By Oliver Boyd-Barrett, Substack, 9/3/24

Little Prospect for Immediate Peace

The general tone of pro-Russian coverage of NATO’s proxy war against Russia over Ukraine continues to be somewhat triumphal, supported by an empirical reality in the battlefields with which western mainstream media are now largely in agreement (perhaps, as one noted, so as to be ready to blame Zelenskiy for the whole sorry mess once Washington has called the whole thing off).

I have explained in a recent post how my immediate instinct is to distrust triumphal reporting, even when substantiated by the empirical “facts on the ground.” That is because I do not believe that anyone or any group, for or against the War or for or against the position of Russia, or Ukraine or the West in the war, is in possession of all of the facts.

There is far less consensus as to how things will turn out from here, with many commentators eager to discern evidence of a movement towards negotiation and a relatively short war, on the one hand, against those who consider the gap between Zelenskiy’s “peace plan” and Russia’s security and other needs absolutely unbridgeable. With Russia now in a more certain position to push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk, some think, Russia will be more inclined to consider negotiations.

The main problems with this expectation, as I see it, are as follows:

(1) Russia’s main enemy is not Ukraine by itself, it is Washington and the West, and parties to negotiation need to include all relevant voices;

(2) Russia’s principal concerns are not concerns that it has only with Ukraine, they are concerns that the Global South has with the West; therefore, the substance of negotiations, if they are to be truly successful, cannot just be about Ukraine. Instead, they need to be about the global order and about reform of that global order in a direction that is more polycentrist, less hegemonic, and regulated by a somewhat re-thought and reformed United Nations, a process in which the BRICS could be an extremely useful intermediary. (I note in passing that Turkey’s request to enter the BRICS has now been formalized).

(3) There are no circumstances in which Russia is going to voluntarily agree to give up Crimea and the four oblasts that it has formally enfolded into the Russian Federation; there are live questions as to whether its security needs can be respected without acquisition of Kharkiv, Kiev, Odessa and any other oblasts that separate Novorussiye from the Dnieper;

(4) There are no circumstances in which Russia is going to agree to talk to a Ukrainian delegation appointed by the current regime, which Russia correctly asserts to be an illegitimate and unelected regime, even by the standards of Ukraine’s own constitution. It is a regime that would be booted out of office in the event that martial law would come to an end, and new elections instituted; regime change is a prerequisite. One cannot negotiate or do deals with people like this.

(5) There are no circumstances so far as can currently be seen in which Zelenskiy and his gang are going to voluntarily give up power;

(6) These considerations, therefore, have two consequences. The first (a) is that practically all discussion in the West about possible endings to this war, together with a great deal of discussion in Russia itself, adopts far too narrow a conception as to what this war is really about and what must happen for it to be won or to reach settlement. The second (b) is that because the gulfs between the main parties – Russia (together with China and other major allies in the BRICS), Ukraine, Brussels, Washington and the West generally – are so broad, no successful negotiation is currently practicable, and the war will therefore continue, finishing only whenever Ukraine collapses, amidst serious fissures and fragmentations within the EU and NATO, or the Russian Federation itself collapses.

(7) For the moment, the first of these two scenarios seems the most likely. This largely results from quantitative and qualitative superiority of Russian forces, weapons, manufacturing capability and alliances (including with China and Iran). The longer the war lasts, the more attrition there will be of Ukrainian forces, specifically, and of Western armories more generally. The pace of Western attrition will speed up if Israel manages to coax the US to fight a war on its behalf with Iran; and if the US manages to provoke a war between China and Taiwan. This would present a three-front challenge to the USA at a time when its ability to fight even only one front seems questionable.

(8) Russia has never at any time indicated that its ambitions went beyond the Donbass. Nor was there any sane reason to think that it did. However, the Western reaction to Russian assertion of its security needs has been so extreme (and, to be frank, so extremely fake), so over-the-top, that Russia must now be obliged to consider the entire West as its enemy. Therefore, against all previous indications to the contrary, Russia may now be planning some broader and more durable defense strategy vis-a-vis NATO.

Fragmenting NATO/ Europe amid Liberal Authoritarianism

As discussed in my previous post, three of the EU’s major powers are in deep water, struggling to climb out of it by ever more authoritarian means.

Britian nears recession, its new government proclaims that ten years of austerity are necessary, yet doubles down on Ukraine and resorts increasingly with dire, repressive measures to crush protests against this clear insanity.

The French President, in the face of an election disaster for his party has manouvered his chips to keep out of power the one party (that of Marine Le Pen) that won the most seats in the general election, and is coopting fragments of the Left alliance to work with his Party and to keep the other fragments out of power.

