Contemporary neoconservatism is, in its guiding precepts and policy manifestations, a profoundly ahistorical ideology. It is a millenarian project that not just eschews but explicitly rejects much of the inheritance of pre-1991 American statecraft and many generations of accumulated civilizational wisdom from Thucydides to Kissinger in its bid to remake the world.
It stands as one of the enduring ironies of the post-Cold War era that this revolutionary and decidedly presentist creed has to shore up its legitimacy by continually resorting to that venerable fixture of World War II historicism, the 1938 Munich analogy. The premise is simple, and, for that reason, widely resonant: British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, in his “lust for peace,” made war inevitable by enabling Adolf Hitler’s irredentist ambitions until they could no longer be contained by any means short of direct confrontation between the great powers.
Professor Andrew Bacevich brilliantly distilled the Munich analogy’s two constituent parts: “The first truth is that evil is real. The second is that for evil to prevail requires only one thing: for those confronted by it to flinch from duty,” he wrote. “In the 1930s, with the callow governments of Great Britain and France bent on appeasing Hitler and with an isolationist America studiously refusing to exert itself, evil had its way.” This is the school playground theory of international relations: failure to stand up to a bully at the earliest possible opportunity only serves to embolden their malignant behavior, setting the stage for a larger and more painful fight down the line.
The Cold War years saw a feverish universalization of the Munich analogy whereby every foreign adversary is Adolf Hitler, every peace deal is Munich 1938, and every territorial dispute is the Sudetenland being torn away from Czechoslovakia as the free world looks on with shoulders shrugged. This was the anxiety animating the spurious domino theory that precipitated U.S. involvement in Korea and Vietnam, but appeasement fever was kept in check by the realities of a bipolar Cold War competition that imposed significant constraints on what the U.S. could do to counteract its powerful, nuclear-armed Soviet rival.
These constraints were lifted virtually overnight with the fall of the Berlin Wall and dissolution of the Soviet bloc. President George H.W. Bush proclaimed the end of the “Vietnam syndrome,” or Americans’ healthy skepticism of war stemming from the disastrous decades-long intervention in Vietnam, following U.S. forces’ crushing victory in the Gulf War. The George W. Bush administration gave itself infinite license to intervene anywhere against anyone, including preemptively against “imminent threats,” on the grounds that anything less is tantamount to appeasement. “In the 20th century, some chose to appease murderous dictators, whose threats were allowed to grow into genocide and global war,” Bush said in 2003. “In this century, when evil men plot chemical, biological and nuclear terror, a policy of appeasement could bring destruction of a kind never before seen on this earth.”
Even as the threat landscape has shifted since 2003, neoconservatism’s epigoni have trotted out the Munich analogy to justify every subsequent military intervention in the Middle East. Where direct confrontation is too costly and risky, as with Russia and China, the historicists insist that anything short of a policy of total, unrelenting maximum pressure and isolation amounts to appeasement.
Thus we are subjected to the insistence, one which was always implausible but comes off as especially fantastical today, that any conclusion to the Ukraine war short of Russia’s total battlefield defeat is redolent of Chamberlain at Munich.
The Munich analogy is potent insofar as it has been used as a neoconservative cudgel to bash all dissenters as craven fools who would sell out their principles for an illusory promise of peace, but that doesn’t make it true. The reality of Munich, if it’s of any help to anyone, is that Hitler was both unappeasable and undeterrable in the context of mid-20th century European international politics. Nazi Germany was a uniquely dangerous adversary because it was a revisionist power with virtually unlimited, and therefore insatiable, territorial and political objectives. France and Britain could not give Hitler what he sought – to wit, destroying the international system and rebuilding it from the ground up with Germany as the global hegemon – even if they wanted to. Threats and shows of force would have shifted Hitler’s tactical calculations, but they would not have dissuaded him from the conclusion that his objectives could only be achieved through a general European war that he believed Germany could win. Paris and London were caught militarily and geopolitically flat-footed against a resurgent Germany as the U.S. continued to adhere to a policy of neutrality, a united anti-fascist front with Soviets was politically not in the cards, and ultranationalist governments were coming to power across the continent in a way that further tipped the scales against Europe’s remaining liberal powers.
