By Paul Robinson, Canadian Dimension, 11/22/24

Back in 1997, when Canada still had a more or less independent foreign policy, the Canadian government celebrated the signing of the Ottawa Treaty banning the use of anti-personnel landmines. At the time, it was heralded as an extraordinary achievement of Canadian diplomacy, and was a source of great national pride. One might imagine, therefore, that Canadians today would be concerned with potential breaches of a treaty that was once considered the crown jewel of our country’s foreign policy. But it appears not.

This week, the Biden administration announced that it would give anti-personnel landmines to Ukraine. Ukraine, unlike the United States (and also Russia), is a signatory to the Ottawa Treaty, and thus would be in serious breach of its international obligations were it ever to use the weapons provided.

This is something that should surely be of concern to the Canadian media and the Trudeau government. Yet although the news was the leading headline in much of the international press, topping, for instance, the BBC website, it has scarcely been noticed here. Google searches indicate no article on the topic published by the CBC, and no statements on the matter by Canadian ministers or officials. It would appear that what was once our pride and joy no longer interests anybody.

The decision to give landmines was not the only escalation of the war in Ukraine to be announced this week by the US. Another was the granting of permission to Ukraine to use American (and also British) long-range missiles against targets inside Russia. Almost immediately, Ukraine carried out a couple of strikes with American supplied ATACMS missiles and British-supplied Storm Shadows on targets in Russia’s Bryansk and Kursk provinces.

In response, Russia has now fired what President Vladimir Putin said was an experimental hypersonic medium-range ballistic missile with multiple warheads at a Ukrainian industrial facility in the city of Dnipro. Such missiles travel so fast—three kilomtres per second—that it is almost impossible to intercept them. They can also carry nuclear warheads, and their use can be seen therefore as a warning to the West and Ukraine not to escalate further.

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All this raises questions about the West’s policy of incremental escalation in Ukraine, specifically what goals it is meant to achieve, whether those goals are actually achievable, and whether the cost of pursuing those goals may be so high as to render them unwise. At present, it is very hard to discern what the goals are. Defeating Russia militarily is now considered almost impossible by all but the most hardline pro-Ukrainians. Instead, it appears that the US and its Western allies are trying merely to slow down the rate of Russian advances and to increase the costs of the war to Russia in the hope that somehow or other this will compel the Russian government to moderate its demands against Ukraine and accept a compromise peace.

What that compromise peace would consist of, and exactly how one would go about negotiating it, remains, however, a mystery. Furthermore, it’s not obvious that the policy of incremental escalation will even induce a more compromising mindset in Russia’s rulers rather than further strengthen their conviction that the war must be pursued until the point of final victory (whatever that means). In short, continued escalation along the lines of this past week may merely increase the risks involved in the war while not serving any useful role in ending it.

Had Kamala Harris won the US presidential election earlier this month, it is likely that this policy would have continued under her leadership. The return of Donald Trump to the White House in January offers instead at least a glimmer of hope that America may change its policy from one of repeated but rather aimless escalation to one of de-escalation or even war termination.

Trump himself is known to be keen to see the war come to an end and to be less sympathetic to the Ukrainian cause than Joe Biden. Much, though, depends on those around the president-elect. In his first term in office, Trump surrounded himself with officials who did their best to undermine some of his foreign policy initiatives. For instance, Trump’s decision to withdraw US troops from Syria led to the resignation of some officials and to others deliberately misleading the president about the number of troops remaining in that country.

It remains to be seen if this scenario will repeat itself with regards to Ukraine, but the signs so far suggest that Trump 2.0 team will be rather more in line with its leader than was the case between 2016 and 2020. Incoming officials such as Vice President-elect J.D. Vance, Secretary of State nominee Marco Rubio, and Secretary of Defense nominee Pete Hegseth can be viewed as foreign policy hawks, but their hawkishness is largely directed at China and Iran, not at Russia. On November 6, for instance, Rubio said that: “I think the Ukrainians have been incredibly brave and strong in standing up to Russia. But at the end of the day, what we are funding here is a stalemate war, and it needs to be brought to a conclusion, or that country is going to be set back 100 years.”

It is likely, therefore, that the Trump administration will seek to start negotiations to end the war. Trump and his team also seem willing to countenance a settlement that leaves a substantial portion of Ukrainian territory in Ukrainian hands and thus falls far short of a Ukrainian victory. What is not clear, though, is whether they are willing to offer Russia something that it will accept (which goes beyond territory and includes Ukrainian neutrality), and whether they are willing to twist the arm of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to force him to agree to whatever is being proposed, by for instance threatening to withdraw all aid if he refuses.

On the one hand, Trump strikes one as the kind of person who in principle might be quite willing to pursue the latter course of action. On the other hand, stories emerging from the US about what those around him might propose as a peace plan suggests that they do not fully grasp what is necessary to bring Russia onside. There have, for instance, been reports that people close to Trump are proposing a 20-year freeze on NATO membership for Ukraine. But this falls far short of what Russia is demanding, and is unlikely to be accepted.

