By Scott Ritter, Substack, 1/5/26

Forces within the US and Russia today openly advocate for the lifting of economic sanctions targeting Russia. But these sanctions are not designed to be lifted for the benefit of Russia, but to exist as a tool designed to bring about the collapse of Russia. The hope of improved economic relations brought on by the end of sanctions is used as a means of leveraging greed and corruption inside Russia in order to bring down the government of President Vladimir Putin. Russia’s best option is to stop advocating for the lifting of sanctions and instead use the existing sanctions as a shield to protect Russia from the inherently corrupting influence of western economies.

I used to hold that sanctions as policy was in fact a statement that there was no real policy in place for the given problem, and that sanctions were simply a mechanism for buying time to consider the options. But the longer I have had to observe US sanctions policy unfold over time, the more I realize that there is, in fact, a method to the madness. Whether this newly discovered intent was in existence when the wide-spread sanctioning of nation states was first employed as a major pillar of US foreign and national security policy, or evolved over time, isn’t the point. The reality is that today sanctions underpin policies of targeted regime change and serve as the primary facilitating agent of such policies.

The primary indicator for this realization is that while sanctions portend to target behavior or policies the United States wishes to see altered, the sanctions are almost invariably tied to a person or persons in power. This linkage almost inevitably means that the desired behavioral modifications sought through sanctions cannot be achieved so long as the targeted persons remain in power.

But such linkage in and of itself does not a policy make. To be effective, a policy must be implementable. And here sanctions bring with them an inherently implementable weapon—human greed. The conventional thinking was that sanctions were designed to compel change from within the targeted nation—punish the people, the people will put pressure on their leadership to effect the necessary changes. But this approach did not achieve the desired results—the case of Iraq stands out, where the regime of Saddam Hussein withstood more than a decade of stringent economic sanctions before being removed by military force.

But lately sanctions have taken on a different character—a commodity, so to speak, part of a transactional approach to policy making which has come to maturity during the second iteration of the Trump administration. Trump has been a master when it comes to employing this new commodity-based approach to sanctioning, slapping sanctions onto a targeted nation, and then holding out the possibility of these sanctions being lifted if certain behavioral benchmarks are met. “We can do business together” has become the mantra of Trump 2.0, a promise of mutually beneficial economic relationships predicated on one side—the sanctioned side—yielding to the demands of the other.

The transactional relationship, however, is never allowed to reach fruition. The promise of economic largesse is instead held hostage to behavioral alterations that cannot be attained because they are linked to the personal and/or political credibility of the targeted personalities named in the sanctions. But the transactions were not designed to enrich the targeted individuals, but rather the class of political and economic elites for whom the targeted individual(s) relied upon for their continued viability as the leader of the targeted nation.

The goal of these new regime-change sanctions is to create leverage inside these elites that can be manipulated by the promise of personal fortune if the impediment to this utopia were only removed from power. There is reason to believe that the promise of economic assistance from the Arab League combined with the lifting of stringent US sanctions created the opportunity for Syrian elites to be bought off, abandoning the former President of Syria, Bashar al-Assad, to the wolves when Islamic forces attacked in November 2024.

The recent abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro by US forces likewise suggests that there was a significant amount of betrayal by Venezuelan political and economic elites brought on by the promise of the lifting of sanctions against Venezuela once Maduro was removed from power.

Likewise, in Iran President Pezeshkian’s stated objective of wanting better relations with the West, inclusive of economic interaction keyed to the lifting of sanctions, created a certain level of societal expectation which was weaponized by the West, linking the inability to lift sanctions until the Iranian government changed fundamental policies, such as those related to their nuclear program. These Iranian elites, having already begun to spend their new-found wealth in their imaginations, were easy pickings for foreign intelligence services looking for vectors of societal unrest linked to the removal of the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khameini, from power.

But the biggest regime change target of them all is Russian President Vladimir Putin. Donald Trump has made the lifting of sanctions and the renewal of US-Russian economic projects one of his highest priorities—after the ending of the Russian-Ukraine conflict on terms acceptable to Donald Trump. Trump has allowed a dual-track of negotiations to proceed simultaneously, the first involving setting the terms of conflict resolution, and the second focused on the economic benefits that would accrue once the war with Ukraine ended.

The problem is that Trump has no intention of agreeing to terms that would be acceptable to Russia, and every intention of continuing to impose targeted sanctions designed to impact various political and economic elites surrounding Russian President Vladimir Putin. Trump has made it clear that he is personally unhappy with President Putin, implying outright that any continuation of existing sanctions and/or issuing of ne sanctions is the fault of the Russian President and no one else.

