By MK Bhadrakumar, Consortium News, 1/26/24

An epochal anniversary from the annals of modern history on Saturday remains a living memory for the Russian people. The Siege of Leningrad, arguably the most gruesome episode of the Second World War, which lasted for 900 days, was finally broken by the Soviet Red Army on Jan. 27, 1944, 80 years ago. 

The siege endured by more than 3 million people, of whom nearly one half died, most of them in the first six months when the temperature fell to 30° below zero. 

It was an apocalyptic event. Civilians died from starvation, disease and cold. Yet it was a heroic victory. Leningraders never tried to surrender even though food rations were reduced to a few slices of bread mixed with sawdust, and the inhabitants ate glue, rats — and even each other — while the city went without water, electricity, fuel or transportation and was being shelled daily. 

It was on June 22, 1941, that the German armies crossed the Russian frontiers. Within six weeks, the Army Group North of the Wehrmacht, armed forces of the Third Reich, was within 50 kilometers of Leningrad in a fantastic blitzkrieg and had advanced  650 kms deep into Soviet territory.

A month later, the Germans had all but completed the city’s encirclement, only a perilous route across Lake Ladoga to the east connected Leningrad with the rest of Russia. But the Germans got no farther. And 900 days later their retreat began. 

The epic siege of Leningrad was the longest endured by any city since Biblical times, and, equally, citizens became heroes — artists, musicians, writers, soldiers and sailors who stubbornly resisted the iron from entering their souls.

The siege of Leningrad, 1942. (Av Boris Kudojarov/RIA Novosti arkiv.
Lisens: CC BY SA 3.0)

Petrified by the prospect of surrender to the Soviet Union, the Nazis preferred to lay down arms before the western allied forces, but Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, supreme commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in Europe, ordered that the honour of victory should go to the Red Army. 

Herein lies one of the greatest paradoxes of war and peace in modern times. Today, the anniversary of the siege of Leningrad has become,  most certainly, an occasion that the U.S. and many of its European allies would rather not remember. Yet, its contemporary relevance is not to be glossed over.

Death by Starvation

The Nazi leadership aimed to exterminate Leningrad’s entire population by enforced starvation. Death by starvation was a deliberate act on the part of the German Reich.

In the words of Joseph Goebbels, Adolf Hitler “intended to have cities like Moscow and St Petersburg wiped out.” This was “necessary,” he wrote in July 1941, “because if we want to divide Russia into its individual parts,” it should “no longer have a spiritual, political or economic centre.” 

Hitler himself declared in September 1941, “We have no interest in maintaining even a part of the metropolitan population in this existential war.” Any talk of the city surrendering had to be “rejected, as the problem of keeping and feeding the population cannot be solved by us.”

Hitler with Finland’s Marshal Carl Gustav Mannerheim and President Risto Ryti in Imatra, near the border with Russia, in 1942. (Kalle Sjöblom, digitized by Finnish Heritage Agency, Wikimedia Commons, Public domain)

Simply put, the population of Leningrad was left to starve to death — much like the millions of Soviet prisoners of war held by the Wehrmacht. The historian Jörg Ganzenmüller later wrote that this form of mass murder was cost-effective for Berlin, for, it was “genocide by simply doing nothing.” 

“Genocide by doing nothing.” Those chilling words are as well applicable today to the West’s “sanctions from hell” with an ulterior agenda to “erase” Russia and carve out five new states from its vast landmass with fabulous resources that can be subjugated by the industrial world. 

The mother of all ironies is that Germany is even today at the forefront of the “genocide by doing nothing” strategy to weaken and bring down the Russian Federation to its knees.

The Biden administration depended on a troika of three German politicians to do the heavy lifting in that failed effort to erase Russia — the E.U,’s top bureaucrat in Brussels Ursula von der Layen, German Chancellor Olaf Schulz and Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock. 

George Santayana, the Spanish-American philosopher, essayist, poet, and novelist once said, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” This is how the far-right thrives.