It could be, therefore, that the Trump presidency will begin with a push for peace that will soon fail, after which everything will revert to what it was before. That said, if the Democratic Party had retained power, it’s improbable that we would be talking about a push for peace at all. Some chance is better than none, and for that at least we should be grateful.

Paul Robinson is a professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa and a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy. He is the author of numerous works on Russian and Soviet history, including Russian Conservatism, published by Northern Illinois University Press in 2019.

By Conor Gallagher, Naked Capitalism, 10/31/24

The Bolshevik revolution of 1917 shook the elites of Europe. They likely hadn’t been that uneasy since the guillotines were getting worn out in France in 1794. In the 2021 book “The Spectre of War: International Communism and the Origins of World War II” Jonathan Haslam makes the case that the fear of Communism was a significant driver behind WWII.

Haslam has another book, “Hubris,” just recently out in which he argues “a gross and systemic lack of understanding by Britian and its allies concerning Russia’s intentions and likely actions is ultimately to blame for the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War.”

There’s another telling of that story in which the US and UK knew exactly what they were doing, but that gives you an idea of where Haslam’s coming from. He takes a similar stance on the UK elite in “The Spectre of War”: that it was British misconceptions about Hitler that led them to pursue a pact with the Nazis or at least use Hitler against Russia.

On one hand Haslam argues that the British view of fascism as the only force standing between the Communist overthrow of the existing order was understandable; on the other he faults the British rich for politically misreading Hitler’s Germany in courting it to battle communism.

The logical conclusion, which he never quite nails down, is that it’s unfortunate Hitler didn’t play ball. In attempting  steer clear of that point, however, he does (unintentionally I think) make the case that the elites in our supposedly democratic societies vastly prefer fascism to losing any of their wealth. That’s because while the book is primarily concerned with the communist menace, it’s hard to provide convincing evidence of it being such an existential threat without referring to that fact.

From his telling of history, Haslam issues warnings for today, including that “today’s great state of balance will not last” and that Bolshevism or fascism could soon re-emerge.

What could lead to their re-emergence? Haslam offers a smorgasbord of threats, including that “the confidence to invest is being undermined by revolutionary extremism,” which sounds oddly like a call for fascism in order to preserve the existing order and wealth. Other threats include runaway inflation, a lack of economic freedom in China, crime in the US, and Iran’s “bid for hegemony in the Middle East.” Okay, then.

Nowhere does our elites’ attraction to fascism in order to protect their wealth factor in, which is probably understandable considering the point of view Haslam is writing from is as a member of that elite. He is George F. Kennan Professor in the School of Historical Studies at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton and Professor of the History of International Relations at the University of Cambridge and is widely considered a Soviet Union expert in the West.

Haslam relied on whatever documents — British, French, Russian, etc. — he could get his hands on from the time period, which is still limited (one can only guess as to why):

Not all of those [diplomatic documents] for the interwar period are declassified, even now. For instance, annual reports written by British diplomats stationed in foreign capitals such as Paris are still unaccountably closed…We still have no access to the files of Britain’s secret service, MI6, for the interwar period.

I wonder what a book based on the same documents but solely focused on Western elites’ attraction to fascism would read like. Maybe that book is still to be written (or I’ve missed it).

Nonetheless, while Haslam wrote a book about the threat of communism, what jumped out to me were the periodic details of UK plutocrats’ love of fascism and how it lay bare the true nature of the British ragion di stato. That’s what I’ll detail here, and in doing so, hopefully shed some light on how the Soviets and Russians have so long been a thorn in the wealthy Brit’s sides that they now hate them today the same as their dads and granddads.

***

Following the Bolshevik Revolution the consensus among the UK establishment was that the Soviets must be defeated at all costs. That thinking was put into practice almost immediately when British troops landed in Murmansk eight months after the Bolsheviks seized power. The UK bombed Petrograd and even enlisted German troops to fight the Soviets in the Baltics.

It continued in the late 1920s when the British tried to embrace the Kremlin’s only ally Weimar Germany, which was still practicing former Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s late 19th century strategy of counting on the natural trading relationship of Russian raw materials for German industry to neutralize any rivalry. As Haslam writes, “…the massive [British] army that had been rapidly mobilized in 1914 was no more. The only means of containing Bolshevism was through diplomacy. By undermining the Soviet-German entente, the British were securing Europe.”

Those efforts continued when Hitler was in power, and despite a few brief pauses, they never really ended to this day despite Communism’s defeat.

Why? If we go back to the beginning, while Britain wasn’t overcome with class struggle, there was widespread fear of it among the wealthy. And the Bolsheviks did cause major problems for the empire, such as in China where they provided early support for the Chinese Communist Party. Haslam can go on for pages about the Japanese running amok, committing endless atrocities in Manchuria and then turn around and write something like this:

In the Far East as in Europe, the Western powers feared that undoing the status quo would unleash the forces of disorder.

