet there is absolutely no indication that the Russians are using such weapons. Besides, the Russians finished destroying their stockpiles in 2017, while the Americans have not yet destroyed theirs.

Perhaps this means nothing. But in the current atmosphere, all the conditions are now met for an incident to happen that would push the West to become more involved, in some form, in the Ukrainian conflict (a “false-flag” incident).