Israeli General Staff meeting on Oct. 8, 2023. (IDF Spokesperson’s Unit, Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 3.0)

In Germany and elsewhere, younger generations are becoming indifferent to the history of fascism. The idea of a Fourth Reich has entered an unprecedented heyday and is currently experiencing a new phase of normalisation in Europe. The tumultuous political upheaval throughout the Western world provides the backdrop today.

The author of  The Fourth Reich: The Specter of Nazism from World War II to the Present, historian and professor of history and Judaic studies Gavriel Rosenfeld has written that “The only way to mute the siren call of the Fourth Reich is to know its full history. Although it is increasingly difficult in our present-day world of fake ‘facts’ and deliberate disinformation to forge a consensus about historical truth, we have no alternative but to pursue it.” 

The justification of political violence is classically fascist. Last week, we saw a breathtaking spectacle at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague reminding us that we are now in fascism’s legal phase. 

If the Nazis used Judeo-Bolshevism as their constructed enemy, Israel is doing the same thing by raising the bogeyman of Hamas. Fascism feeds off a narrative of supposed national humiliation by internal enemies. 

Meanwhile, what gets forgotten is that there has been a growing fascist social and political movement in Israel for decades. Like other fascist movements, it is riddled with internal contradictions, but this movement now has a classically authoritarian leader in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who has shaped and exacerbated it, and is determined that in his time in politics it will be normalised. 

The probability is high that in a matter of a few days, the ICJ will give some sort of interim order/injunction to Israel to end the violence against the hapless Palestinians in Gaza. But the fascist movement Netanyahu now leads preceded him, and will outlive him.

These are forces that feed off ideologies with deep roots in Jewish history. They may be defending a fictional glorious and virtuous national past, but it would be a grave error to think they cannot ultimately win.

The Russians are learning this home truth the hard way in Ukraine where “denazification” is turning out to be the weakest link in their special military operation, given its geopolitical moorings traceable to Germany’s dalliance with the Ukrainian Neo-Nazi groups in Kiev in the run-up to the 2014 coup, which the U.S. inherited gleefully and wouldn’t let go. 

M.K. Bhadrakumar is a former diplomat. He was India’s ambassador to Uzbekistan and Turkey. Views are personal.

This article originally appeared on Indian Punchline.

By George Beebe & Anatol Lieven, Responsible Statecraft, 1/11/24

Russian progress in the Ukraine war is pushing the United States toward a painful choice.

If we want a prosperous Ukraine with a viable path toward liberal governance and European Union membership, we will have to concede that it cannot be a NATO or U.S. ally, and that this neutral Ukraine must have verifiable limits on the types and quantities of weapons it may hold. If we refuse to agree to those terms, Russia will quite probably turn Ukraine into a dysfunctional wreck incapable of rebuilding itself, allying with the West, or constituting a military threat to Russia.

Russian progress is not yet evident on the map, where the battle lines have not moved appreciably over the past year. Ukraine’s counteroffensive failed to break through Russian defenses, and Russia has not pushed Ukrainian forces significantly westward. An observer comparing territorial holdings in January 2023 with January 2024 might reasonably conclude that the war has become a stalemate.

But this picture is misleading. The Kremlin is almost certainly not seeking such a breakthrough, at least not yet. Rather, it is methodically grinding down Ukraine’s capacity not only to wage war, but also to reconstitute a post-war military, by killing and wounding enormous numbers of Ukrainian soldiers and exhausting Ukrainian and Western arsenals of arms and ammunition. Ukraine is running short of artillery shells, and the U.S. and Europe cannot manufacture new ones quickly enough to meet Ukraine’s needs. Russian barrages of long-range air and missile strikes are increasingly overwhelming the capacity of Ukrainian air defenses, and the West simply lacks the ability to continue providing Patriot missiles or other advanced air defense systems.

It is quite true, as the Biden administration has warned, that ending U.S. aid to Kyiv would quickly result in Ukraine’s collapse. Sufficient aid to help Ukraine to stand successfully on the defensive should therefore continue. But what U.S. policymakers need to understand and honestly acknowledge is that absent a compromise peace settlement, massive levels of aid will have to continue not just for the coming year, but indefinitely. There is very little realistic chance of the West being able to outlast Russia and force it to accept peace on Ukrainian terms. The controversies in Congress over aid to Ukraine reflect these realities and are unlikely to diminish.