Which of course were the communists and why the UK and US supported Japan despite the horrors they were unleashing on civilians.That’s because the true victims were traumatized British bourgeois in Haslam’s telling:

The customary forms of international relations were thus systematically overturned by Moscow’s messianic commitment to overturning the established international order at all costs and as soon as practicable. At the receiving end throughout Europe, the bureaucratic elite, dressed for the day in detachable collars and morning suits, sitting down to work despatching and receiving deciphered telegrams to and from the embassies of Europe, found their customary conduct of diplomacy repeatedly frustrated by Comintern subversion across the globe.

That’s all fine and good, but there are two problems with Haslam’s apologia:

1. He frequently depicts the Communist International (Comintern) as ineffective.
2. According to Haslam, it was the British who didn’t take diplomacy with the Russians seriously as the Nazi storm clouds gathered over Europe. They instead wanted a deal with Hitler to form a united front against Communism. Here’s one such example from the book:

Moscow, faced with German enmity, was actually working hard to make friends across Europe. It wanted to avoid unexpected crises arising from Comintern operations and was willing to make concessions to appease potential partners. …the problem for Soviet diplomacy was that the core objective of Comintern’s Popular Front strategy was…aimed, of course, not merely at isolating German fascism but at combating fascism in general.

Let’s look at what the UK, in comparison, was up to in the interwar years:

Alberto de Stefani, italy’s finance minister, reported to the prime minster (and foreign minister) Benito Mussolini from Paris on 7 January 1925 that “[I]n a discussion that I had today with [Winston] Churchill [then chancellor of the exchequer]…the latter expressed his sympathy for Your Excellency and his esteem for the energetic work carried out by Your Excellency in suppressing Bolshevism.”

At that point Mussolini had murdered hundreds and imprisoned thousands of Italians in those suppression efforts. Haslam goes on to quote a 1927 piece from the British newspaper Morning Post entitled “The Fascist Ideal”:

When Mussolini took hold of Italy, democracy, delirious with Communism, was swiftly and bloodily ruining the country. And because every other nation is menaced by the same disaster, the example of Italy is peculiarly illuminating, as a ‘contribution to civilisation.’

In London on 19 October 1930 Churchill, now on the back benches, told Prince Otto von Bismarck, the counsellor at the German embassy in London, that “the burgeoning industrialization of the Soviet state presents a great danger to the whole of Europe that can be dealt with only through the establishment of an alliance with the whole of the rest of Europe and America against Russia.”

Here’s the US ambassador to Germany echoing that sentiment:

[President] Hindenburg backs Bruening on the question that Germany is facing a Russian menace,” reported the US ambassador to Germany Frederic Sackett, a solid Republican businessman. “They believe that eventually Russia will be compelled by public opinion to take back Bessarabia and that this will reopen the whole question of the spread of Bolshevism throughout Europe. In this maelstrom Germany will be the buffer state and must be ready to defend itself and the rest of Europe against Bolshevism.

Here is former British Prime Minister Lloyd George in September 1933 explaining that Hitler was the only alternative to communism:

If the Powers succeed in overthrowing Nazism in Germany, what would follow? Not a Conservative, Socialist or Liberal regime, but extreme Communism. Surely that could not be their objective. A Communist Germany would be infinitely more formidable than a Communist Russia.

This belief was widespread at the British Foreign Office:

The red-headed young Robert Hadow, then first secretary of the embassy in Vienna, argued that weakening Hitler would lead towards a Communist Germany “led by utterly unreasonable men — which I do not consider Hitler to be.”

Haslam has harsher words for the Germans like Hindenburg and Schleicher who “arrogantly deluded themselves that they could simultaneously use, contain and control a populist agitator [?] like Hitler to their own ends.” It would appear they were not the only ones, however:

The British were utterly unavailable and had no intention of taking any initiative…tending towards the containment of Nazi Germany. France was thus on its own. Worse than that, the British, with no illusions about French motives, exerted their utmost influence “to prevent the Franco-Russian alliance.”

…No one could deny that the British knew exactly what they were doing, though they had as yet no clear idea as to the longer-term consequences of their actions.

Did they not though? Haslam cites the following examples, which show they did know:

A junior minister at the Foreign Office, Anthony Eden, had begun to shift from the consensus that Germany was much misunderstood and deserved the benefit of the doubt to a more realistic assessment of where the Nazis were heading. His superior Sir John Simon, however, was of a different mould. He held out to Hitler the prospect of a deal on Air Force limitation in return for a more general European settlement. When Hitler showed himself willing to take the deal without the quid pro quo, Eden of course protested. But Simon characteristically gave way.

