“Why are you pro Putin?” This was how a woman responded to me on Twitter when I provided some historical context to the current war between Russia and Ukraine, though nothing I had said implied what I thought about Putin either way. It’s a common tactic in media and social media. When someone tries to present a contextual history of the conflict that is inconvenient to the overly simplistic Marvel comic book depiction that is constantly pounded home by most establishment media in the US, they and what they say are equated with being pro-Putin or a Russian propagandist.

It’s a convenient way to avoid engaging with the substance of the argument being made. Indeed, it often is a way to avoid facts the person employing this device doesn’t like. And that represents a disturbing trend highlighted by this conflict – the increasing tendency for people to decide whether to acknowledge facts based on whether they like them or not. Even more disturbing is that this anti-intellectual line of thinking is often being practiced by people who consider themselves to be liberals.

When I was growing up liberals would never have accused a sociologist who studies crime and tries to understand its dynamics of being pro-criminal.  A scientist who studied cancer would not have been considered a cancer apologist. Quite the contrary, liberals would have hailed the sociologist and scientist as carrying on in the best tradition of the Enlightenment principles of open debate and fearless, in-depth exploration of a topic to gain a constructive understanding of it. But if someone tries to apply these same principles in 2022 to geopolitics and a war that has the potential for grave escalations, it’s beyond the pale.

A recent commenter on one of my articles posted to Medium, in which I relayed the thoughts of several people in Russia I’m in contact with about the war and sanctions, asked me why I didn’t say what I thought about Putin and the Russian government. She clearly couldn’t accept the merits of hearing what Russians had to say unless the person who’d reported it had made an anti-Putin statement first. Because I hadn’t done that, my reporting was “sus” as the saying goes these days.  Apparently, Americans are so used to “reporting” that reinforces one viewpoint that they can’t fathom someone reporting what people in another country think that doesn’t jibe with their preconceived ideas. There must be something nefarious going on. As another commenter on the article warned, I might be getting paid by Russia.  After all, a writer who lives in a one room studio and doesn’t own a car must have a Putin-affiliated Russian oligarch benefactor. It’s the only explanation.

What Does “Pro-Putin” Actually Mean?

I’ve stated several times on social media, in a podcast interview in early March, and in my last feature-length article that I oppose Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. I had even made it clear in the Twitter exchange with the lady mentioned above right before she accused me of being pro-Putin. How I could oppose one of the most consequential decisions Putin has ever made and still be pro-Putin is a bit of a mystery to me.  But I’ve seen this thinking even used against solid Putin critics when they don’t engage in the requisite vilification of the Russian president and preface every statement with “I hate Putin.”

I’ve even seen famous Russian journalist Vladimir Pozner characterized as pro-Putin. I know for a fact, based on words directly out of Pozner’s mouth, that he “doesn’t like the guy” (referring to Putin) and has publicly criticized the Russian president numerous times over the years. But if you try to explain why Putin’s attitude toward the West changed over the years or you don’t use over-the-top rhetoric about Putin being Hitler, Stalin and Jeffrey Dahmer all rolled into one, then you’re simply pro-Putin.

It’s hard to understand how this childish level of discourse helps anything. I’m guessing that it makes people feel good on an emotional level to disregard what anyone has to say that might cause the slightest bit of cognitive dissonance. But, as an analyst of Russia, I don’t see my job as providing people with emotional comfort. I see my job as providing factual analysis about Russia to the best of my ability. In this vein, I’m not pro-Putin or anti-Putin, but have tried to study and assess the Russian president based on the best information I could find, including the historical, social and geopolitical context of his governance.  I’ve also tried to convey how Russians view him and why.

I’m fallible so there will be – and have been – times when I’m wrong. This is why people should read a wide variety of sources and hear different views and then draw their own conclusions. But this widespread attitude of only wanting to hear what makes one feel good or secure blocks that endeavor by shutting down anything beyond one simplistic and decontextualized viewpoint from the debate.

The bottom line is that if one is interested in figuring out how to end this terrible conflict without a dangerous escalation, then one needs to understand how we got here.  That means understanding the complex contextual background of it and that includes discussing the less-than-innocent role of our own government. Anything else strikes me as empty sloganeering and virtue signaling.