The hope attached to this methodology is that by dangling the possibility of lifting sanctions in front of these elites, they can be persuaded/influenced to exert pressure on the Russian leadership to change policy goals and objectives or, failing that, to change leadership.

Given everything I have analyzed over the course of the past several days, I am convinced now more than ever that the Trump policy toward Russia is not normalization, but regime change, and that economic sanctions are not viewed as something that is transitory, but rather something that serves as a permanent fixture of policy designed to create the potential for regime change. There are zero advocates for the genuine normalization of relations on Trumps’ innermost circle of advisors. Steve Witkoff, the former New York real estate broker turned special envoy, does not make policy, but rather furthers the possibility of better economic relations once sanctions are lifted—which, of course, they never will.

Marco Rubio, the dual-hatted Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, is staunchly anti-Putin. Scott Bessant, the Secretary of Treasury, believes that Russia can be brought to its knees using sanctions. And John Radcliffe, the Director of the CIA, oversees an agency that has sought the demise of Vladimir Putin and Russia since the fall of Boris Yeltsin.

There are zero advocates for a truly mutually beneficial relationship between the US and Russia in the Trump cabinet today. A relationship built on transparency and mutual trust is impossible so long as one party is actively seeking the strategic defeat of the other.

The strategic defeat of Russia continues to be the policy of the United States.

And economic sanctions are the primary tool being used to achieve this result.

Gone are the days of calling Russia out as the principal opponent of the United States. That action only solidified the United States as an enemy in the minds of those Russians the United States seeks to bring over to our side.

Instead, the United States, by publishing a National Security Strategy document that lists Russia as a force of strategic stability, creates the notion that the path has already been cleared for a revitalized relationship born on the principle of mutual benefit.

But the US-Siberian tunnel that Kirill Dmitriev is fond of promoting isn’t designed to bring American wealth to Russian shores, but rather to extract Russian resources on terms unilaterally beneficial to the United States. Yes, the United States desires a time when sanctions can be lifted, and US businesses can return to Russia. But only on terms acceptable to the United States, and these terms cannot exist in an environment where Russia operates as the geopolitical equal of the United States. Vladimir Putin has spent 25 years leading Russia out of the ruins of the decade of the 1990’s. It is the goal and objective of the United States to return Russia to that period, where Russian nationalism has been subordinated to Western commercialism, where Russian culture and traditions are seen as an expression of inferiority in the face of all that the West can offer.

A new Trump Tower, not the towers of Moscow Center, would be the landmark of Moscow if Donald Trump had his way, with all that entails.

But in the case of Russia sanctions are a double-edged sword. The combined impact of the US-European sanctions is the near total isolation of Russia from the western economy. If Russia continues to play the game of pretending there will be better times ahead once these sanctions are lifted, it is just a matter of time before human greed and CIA money find common cause, and Russia finds itself wracked by internal political disputes designed to weaken it and its leadership.

Sanctions, simply put, are not a path toward prosperity, but a highway to hell.

Russia can isolate itself from the negative consequences of the Trump sanction game simply by refusing to engage on any discussion that doesn’t have the immediate, unconditional lifting of economic sanctions as the core objective. There can be no quid pro quo, no phased easing out—nothing. Anything that creates conditions for the lifting of sanctions provides the US the leverage it needs to start corrupting segments of Russian society, to turn them against the Russian government.

None other than the esteemed Russian philosopher, Alexander Dugin, agrees that Russia faces such a threat today. “Look,” he recently wrote, “friendly regimes and forces are collapsing one after another. Of course, we’re reacting and trying to take advantage of the general crisis of globalism, but we’re missing a lot.

It’s perfectly clear, and this has been confirmed by events in Syria, Iran, Lebanon, and now Venezuela, that over the past decades, the West has created spy networks within the highest leadership of all countries. I think even China is no exception. And at the right moment, they activate to betray the supreme power. Such a network simply cannot fail to exist in Russia. It would be logical for it to be the source of systemic sabotage and the slowdown of all those processes that must be conducted at a completely different speed to effectively defend and strengthen our sovereignty. And these agents can be found anywhere, including in circles and departments where we least expect them.”

Dugan is right—these networks exist in Russia today. The point of vulnerability which is exploited most effectively by the West is the greed that comes with the unfulfilled desires of those who have bought into the notion of the West serving as the source of Russia’s economic wellbeing.