“Simon toys with [the] idea of letting [Germany] expand eastwards,” Eden surmised…”Apart from its dishonesty…it would be our turn next.” Simon nonetheless drew consolation from Hitler’s obsession with marching to Eastern Europe.

British diplomat Sir Orme Sargent saw a war by Germany against the Soviet Union as welcome inevitable:

“The need of expansion will force Germany towards the East a being the only field open to her, and as long as the Bolshevist regime exists in Russia it is impossible for this expansion to take merely the form of peaceful penetration.”

And here’s Ambassador Phipps in Berlin:

He proffered the tactical objection that by “erect[ing too much barbed wire, whether along Hitler’s southern or eastern frontier, we will head the beast back to the west.” Sargent commented with respect to this that a “great deal” could be said for Britain making no commitments to defend Eastern Europe.

How about Lord Londonderry, “one of Churchill’s innumerable cousins”?

He was an extraordinarily wealthy man, with more than most to lose were genuine socialism to take power. Londonderry was of the view that Germany was the lesser evil.

Here is Colonel Rogers of British intelligence to his counterparts in France:

The liquidation of the growing danger [the Soviet Union] is entirely in the interests of Britain. The British will in no way attempt to do this with their own hands and will not take part openly in any anti-Soviet combinations…But should there be emerge the possibility of defeating the Bolsheviks by any combination of forces, then the British will look upon it with sympathy and will at the decisive moment themselves take part in it. If another government forms in Russia, then the possibility is not to be excluded that Britain will support it, thereby finally re-establishing the balance of power in Europe.

France signed a pact with the Soviets nonetheless, and the Brits replied by breaching part five of the Versailles Treaty with an agreement with Berlin that legitimized German naval rearmament at 35% of the British level. The UK would go on to pressure Paris to abandon the treaty as the foreign office saw it as the greatest obstacle to “any attempt at collaboration in Europe.” France had to choose between Russia and the Western European Great Powers.” Here’s Sargent again:

Sargent in late 1936 sought to revive a Concert of Europe…What he foresaw, as did The Economist, was the division of the continent into ideologically opposing camps. Spain was the catalyst, but France, as he saw it, was the real problem…As to the two fascist powers, however, the task lay in removing their “feeling” of being isolated.

Here’s Oliver Harvey, private secretary to foreign secretary Lord Halifax in June of 1938:

…the British were “praying for Franco’s victory and bringing all the influence they can bear on France to stop the inflow of munitions to Barcelona.” Halifax was no exception. He believed the civil war made it easier to find common ground with Germany, because the Communist role would cause the British to see Germany “as an ally of ours and of all order-loving folk.” The pressure from London under Chamberlain was unremitting. On 13 June French Prime Minister Edouard Daladier finally closed the frontier to arms traffic heading into Spain. Thereafter the Republic was doomed.

Somewhat unexpectedly British public opinion was staunchly against Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 and demanded action. The government, which looked favorably upon Mussolini’s efforts against communism, was unmoved.

“That was what was at the back of their minds,” recalled [British historian] A.L. Rowse: “the anti-Red theme that confused their minds when they should have been thinking in terms of their country’s interests and safety.”

Were they not though? As Haslam admits at one point, “This was, after all, a society run by a homogeneous caste who had, with very few exceptions, attended the leading private schools and university at Oxford and Cambridge.” If their idea of country is their caste, then they were looking out for their interests by offering tacit support for Mussolini and Hitler. And that leads to the prime ministership of Neville Chamberlain.

Chamberlain as Appeaser? 

The simple story told in the history books is that Chamberlain’s run as prime minister (1937-40) was one of naivety and weakness. He was an appeaser who failed to stand up to dictators and prevent WWII. In reality he was representing the interests of much of the British upper class, which preferred a pact with Nazi Germany.

In 1938 the British politician and diplomat Sir Harold Nicholson wrote in his diary the following:

“People of the governing classes think only of their own fortunes, which means hatred of the Reds. This creates a perfectly artificial but at present most effective secret bond between ourselves and Hitler. Our class interests, on both sides.”

Or consider Lord Privy Seal Viscount Halifax on a trip to Germany in 1937 on the Chamberlain government’s behalf:

Halifax was hosted by Goring and visited Hitler at Berchtesgaden, where he thought it appropriate to congratulate the dictator on performing what he described as “great services in Germany.” Halifax added that Hitler “also, as he would no doubt feel, had been able, by preventing the entry of communism into his own country, to bar its passage further west.”

Halifax…”liked all the Nazi leaders, even Goebbels! Whom no one likes”…He believed it vital that Britain “get on with them.”

When Germany invaded Czechoslovakia in 1939 Britain exerted maximum pressure on Prague to bow to the Germans. In July of that year Head of the Home Civil Service Horace Wilson met with the German ambassador and proposed that Britain and Germany divide Europe into “economic spheres of influence, which involved directing the Germans towards eastern and south-eastern Europe…”

Ahead of the Munich Conference, ‘Chamberlain, confident of royal support, said he would outline “the prospect of Germany and England as the two pillars of European peace and buttresses against Communism.”’