Critics of “appeasement” distort the difficult policy landscape that confronted Britain and France, conjuring up opportunities for deterrence and preemption that simply did not exist in mid 1938. They distill these specious arguments into a historical analogy, the “lesson of Munich,” that doesn’t even work in its own original setting and impose it as a kind of sacred truth through which all U.S. policy decisions must be filtered.
The U.S. has never again faced an adversary like Nazi Germany. The USSR, for all its revolutionary aesthetics and rhetoric, was a status quo power that competed but also cooperated with the U.S. on the margins and never sought to challenge core Western security interests in the way that Nazi Germany did.
The contemporary strategic landscape is even less reminiscent of the 1930’s. China harbors regional ambitions in the Asia-Pacific that are situationally at odds with U.S. interests, and Russia seeks to prevent post-Soviet states from drifting into the Western camp in ways that pose a challenge to NATO. But neither adversary is pursuing objectives that can only be achieved through great power conflict, positioning itself as a global hegemon, or trying to overthrow the international system. As I explained along with my colleagues George Beebe and Anatol Lieven, Russia invaded Ukraine as part of a strategy of hybrid compellence to curtail the West’s influence in part of the post-Soviet sphere, not as a prelude to a larger planned program of continental conquest against NATO states.
The Munich analogy is deeply dangerous not because it is historically illiterate and utterly inapplicable to the challenges America faces today – though it certainly is both those things – but because, in its framing of adversaries as existential enemies that must be pressured, isolated, and confronted at every step, it precipitates the very catastrophe it is supposedly warning against. Managing these complex strategic relationships in a way that does not lead to war between the great powers will require a diverse, flexible policy toolkit that recognizes our limited resources and is able to balance deterrence and engagement, rather than committing to a policy of rollback that would have been appropriate against Nazi Germany but simply does not capture the contemporary threat environment.
The real “lesson of Munich” is how corrosive ideologically-driven historicism, completely untethered from actual history, can be to the foreign policy debate. It is long past time to lay the ghosts of 1938 to rest.
Below is my exclusive interview with a Russian war reporter who grew up in Donetsk and lived in Kiev until 2018. She tells the truth that western regimes are trying to hide.
Svetlana Pikta was born in a mid-size city in the Volgograd Region, but at the age of two, her parents were sent to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, to the city of Donetsk. At first, they lived in the suburbs, in Peski, and later in Donetsk itself. Her childhood and youth were spent there. She was part of the Ukrainian youth Olympic swimming team. Training was mostly in Kurakhove (where battles now rage), and competitions were all across Ukraine. She has visited nearly every city in Ukraine. Later, she moved to Kiev, where she lived for 18 years and her children were born there. During her last pregnancy, she was attacked by two dozen members of C14, a Ukrainian Neo-Nazi group that was angry with her opposition to Kiev’s brutal crackdown on Donbass. In 2018, she and her family fled to the city of Yaroslavl (Russia) where she now works in TV as a war reporter and often travels to the front.
Below is my full and unabridged interview with Svetlana, originally conducted in Russian and which I translated. All her observations are very interesting and insightful. But one of the most important is her confirmation that the Ukrainian Army began a murderous bombing of Donetsk and other cities in Donbass one full week before President Putin sent an expeditionary force to protect the locals and attempt to compel Kiev to sit at the negotiating table, (something that the West mistakenly calls “the Russian invasion”).
Q: What was life like in Donetsk before Kiev began to bomb the city?
In 2013, life in Donetsk was very prosperous. The city competed with Kiev and often surpassed it in terms of both culture and infrastructure. The oligarch Rinat Akhmetov built Ukraine’s finest airport and finest stadium, the “Donbass Arena.” Businesses thrived. Nobody was concerned about language or politics; it seemed like everyone was only interested in making money.
Q: Why did Kiev bomb Donetsk and other places in Donbass in May 2014?
When the so-called “Maidan” occurred in Kiev, Donbass was left with a choice: either die fighting or die without resisting. The illegal insurrection in Kiev saw the rise to power of radical nationalist forces intent on destroying ethnic Russians and all things Russian. Despite the efforts of the Soviet Union and later an independent Ukraine, Donbass never truly became Ukrainian (there had been a policy of forced Ukrainization). It became clear that Donbass was being prepared as a sacrificial pawn, a pretext to entice Moscow into a war with the many years of lawlessness and genocide of the local Russian population.
