An excerpt from Chapter 1 of my forthcoming book:

By the time the Mongols first invaded in 1223, the Kiev Russian territory had degenerated into rivalries between princes who lorded over around “a dozen or so” independent areas which resulted in disorganized rule (Szamuely 1974). 

Subsequently, the Mongols were able to burn, sack and massacre virtually all cities and towns of the territory in short order.  Around two thirds of the population perished and many survivors retreated into the forests, taking solace in their Orthodox faith (Massie 1980).  They eventually migrated further out to less vulnerable areas, closer to Moscow.  As Tibor Szamuely described in The Russian Tradition, these Russian refugees migrated to form:

…thousands of tiny, self-contained, scattered peasant communities existing largely in isolation, using their primitive implements to clear small patches of subsoil amidst the great forests, and, having exhausted them, moving on again along the banks of numerous rivers (Szamuely 1974).

The Mongols reigned over the land through the 13^th and 14^th centuries, forcing the surviving Russians into complete subjugation.  They were able to impose their centralized and absolutist rule on the scattered Russians who had lost their complex Slavic tribal bonds in the process (Szamuely 1974).  Massie describes an important aspect of this rupture of bonds among the Slavs who’d constituted Kiev Rus:

Earlier as the Slavs had expanded and absorbed the land, they had fallen into two natural divisions:  the Great Russians in the north and the Little Russians in the south.  After the Mongol invasion, the Little Russians were cut off from the Great Russians.  While the Great Russians became vassals of the Mongols, the Little Russians, who were later known as Ukrainians, were taken over by the Poles and the Lithuanians (Massie 1980).

The Mongols, for all of their viciousness, did have a socio-political ideology.  It required absolute submission to the power of the Khan, who embodied the state.  This Khan owned all of the land and had unqualified authority over his subjects.  Land might be temporarily given to others to be overseen at the pleasure of the Khan who could withdraw the privilege at any time.  The overall objective was to create an empire that, after quick and dirty wars of conquest, would be ruled over by the Khan as a “worldwide social order based on justice and equality,” living in eternal peace (Szamuely).  The price for this security and justice was perfect submission.  

The efficient rule of the Mongols, which lasted for almost 250 years, was achieved by re-establishing a form of national unity from the top, delegating responsibility at the local level for maintaining peace (with quarreling princes, no less), collecting tribute (taxes), and enforcing the law to those princes and those among their entourage who showed trustworthiness.  Faithfulness to the Khan/state was rewarded through a system of seniority among the princes (Szamuely 1974).  

The basic principles of Mongol rule – security and justice in exchange for submission to an absolute central authority – would influence Russian governance into the 20^th century. 

The one city that was spared was Novgorod.  Due to a combination of fortuitously bad weather that prevented the invaders from penetrating the city and the continual payment of tribute by its ruler, Alexander, Novgorod remained intact.  Alexander also fought off a Swedish invasion instigated by an opportunistic pope who hoped to capture Novgorod and convert it to Catholicism (Massie 1980).

As Russians fled from Kiev and surrounding areas, Moscow – once considered a small and unimportant “trading post in the wilderness” (Massie 1980) – gradually developed into a prominent city that was influenced by the Mongols instead of the west and by a mystical rather than scholastic emphasis by the Orthodox Church (Billington 1970). 

The princes of Moscow collected tribute from their subjects which they, in turn, used to pay tribute to the Mongols.  In exchange, the Mongols gave the local princes liberty to administer their domain however they wished (Massie 1980).

The Moscow princes expanded the city mostly through annexation, increasing its power and wealth.  It’s location between major river routes, which enabled communication, travel and trade, contributed to its growing success (Szamuely 1974).  The leader of the Orthodox Church, called the metropolitan, moved from Vladimir to Moscow in 1326, adding to the city’s importance (Massie 1980).  Moscow developed in a series of concentric rings around the center as churches and villages sprang up on the periphery. 