There was a reason he was confident of royal support. Here’s King Edward VIII’s hand-picked equerry, Dudley Forwood:

“We were not averse to Hitler politically. We felt that the Nazi regime was a more appropriate government than the Weimar Republic, which had been extremely socialist.”

The Duke of Windsor was “very pro-German.” As were the Duke and Duchess of Kent and Queen Mary. Moscow, slowly but surely, was beginning to figure out what was going on. Here’s a Kremlin memo following the capitulation of Czechoslovakia:

“From an analysis of the current military-political situation in Europe it follows that the main organiser and inspiration for war against the Soviet Union in the West is Fascist Germany evidently under the patronage of England and France.”

Moscow had a different word for Chamberlain’s “appeasement.” They called it “pro-fascist.”

Even as 1939 was drawing to a close Britain was making preparations for war with the Soviets, and it wasn’t so much that Chamberlain’s successor Churchill was anti-fascist, but he was worried about the German threat to the British empire. Or the view from Comintern: “The war is turning out to be between two groups of capitalist countries for the domination of the world.”

After Churchill’s rise to prime minister he refuted rumors of peace talks with Germany and declared that Britain would fight to the end as it was “a matter of life or death for England and the British empire.”

There were, however, repeated attempts still to come to terms with Berlin. Here’s one such example involving the Duke of Windsor (formerly King Edward VIII), according to the foreign department of Soviet state security:

“…Edward, together with his wife Simpson, are currently in Madrid where they are in contact with Hitler. Edward is conducting negotiations with Hitler on the question of forming a new English government, the conclusion of peace with Germany conditional upon establishing a military alliance against the USSR.”

Hitler was coming to similar conclusions about the UK that the communists were. According to Rudolf Hess’s personal adjutant, Hitler believed “that after the fall of France, Britain was more likely to come to terms if Germany attacked the Soviet Union.” Hard to blame him for thinking so.

Lessons

The lesson, we are told repeatedly, learned from WWII is to never appease dictators. This is used to sell so many of the US and friends’ interventions today.

Maybe that lesson is apt for the plutocrats and their court jesters who rued (still rue?) the fact that Hitler wouldn’t play along. Maybe they still have a lingering sense of a missed opportunity to conquer Russia.

For the rest of us the lesson from WWII might be very different: that the concentration of wealth and its stranglehold on politics and government are preludes to fascism. As Haslam writes:

Fascism in Germany, as in Italy and then in Spain, was viewed as a necessary antidote to revolutionary excesses. In some senses the official British interpretation was justifiable.

While the Western plutocrats might have missed their WWII opportunity to defeat Russia due to infighting over empire, they are on the same page this go-round. As Diana Johnstone wrote shortly after the official beginning of the war in Ukraine:

When Western leaders speak of “economic war against Russia,” or “ruining Russia” by arming and supporting Ukraine, one wonders whether they are consciously preparing World War III, or trying to provide a new ending to World War II. Or will the two merge?

As it shapes up, with NATO openly trying to “overextend” and thus defeat Russia with a war of attrition in Ukraine, it is somewhat as if Britain and the United States, some 80 years later, switched sides and joined German-dominated Europe to wage war against Russia, alongside the heirs to Eastern European anticommunism, some of whom were allied to Nazi Germany.

Unfortunately for this new alliance, the Nazis appear to be on the losing end against Russia yet again.

Another topical lesson that didn’t get learned is that the UK and other Western powers shouldn’t try to control and steer Nazis. If we want to imagine a real nightmare for Europe (as opposed to the imagined one of Putin conquering the continent), how about if Ukraine, feeling betrayed by Europe, turns its still-large army and all its toys westwards while the Americans and Russians look away? As Anthony Eden told Russian Ambassador to the UK Ivan Maisky in 1940:

“You know the greatest difficulty for me at this time was to convince my friends that Hitler and Mussolini were not quite similar to in psychology, in motive and methods, in their entire cast of mind anything like English ‘business men or country gentlemen.’ This they could never get themselves to believe. They though that I was ‘biased’ against the ‘dictators’ and that I didn’t wish to understand them…Some of our statesmen even after me attempted to communicate with ‘dictators’ as with ‘business men.’

By Andrew Korybko, Substack, 11/22/24

Putin surprised the world on Thursday when he addressed the nation to inform them that Russia had tested a new hypersonic medium-range missile earlier that morning in an attack against a famous Soviet-era industrial complex in the Ukrainian city of Dnepropetrovsk. He explained that this was a response to the US and UK recently allowing Ukraine to use their long-range missiles inside of Russia. Their decision resulted in the NATO-Russian proxy war in Ukraine “assuming elements of a global nature” in his words.