On September 27, 2018, Yale’s Program in Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies, and the Poynter Fellowship for Journalism hosted Vladimir Pozner, the acclaimed Russian-American journalist and broadcaster. Pozner spoke on the impact of US foreign policy towards Russia after the Soviet Union had been disbanded, and shared his opinions on a range of issues raised by the audience, from the alleged Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential elections, to Skripal poisoning, to the state of independent media in Russia and the US.

By Andrey Kortunov, Russian International Affairs Council, 4/14/22

Kortunov has a Ph.D. in History and is Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council, RIAC member

The interim results of the Russian-Ukrainian talks in Istanbul unsurprisingly produced a surge of optimism among all those in Moscow who consider diplomacy the main tool for achieving peace and solving the “Ukrainian issue”. Within the expert community, they started exploring the prospects for an early Putin-Zelensky meeting, trying to envisage appropriate mechanisms for multilateral security guarantees to Ukraine (as much as to Russia), agreeing on potential compromises on territorial issues and even about blueprints for the post-conflict reconstruction of Ukraine.

However, adherents of diplomatic solutions were immediately confronted by numerous implicit and explicit opponents. Champions of the ‘military solution’ started accusing Russian negotiators of unforgivable credulity, excessive softness and almost of an outright betrayal of Russia’s national interests. In the public space, statements poured in, suggesting that the Ukrainian side is “non-negotiable” in principle, that Kiev needs negotiations only in order to create the appearance of moving forward, and that, therefore, Russia’s special operation must be brought “to a victorious end” in any case, even if it is accompanied by large-scale losses and costs.

Emphasis on diplomacy

These mixed reactions to the results of the Istanbul round of negotiations can hardly be considered accidental. They reflect the two fundamentally different understandings of the desirable and even of the plausible resolution of the ongoing conflict that currently coexist in the Russian society. Part of the society firmly believes that the current conflict can only be ended with a political compromise—for this compromise to be achieved, both sides must demonstrate willingness to make significant concessions. The other part of the society apparently sticks to the vision of the conflict ending with a complete and unconditional surrender of Kiev. Therefore, any significant concessions or compromises on the part of Moscow should not even be considered.

It would be tempting to offer some general explaining the diversion in public positions regarding the special military operation. For example, claiming that the Russian establishment is in favor of a military solution, while ordinary people want peace. Or saying that the military experts tend to focus on the continuation of the special operation, while their civilian colleagues prefer to discuss diplomacy. Or arguing that the older generation demands the unconditional surrender of Kiev, with young Russians tending to look for political compromises.

However, it seems that the lines of divergence have more emerged within various professional, social and age groups rather than between them. Let us recall, for instance, a public appeal to the President and citizens of Russia, by Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, published on the eve of the special operation, warning against attempts at a military solution to the “Ukrainian issue”. It is difficult to associate someone like General Ivashov with political dissidents, or armchair experts who have never sniffed gunpowder, or with yellow-haired chicks with no life experience. The conflict in Ukraine has produced completely new coalitions and alliances cutting across traditional partisan groupings and old political preferences.

What are the main disagreements in the assessments of the Ukrainian crisis? First of all, proponents of a diplomatic solution perceive Vladimir Zelensky as the legitimate leader of a large European country—an indispensable, even if not the most convenient partner for negotiations. Those who endorse a military solution would like to present Zelensky and his negotiating team as puppets of the West with no political ‘subjectivity’, which is why they claim it makes no sense to seriously discuss anything with them but the terms of surrender.

The diplomatic approach implies an intention to treat Ukraine as a young and not fully matured, but an unquestionably sovereign state that has an inalienable right to make an independent choice on the vector of its economic, social and political development. The rejection of the diplomatic approach reduces Ukraine to an unenviable position of a platform for geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the West, a “no man’s land”, an eternal “Wild Field”, which possesses no destiny of its own and has neither national sovereignty nor national identity.

Hawk’s peck

The emphasis on diplomacy means Russia’s readiness to limit itself to the already well-known set of specific and generally negotiable demands on Kiev, including Ukraine’s abstention from attempts to join NATO, certain restrictions imposed on the offensive capabilities of the Ukrainian armed forces, legislative measures taken to counter radical ethnic nationalism and other forms of political extremism, ensuring the security of the proclaimed Donbass republics, etc. The rejection of diplomacy suggests that Russia has to insist on a complete reset of the “Ukrainian project” as such, including a change of the currently existing political regime in the country and a subsequent revision of the fundamental principles of the Ukrainian statehood.

