By Dave DeCamp, Antiwar.com, 9/25/24

Russian President Vladimir Putin on Wednesday outlined changes that will be made to Russia’s nuclear doctrine as the US and NATO consider supporting long-range Ukrainian strikes inside Russia.

Putin said in a meeting with the Russian Security Council that under the new doctrine, an attack on Russia by a non-nuclear state that’s supported by a nuclear-armed power would be treated as a joint attack, a clear reference to Ukrainian attacks on Russian territory that use NATO weapons and intelligence.

Based on Putin’s comments, it’s unclear if that means such an attack would trigger a nuclear response. But the new doctrine will allow the use of nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack that poses a “critical threat to Russian sovereignty.”

According to TASS, the doctrine will also allow the use of nuclear weapons in response to “aggression” against Russia and Belarus, and if Russia becomes aware of plans to launch massive airstrikes against its territory.

“Reliable information about a massive takeoff of strategic or tactical planes towards Russia, or the launch of cruise missiles, drones, hypersonic weapons towards its territory may be interpreted as a sufficient reason for a nuclear response by Moscow,” TASS reported.

The new language is more vague than Russia’s current nuclear doctrine, which allows the use of nuclear weapons “in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.”

The US has supported Ukraine’s attack on Kursk, which came a few months after President Biden gave Ukraine the greenlight to use US weapons on the Russian border region. But the Biden administration is still holding out on supporting long-range strikes.

Putin has said that if the US supports long-range Ukrainian strikes inside Russian territory, it would mean NATO is at war with Russia. Despite the clear warning and risk of nuclear war, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and many hawks in the US and Europe are pushing hard for the escalation.

By Fyodor Lukyanov, RT, 9/12/24

There’s a reason why 2024 has been called the year of the big elections. More than half of the world’s population will be called to the ballot boxes, but this time it goes deeper than normal. Voting has always been important, of course, but in calmer – or rather more orderly – times, not every election was considered crucial. Now, on the contrary, consequential elections are routine. Almost every contest is capable of shaking up, if not changing, the course of events. And it’s not just about who wins. More important is the sense of legitimacy, and the recognition by citizens that the results themselves are legitimate.

This should be a well-established, self-evident truth. Firstly, it has always been the case, and secondly, political institutions exist to ensure it. The era of rule by force alone is long gone, and even openly authoritarian regimes have to take account of the interests and demands of the population. And entrenched democracies have to find sophisticated ways to maintain stability and continuity in the face of mistrust of procedures.

Twenty years ago, one of the dominant trends was ‘promoting democracy’. The policy of the neo-conservative US administration (George W. Bush and Dick Cheney) was based on the ideological postulate that the spread of the democratic form of government around the world is the most reliable guarantee not only of the national interests of the US, but also of a positive universal order. They felt that one was inseparable from the other.

The range of tools they had was wide: From actively supporting certain social processes (color revolutions – which raged from the post-Soviet space to the Middle East and North Africa) to direct military intervention to effect regime change (from the Balkans to the Middle East again). Whether Washington wanted it or not, democracy became a political and economic tool for external rather than internal use. The notion of the fundamental importance of having elections recognized by an external arbiter – with the right to certify the result – was what emerged. And if that arbiter wasn’t happy with the outcome, it empowered itself to demand a revision, even by force.

The implication was that problems with electoral legitimacy were only possible in fragile young democracies. However, even in stable, well established democracies, things do not always run smoothly – even if generally institutions guarantee order.

Now, two decades later, the focus has shifted to those same older democracies. Many of these countries are undergoing changes that involve the erosion, if not the loss, of familiar ways of life and ideas about the future. The capitalist economy seems to be solving the problems not of society but rather its own issues. And technology may work wonders, but whether it is to the benefit or detriment of man, is less and less obvious.

Political mechanisms carry a heavy burden. They have to keep the system afloat, and prove its effectiveness and legitimacy. After all, the parties may once have reflected the composition of societies, but many no longer do so. Trust in institutions is falling, as it almost always does in times of great change. And the nature of the mistrust is similar to that which created the conditions for color revolutions in more fragile states. Hence the constant fears (and they may be genuine) of outside interference and influence. The American and Western European establishment knows very well how to intervene in and influence troubled societies – now they think the same will happen to them.