As was explained here with regards to the “moment of truth” that this latest phase of the conflict led to, he was faced with the choice of either escalating or continuing his policy of strategic patience, the first of which could foil attempts by Trump to reach a peace deal while the second could invite more aggression. Putin chose the former and did so in a creative way that few foresaw. The Oreshnik missile system whose existence he disclosed on Thursday has Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs).

It’s essentially the same sort of weapon that Russia could use in the event of a nuclear conflict with the West since the aforesaid feature coupled with its hypersonic speed means that it’s impossible to intercept. In other words, Putin rattled Russia’s nuclear saber in the most convincing way possible short of testing a nuclear weapon, which his government previously confirmed that it wouldn’t do for the reasons that were explained here. He’s therefore finally climbing the escalation ladder.

Putin hitherto declined to escalate in response to the over 1,000 days’ worth of NATO-backed Ukrainian provocations that included bombing the Kremlin, early warning systems, strategic airfields, nuclear power plants, and the Crimean Bridge, among many other sensitive targets, so as to avoid World War III. He also prioritized political goals over military ones up until this point, but that’s all changing now since he realized that his strategic patience was interpreted as weakness and only invited more aggression.

Seeing as how Ukraine’s latest use of Western weapons inside of Russia’s pre-2014 territory isn’t unprecedented due to the HIMARS already having been used in Belgorod and Kursk Regions, the latter of which Ukraine invaded with NATO’s support over the summer, the question arises of why it took over three months for his views to change. It should also be noted that Russia didn’t significantly respond to Ukraine fielding the F-16s despite Lavrov previously warning that they could be nuclear-equipped.

Russia might have therefore received intelligence that the West is plotting an even greater provocation in the future. Belarusian media just aired a documentary exposing a Western plot to destabilize and invade their country, which readers can learn more about by reviewing the seven analyses that were listed in this one here. Correspondingly, it was assessed that “Russia’s Updated Nuke Doctrine Aims To Deter Unacceptable Provocations From NATO”, and the aforesaid would certainly constitute such.

Putin’s strategic patience would have finally reached its limits if he caught wind that anything of the sort was afoot, which would explain why he’d order the Oreshnik to be used against that Soviet-era industrial complex in Central Ukraine in order to send an unmistakable message to the West to reconsider its plans. Recalling how concerned he is about avoiding World War III, it also makes sense why his spokesman confirmed that Russia informed the US about this approximately half an hour ahead of time.

After all, launching an intermediate-range hypersonic missile westward without any advance notification could have prompted the US to panic by interpreting this as the start of a potential nuclear first strike by Russia, thus setting into motion the exact same scenario that he’s worked so hard to avoid. His motive was to deter the West from carrying out unacceptable provocations that cross Russia’s most sensitive redlines, which the West might be plotting out of desperation to “escalate to de-escalate” on its terms.  

It was written here, here, and here that Trump might resort to that, but the latest ATACMS escalation – which can be regarded as a provocation due to these missiles having a much longer range than the HIMARS – suggests that the “Collective Biden” decided to do so first out of fear that whatever deal he might reach with Putin would compromise on too many of the US’ interests. Accordingly, Putin might now have decided to beat the US to the punch by “escalating to de-escalate” on Russia’s terms instead.

Thursday morning was the first time that a MIRV was used in combat, which is much more significant than the US “boiling the frog” by expanding the range of the missiles that Ukraine has already been able to use inside of Russia’s pre-2014 borders after once again signaling its escalatory plans long in advance, especially since few saw it coming and the US only had around a 30-minute notice. Putin also warned that Russia’s new doctrine allows it to use such weapons against those who arm Ukraine.

It’s unlikely that he’ll throw caution to the wind by launching Oreshniks against military targets in NATO countries at the risk of sparking World War III, but it can’t be ruled out that the next escalation that he’s considering in response to more aggression could be bombing Moldova instead. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zakharova said earlier in the week that the Western-backed government there is “turning the country at a rapid pace into a logistics hub used to supply the Ukrainian armed forces.”

It’s not a NATO member though so Russia could bomb it without crossing the West’s red lines while still signaling that he’s not the pushover that they convinced themselves that he was after misreading the reasons for his strategic patience if they still keep provoking him even after Thursday’s escalation. They want him to accept Western/NATO peacekeepers along the Line of Contact (LOC), Ukraine’s continued militarization, its future membership in NATO, and no change in its anti-Russian legislation.

By contrast, Putin wants to expel Ukraine from the four regions that voted to join Russia in September 2022, no Western/NATO peacekeepers along the LOC, Ukraine’s demilitarization, the restoration of its constitutional neutrality, and the rescinding of its anti-Russian legislation. Beating the West to the punch by “escalating to de-escalate”, or at least finally climbing the escalation ladder in response to their provocations, is therefore aimed at achieving as many of these maximum goals as he can.