The sanctions against Russia were specifically crafted to isolate Russia from the West and, in doing so, create the impression that Russia’s economic woes could be resolved simply by creating the conditions under which these sanctions could be lifted.

But at what cost?

The West does not seek to live side by side with a rejuvenated Russia. Europe has made it clear that a Russia that stands on its own two feet is deemed a threat, and must be brought down.

The West wants Russia to be brought to its knees, to crawl toward its master, begging for relief.

This is not the Russia I experienced in my past travels.

This is not the Russia I fell in love with.

And this is not a Russia I would want to be friends with.

And so Russia should seek to activate the “sanctions shield”, to do everything possible to encourage the economic isolation from the West, to weaken the leverage those in Russia who would sell their magnificent civilization for a handful of silver will never get the chance.

Sergei Karaganov is right—Russia’s future lies to the East, its ruination to the West.

It is to the East and the collective South that Russia must now turn for its economic future.

Make sanctions moot by making it impossible for sanctions to be lifted.

Stop the Dmitriev-Witkoff experiment in its tracks.

One day—maybe soon, probably not—the conditions will exist where Russia can once again do business with the West.

But first the European Union must be broken up.

NATO disbanded.

And the United States compelled through the reality of its own limitations to accept Russia on terms wholly acceptable to Russia, for the benefit of Russia, and not the other way around.

Never forget—Russia has never sought the strategic defeat of the United States.

The United States today is actively seeking the strategic defeat of Russia.

Sanctions are the chosen vector for this policy to reach fruition.

Therefore Russia has no choice, if it desires to avoid being caught up in the regime change policy construct of the United States, than to do everything possible to keep the sanctions imposed against it by the collective West in place in order to shield itself from the destructive forces of corruption and greed that are an inherent part of any “economic engagement” with the West—especially with the United States under the rule of the most transactionally-minded President in US history, Donald Trump.

By Ben Aris, Intellinews, 1/4/25

President Vladimir Putin continues to enjoy strong approval ratings nearly four years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, according to polling from the Levada Centre, an independent [western backed] Russian research organisation.

Despite economic pressure, mounting casualties, and a protracted war effort, public support for the Russian president remains consistently high, highlighting the durability of the Kremlin’s control over the domestic narrative.

Putin’s approval surged in March 2022—just weeks after Russian troops crossed into Ukraine—from 71% in February to 83%, and has since remained above 80% for most of the conflict.

As of December 2025, 85% of respondents said they approved of the president’s performance, while just 13% disapproved. The data shows only minor fluctuations over 36 months, indicating stable support throughout what the Kremlin continues to call its “special military operation.”

The Russian government, while less popular than Putin himself, has also maintained majority approval ratings. Support for the federal government rose from 53% in early 2022 to a high of 76% in mid-2025, before easing slightly to 70% in December.

Disapproval of the government fell from 44% in early 2022 to just over 20% in late 2025 as the war in Ukraine has had little impact on daily lives inside Russia other than pushing prices up. The figures suggest that a significant portion of the Russian population continues to back the state’s actions and overall direction despite the sustained conflict. [Would this be the case if the number of Russian casualties were as ridiculously high as the west claims? – Natylie]

Similarly, the share of Russians who believe the country is heading “in the right direction” has also climbed since the start of the war. In January 2022, only 50% of respondents said Russia was on the right path, with 39% saying it was not. That number jumped to 69% in March 2022 in tacit approval of the Ukrainian invasion, and peaked at 75% in early 2024. As of December 2025, 67% still say the country is moving in the right direction.

Levada Centre sociologist Denis Volkov attributed the early rally-around-the-flag effect to “a consolidation of society in the face of external pressure.” He told The Moscow Times in 2023 that “Putin’s ratings reflect more than just support for the war — they reflect an emotional rejection of what is seen as Western interference.”

While polling in authoritarian states is subject to pressure and self-censorship, the Levada Centre is widely regarded as one of the few credible independent pollsters operating in Russia. “The numbers are real in terms of expressed sentiment, but the environment in which they are collected matters,” said Andrei Kolesnikov, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Centre.

Analysts also point to a lack of visible hardship in large Russian cities as a reason for sustained public support. Although sanctions have crippled key sectors, state spending has helped shield much of the population from economic pain. “The war is largely invisible to the public,” said Tatiana Stanovaya, founder of political consultancy R.Politik. “That insulates the Kremlin from accountability.”