So far, the ruling elites have been strong enough to cope. On the one hand, there are still considerable economic reserves that can be used to plug holes, and on the other hand, there is the adroit use of manipulation that makes it possible not to allow alternatives to take the helm. But these resources are not infinite. Paradoxically, systems accused of being undemocratic are probably better equipped to survive, at least in the short and medium term. They have to constantly demonstrate to citizens that they are capable of solving their problems, whereas a traditional democracy believes that democratic turnover itself is a remedy for problems. In reality, swapping out one party in power for another changes almost nothing, which only exacerbates discontent.

All signs suggest we are now in a transition period, and it is impossible to predict what the future will look like. But the process promises to be long and uneven, and much depends on how – and in what form – the new reality is embraced. What is happening now are attempts to maintain an acceptable status quo in spite of all the obstacles.

This article was first published by the newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta and was translated and edited by the RT team:

https://rg.ru/2024/09/10/cvetnye-revoliucii-naoborot.html

By Andrew Cockburn, Substack, 9/12/24

Though they may be happy to ignore Palestinian-American voters’ pleas for a halt to U.S. support for Israeli butchery in Gaza, the Harris-Walz campaign is only too happy to go full cold war for the sake of Polish-American and Ukrainian-American votes in Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin.

Politico National Security reports that a Democratic dark money operation, America’s Future Majority Fund super PAC,  is about to blanket the Keystone State with a full-throated ad campaign invoking Reagan’s and Kennedy’s stand against “communist dictators” and pledging that Harris “will stand up to Putin, protect our allies and keep us safe.”  There’s even a brief shot of Joseph Stalin to remind us how wicked the Russians are. Trump, naturally, features as Putin’s ally…

Andrew Cockburn’s Substack page is here.

By Oliver Boyd-Barrett, Substack, 9/22/24

I havent seen anything very substantial since my morning post on “Ukrainian” attacks on Russian ammunition depots, other than Dima’s midday report (California time of Sunday, September 22). There may now have been four such attacks in recent days. While the sites were big, and the damage apparently extensive, there are thousands of ammunition depots throughout Russia.

Dima continues to confirm that these attacks have involved cruise missiles which, if true, of course implicates NATO, providing evidence of direct NATO involvement. Since there has been no official Washington permission for this, it is hardly surprising that Washington is not saying anything, and I suspect that Russia at this time is too embarrassed or uncertain as to how it wants to proceed to make any formal pronouncement either. Dima implies that Russia is waiting for Washington to “officially” give the green light for the use of such weapons before Russia responds, but I think this is absurd unless Russia simply wants an excuse not to have to respond to this escalation right away.

Of course it is still theoretically possible that Ukraine has all of a sudden come up with some miracle drone that does as much damage as a cruise missile, just at the very same moment as Washington has appeared to go quiet on the subject of allowing the use of Western long-range missiles on targets deep in Russia.

Perhaps things will be clearer once Zelenskiy arrives in New York, which I believe he will have done by tomorrow, September 23.

Of course, attacks on Russian ammo depots is not a new phenemonon in this war. They have been ongoing. What is surprising right now is the size of the depots involved, their long distance from the front lines, and the scale of the damage that they have inflicted. Up until now attacks on ammo depots have seemed of relatively slighmt significance, and it was not unreasonable to attribute the damage that was caused to drones, except for some attacks by cruise missiles on depots in Crimea. Up until now use of Western long-range missiles on targets in Crimea has been considered “permissible,” given that for the West and for Ukraine, Crimea has been considered Ukrainian territory illegally seized by Russia in 2014 but which Russia says asked to join the Russian Federation for protection against the illegal, anti-Russian Kiev regime that came to power following the US-instigated, violent and unrepresentative coup that year in Kiev.