The pro-western Maidan regime, which unfortunately was recognized by Russia, was entirely subordinate to the West. President Poroshenko promised, while speaking publicly, that “the children of Donbass will sit in basements [under bombs], while our [Ukrainian] children will study.” He made it clear that Kiev was going to continue to devastate Donbass. The Maidan [insurrection in winter 2014] was orchestrated to provoke a war with Russia; but Moscow hesitated and only entered the war in 2022, unfortunately. When I visited Donbass after fighting began, I saw children playing with the shells of bombs, and my hair turned gray.Donetsk boy plays with army projectile
Q: When you lived in Kiev did you protest against the massacres in Donetsk?
At that time, camps were organized for Ukrainian children, encouraging them to collect items for the Neo-Nazis of the Azov regiment who actively destroyed Donbass and murdered civilians. Essentially, all the children of Ukraine were made to become complicit in the bloodshed of their fellow countrymen. In every school, they organized collections of blankets, socks, etc for Azov. Children were involved in training camps for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. This is a well-known tactic described by Dostoevsky in Demons — a shared crime binds together a group of people. Ukrainian society at that time lacked solidarity and purpose. Kiev used the war against the people of Donbass to unite the rest of Ukraine.
One day, in a chat group raising funds for Ukrainian soldiers, I posted a photo of a monument commemorating the children of Donbass killed by the Ukrainian army. What happened? I was hounded and persecuted by Ukrainian journalists, the SBU [secret police], and later Neo-Nazis from C14, the youth wing of the “Svoboda” party affiliated with the SBU. My name was added to the Mirotvorets database [Kiev’s list of dissidents marked for assassination]. Ukrainian police ignored my complaints. I was pregnant and forced to hide daily from 9 AM to 6 PM except on weekends. Why only during those hours? We realized that Neo-Nazis appeared only during working hours, meaning they were on someone’s payroll. It was both amusing and sad, but after 6 PM we got a reprieve. They threatened violence when they pounded on my door. Eventually, I couldn’t bear it; I was too frightened. Moreover, I was pregnant. We decided to flee to Russia.
Q: Following Kiev’s bombing of Donbass, to where did most people flee?
During the first bombings [2014-15], the vast majority of people — over a million — fled to Russia. At the time, White House press secretary Jen Psaki callously and cynically remarked that those refugees had gone “to visit their grandmothers” in Russia. Most later returned home, as they tired of living off Russia’s support.
Q: What was life like in Donetsk from 2014-2022?
The years 2014-2016 were dramatic in the intensity of the conflict; later it was less-tense but still the shelling was deadly. The frontline regions didn’t see a single quiet day for eight years. I witnessed Ukrainian and Polish mercenaries, snipers, and nationalist battalions “entertaining” themselves by shooting at locals out of boredom. What struck me most was how locals, even six-year-old children, could identify the caliber, type of shell, and even the country of origin of ammunition by its sound. Over time, I also learned to distinguish “outgoing” and “incoming” fire, silent Polish mines, Grads, and howitzers. I was very cautious about where I stepped, many areas were littered with “Petals,” small mines that blow off a foot when stepped on. I especially pitied the elderly and children.Svetlana in Avdeevka after its liberation earlier this year
Q: Could you please tell us about how events developed in February 2022?
A week before the SMO [Special Military Operation] began [Feb 24, 2022], Donetsk faced the heaviest artillery shelling since 2014. Earlier that month (February) nationalist battalions occupied schools in the Zaporozhya and Kherson regions to prepare for an assault on Crimea, (I made a report about this). The population of Donbass was offered mass evacuation to Russia, but 90% refused, having grown accustomed to life under shelling. On Feb 25, water supply ceased in Donetsk after the “Seversky Donets-Donbass” pumping station was shut down due to an energy disruption caused by Ukrainian sabotage. A distinctive feature of this period was the use of HIMARS and other Western 152-155mm shells targeting the city center, deliberately hitting civilian sites and gatherings. In June 2022, I witnessed a HIMARS strike on the central bus station. I saw firsthand the destruction of U.S. missiles, the many dead civilian bodies and the wounded with severed limbs.