If he sticks to his guns and doesn’t waver from his newfound approach, which is arguably long-overdue since some believe that he should have begun applying it after the failure of spring 2022’s peace talks, then he stands a much greater chance of achieving at least part of the most important ones. NATO can always conventionally intervene in Ukraine west of the Dnieper to salvage some of its geopolitical project so Russia should assume that it won’t be able to demilitarize or denazify that part of the country.  

What it can do, however, is employ military and diplomatic means (both individually and in combination through its abovementioned newfound approach) to obtain control over all the territory that it claims as its own east of the Dnieper, possibly including Zaporozhye’s eponymous city of over 700,000 people. The new LOC could then be patrolled by purely non-Western forces deployed as part of a UN mandate while Ukraine might be coerced to demilitarize everything that remains under its control east of the Dnieper.

All heavy weapons would have to be withdrawn westward as part of a massive demilitarized zone (DMZ), while the possibility also exists that this “Transdnieper” region might also receive political autonomy or at least cultural autonomy to protect the rights of ethnic Russians and those who speak that language. This scenario was first tabled here in March and could take the form shown below, with the western part of the country in blue possibly hosting NATO troops as part of the arrangement that’ll then be described:

Ukraine could be deterred from breaking the ceasefire due to the DMZ placing it at a disadvantage, while Russia would be deterred by the “security guarantees” that Ukraine clinched with a bunch of NATO countries this year, which amount to de facto Article 5 support. While Russia could storm into the DMZ, NATO could also storm into Western Ukraine or possibly even cross the Dnieper, whether due to a swift intervention or having already deployed its troops west of the river per tacit agreement with Russia.

What was detailed in the three preceding paragraphs is the maximum that Russia can realistically achieve given the new military-strategic circumstances in which it finds itself over 1,000 days since the special operation began. Putin finally started climbing the escalation ladder in order to deter the even greater provocations that the West might now be plotting with the intent of coercing him into freezing the existing LOC and then possibly accepting the deployment of Western/NATO peacekeepers there.

Such a scenario would be completely unacceptable for him from the perspective of Russia’s national security interests and his own reputational ones after promising to check NATO’s expansion in Ukraine. Keeping that bloc west of the Dnieper while demilitarizing everything east of it and north of the administrative borders of the four former Ukrainian regions that joined Russia in September 2022, tentatively known as the “Transdnieper” region, would be a tolerable compromise though.

Trump might deem this to be pragmatic enough of a deal for him to go along with since it could still be spun by all relevant parties to the conflict as a victory (e.g. Russia gained land and created a DMZ deep inside Ukraine; Ukraine continued to exist as a state; and the US de facto incorporated Western Ukraine into NATO). It could even enter into force prior to that if either side “escalates to de-escalate” before his inauguration and this is the “mutually face-saving” compromise that they reach to avoid World War III.

Of course, it would be better if they agree to this without sparking a Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis that risks spiraling out of control, hence why their diplomats should begin discussing it now or a third country’s ones like India’s should propose it behind the scenes to get the ball rolling. Putin’s newfound (and arguably long-overdue) approach signals that he won’t accept freezing the existing LOC, nor especially the deployment of NATO/Western peacekeepers there, and will escalate to avert that.

He might even go as far as using tactical nukes in Ukraine (and/or NATO’s logistics hub in Moldova) if he feels that he’s being cornered by the evolving circumstances in which the West might soon place him through its possibly forthcoming greater provocations (e.g. destabilizing and invading Belarus). The West must therefore start taking Putin seriously after he finally began climbing the escalation ladder otherwise the worst-case scenario of World War III might become unavoidable if they push him too far.

By Mark Episkopos, Responsible Statecraft, 11/13/24

The enduring truism of electoral politics, unflinchingly even if uncritically repeated, that Americans don’t vote on foreign policy, was repudiated this election cycle.

While no single foreign policy issue commanded anything near voters’ concern for domestic challenges, the twin spiraling crises in Europe and the Middle East led a large swathe of the electorate to conclude that foreign policy is too important to be left to the technocrats.

President-elect Trump deftly exploited this lingering anti-establishment sentiment first by picking JD Vance as his running mate and then by defining himself against Harris — who did everything she could to advertise the Democratic party to anti-Trump neoconservatives, up to and including by christening Liz Cheney a core campaign surrogate — as the anti-war candidate.

The difficult but necessary work of resolving the Ukraine war, the most dangerous and destructive conflict on the European continent since 1945, now falls to the incoming Trump administration. But doing so requires coming to grips with, and rejecting, the shibboleths and superstitions that have characterized the established approach to Ukraine.

When diagnosing the crises facing U.S. foreign policy, it pays to consult the prior generation of American diplomats. As is well known, the Cold War exercised a disciplining effect on its American and Soviet figurants. The neck to neck nature of that rivalry, coupled with what both parties recognized as the catastrophic consequences of direct confrontation, meant that neither side was in a position to dictate to the other.