Under such circumstances, for the Biden administration to pledge American support to Ukraine for “as long as it takes” to defeat Russia is unwise, and even dishonest. It is widely believed in Washington that the failure of Ukraine’s counteroffensive means that the West has no choice but to back Ukraine’s fight against Russia for many years to come. Seeking compromise with Moscow is regarded as not only undesirable but also futile. Lacking alternatives, we must stay the present course, hoping that time will improve Ukraine’s position.

But time is not on Ukraine’s side, either militarily or economically, and so Ukraine’s position in any future negotiations may well be very much worse than at present. Russia’s population is at least four times that of Ukraine and its GDP 14 times. The Russian army is far better led and more tactically adept than it was at the start of the war, and Western sanctions show no signs of being able to cripple the Russian economy, which is more and more geared for war.

And whatever Brussels may say, as long as the war continues it is exceptionally unlikely that Ukraine will be able to develop economically and begin the extremely difficult process of joining the European Union.

Most importantly, the United States has not tested the assumption that Russian President Vladimir Putin has no interest in talking. It is indeed very likely that Putin believes Russia now has the upper hand in the war and can afford to wait. Nonetheless, Putin has repeatedly insisted that Russia is ready to talk, and also that Washington – not Kyiv – makes the key decisions in the war and therefore it is for Washington to engage in talks.

This may be posturing; but it is also possible that Putin recognizes that absent a settlement, Russia is headed toward the dangers of a permanently volatile confrontation with the West, an economy distorted by the demands of military production, and a constricting degree of dependence on China. Russians’ concerns about these problems are likely to grow as their fears they may lose the war in Ukraine diminish.

It is further alleged that Putin believes that a future Donald Trump presidency would be the Kremlin’s best hope for a settlement on Russian terms. However, Trump’s first term produced some friendly rhetoric but much hostile action toward Moscow, including withdrawal from nuclear arms agreements and increased flows of U.S. weapons and training for the Ukrainian army.

Moreover, given the animosity toward Trump evident in Congress and the U.S. foreign and security policy establishment, Putin has little reason for confidence that Trump could actually deliver any deal. By 2020, Russians were thoroughly disillusioned with Trump. As the leading Russian foreign policy thinker Fyodor Lukyanov told Radio Liberty about the 2020 elections, “Why should Russians care? I don’t believe anyone here expects any change regardless of who will win.”

Given that Russia now has the advantage on the battlefield and senses that time is on its side, to get Putin to end the war and end his ambition to subjugate Ukraine or seize more territory, Washington will have to offer some serious incentives. These will need to include showing that the U.S. is prepared to meet Russian concerns about the U.S. and NATO security threat to Russia (concerns that are genuinely held throughout the Russian establishment).

This will mean agreement to a Ukrainian treaty of neutrality, with security guarantees for Ukraine, that will allow that country to follow neutral Finland and Austria during the Cold War and develop as a free market democracy. Western sanctions against Russia would need at least to be eased if not suspended, but with a binding commitment that they would automatically resume if Russia launched new aggression.

On the issue of the territories presently occupied by Russia, the only possible way forward is to defer this question for future talks under United Nations auspices, while putting the maximum possible security measures in place to prevent a resumption of war.

An agreement along these lines would be extremely painful for both Ukraine and the Biden administration. However, we should see preserving the independence of 80 percent of Ukraine as a real victory, even if not a complete one. It is certainly far better than what appears to be the alternative: a war of attrition with dreadful losses for Ukraine, leading sooner or later to a far greater Ukrainian defeat.

Sophia Ampgkarian contributed to the research for this article.

Veterans Intelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS), Consortium News, 1/25/24

ALERT MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

FROM: VETERAN INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS FOR SANITY (VIPS)

SUBJECT: Throwing Good Money After Bad: Decisions in an Intelligence Vacuum

Dear President Biden:

We noted in our January 26,2023 Memorandum to you that National Intelligence Director Avril Haines had expressed skepticism that Russian forces would be sufficiently prepared for Ukraine’s coming offensive. She said Russia was using up ammunition “extraordinarily quickly” and could not indigenously produce what it was expending.