Q: Has life improved in Donetsk since the Russian offensive began this year?
After the liberation of Avdeevka and Krasnogorovka, Donetsk has had a slight sense of relief. There is now a fragile concept of “relatively safe districts of Donetsk,” which did not exist previously. Unfortunately, water issues remain severe, but there are a few hours of water supply daily to each area.
Q: Is Donetsk now able to rebuild itself?
Large-scale reconstruction has begun. As soon as it is possible to build without immediate destruction from nearby fighting, construction firms and road workers are eager to get to work. Progress is slower than desired, but Russian authorities have managed to build highways, hospital clinics, maternity wards, and entire new neighborhoods. Nothing of this scale was achieved during the 30 years of Ukrainian rule.
Q: What is life like now in Donetsk?
In Donetsk, I now have my own “paradise,” with water available for a few hours, and heating. My apartment is now warm! During water supply hours, the pressure is enough to run the washing machine, which is a great joy. Bathing still involves pouring water from a pot with a ladle, as the stream is too weak for a shower. But the main thing is the semblance of regular water supply. Usually, I spend mornings filming in different areas under shelling, and when I return, I’m thrilled to be able to wash in a warm apartment. Just six months ago, this was very difficult. I slept under three blankets in winter and bought water for washing.
Q: Could you please tell us about the people of Donetsk? What are they like?
People in Donbass are mostly fatalists. They’ve lived for a long time prepared to die at any moment. The best depiction of these people comes from the sayings I’ve heard: “You won’t hear the shell that’s yours, so why panic?” or “I wear lace underwear so that I won’t be ashamed on the coroner’s table.” Donetsk residents have learned the value of community, closely interacting with neighbors since survival in war isn’t possible alone. Unfortunately, they’ve also become emotionally reserved — smiles or emotions are rare. Warm words are seldom heard. Actions are what matter. To outsiders, they may seem embittered, but this is simply the strictness and composure necessary for survival in war.Ukraine’s American and German-built tanks burn in the Zaporozhya Region — during the disastrous ‘counteroffensive’ of summer 2023
Q: You were recently on the front lines in Zaporozhya Region — what was it like?
In the Zaporozhya region, I was in the frontline Pology district, in the Orekhov direction. I can confirm that there has been a shift in the front line near Robotino. At the time, it was minor, but the wheel has started turning. Many locals still live in fear of the SBU and the nationalist battalions and international brigades; that they might return. The locals fear being caught on camera. And in personal conversations, you hear things that make your hair stand on end. People refer to NATO military contractors and international brigades as “Germans,” which clearly has connotations of World War 2.
There are also pro-Ukrainian individuals, but oddly enough, they were first in line for Russian passports and for the financial aid that Moscow distributed in the conflict zones. I’ve been visiting this area since 2022. Initially, I was told that the locals were all “waiters” (waiting for Ukraine to return), and to be cautious with them. But this is a complete lie spread by the fifth column and those Russian media magnates with villas in the EU. (Such people don’t want Russian people to reunite; they only care about preserving their money in the West and lifting sanctions, pretending to be patriots). These enemies of Russia are lying. The majority of the people in Zaporozhya were waiting for Russia — about 80%. I never return from Zaporozhya empty-handed. Locals give me honey, milk, and homemade wine; simple but heartfelt gifts from people living in a war zone.
Q: How is the fighting morale of Russian troops on the front?
Regarding the troop’s morale on the front: it’s a unique place, where a sense of brotherhood prevails. The world today is very selfish, where people are isolated, even within families, and people often feel alone. We live in a consumer society where comfort has replaced love. On the front lines, however, it’s very different. You’ll see genuine brotherly love, as one soldier told me. Broken or selfish people can’t comprehend this. It reminds me of what my university professor, a World War 2 veteran, used to say. You go to the front to breathe the air of brotherhood. The world of the front lines and civilian life are as different as a plastic tomato is from a real one.