In Germany, a recently formed party, the AfD, typically described by its Establishment opposition – the SPD (in power) and CDU (principal opposition) – as “far right,” has won over 30% of the votes in two States – Thuringia and Saxony. A new Left party, the BSW, formed only six months ago as a splinter of the traditional Left party Die Linke, and led by Sahr Wagenknecht has won 16% of the votes in Thuringia and 12% of the votes in Saxony.

The AfD and the BSW together, therefore, represent almost half the voting population of these two, formerly East German states. Both parties oppose continuing German participation in the war in Ukraine. A likely alliance in the federal elections of October 2025 between the CDU and BSW (or comparable alliances at several state levels) might therefore force a radical shift in Germany’s stance in the war, and also derail moves by Washington to establish intermediate and long-range nuclear missiles on German soil.

The Battlefields

A Russian Iskander strike with two ballistic missiles struck a military academy in the Central Ukrainian town of Poltava and, according to some reports, also hit a nearby hospital. This has killed over 50 and wounded some 500, according to a source cited at midday today by Dima (i.e. not the 200 I originally saw reported). Poltava is west of the Dnieper. At this time of writing I do not know if all the victims are military or whether, as one might expect, some civilians have also suffered. It was mainly contract soldiers, not cadets, who were hit. The dead included foreign, including several Swedish, instructors, probably assigned there for training courses related to 2 AWACS aircraft that Sweden has gifted Ukraine.

Following Russian strikes elsewhere across Ukraine, there have been reported Iskander explosions in Kharkiv, Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia (where an Iskander destroyed a hotel hosting many foreign instructors). All Russian artillery brigades are now being equipped with Iskander missiles and have the authority to use them.

In southern Donetsk, Russian forces have secured the village of Prechystivka, west of Vuhledar, and have been shelling Urozhaine, Novodonetsk, and Makarivka. From Prechystivka they have advanced north in the direction of Novokrainke, and, as a result, they likely control a large swathe of territory from Novomaiorske up through Prechystivka and Novokrainke, eastwards to Pavlivka. To the northeast of Vuhledar they have taken the South Donbass coalmine together with a nearby stronghold and are poised to enter the eastern outskirts of Vuhledar itself.

In Pokrovsk, Russian forces have moved on Zhelanne Persha, of which they now control 50%. This is east of Lisivko which they took yesterday; they are attacking Ukrainsk nearby to the west, from Dolynivka and Memryk, and poised to move on Zhelanne Druhe, and on Hirnyk to the south. Ukrainian forces have abandoned a swathe of territory that runs from Hstytsynivka in the west to Nevelske in the east and then, moving southwards, to Krasn. In Selydove, Russian forces continue to advance on the town from Mykhailivka to the east and have taken the hospital area. North of Selydove, Russian forces control over a good half of Novohrodivka but there are still significant clashes for control over the western half of the village.

Russian forces are entering deeper into Toretsk, where they have occupied the school area while, to the immediate north, they have established control over Druzba. Russian forces have resumed their offensive towards the center of Chasiv Yar, making new advances and have established a foothold west of Kalinivka to the north of Chasiv Yar, tracing all the way down the western bank of the Kanal to a point south of Kleshchiivka.

South of Siversk, Russian forces have resumed progress towards the taking of Pereizne (they control 50%), and in the very near future are likely to take Fedoriivka to the immediate west. In Kupyansk, Russian forces have moved further from Pishchanne and are within less than two kilometers from the Oskil river at the settlements of Hlushkivka and Kolishnykivka.

In Kursk, there are reports that Russia has recovered a line of villages from Pogrebki down to Malaya Loknya. Dima considers that Ukraine will be forced out of Kursk by the end of the year.

Palestine

Just as consensus accumulates in favor of a triumphal outcome for Russia in Ukraine, there is a gathering unison of pessimistic tone with respect to the situation in Gaza and the West Bank. Netanyahu is proving himself impervious to the unrest of a sizable proportion of all of Israel that protests vehemently for a ceasefire that will bring home all the remaining hostages. He is impervious too to the voices in his own army, the IDF, that express concern that they are barely able to defeat Hamas, let alone Hezbollah in Lebanon, or to win a war against Israel [I think he meant to say Iran – NB].

Writing for Antiwar.com, Caitlin Johnson writes of Israeli and western media reaction to the recent deaths of six hostages:

“Israeli strikes killed 47 Palestinians in Gaza in one 24-hour period between Saturday and Sunday, receiving not the tiniest fraction of the attention as those six Israeli hostages.Israel is extending its military offensives”

Jeremy Scahill reports today the situation in Jenin:

“For nearly a week, the Israeli military has been laying siege to hospitals in Jenin and other cities in the northern part of the occupied West Bank, severely restricting access to medical care, targeting medical workers and ambulances, and cutting off water and electricity, as part of a massive military offensive in the occupied West Bank, the largest operation  in the Palestinian territory in over two decades.”