You had just approved sending Abrams tanks to Ukraine. We wrote:

“None of the newly promised weaponry will stop Russia from defeating what’s left of the Ukrainian army. If you have been told otherwise, replace your intelligence and military advisers with competent professionals – the sooner the better.”

Russia Has Not Already Lost

On July 13, 2023, you said Putin “has already lost the war”. You may have gotten that from C.I.A. Director William Burns who, a week before, wrote an op-ed in The Washington Post saying: “Putin’s war has already been a strategic failure for Russia – its military weaknesses laid bare.” Both statements are incorrect. Nor is the war a “stalemate”, as Jake Sullivan has claimed more recently.

Ukraine has lost the war, and this will become very clear in the weeks ahead. Given the lack of any prospect for negotiations, nothing short of nuclear weapons could stop the measured but inexorable advance of Russian forces. You have said you want to avoid World War III. That’s what nukes (including “mini” ones) would mean.

Wooden-Headedness

At this historic juncture, we might seek what wisdom historians might offer. Here is Barbara Tuchman in her highly relevant book, The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam:

“Wooden-headedness…consists in assessing a situation in terms of preconceived fixed notions while ignoring or rejecting any contrary signs. It is acting according to wish while not allowing oneself to be deflected by the facts.”

As an example, Tuchman offered 16^th century Philip II of Spain: “No experience of the failure of his policy could shake his belief in its essential excellence.” In the end, Philip amassed too much power and drained state revenues by failed adventures overseas, leading to Spain’s decline.

U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s appeal Tuesday to U.S. allies to “dig deep” to provide Ukraine with more arms has the ring of wooden-headedness. It also brings to mind a more colloquial quip: “When you find yourself in a hole, stop digging.”

Obama’s Take

We do not have to go back five centuries to Philip II. As you will recall, President Obama faced down bipartisan pressure to send arms to Ukraine. According to The New York Times, he warned aides “that arming the Ukrainians would encourage the notion that they could actually defeat the far more powerful Russians, and so it would potentially draw a more forceful response from Moscow.”

Lastly, attempts to dismiss President Vladimir Putin as paranoid don’t pass the smell test. Putin has heard from the lips of Secretary Austin:

“One of the U.S.’s goals in Ukraine is to see a weakened Russia. … The U.S. is ready to move heaven and earth to help Ukraine win the war against Russia.”

Our closing warning of a year ago seems worth repeating:

“Can the U.S. achieve Austin’s goal? Not without using nuclear weapons.

Thus, there is a large conceptual – and exceptionally dangerous – disconnect. Simply stated, it is not possible to ‘win the war against Russia’ AND avoid WWIII. That our Defense Secretary Austin may think this possible is downright scary. In any case, the Kremlin has to assume he thinks so. Thus, it is a very dangerous delusion.”

Willing to Help

Lastly, we are about to re-issue our quadrennial offer to be of assistance to all presidential candidates. This would, of course, include you.

FOR THE STEERING GROUP,
VETERAN INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS FOR SANITY (VIPs)