The Moscow prince who founded the dynasty that would rule Russia after the Mongols and through the 16^th century was Ivan I, also known as Kalita.  Ivan was ruthless when it suited him to get rid of rivals and in the service of his Mongol bosses who rewarded his subservience with increased power and prestige within his fiefdom.   In 1327, the Mongols conferred upon Ivan the title of “Great Prince” (Billington 1970).  He was granted exclusive judicial authority and right of tax collection over all the other princes after he brutally put down a rebellion initiated by another prince attempting to overthrow Mongol rule (Szamuely 1974). 

Wars were a major feature of the next three centuries, including wars of aggression and expansion as well as wars of defense and of internal conflict.  There were six wars with Sweden and twelve with Poland-Lithuania alone (Szamuely 1974).  Much of this martial conflict was driven, at least in part, by Russia’s geographic situation between Europe and Asia. 

When the Golden Horde’s dominance eventually faded, the Tartars based in the southwestern area of Crimea, terrorized Russia with constant raids on horseback that killed or captured Russians, selling the victims into slavery in surrounding territories.  This only ended when Catherine the Great annexed the area in the latter 18^th century. 

Due to the Tartar aggression, Russian men were conscripted from Spring through late Autumn every year to defend against the violent incursions.  The situation also forced Russia to focus its colonization efforts on the harsher areas to its north and east. 

Szamuely asserts that, from a psychological standpoint, when it came to their long conflict with the Muslim Tartars, Russians believed that they’d invested their blood, sweat and tears not just in defending their own land and people, but in preventing Tartar expansion further into Europe, enabling the Europeans to develop more rapidly as a result of their relative period of peace and stability (Szamuely 1974).  

Ivan IV, also known as Ivan the Terrible (or “Ivan the Formidable” in Russian) finally defeated the last of the Mongol-controlled areas of Kazan, Astrakhan and Siberia in the 1550’s.

References:

Massie, Suzanne.  Land of the Firebird:  The Beauty of Old Russia.  HeartTree Press.  Blue Hill, ME.  1980.

Billington, James H. The Icon and the Axe: An Interpretive History of Russian Culture. Vintage Books. 1970.

Szamuely, Tibor. The Russian Tradition. Fontana Press. 1974.

East Bay Peace Action & Ecumenical Peace Institute present

Natylie Baldwin speaking on

Russia and the West:

What’s True, Exaggerated and False?

Natylie Baldwin is the author of Understanding Russia and U.S.-Russia Relations:  A Primer, forthcoming in Spring of 2019.  She is also co-author of Ukraine: Zbig’s Grand Chessboard & How the West Was Checkmated.  She has traveled to Russia twice, visiting 6 different cities and interviewing a cross-section of Russians on various issues, including their views of Putin, the economy, US-Russia relations, the Yeltsin era, and the Russian Revolution.  She writes for Consortium News and blogs at natyliesbaldwin.com.

“I’m not sure there’s been a better book published this year …. I’m confident there’s not been a more important one.” – Author and activist David Swanson, re Ukraine: Zbig’s Grand Chessboard. . .

Sunday March 31st 2:00 – 4:00

Edith Stone Room

Albany Community Center

1249 Marin Avenue (at Masonic), Albany

For more information call (510) 524-6071

Here is a short excerpt about democracy and the rule of law under Putin from my forthcoming book:

One very frequent criticism of Russia by the West is that the rule of law is weak, if it exists at all.  Let’s look at three important measures of the rule of law in Russia:  the rights of the accused, judicial independence, and the confidence and participation of Russian citizens in the court system.

The 1993 constitution guarantees the presumption of innocence for criminal defendants as well as the right to counsel (Henderson 2011).  During Putin’s first two terms as president, he introduced or oversaw the implementation of the rights of habeas corpus and trial by jury, and increased rights to exculpatory evidence (Petro 2018).  After certain reforms made by Putin to the criminal code, acquittal rates in bench trials (only heard by a judge) doubled and acquittal rates in jury trials tripled, contributing to a 40 percent drop in the overall  incarceration rate and a 95 percent drop in the juvenile incarceration rate since 2001 (Petro 2018). 