By Oliver Boyd-Barrett, Substack, 1/1/26

Berletic in his latest article and podcast (Berletic) argues that the US bid for supremacy is accelerating; there is no “retreat” to the Western hemisphere; there is no process of “adaptation” to multipolarism. To the contrary, the US has launched a war against multipolarism. The US continues its proxy war against Russia (I think we should consider it a CIA-led war), persists in its encirclement of China, and, in the Middle East, once again threatens Iran (now enfeebled by domestic dissension and protests as well as by existential problems of drought and pollution).

The US obsession with Greenland, he argues, is far from being a signal of a US wish to retreat to the Western hemisphere (as if that excused such a blatant violation of international law in any case, any more than the ongoing US menacing of Venezuela). The US acquiring or exerting control over Greenland is in fact the US moving closer to Western Russia, where most of Russia’s big centers of population are, including Moscow, threatening Russia to a greater degree, even, than it already does. Alaska is close to Russia but it only close to eastern Russia.

US commanders are currently running the war in Ukraine from Germany; the logistical support for Ukraine is coming from other US proxies Poland and Romania. Greenland will offer an alternative location for rear command of the war as it is undertaken by US’ European proxies, giving the appearance of an “abandonment” of Ukraine by the US, while in fact it prepares a global blockade of Russian, Chinese and Iranian maritime shipping.

As Ukraine collapses, the US will push other US proxies in Europe to come forward to fill the gap left by Ukraine’s collapse of fighting capability, Seizure of Greenland would assist the evolving maritime blockade and in continuing the war against Russia in Ukraine. US military bases in Greenland would be closer to Russia than military bases in Europe, including Turkiye and Great Britain. In February 2025, US Secretary of State for War, Pete Hegseth, told Europe to double down on support of Ukraine, investing in its arms industry capability, increasing military expenditure on NATO from 2% to 5% of GDP, and establishing a division of labor between the US and Europe, with Europe taking responsibility for Ukraine while the US focuses on China.

In Europe the US will position itself in the rear, in Greenland, from which it can supervise the activity of its European proxies in their struggle against Russia and supply the necessary reconnaissance and intelligence. The idea is to pin Russia down and depleted. US proxies will pay the full costs of the conflict with Russia while the US reaps the full benefits. The fall of Syria is an example. Proxies fought the war, the US benefits geopolitically from its collapse.

From 1992, US foreign policy (the Wolfowitz doctine, later refined as the Bush doctrine in 2003) has been driven by the ambition to suppress all actual and potential rivals to US supremacy, everywhere. Even though the latest US strategy paper says that the US policy of supremacy was wrong, it spends most of the time talking about what it must do to stop emergent rivals to US power, even regionally. Nothing in the US will change this; the only source of change can come from without. Such a challenge is most likely to come from China.

A 2018 US naval War College review paper advocated a maritime oil blockade against China and sought to identify ways in which limitations on the possibility of such a blockade could be circumvented. It talked not about blockading ports but about blockading choke-points well beyond the range of most of China’s weapons: e.g. the Malacca Strait (between Malaysia’s Malay Peninsula and Indonesia’s Sumatra, connecting the Indian Ocean – via the Andaman Sea – to the South China Sea) which forms a vital, heavily trafficked global shipping route for energy, goods, and components, rich in history, commerce, and strategic importance, with Singapore located at its southern gateway.

The US marine force has an anti-shipping division that can relocate to such sensitive chokepoint areas to interdict Chinese shipping or other shipping headed for, or from, China. US strategies anticipate how China might evade US actions in relation to such choke points and seek to blunt their efficacy. Destruction of the Myanmar oil pipeline is envisaged as a way to interrupt the flow of energy to China, given China’s limited capacity to control what happens within Myanmar. Since the 2018 paper, US-backed militants have already begun to physically attack the Myanmar pipeline. There are areas along the pipeline that the Myanmar government has had to abandon. If any part of the pipeline is compromised, the whole project is useless.