• Bogdan Dzakovic, former Team Leader of Federal Air Marshals and Red Team, FAA Security, (ret.) (associate VIPS)
• Graham E. Fuller, Vice-Chair, National Intelligence Council (ret.)
• Philip Giraldi, C.I.A., Operations Officer (ret.)
• Matthew Hoh, former Capt., USMC, Iraq and Foreign Service Officer, Afghanistan (associate VIPS)
• Larry C. Johnson, former C.I.A. and State Department Counter Terrorism officer
• John Kiriakou, former C.I.A. Counterterrorism Officer and former senior investigator, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
• Karen Kwiatkowski, former Lt. Col., U.S. Air Force (ret.), at Office of Secretary of Defense watching the manufacture of lies on Iraq, 2001-2003
• Linda Lewis, WMD preparedness policy analyst, USDA (ret.)
• Ray McGovern, former U.S. Army infantry/intelligence officer & C.I.A. analyst; C.I.A. Presidential briefer (ret.)
• Elizabeth Murray, former Deputy National Intelligence Officer for the Near East, National Intelligence Council & C.I.A. political analyst (ret.)
• Todd E. Pierce, MAJ, US Army Judge Advocate (ret.)
• Pedro Israel Orta, former C.I.A. and Intelligence Community (Inspector General) officer
• Scott Ritter, former MAJ, USMC; former U.N. Weapons Inspector, Iraq
• Coleen Rowley, FBI Special Agent and former Minneapolis Division Legal Counsel (ret.)
• Lawrence Wilkerson, Colonel (USA, ret.), Distinguished Visiting Professor, College of William and Mary (associate VIPS)
• Sarah G. Wilton, CDR, USNR, (ret.); Defense Intelligence Agency (ret.)
• Ann Wright, retired U.S. Army reserve colonel and former U.S. diplomat who resigned in 2003 in opposition to the Iraq War

By Stephen Bryen, Asia Times, 1/11/24

Update: Today Russia’s RT reports that the Norwegian NASAMS system won’t arrive anytime soon in Ukraine.

On January 8 Ukraine was hit by the second massive missile and drone attack in ten days.  The Russians struck at locations in cities including Kiev, Odesa, Kharkiv and L’viv —altogether, 10 Ukrainian cities.

The Russian attacks used a variety of air-launched hypersonic and cruise missiles and Geran-2 drones.  From all accounts, the Russians successfully destroyed a number of munitions and armaments factories, command centers and airfields.   

Reports from Ukraine, Russia and Poland say that in the January 8 strike Ukraine was able to knock out only 18 of the 51 missiles and drones launched by the Russians.

There are reports that Ukraine says it was not able to shoot down any of the Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, nor any of Russia’s Iskander-M ballistic missiles, nor any of the Kh-22 (anti-ship) liquid fueled missiles, and that it managed to down only some of the Kh-101 air-launched cruise missiles. 

Ukraine also says it shot down all of the Geran-2 drones, the Russian version of Shahed-136 suicide drones – but Kiev claims that only eight of them were launched by the Russians. In fact, drones were used in large number.

The United States and its NATO allies (and two couintries that were not part of NATO at the time, Sweden and Finland) have been supplying various types of air defense systems to Ukraine.

The US supplied the Patriot air defense system, most likely the Pac-2 version, although it also supplied Pac-3 interceptor missiles. Norway, in partnership with the US, supplied its NASAMS air defense system. The European consortia supplied IRIS-T. Italy sent its Aspide; France and Italy, SAMP-T; and the Germans supplied their twin-barrel radar-driven Flakpanzer Gepard.

Sweden also provided Bofors air defense guns. 

In addition, the US supplied its best MANPADS shoulder fired anti-aircraft system, the FIM-92 Stinger and the Ukrainians also had Russian Igla MANPADS, at least in the early days of the war.

In addition to NATO- and other Western-supplied air defense systems, Ukraine has installed the Russian S-300S and BUK-1M air defense systems around Kiev.

By Alexander Hill, Canadian Dimension, 12/8/23

I used to have some respect for elements of the mainstream news media. While that respect has eroded gradually over time, it has been coverage of the war in Ukraine that has finally destroyed what hope I had for corporate journalism. When it comes to Ukraine and Russia, it is left to outlets like Canadian Dimension to question narratives that seem to be lifted straight out of government press releases in Washington or Kyiv.

One of those narratives claims that, bit by bit, a Western-backed Ukraine is bringing down its larger Russian neighbour in a David and Goliath struggle. As well-known historian and Yale professor Timothy Snyder recently implied in a piece for the Guardian, all the Ukrainians need is a few more ‘queens’ on the chessboard and they can win the day. The piece makes little mention of Russia—as if more equipment and willpower alone are enough to bring ‘victory’ regardless of the state of affairs on the other side of the frontline.