He also introduced the role of bailiffs and Justices of the Peace (JP’s) into the system (Petro 2018).

JP’s act as judges in the lowest tier of courts and preside over approximately 75 percent of civil cases and 45 percent of criminal cases – most of the latter are resolved through plea bargaining (Hendley 2017). University of Wisconsin Professor Kathryn Hendley concluded in her years-long study of Russia’s court system, Everyday Law in Russia, that JP’s demonstrate independence – in other words, they base their decisions on the written law – in the vast majority of cases before them.  Exceptions involve the very small percentage of cases that are politically sensitive, particularly to the Kremlin.  In these instances the JP’s will often go along with power as a matter of being socialized into the system rather than being overtly told to do so. 

JP’s, who are primarily women and do not enjoy the same prestige as their counterparts in the US, are not specialized and have very heavy caseloads that must be decided within statutory deadlines.  Though they generally strive to be fair, they also tend to feel burdened by the workload and diligently seek to avoid reversals on appeal, the ramifications of which can hurt them financially and professionally, though only a small percentage of litigants ever exercise the right of appeal (Hendley 2017). 

All JP’s are required to be over the age of 25, have a law degree, and pass an exam and a strict security clearance.   They are formally appointed by either regional governors or regional legislative bodies and are often former JP law clerks or prosecutors rather than attorneys in private practice since, as someone who has already served in a public position, their professional background and propensities will be more readily ascertainable.  They are then given 3 months of formal training before they are allowed to preside over cases (Hendley 2017).

Hendley also found that overall, in civil and administrative cases, the Russian government often loses.

State agencies are frequent litigants in civil cases, both as plaintiffs and defendants.  Both in JP courts and other courts, they are more likely to lose these cases than are private actors.  Their victory in administrative cases involving private citizens, such as traffic violations and fines for noncompliance with various laws, is far from automatic.  The same is true in the business setting.  Economic actors’ challenges to their treatment by the tax and other regulatory authorities are frequently successful (Hendley 2017).

Court rulings in civil cases favoring private plaintiffs over the government occur at a rate of approximately 70 percent (Petro 2018). 

Furthermore, during Putin’s second term, courts ruled that individuals arrested without merit must be compensated and compensation limits for government negligence were struck down, making it more meaningful when the Russian government comes out on the losing end of such cases (Petro 2018). 

Foreign businesses operating in Russia have benefited from the improved state of the legal system.  Lawsuits on behalf of foreign businesses have tripled since 2014 and favorable judgments have increased from 59 percent to 83 percent (Petro 2018).  Many Russians are reluctant to take a dispute to court, citing time, inconvenience, and “the difficulty of proving one’s case.” But as incomes increase and the traditional informal methods of resolving disputes become less relevant, more Russians are utilizing the court system, increasing from one million in 1998 to over seventeen million in 2016 (Petro 2018).  Hendley found many of these Russians to be generally satisfied with their experiences, which largely take place in the JP system, regardless of whether they won or lost.  80 percent of Russians find JP’s to be “well trained and competent” with only 10 percent believing their JP was biased (Hendley 2017). 

References:

Henderson, Jane. The Constitution of the Russian Federation:  A Contextual Analysis.  Hart Publishing.  Oxford and Portland, OR. 2011.

Hendley, Kathryn.  Everyday Law in Russia.  Cornell University Press. Ithaca, NY.  2017.  Pp. 137, 142 – 146.

“Are We Reading Russia Right?” by Nicolai N. Petro.  The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs.  Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 131-154.

I wanted to give readers an update to explain the slowdown over the past 6 weeks in posting to my blog.  I’m currently transitioning out of my day job and, starting in December, I will be spending the next six months writing full-time.

In addition to a couple of other projects, I will be working full-time on a new book on Russia and U.S.-Russia relations that I hope to have out in late winter or early spring.   I will also be working on articles and will be able to post to the blog more regularly.

Thank you for your patience and I hope everyone enjoys the upcoming holidays.

Regards,

Natylie