For Global Research, Steven Sahiounie writes:

“The Israeli military is attempting to pull Hezbollah into a full-scale regional war, through the massive and continuous airstrikes across the south of Lebanon and into the Bekaa Valley. Only Netanyahu benefits from this plan so that he can remain in power and stay out of jail due to being found guilty of corruption. This is the same reason why Netanyahu has continued to refuse a ceasefire in Gaza, despite the massive losses of Israeli military personnel, equipment, and the economy.”

Tunnels and Missiles

In interview today with Judge Napolitano, Alastair Crooke wonders in amazement how it is that neither Israel nor the West seem to understand just how far the nature of war is changing, in the first place, how sophisticated are the stocks of missiles and drones in the hands both of Hezbollah and, even more, Iran, in the second place and how, thirdly, these weapons and their launch systems are increasingly located underground, often unknown and invisible to their enemy.

The New York Times today carries a long article about the Hamas’ networks of tunnels, especially under Gaza, and puts these forward as the reason why Israel’s progress against Hamas has been so slow. The silly pretence is that for the New York Times this is an amazing discovery! Yet for up to a decade or more, the Times and other western mainstream media have eagerly devoured Israeli propaganda stories about the Hamas tunnels as evidence of how evil and threatening to Israeli security is Hamas.

It is obvious that the tunnels have been a major obsession in Israeli security and military planning and that their existence cannot possibly have been a surprise to anyone. Indeed, one only had to listen to Scott Ritter’s analyses since the beginning of the war to know that Israel was likely biting off more than it could chew. If Ritter knew about the tunnels, certainly everyone else who matters knew as well. Finally, one can observe the usefulness of this “tunnel discourse” as forming the basis of a fake justification for Israeli genocide.

By Fred Weir, Christian Science Monitor, 8/23/24

Russian foreign policy experts express zero enthusiasm for another Donald Trump presidency, should he win the upcoming election. There’s a simple reason why.

They’ve already experienced one term of Mr. Trump in the White House, and it was the worst four years of their lives.

“Even if we assume that Trump genuinely wanted to improve relations with Moscow when he came in the first time, what he achieved was the exact opposite,” says Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs, a Moscow-based foreign policy journal. “There was chaos in Washington. There was a storm around Trump that affected anything to do with Russia, and it destroyed even the most modest efforts to start a dialogue.”

Russians remain fascinated with U.S. politics. The official media has covered each dramatic turn of the 2024 presidential race over the past couple of months with a mixture of excitement, bafflement, and dark schadenfreude. But gone is any expectation that the winner is likely even to slow the relentless downward spiral of U.S.-Russia relations, much less find the new level of mutual understanding, perhaps a U.S.-Russia compact, that they once hoped for.

Most Russian analysts seem to view Kamala Harris as a continuation of the Joe Biden administration, which has solidly backed Ukraine and hit Russia with the most intense blizzard of sanctions in history. As for Mr. Trump, even his pledge to end the Ukraine war “in 24 hours” is seen as empty verbiage at best or, more likely, a cynical effort to tap into the war-weariness of the U.S. electorate.

“The Russian media coverage of the upcoming U.S. elections seems rather objective to me,” says Lev Lurye, a St. Petersburg-based historian. “The general idea is that either Trump or any candidate from the Democratic Party will be equally bad for Russia.”

Frustration with Trump’s leadership

When it was announced that Mr. Trump had defeated Hillary Clinton back in November 2016 to become president, the entire State Duma – Russia’s lower house of parliament – rose to their feet and delivered a noisy, sustained standing ovation.

Such were the hopes aroused, not only among officials but ordinary Russians as well, by Mr. Trump’s expressions of admiration for Russian President Vladimir Putin and promises during his first presidential campaign that he would find ways to “get along with Russia.”

But they quickly were dashed once he entered office.

Many Russians were bemused by the #Russiagate scandal, which saw Mr. Trump mired in accusations that he had colluded with the Kremlin in unsavory ways for years, that he was profiting from lucrative business deals in Moscow, and that Russian internet trolls had helped to secure his election by manipulating social media in the U.S. Most of those accusations turned out to be false or greatly exaggerated, but at the time they dogged any conversation about Mr. Trump’s Russia policy and seemed to make any progress impossible.

It all came to a head at the July 2018 Helsinki summit, where Mr. Putin tried to press Russia’s agenda on issues like the war in Syria and nuclear arms control. But the summit was quickly overshadowed by Mr. Trump’s unusually deferential stance toward the Russian leader, which triggered a strong critical response among U.S. media and officials.

“The main thing that struck me, watching that show in Helsinki, was the total mismatch between the substantive issues that two leaders were supposed to be discussing, and the utter lack of interest in any of those things that was displayed at the press conference,” says Mr. Lukyanov. “Nobody wanted to hear anything about the actual agenda. They were only interested in some supposed secret relationship between Trump and Putin.”