I can tell you now—both from a professional analysis of the situation as a military historian specializing in Russia and first-hand experience during multi-week trips there in both October 2022 and November 2023—that Russia is a long way from being beaten and in many ways is in a stronger position today than it was at the end of last year. But getting that information out into the mainstream press is becoming more and more difficult—perhaps suggesting that the Western crusade against Russia, using Ukraine as a proxy, is not going to plan. Meanwhile, both Ukrainians and Russians are being killed by the thousands in a war in which neither side is likely to achieve a clear ‘victory.’

One can analyze Russian media and opinion polls from afar all one wants, but the picture one gains of the situation in Russia is incomplete without actually spending any time there. The first time I visited Russia during the war was during a nearly three-week trip back in October 2022—just over a year ago. At that time things were very different than they are today. Back in September 2022 the Russian government had just announced a wave of mobilization in the face of Ukrainian battlefield successes, not only initially on the Kyiv axis, but also in the north-east near Kharkiv. In the face of realities on the ground Russian forces subsequently gave up territory on the Western bank of the Dnieper River. In the aftermath of these events the mood in Moscow—and indeed in Murmansk where I also spent some time last fall—was relatively sombre as Russians came to terms with the fact that the ‘Special Military Operation’ was more like a fully-fledged war than was initially portrayed—a war that had now provoked a call-up of reservists and was clearly not going to be over in the near future.

In the aftermath of the announcement of a mobilization thousands of younger urban Russians fled the country to avoid being called up and to join those who had already left in order to continue working for foreign companies forced to transfer their operations to neighbouring countries in the face of Western sanctions. Although in many ways life in both Moscow and Murmansk went on as normal—with a few shuttered Western shops and the absence of many Western brands on supermarket shelves being two noticeable realities—under the surface there was certainly a growing sense of unease. Now, however, just over a year later, much of that foreboding has dissipated.

Since the fall of 2022 Russia has fought off the much-vaunted Ukrainian counteroffensive, which was supported by some of the latest equipment that NATO could provide. The Russian armed forces that threw themselves forward with reckless abandon and insufficient preparation in the spring of 2022 on the Kyiv axis soon learned their lesson—the Ukrainian armed forces were not going to be steamrolled and a more methodical approach was called for. Very quickly, the Russian army regrouped, reorganized and much more methodically advanced—gaining significant territory in the east, most of which they still hold.

The mobilization of September 2022 turned out not to be on the scale that many Russians feared—it was quite clear that many young men were not going to be called up and many have now returned to the country. Some of them are opposed to the war on political and moral grounds, but it is difficult to gauge anti-war sentiment given the Russian government’s near total crackdown on dissent. To top up the tens of thousands mobilized in the fall Moscow decided to offer pay and conditions for those signing up for the armed forces that are enough to transform the lives of the families of those from the provinces and rural areas who have signed up in their thousands. As in Ukraine, how many are being killed remains a closely guarded secret.

Alongside high pay for soldiers (approximately 14 times higher than the median salary in some regions of Russia) Russian propaganda campaigns focus on ‘national projects,’ with new schools and hospitals being showcased in short infomercials on television. Where the money is coming from remains unclear. Inflation may be high, but there is abundant employment in the cities and for most life is far better than it was a couple of decades ago after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Vladimir Putin continues to enjoy sky-high public-approval ratings, and most Russians couldn’t care less about upstarts like Yevgeny Prigozhin or the oligarchs who got fat on the privatizations that followed the collapse of communism and who are occasionally picked off for stepping out of line.

Prigozhin’s abortive mutiny and subsequent demise seem to have contributed to a strengthening of Putin’s position. Even according to polling by the Levada Center, which is deemed a ‘foreign agent’ by the Russian government, the president’s approval rating is now above 80 percent, up from lows of around 60 percent immediately before the war. It doesn’t matter whether the pollsters are within or outside Russia—support for the war effort is evidently high.

Western sanctions were supposed to bring the Russian economy to its knees, but that clearly hasn’t happened. Although sanctions have hit the economy hard in some sectors (especially the high-tech industries), in others Russia has effectively found alternatives or successfully substituted Russian products. Fast-food chain McDonald’s has become ‘Vkusno i tochka’ (literally translatable as ‘Tasty and On Time’) with a logo reminiscent of an ‘M’ that not only reminds customers of its origins but in a way sticks a finger up at the West. The non-Western world can supply Russia with all the tea and coffee and other similar products it needs—and even many Western goods remain on the shelves as if there weren’t any sanctions.