This brotherhood extends not only among the soldiers but also to the locals. For example, some locals refer to soldiers as “son,” and they respond with “dad” or “mom.” They help one another; soldiers share food with locals, who in turn share their internet connections. They are always helping with repairs. Of course, this warmth is only found among the bravest. Many are still afraid that the Russian army might leave, and that there would be reprisals from the Ukrainian Army and SBU. But the number of such people has declined tenfold compared to 2022.
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In the immediate wake of the Syrian government’s abrupt collapse, much remains uncertain about the country’s future. While longtime leader Bashar Assad has sought refuge in Moscow, most of his government and its military, security, and intelligence apparatus remains in Damascus. Calls for reconciliation between officials and the predominantly foreign “opposition” abound, but the prospect of show trials for state apparatchiks is high. After all, elements of Anglo-American intelligence have been planning for such an eventuality since before the Syrian civil war even started.
In May 2011, the Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA) was birthed by shadowy NATO state contractors, ARK and Tsamota. Its first act was to train handpicked Syrian “investigators, lawyers, and activists in basic international criminal and humanitarian law…enabling [them] to link state and non-state actors to underlying criminal acts.” Dedicated “teams of investigators according to their regions” – including Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Idlib – were created, “and equipped with field investigative kits.”
Their objective was to gather evidence of war crimes committed by Syrian government forces, in support of a “domestic justice process in a future transitional Syria.” We must ask ourselves how such a project came to be before the Syrian army was formally deployed by Damascus, in response to the foreign-fomented crisis that commenced in mid-March that year. Particularly given bringing officials to trial in a “future transitional Syria” was wholly contingent on all-out regime change.
The timing of CIJA’s launch is a palpable indication foreign actors were laying foundations for that eventuality from the very first days of Syria’s “peaceful revolution”, before full-blown civil war had erupted. Given the affiliations of ARK and Tsamota, the pair were well-placed to know in advance of plans by Western governments to topple the Assad government via brute force. Now that has come to pass, it may be time for their long-standing plan to at last be put into action.
‘Regime Change’
Founded by MI6 journeyman Alistair Harris, ARK was one of a constellation of contractors, staffed by military and intelligence veterans, employed by British intelligence at a cost of many millions to conduct covert psychological warfare campaigns in Syria, from the initial days of the crisis. The aim was to destabilise Assad’s government, convince the domestic population, international bodies and Western citizens that genocidal CIA and MI6-backed militant groups pillaging the country were a “moderate” alternative, and deluge media the world over with pro-opposition propaganda.
Under this operation’s auspices, ARK founded and ran numerous ostensibly independent opposition media outlets targeting Syrians of all ages, while tutoring and equipping countless local “citizen journalists”, teaching them “camera handling, lighting, sound, interviewing, filming a story…video and sound editing…voice-over, scriptwriting,” and “graphics and 2D and 3D animation design.” The firm’s students were also instructed in practical propaganda theory, such as “target audience identification, media narrative analysis and monitoring, behavioral identification/understanding, campaign planning, behavioral change, and how communications can influence it.”
Such was ARK’s intimate proximity with anti-Assad elements, it boasted in leaked submissions to the Foreign Office of being entrusted by Western governments to develop a dedicated Office for Syrian Opposition Support. This entity identified the most promising groups for the proxy war’s sponsors to finance, in turn “[helping] present them to international donors, and provide access to networks that could deliver assistance.” These efforts intensified “as the conflict deepened and it became apparent that regime change would not occur in the short term.”
Tsamota’s primitive official website describes the company as “a security and justice sector consultancy which provides rule of law, forensics and natural resources advisory services,” working in “in politically, legally, socially and logistically challenging environments” for Western governments. The firm is not a compelling candidate for holding government officials anywhere accountable for war crimes. Tsamota has since inception offered guidance to major corporations on how to maximise profits in the Global South, while limiting their local and international legal liabilities.
In 2013, Tsamota director William Wiley gave a scandalous presentation to Canadian consortium MineAfrica Inc. In it, he set out a series of hypothetical scenarios in which mining companies operating in countries such as the Congo and Mali employed private security firms to crack down on striking workers, or deal with “local militias” interfering with their operations. Wiley outlined a number of means by which companies could be insulated from repercussions of heavy-handed responses to such incidents, up to and including murder.