The diplomatic approach is set up to reach peace agreements “here and now”. With the full understanding that any agreements will not be perfect at all, they will leave many sensitive issues unresolved to face inevitably stiff resistance not only in Kiev but also in Moscow. It is not difficult to predict the emergence of multiple problems related to the practical implementation of agreements, to their interpretation by each of the two sides, to the subsequent clarification of specific provisions and to politically driven attempts to revise the latter.

Abandoning the diplomatic approach suggests the course of actions under the slogan “victory at any cost”. This means a further continuation—rather than a downscaling—of the special military operation, including the most difficult and potentially disastrous tasks of capturing all major Ukrainian cities. Further, it involves establishing Russian military administrations and ensuring control of the entire territory of Ukraine for a long term, the country’s entire perimeter of borders, as well as long-term fight against very likely guerrilla warfare and terrorist acts on this territory (possibly on the territory of Russia, too).

To find a diplomatic solution, all the necessary and sufficient preconditions are already in place. There are two negotiating teams, an unlimited choice of external mediators, numerous proposals of experts and the already emerging convergence of the positions of the parties on a number of important matters. Proceeding with a military solution will require a further horizontal and vertical escalation of the conflict, not excluding a general mobilization in Russia. In this case, new combat losses and new civilian casualties are unavoidable, not to mention the risks of the Russian special operation escalating into a major European war.

Today, the Russian society is in a state of extreme excitement and even exaltation. From the pages of newspapers and from TV screens, hawkish pecking is heard much louder than pigeon cooing. Public sentiments, however, can and should be managed. Otherwise, when (and if) the country’s leadership does make a choice in favor of a political solution, the central topic of public discussions in Russia will inevitably be the sacramental question: “Who stole our victory?”. Then, it will be very difficult for the authorities to prove to an agitated society that the desire for compromise is better than the demands for unconditional surrender, and the bickering of diplomats is better than the exchange of missile strikes.

This provided a good chronology of the history of Ukraine’s attempt at independence between 1917 and 1922, during which time it underwent numerous changes of governance.

If this is true as reported – and it’s also been reported in NYT along with stories of a few other Russians who’ve experienced similar problems – it is sad and distressing. This is not the Russia I saw when I visited in 2015 and 2017. On those trips, I talked to a range of Russians and no one seemed afraid to say what they thought about politics. And, despite western media distortions, there had been diversity of opinion represented in print media. It appears that has all changed now. – Natylie

By Kelsey Vlamis, Business Insider, 4/9/22

A teacher in Russia said she was fired and fined after being turned into the authorities for comments she made to students about Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Marina Dubrova told The New York Times she showed her eighth-grade class a YouTube video with an anti-war message. Afterwards a group of girls asked her about the war.

Dubrova, an English teacher on the Russian island Sakhalin, told the girls: “Ukraine is a separate country.” One of the girls responded: “No longer.”

Russian police arrived at her school days later, The Times reported, and a recording of her comments, apparently taken by a student, was presented at court.

She was fined $400 for “publicly discrediting” Russian forces and fired by the school for “amoral behavior,” she told The Times. When speaking about Russians in favor of the war, Dubrova said: “It’s as though they’ve all plunged into some kind of madness.”

There have been various reports of Russians turning each other in for speaking out against the war, which Russia calls a “special military operation,” though it’s unclear how widespread an occurrence it is.

Russian President Vladimir Putin last month indicated Russia must undergo a purging of society to root out those who are anti-war or align with the West.

“The collective West is attempting to splinter our society, speculating on military losses, on socioeconomic effects of sanctions, in order to provoke a people’s rebellion in Russia,” Putin said in a video address.

“But any people, the Russian people, especially, are able to distinguish true patriots from bastards and traitors and will spit them out,” he said, referring to people who do not support the Kremlin.

“I am certain that this necessary and natural self-cleansing of society will only strengthen our country, our solidarity, togetherness, and our readiness to answer any calls to action,” he added.

More than 4,300 anti-war demonstrators in Russia had been detained at protests across the country as of early March.