Here and elsewhere, the US seeking to sabotage China’s Belt and Road initiative. The US is manipulating Cambodia to destabilize pro-Chinese initiatives in Thailand. In Pakistan there is another transport and trading corridor in which China has been investing heavily but where the US backs local militant attackjs, while the US also tries to destabilize the Pakistani regime. The same is true of Balochistan, where Pakistan had allowed China a development area and which the US is now tyring, through proxy rebels, to dismantle. So far as China’s long shared border with Russia, across which China it imports Russian energy is concerned, US aggression against Russia over Ukraine targets Russian energy facilities that in turn affects Russian capacity to supply energy to China if continued for long enough. New York Times articles on the secret war against Russia over Ukraine notes how the CIA has supported drone attacks on Russian shipping and energy facilities in Sebastopol, the Black Sea, and Russian energy facilities in the Caspian, Mediterranean and off the coast of Africa. This reduces Russian ability to come to China’s assistance in the event that the US launches a maritime blockade of China.

US interventions against the flows of oil to China from Iran and from Venezuela, and Marco Rubio’s assertion in January 2025 that US control of Greenland would enable it to control energy flows enhanced by growing navigability of shipping lanes through the Arctic – similar to US attempts to interfere with shipping lanes in the South China Sea – are all indications of an evolving US policy of containment by blockade. All are examples of US pressure on choke-points in the flow of energy and trade to and from China that otherwise might reduce the efficacy of a US maritime blockade of China.

Strana.UA, 12/31/25 (Translated by Geoffrey Roberts)

This entire year has been marked by US President Donald Trump’s efforts to end the war in Ukraine.

Outwardly, these efforts have been fruitless: the war continues, casualties and tensions mount, and the year ends amidst Kremlin announcements of a strike on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s residence and threats of a military response.

It would seem like a dead end.

In reality, Trump has succeeded in bringing the positions of the two sides closer together.

If we recall the situation at the beginning of the year, it was strikingly different from now.

Kyiv’s official doctrine was the “Zelensky peace formula.” It included war until the 1991 borders were reached, with demands for Russia to pay reparations.

Indeed, the cause of the infamous scandal in the Oval Office in late February 2025 was Zelensky’s refusal to stop the war along the front lines.

After the scandal, Trump stopped supplying weapons and intelligence to Ukraine, and Kyiv’s position changed dramatically. Zelensky agreed to a ceasefire along the current demarcation line.

Putin’s official doctrine, announced in June 2024, demanded the transfer to Russia of the entire territory of the four regions whose annexation Russia announced in 2022 (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia), along with much else. Hence, the Kremlin initially refused to agree a ceasefire along the front line, demanding a broader agreement, which was communicated to the Ukrainian delegation during talks in Istanbul. Kyiv predictably rejected these conditions.

This led to tensions in the Trump-Putin relationship. Trump threatened to impose tariffs on buyers of Russian oil and gas. However, after encountering resistance from India and China, he reversed his position and met with Putin in Alaska. Putin also softened his demands, retaining the condition of Ukrainian troop withdrawal from Donbas but removing it for the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. Moreover, according to the US President, Putin was accommodating regarding security guarantees for Ukraine. This laid the framework for Trump’s peace plan, which emerged in November 2025.

Zelensky disagreed with this plan and – with European support – attempted to radically revise it. However, following his meeting with Trump in Florida, he was unsuccessful. Washington continues to adhere to the “Alaskan position” on key issues, including the withdrawal of troops from the Donetsk region. Zelensky remains somewhat opposed, but is no longer as unequivocal as before.

In other words, in less than a year, Trump has narrowed the disagreements between Ukraine and Russia over the terms of the peace agreement to the issue of the 25% of the Donetsk region’s territory currently under the control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Another important contentious issue is security guarantees for Ukraine. As noted above, in Alaska, according to Trump, Putin agreed that such guarantees should be provided.

However, there is a difference between how Russia views security guarantees and how Ukraine and Europe view them. For Russia, the absence of foreign troops on Ukrainian territory is essential, as are guarantees that Ukraine will not join NATO. Kyiv and the Europeans insist that the door to Ukraine’s accession to the Alliance should not be closed de jure (although it is clear that it is still closed de facto). And, most importantly, they insist on the deployment of foreign troops. This is still considered a “red line” in the Kremlin.

Trump’s initial plan included a provision stating that Ukraine should not join NATO and that foreign troops would not be stationed in the country. Then, after a series of negotiations with Kyiv and the Europeans, media reports surfaced that the US had given the go-ahead for the deployment of foreign troops and, moreover, was prepared to shoot down Russian missiles and aircraft in the event of a new war, and – if Zelensky and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk are to be believed – to send its own troops to Ukraine.

It should be noted that the Americans have never officially confirmed this. However, it appears that security guarantees remain the “carrot” that Washington intends to offer Kyiv in exchange for ceding Donbas.