That presentation described Tsamota as composed of “experts” drawn from “national police, military and intelligence forces.” Wiley is no exception, having served in the Canadian military for almost two decades. Subsequently, he turned to international law, among other things overseeing the trial of Saddam Hussein October 2005 – December 2006, for crimes against humanity. Mainstream accounts acknowledge Wiley was imposed on the former Iraqi leader’s defence team without consent – a major breach of basic legal norms – by the US embassy in Baghdad’s Regime Crimes Liaison Office.
After capture, Hussein was initially interrogated by the CIA. Contemporary media reports note there was significant concern within the Agency that “their questioning could become public during his eventual trial,” raising issues around “how to conduct the questioning and record the conversations.” The reasons why were unstated, although a likely explanation was Washington wished to avoid awkward disclosures in court about Hussein’s long-running relationship with the CIA, and active US complicity in many of the most heinous crimes of which he was accused.
To say the least, this was a sensitive role indeed. Even prominent Iraqi supporters of US invasion and occupation charged Baghdad’s “interim” puppet government was seeking “show trials followed by speedy executions” of Hussein et al to boost its credibility. That Wiley was entrusted with this mission speaks volumes about his reliability from the US government’s perspective. It also raises obvious questions about the nature of his relationship with the CIA, and whether that bond influenced CIJA’s creation half a decade later.
‘Moving Documents’
A series of leaked ARK files on CIJA’s activities authored in the years immediately following its creation make grand claims about its achievements. One declares the Commission “innovated in the field of transitional justice…aiding the collection of evidence to document war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other violations of International Humanitarian Law” in Syria. Another states its work represented “a landmark development in international justice: the contemporaneous gathering of evidence of violations of international humanitarian law conducted by regime forces”:
“[CIJA], through expert training, effective equipment provision and a commitment to the truth were able to ensure that when the conflict ends, the raw material of a post-conflict war crimes process is ready for trial, in turn providing a key contribution to truth telling, reconciliation and the future of Syria.”
Elsewhere, ARK boasted how CIJA had seized thousands of kilograms of “contemporaneous documentation”, hundreds of thousands of pages of “evidential material” and thousands of videos from Syria, “all of which had to be hand carried” out of the country. Cut to February 2021, and Commission chair Stephen Rapp, a US diplomatic warhorse, bragged to CBS about the sheer volume of evidence CIJA collected. He claimed the papertrail exposed a systematic strategy of Assad government-directed executions of opposition activists, along with ensuing coverups:
“Now we have 800,000 pages of original documents, signed and sealed with original signatures going all the way up to Assad that document this whole strategy…We see reports back about ‘well, we’ve got a real problem here, there are too many corpses stacking up, somebody’s gonna have to help us with that’…Everything is handled in this sort of totalitarian system where they frankly think they can get away with things…they were almost stupid…they created evidence.”
If such damning, incontrovertible proof was bagged at any stage by CIJA, it has never emerged publicly. Still, throughout the Syrian dirty war, the Commission enjoyed glowing profiles in Western media, while providing journalists and rights groups with multiple scoops supposedly exposing Syrian government atrocities. At no point did any mainstream reporter or NGO question, let alone raise concerns about, the manner in which the Commission garnered the material upon which its cases against government officials in Damascus was “hand carried” out of the country.
CIJA chief Wiley acknowledged in 2014 that his organisation smuggled evidence from Syria by working with every opposition group “up to but excluding Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State.” However, a 2019 investigation by The Grayzone amply indicates that CIJA was frequently in extremely close quarters with both groups. Moreover, they were paid handsomely for their assistance in securing documentation. This included material seized in Raqqa after its January 2014 capture by ISIS, right when the ultra-extremist group was massacring Alawites and Christians.
In a 2016 New Yorkerprofile of CIJA, Wiley detailed the practical hassles and financial drain inherent in “moving documents [over] international borders” and opposition-controlled “checkpoints”, while relying on “rebel groups and couriers for logistical support.” He described how bundles of government files “typically” arrived at the Commission’s offices “in a dizzying array of crappy suitcases.” Wiley lamented, “we burn enormous sums of money moving this stuff.”