There is a confidence in the air in Russia’s capital—and indeed in Ryazan, home of the Russian airborne forces in which I also spent a number of days last month—that was clearly lacking a year ago. Many Russians I have spoken to clearly believe that it is only a matter of time before the Ukrainian military collapses, as Russian television shows scenes of the Ukrainian authorities rounding up unwilling conscripts and pleas from Volodymyr Zelensky for more Western aid. Meanwhile, much of the Western press still continues to pretend that it is Russia that must be close to collapse—a wishful thinking that is increasingly far from the truth.

For many Russians the war now is an existential one. The Russian government has successfully argued that the war is aimed at a West intent on ‘cancelling’ Russia and its culture using Ukraine as a vehicle. The villain of the piece is undoubtedly the United States, towards which the vast majority of Russians polled by Levada continue to express negative attitudes. US focus on Israel’s war in Gaza has undoubtedly deflected some of the West’s attention from Ukraine—with the Russian press only too pleased to point out the hypocrisy of US support for an Israel only too willing to inflict casualties on the civilian population in Gaza at a rate far outstripping anything the Russian armed forces have committed in Ukraine.

Although it is specifically Russian language and culture that is seen to be being ‘cancelled’ in Ukraine and indeed the Baltic Republics as well, Russia itself has now started to focus much more on the idea of the Russian state as a vessel not only for Russian culture but all of the cultures of Russia—with a new racial tolerance apparent both in the media and on the street. This may to some extent reflect a cynical need for more troops, but it is nonetheless real. At a recent exhibition showcasing the activities and achievements of Russia’s regions in Moscow smaller regions such as Chechnya and Ingushetia have been given as much exhibition space as any other larger regions. The Russian media hails the heroism of soldiers from villages thousands of kilometres from the European part of the country who are serving a wider, ethnically diverse Russia. In St. Petersburg a recent conference promoting cultural diversity in the world—and the value of Russian culture as part of that diversity—was attended by hundreds of delegates from tens of countries, highlighting that Russia’s isolation from the West isn’t isolation from much of the remainder of the world.

That doesn’t mean that tolerance is now the order of the day in Russia. Obviously public opposition to the war is stamped out quickly, with the few celebrities who publicly display opposition soon being labelled ‘foreign agents.’ Even the famous singer Alla Pugacheva is not immune, although the Russian government has been wary of punishing her given her almost legendary status. The tolerance, even celebration, of Russia’s national minorities such as the Chechens has a corollary in that such ethnic groups are typically as, if not more, socially conservative than the Russian Orthodox Church, and willing to get behind the resurgence of ‘traditional values’ that means that Western-associated liberalism is in the crosshairs. A popular whipping boy is the LGBTQ movement, recently declared ‘extremist’ by the Supreme Court. ‘Anti-woke’ attacks on symbols of the culture war in the West seem to go down well with a vast majority of Russians, and contribute to a sense of Russia being a moral bastion again perceived Western ‘social decadence.’

As the bloodbath in Ukraine continues Russian morale clearly remains high. Russia has upped its game but is far from fully mobilized for war. In the face of the awoken bear some sort of mythical Ukrainian victory that would see it recapture territory lost since 2014 is increasingly unlikely, no matter how many tanks and fighter aircraft the West will deliver to Kyiv.

The more time passes the more urgent it becomes for the West to encourage Ukrainian leaders to restart negotiations with Russia that were cut short in the spring of 2022. Since then tens of thousands of lives have been lost on both sides. Many more may be lost for little change of the frontline in something akin to the later stages of the Korean War. It is now more than ever time to act to prevent the loss of tens of thousands more lives in a war that isn’t going anywhere soon, and in which there is unlikely to be a silver bullet for either side. It is unquestionably time to start talking about the sort of peace that will be a just one for all of those involved—whether they identify themselves as Ukrainian or Russian, and live in Lviv or Donetsk.