Theoretically, Trump could accommodate Zelensky’s requests, although, of course, this doesn’t mean the Americans will honour these guarantees in practice due to the risk of nuclear war with Russia.

Moscow, for its part, is currently making efforts to return Trump to his original peace plan, excluding the deployment of foreign troops. According to one theory, this is part of the meaning of the statements about the “attack on Putin’s residence.” The Kremlin is essentially telling Washington: “With the kind of guarantees Kyiv is asking for, they’re simply dragging you into a nuclear war with us.”

But, let us reiterate, there’s no evidence yet that Trump considers the deployment of European, let alone American, troops to Ukraine as security guarantees. Only Zelensky (which may be his wishes) and media outlets close to the Democrats, which have repeatedly published “inside information” that has subsequently been outright refuted (such as reports about Russia agreeing to a ceasefire for the sake of holding a referendum), have said so. There are other contentious issues in the peace plan. But if we can reach an agreement on territories and security guarantees, everything else will move much more quickly.

Of course, there’s no 100% certainty that an agreement will be reached.

The warring parties are very reluctant to compromise.

The Ukrainian authorities don’t consider their situation on the front lines, or in general, so catastrophic that they should cede territory. Yes, the Russians are advancing, but the front isn’t collapsing. Yes, there are problems with manpower in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, but thanks to drones, they’re holding their ground. Yes, Europe has provided less money than expected, but it’s still something. Yes, the energy situation is very difficult, but there’s no total blackout. At the same time, Kyiv constantly harbours hopes of a “quick collapse in Russia”- because of mounting economic and interethnic problems, as well as problems with conscription that would necessitate a new mobilisation.

However, the “collapse of Russia” – anticipated for several years now – may not happen in the coming year either. And if Ukraine experiences serious problems at the front and with its energy supply, then the peace terms will become much worse than they are now. And this is being discussed with increasing frequency.

Besides, Trump may pressure Kyiv to expedite the process before the congressional mid-term elections. So far, he hasn’t done so. But such a threat could also influence Kyiv’s decisions.

But all is not clear about Russia’s position. Even if Kyiv agrees to withdraw its troops from the Donetsk region and security guarantees can be agreed upon, won’t the Kremlin impose new conditions in order to prolong the war?

The “war party” in Moscow is constantly calling for the this They, like their Kyiv and Western counterparts, say that “time is on our side,” “the Ukrainian front is about to collapse, the power supply will shut down, we just need to step it up a bit,” “sanctions aren’t a threat to us,” and so on. However, they’ve been repeating these lines for the past year. But the Ukrainian front hasn’t collapsed yet. Yes, Russia has managed to create and maintain an advantage in manpower, and recently, in some areas, in drones. Moreover, it has adapted its tactics to the new battlefield conditions, infiltrating the “drone line” in small groups. This allows it to advance, albeit slowly and with heavy losses. And no one can say how long the army will be able to replenish itself solely with contract soldiers, without declaring mobilisation. The Russian economy has withstood sanctions by reorienting sales markets, tapping into its reserves, and also by Russian entrepreneurs returning money to Russia due to the risks they face abroad. But the reserves are not unlimited. Sanctions are hitting oil prices, increasing sales costs, and creating many other problems. Furthermore, interethnic and interreligious tensions are being systematically fuelled within the country (including by the same information and political network that previously promoted Prigozhin, preparing the ground for his rebellion).

Both Ukraine and Russia are walking on very thin ice, hoping the other side will fall through first, even though both sides could drown.

The main justification for the concept of “war to the bitter end” in Ukraine and Russia, as well as among certain forces in the West, is the thesis of the “existential” nature of the war. This definition derives from the Latin word “existentia,” meaning existence. Thus, an “existential war” is a war for existence, the outcome of which determines the life and death of a state and nation. In the event of defeat, the nation and state perish. To complement the thesis of the “existential” nature of war, it is common to repeat the phrase, “either they perish, or we perish.” This thesis posits the incompatibility of Ukraine and Russia’s existence as two neighbouring states.

However, such reasoning is an “existential trap” for both countries.

Regarding the current war, it is clear that one of the warring parties (or both) will only find itself facing a real existential threat in the event of a “war to the bitter end.” Then it could indeed end in the complete collapse of one of the adversaries, the loss of statehood, or the disintegration of the state (which many in Kyiv and Moscow wish for each other). But for the victor, the price could be so high that it would amount to defeat.