Accordingly, CIJA received tens of millions of dollars for its efforts from a variety of Western governments, including those at the forefront of the Syrian dirty war. Despite the vast windfall, the Commission’s work produced zero prosecutions for many years. This changed in late 2019, when Anwar Raslan and Eyad Gharib, two former members of Damascus’ General Intelligence Directorate, were indicted in Germany for crimes against humanity.
‘Many Contradictions’
Raslan headed the Directorate’s domestic security unit, while Gharib was one of his departmental subordinates. The pair defected to the opposition in December 2012. Raslan and his family fled to Jordan, where he played “an active and visible role in the Syrian opposition.” He was part of the anti-Assad delegation at the Geneva II conference on Syria in January 2014, and in July that year, was granted asylum in Germany.
After his escape from Syria, Raslan told numerous lurid tales of abuse and atrocities perpetrated by his unit, and the Assad government more widely, during his 20 years of state service. He claimed his defection was spurred after learning an apparent opposition attack in Damascus that he was charged with investigating was, in fact, staged by security forces. Significant doubts about his accounts, and whether his defection was principled or just cynical opportunism, have been raised in many quarters.
Artist’s rendition of Raslan’s trial
In a perverse irony, Raslan’s loudmouth propensity was his undoing. His assorted claims post-defection provided grounds for arrest by German authorities, and were used against him and Gharib in their prosecutions. These legal actions heavily relied on documents seized by CIJA, including Central Crisis Management Cell records. This unit was created in March 2011 by Damascus, to manage responses to mass rioting that erupted this month. These documents have been widely described as the “linchpin” of the Commission’s case against “the Syrian regime.”
Yet, as this journalist has previously exposed, the Central Crisis Management Cell files in fact show the Assad government explicitly and repeatedly instructed security forces to protect protesters, prevent violence, and keep the situation under control. The documents also detail how from inception, many “peaceful” demonstrators were extremely violent, while opposition fighters systematically murdered security service operatives, pro-government figures, and demonstrators to foment catastrophe, in a manner eerily similar to many CIA/MI6 regime change operations old and new.
In February 2021, Gharib was found guilty of aiding and abetting crimes against humanity. He received four-and-a-half years in prison. A year later, Raslan was given life for crimes including mass torture, rape, and murder. The pair were not convicted for personally perpetrating these horrors, but serving in the General Intelligence Directorate at the time they were allegedly committed. “Expert” witness evidence provided at their trials left much to be desired.
For example, judges and prosecutors alike expressed disquiet at “many contradictions” in the testimony of “P3”, a Syrian government operative who purportedly worked in a security service “mail department”, and was central to Gharib’s conviction. P3 professed to seeing sensitive documents “related to the transfer of corpses” of opposition activists “to burial sites.” They “provided contradictory information” in statements to German police and the court, and were “visibly nervous” while testifying. Throughout, their seemingly aghast attorney sat nearby “putting his hands behind his head.”
Meanwhile, during Raslan’s prosecution, “P4” – a nameless individual who claimed to have been detained in a Syrian prison, and bribed his way out – testified he saw 500,000 corpses buried via a “bulldozer and a truck” next to his house, in an area which was previously “a desert”. Reports of the trial indicate there “was a feeling” among those present in court, including “the public”, that these numbers were greatly “exaggerated.”
The sense that Gharib and Raslan were prosecuted because they were within easy reach, and CIJA needed something to show for all its well-remunerated efforts, is ineluctable. The Commission had strong grounds to be anxious about failing to fulfill its founding objective. In March 2020, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) formally accused the organization of “submission of false documents, irregular invoicing, and profiteering” relating to an EU “Rule of Law” project it ran in Syria.
Fast forward to today, and The Guardian reports that “the abrupt implosion of the infrastructure of state terror” in Syria “has made available a huge volume of evidence.” The outlet quoted CIJA chief William Wiley at some length. He compared Assad’s fall to “a situation much like Germany in 1945 or Iraq in 2003,” with “a sudden availability of all state records” making prosecution of state officials a fait accompli:
“It’s a very unusual situation, and its suddenness creates challenges and opportunities in simply dealing with the material…If there’s any security intelligence guy that rocks up in Europe, there’s typically going to be enough material already to hand.”