Dima also appears to be the only source I have seen today who is reporting the failure of a Russian test of its R5-28 “Sarmat” nuclear-capable missile, following the recent Russian confirmation that it was re-initiating such tests. The rocket exploded in or before take-off from a mine, destroying the test site, leaving a huge crater. The most recent comparable test took place on April 20, 2022. There have been four failed tests of the Sarmat to date, at least, according to Dima, and one success.

The Sarmat is nuclear capable, but can also carry Avantgard warheads. These are not nuclear but their explosive force is equivalent to 18 tons of TNT. By comparison, the hypersonic Kinzhal missile, when it is not fitted with a nuclear warhead, can carry a non-nuclear warhead with the impact equivalent to just one ton of TNT. That, at least, is as much as I could understand of Dima’s report today.

Dima suggests that Russia’s response to Western use of long-range missiles on Russian targets will take the form of the use of Avantgards but he does not explain how Russia intends to do this if Avantgards can only be deployed from Sarmat launchers that have only a one in five success rate. Once again, I shall be looking out for more reliable data on this matter.

In Kursk, which is of considerable importance to Western and Ukrainian narratives of the war’s progress, Russia continues to push back on previous Ukrainian successes south east of Snagost, and some of the fiercest clashes are in the forested areas close to Lyubimovka (recently recovered by Russia, according to some reports) and Tolstyi Lug. Further to the east, there are still fierce clashes in the highly contested area of Martynovka. Ukraine’s cross-border raid on Veseloye, well to the west, appears to have been repelled, but there are continuing clashes to the north near Glushkovo.

Otherwise, Dima’s most recent reports are of Russian advances in Zapporizhzhia in the territory north of the Russian-held settlements of Preschystivka and Pavlivka, from which Russian forces have been establishing a semi-encirclement of Vuhledar, while to the east Russian forces are moving from their recent acquisition of Vodiane towards Bohoiavlenka to the northwest, completing another part of the circle around Vuhledar. Bohoiavlenka would be the natural destination, otherwise, of Ukrainian forces abandoning Vuhledar.

Further north, west of Marinka and Krasnohorivka – both now under Russian control – Russian forces are moving from Hostre towards Ostrivske and the Kurakhove reservoir. They will soon likely take Maksymilianivka on this route. Moving up towards Pokrovsk, Russia is recovering positions in the south and southeast of Selydove, and appear to have taken the coalmine and Ukrainian stronghold in that area. Russia has control over most of Novohrodivka, as well as over Mykolaivka and Krasnyi Yar to the north. Further north still, Russian forces are moving from Niu-York, which they have recently taken, towards Leonidivka, and they control 70% of the Toretsk agglomeration.

Russia continues to consolidate control over all territory east of the Kanal, north and south of Chasiv Yar. Otherwise, the main recent developments have been in Kupyansk where Russian forces gradually edge towards to the Oskil river in a number of different locations, with a view to dividing up the oblast into three sections.

Russia Matters, 9/23/24

1. The editorial boards of several Western publications, including BG, WP and The Economist, have called on Joe Biden to allow the Ukrainian armed forces to use longer-range Western-supplied missiles, such as Storm Shadows, for strikes inside Russia’s officially recognized borders. The calls were published ahead of Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to the U.S., which began on Sept. 23. Later this week, Zelenskyy intends to hold separate meetings with Biden, Kamala Harris and Donald Trump to promote his “victory plan,” in which the approval of long-range missile use is a key part, according to the Ukrainian leader.Zelenskyy has refused to disclose the plan in its entirety so far; however, the Ukrainian leader did share that “most of the decisions on the plan depend” on Biden, and that these decisions need to be made in October to December, according to Ukrainska Pravda.
2. Should strikes into Russia by Storm Shadows and ATACMs take place, Moscow’s potential response is likely be directed in the first instance against Great Britain, not America, but it would not involve the use of nuclear weapons, according to Anatol Lieven of the Quincy Institute. One response would be to shoot down British military aircraft operating close to Russian airspace; another would be to destroy British intelligence satellites; yet another one would be to provide Hezbollah and the Houthis with both missiles and the satellite technology to launch much more effective strikes on Israel and Western shipping, Lieven wrote in Unherd.