Will ending the war based on Trump’s current peace plans mean that Ukraine or Russia collapse into the abyss and lose their statehood? Of course not. On the contrary, it would mean saving both countries from this scenario. It would mean eliminating the existential threat (a threat to their very existence) that could threaten both countries if the war continues.

Incidentally, such an end to the war would not pose an existential threat to Putin or Zelensky personally. For Putin, ending the war along the front lines (let alone gaining control of the entire Donbas) would be a victory. Of course, questions may arise about the price of such a victory, but it’s unlikely anyone will dare to ask them out loud. And most Russians won’t even ask them, rejoicing that the war is finally over.

For Zelensky, withdrawing troops from Donbas won’t mean a clear political defeat if in return Ukraine receives security guarantees and EU membership.

Will the implementation of Trump’s peace plans mean a resumption of war after a certain period of time? Not necessarily. It will depend on whether both countries continue to see each other as existential adversaries that must be destroyed sooner or later, or whether they allow each other to live in peace.

It will also depend on Europe’s position. More precisely, the West as a whole. And the United States, of course. But primarily on Europe’s position.

There, too, the prevailing attitude is now to view the war in Ukraine as an “existential” (for Europe) conflict. A theory has become widespread that Europeans benefit from prolonging the war in Ukraine because if it ends, Putin will attack the EU. We have written many times about the extreme dubiousness of this theory.

But it directly influences the European position and is a factor contributing to the prolongation of the war (given the EU and UK’s influence on the Ukrainian authorities). This is also influenced by the domestic political struggle in the US itself, where the Democrats (allied with the current European elites) do not benefit from Trump’s success in achieving peace in Ukraine, as this could strengthen the Republicans’ hand in the Congressional elections at the end of next year.

However, prolonging the war in Ukraine carries real existential risks for Europe if it is drawn directly into the war – with a far from zero risk of it escalating into a nuclear war.

There could be many occasions for this. For example, Europeans support for Ukraine crossing the Kremlin’s “final red line,” perhaps by beginning the supply of long-range Taurus missiles or by blockading Russian ports and the “shadow fleet.” Or, if the situation on the front reaches a stalemate, the Russian “war party” will convince the Kremlin to “intimidate” Europe militarily, forcing it to abandon its aid to Kyiv. Or perhaps there are simply some incomprehensible situations, like the sudden appearance of drones over Europe this fall. Who launched them and for what purpose remains a mystery. But this immediately sparked calls in the West to retaliate against Russia. Such “anonymous” incidents aimed at provoking a war between Europeans (and even NATO as a whole) and Russia are certainly not ruled out in the future.

And this, we repeat, is a real existential threat for Europe, Ukraine, Russia, and indeed for all of humanity, given the risk of nuclear war.

And the only way to mitigate this risk is to stop the war in Ukraine.

By the New Year, this task had not been accomplished.

However, given the significant narrowing of the range of contentious issues, it cannot be ruled out that this could happen in the coming months.

This offers hope for peace, but also makes these months extremely dangerous. On the one hand, the “war parties” in all countries will make every effort to disrupt the agreements (media outlets close to them are already full of predictions that the war will not end next year). On the other hand, all sides will try to “raise the stakes” to persuade the other side to make concessions.

However, with willpower, a successful conclusion to the negotiations is possible. The main thing to remember is that the real existential threat to everyone is the continuation of the war, not its end on compromise terms.

The BBC-Mediazona count of confirmed Russian military fatalities has reached c.160,000 – which indicates to me that Russia’s total irrecoverable losses (dead + seriously wounded) may be as high as 250,000. – Professor Geoffrey Roberts

Obviously, the estimates provided for Ukraine’s losses is a major undercount by comparison. – Natylie

By Olga Ivshina, BBC, 12/29/25

Over the past 10 months, Russian losses in the war with Ukraine have been growing faster than any time since the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022, BBC analysis suggests.

As peace efforts intensified in 2025 under pressure from US President Donald Trump’s administration, 40% more obituaries of soldiers were published in Russian sources compared with the previous year.

Overall, the BBC has confirmed the names of almost 160,000 people killed fighting on Russia’s side in Ukraine.

BBC News Russian has been counting Russian war losses together with independent outlet Mediazona and a group of volunteers since February 2022. We keep a list of named individuals whose deaths we were able to confirm using official reports, newspapers, social media, and new memorials and graves.

The real death toll is believed to be much higher, and military experts we have consulted believe our analysis of cemeteries, war memorials and obituaries might represent 45-65% of the total.