The two superpowers were bound to a shared logic of strategic caution that permitted and, indeed, necessitated competition on the margins but harshly discouraged an uncompromising “winner takes all” mentality on existential questions of war and peace.

This provided fertile ground for the development of a decision-making community eager to learn from their mistakes, obsessively grasping for even the most minute ways in which U.S. policy can be refined or reformed. It is not brute coercive force but rather a persistent open-mindedness, tempered by a nagging recognition and respect for the limits of American power, that produced such exertions of political genius as the long telegram and policy of detente that enabled the U.S. to contend on favorable footing with its Soviet competitor.

To draw the obvious connection between this culture of purpose-driven introspection being a rare commodity in past decades and the cascade of foreign policy blunders visited upon America since 1991 could very well be seen as an exercise in reaching for low-hanging fruit. It’s not a charge of which I wish to acquit myself. The prudence and foresight exercised by policymakers in the not-so-distant past does offer an instructive parallel to the contemporary challenges facing the U.S. — there is no shame in repairing to old wisdoms.

Yet the pervasive nescience gripping parts of Washington has been replaced by something even worse: a kind of shallow, performative introspection that draws all the wrong lessons in service of a failing status quo.

This strain is fast becoming the prevalent bar in the swan song of Kyiv’s maximalist battlefield program. Ukraine is losing the war, we are told, because its Western backers dithered in their provision of lethal aid; because the White House paid too much heed to Moscow’s red lines; and because NATO would not formally commit itself to “victory,” defined as Russia’s unconditional battlefield capitulation.

The lessons stemming from these conclusions are simple. The Pentagon should have emptied its stockpiles to aid Ukraine even if doing so would have exposed critical vulnerabilities in its own preparedness — as a lawmaker put it in the war’s early days, “if it shoots, send it.”

Western countries, the argument goes, should have stampeded as a matter of principle over anything Moscow may regard as a red line. Even to try to balance our aid for Ukraine with the real and serious risk of escalation, as the Biden administration attempted to do with its escalation management model, is decried by these voices as surrendering to Russian “nuclear blackmail.”

Still, and for many of the same reasons, this war has taken on a metaphysical superstructure that blots out and renders impossible any meaningful debate. We are told against all the weight of all available evidence that the wanton slaughter unfolding in eastern Ukraine and, more recently, Russia’s Kursk region, is part of a noble crusade for democracy. And it is a global crusade, for Russia’s “victory” in Ukraine will impel Putin’s Westward march and give Xi Jinping a “green light” to attack Taiwan.

But when has wartime mobilization ever made a country less corrupt, more free, or more liberal? To the extent that democracy requires stability, it is not at all clear that Ukrainian institutions have benefited from the indefinite continuation of a war that has ravaged the country’s economic outlook and thrust it into a demographic crisis.

The notion that the Chinese are waiting to see who controls which part of western Donetsk —as opposed to gauging factors much closer to home, like the balance of forces in the Asia-Pacific and Taiwan’s deterrent capabilities — is hardly deserving of sober commentary. Nor can Beijing interpret the West’s clear signal that it will not fight for Ukraine as taking a stance on Taiwan, as the latter occupies an entirely different tier of strategic significance in U.S. policy thinking.

Finally, as I previously explained along with my colleagues George Beebe and Anatol Lieven, there is not a shred of evidence that Moscow demonstrates either the capability or the intention to launch a war of aggression against any NATO state; indeed, doing so would contradict Russia’s strategic aims behind invading Ukraine in the first place.

The problem is not just that the Ukraine war is the most propagandized, ideologized conflict since Iraq, though it is that, too. It is, moreover, that the military and political realities governing this conflict have become dangerously unwound from security discourses in most Western governments.

Any effort to disentangle the West from this quagmire can only but start with acknowledgement of simple truths: Ukraine could not, cannot, and will not prevail over Russia in a full-scale conventional war, if victory is defined as the complete ejection of Russian forces from Ukraine’s 1991 borders solely by military means; Ukraine is decisively losing this war of attrition and no amount of Western military aid can reverse its trajectory of collapse; Russia’s total, unconditional defeat cannot be brought about by any means short of a full-on war between NATO and Russia, whereas Washington and European capitals have concluded and continually reaffirmed over the past three years that they will not go to war over Ukraine.

It isn’t difficult to tell where this leads, but that doesn’t make it any easier to accept after three years spent submerged in an ocean of denial and conceit. It is long past time for Washington to come up for air on Ukraine.

American, European, and Ukrainian interests are best served by a U.S.-led effort to swiftly reach a negotiated settlement, something President-elect Trump rightly identified as one of his key foreign policy priorities. The administration should be candid with the American people that this process will be complex and challenging, as peace talks always are, but the cost of inaction, of failing to rise to the occasion, is infinitely greater.

President-elect Trump has secured a powerful mandate to stop this war and, in doing so, strengthen not just America’s European posture but its global standing. The time to seize it is now.

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