That would put the number of Russian deaths at between 243,000 and 352,000.

The number of obituaries for any given period is a preliminary estimate of the confirmed losses, as some need additional verification and will eventually be discarded. But it can indicate how the intensity of fighting is changing over time.

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2025 starts with a relatively low number of published obituaries in January, compared with the previous months. Then the number rises in February, when Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin talked directly for the first time about ending the war in Ukraine.

The next peak in August coincides with the two presidents meeting each other in Alaska, a diplomatic coup for Putin that was widely seen as an end to his international isolation.

In October, when a planned second Russia-US summit was eventually shelved, and then in November, when the US presented a 28-point peace proposal, an average of 322 obituaries were published per day – twice the average in 2024.

It is difficult to put increased Russian losses down to any one factor, but the Kremlin sees territorial gains as a way of influencing negotiations with the US in its favour: Putin aide Yuri Ushakov stressed recently that “recent successes” had had a positive impact.

Murat Mukashev was among those who gambled on a quick peace deal, and it cost him his life.

Mukashev was an activist who had never supported Putin’s policies.

Over the years, he had taken part in demonstrations against police violence and torture, and joined rallies for LGBT rights and the release of Alexei Navalny, the Kremlin’s main opponent who died in prison in 2024.

He had repeatedly condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on social media from 2022. Then, in early 2024, Mukashev was detained near his home in Moscow and charged with large-scale drug dealing.

While his case was being tried he was offered a contract with the defence ministry, according to his friends and family.

They saw the heavy charges levelled against him as a typical ploy to get people to sign up. A 2024 law allows the accused a way out of a criminal conviction if they join up – an attractive option in a country with an acquittal rate of less than 1%.

Mukashev refused the offer, and the court sentenced him to 10 years in a high-security penal colony.

In prison in November 2024, he changed his mind. Friends said he was encouraged by Trump’s promises to end the war quickly and decided he needed to sign up as soon as possible to secure his release before a peace deal was reached.

“He saw this as a chance to be released instead of being imprisoned for 10 years of strict regime,” reads a statement from his support group.

There was no explanation of how he reconciled taking part in the war with his reluctance to kill.

On June 11 2025, Mukashev died fighting as part of an assault squad in the Kharkiv region of north-eastern Ukraine.

Like him, the majority of Russians killed at the front in 2025 had nothing to do with the military at the start of the full-scale war, BBC figures show.

But since the bloody battle for the city of Avdiivka in October 2023, there has been a steady increase in casualties among so-called “volunteers” – those who have voluntarily signed a contract since the start of the invasion.

They now appear to form the majority of Russia’s new recruits, as opposed to professional soldiers who joined the army before the invasion or those mobilised for military service afterwards.

A year ago 15% of Russian military deaths were volunteers, but in 2025 it was one in three.

Local governments, under pressure to maintain a constant flow of new recruits, advertise hefty pay-outs, meet people who have large debts and campaign in universities and colleges.

This means that the Kremlin has been able to compensate for heavy losses at the front while avoiding the politically risky move of a large-scale mandatory mobilisation.

By October, 336,000 people had signed up for the military this year, according to National Security Council deputy chief Dmitry Medvedev – well over 30,000 a month.

Nato Secretary-General Mark Rutte has since said that 25,000 Russian soldiers are being killed every month. If both are right, Russia is still recruiting more soldiers than it is losing.

Based on obituaries and relatives’ accounts, most of those who signed up to fight did so voluntarily; but there are reports of pressure and coercion, especially on regular conscripts and those charged with criminal offences.

Some recruits mistakenly believe that after they have signed up for a year they can return to their old life with money in their pockets.

A new recruit can earn up to 10m roubles (£95,000; $128,000) in a year. In reality all contracts signed with the defence ministry since September 2022 are automatically renewed until the war is over.

According to Nato, the total number of Russian dead and wounded in the war is 1.1 million, and one official has estimated there have been 250,000 fatalities.

This is in line with the BBC’s calculations, although our list does not include those killed serving in the militia of two occupied regions in eastern Ukraine, which we estimate to be between 21,000 and 23,500 fighters.

Ukraine has also sustained heavy losses.

Last February, President Volodymyr Zelensky put the number of battlefield deaths at 46,000 and 380,000 others wounded.

Tens of thousands more were either missing in action or held captive, he added.

Based on other estimates and cross-referencing data, we believe the number of Ukrainians killed by now is as high as 140,000.