“We thought that Trump was different”

The widespread view in Moscow now seems to be that U.S. hostility to Russia is hardwired, and unlikely to change regardless of whoever becomes president.

“Much of the Russian political elite thinks that the U.S. deep state is in charge, directing events, and no political actors can change anything,” says Alexei Mukhin, director of the independent Center for Political Information, a Moscow think tank. “We thought that Trump was different, but now it looks like he’s just another agent of the deep state.”

But some watch the electoral turbulence, the deep polarization, and the somewhat disorderly changes at the top with a bit of satisfaction. The way the former Soviet Union tried to reform itself with a younger leader, and then collapsed, is a staple analogy in Russian news commentaries.

Sergei Markov, a former Kremlin adviser, says Russia is less interested in U.S. political developments and more concerned about the shifting global order, in which Russians perceive the U.S. steadily losing ground. New faces such as Ms. Harris aren’t likely to reverse the underlying dynamics of decay, he argues.

“All that’s happening in the U.S. is just what we’ve been saying for some time,” he says.

“Some Russians are enjoying the spectacle of chaos in American politics, because they think that the more disruption in the U.S., the better things will be for us,” says Mr. Markov. “I think we should be careful what we wish for. This is a very dangerous time, and there is a possibility that expanding crises can lead to a real world war. That would be catastrophic.”

Russia Matters, 8/30/24

Pavel Durov, the Russian-born entrepreneur who founded the online communications tool Telegram, has been charged in France with a wide range of crimes for failing to prevent illicit activity on the app, and barred from leaving the country, NYT reported. French law-enforcement procedures with regard to Durov sent alarms ringing in Russia’s pro-war establishment as Telegram is widely used by the Russian military for battlefield communication, according to Politico. “They practically detained the head of communication of the Russian army,” Politico quoted Russian military blogger channel Povernutie na Z Voine as writing about Durov’s 4-day detention in Paris. A number of top Russian officials have decried Durov’s detention, and Russia’s opposition outlet Important Stories reported that the Telegram founder has visited Russia more than 50 times since ‘expulsion’ from Russia in 2014. If accurately reported, Durov’s frequent visits to Russia could not have occurred without the tacit approval of the Russian authorities.*

***

Read Craig Murray’s article, Pavel Durov and the Abuse of Law, at Consortium News here.

Read Andrew Korybko’s article, Pavel Durov’s Naivete Was His Achilles’ Heel, here.

RT, 8/24/24

Nearly 73% of Russians agreed it is necessary to be cautious in interactions with fellow citizens, the latest survey conducted by the long-established Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) has found.

Only about a quarter of respondents (24%) are ready to trust most people, as the remaining 3% are undecided, the poll indicated.

People in Russia, however, seem no less confident in each other than they were six years ago, the researchers noted; in 2018, a similar poll suggested that 74% of respondents demonstrated caution when engaging with others.

Trust in others directly depends on financial stability; the latest poll indicates that confidence was lowest among people with lower incomes. Respondents who assess their family’s financial situation as “very good” and “good” demonstrated a tendency to trust people more often (30%) than those who think that their finances are “bad” or “very bad” (15%).

Men tend to exhibit less trusting behavior toward others than women in social exchanges. Some 40% of male respondents said that they expect other people to deceive them when the occasion arises, while only 30% of females shared their trepidation. Meanwhile, 51% of women and 45% of men expect honest behavior from other people in any situation; 21% and 15%, respectively, were undecided.

The researchers added that responses were different in various age groups, with younger people being more anxious about others’ reliability: 45% of those aged 18–24 fear other people may to let them down at some point, while the share of older age cohorts giving the same answer ranged from 28% to 35%.

Commenting on the results of the latest poll, Valery Fedorov, the head of VCIOM, stated that the level of interpersonal trust between Russians hit its nadir during the 1990s, when the nation underwent a severe crisis and shortages of basic goods due to the rapid transition from a state-planned to a market-based economy.

The official added that the tendency towards the normalization of public life had boosted trust, but was interrupted due to new “traumas” in society, including an extension of the retirement age in 2018, the coronavirus pandemic, and the escalation of the Ukrainian conflict, among other things.

“The younger generation, on which sociologists rest their hopes when it comes to the potential waning of distrustful trends, turned out to be victims of new, difficult times,” Fedorov said.

By Tataragami, Euromaidan Press, 8/28/24

As Russian forces continue their rapid advance toward Pokrovsk, now just over 10 kilometers from this critical logistical hub in Ukraine’s Donbas Oblast, concerns are growing over the town’s potential loss.

One issue for the public is the lack of clarity about why Pokrovsk is seen as different from any other lost settlement in the Donbas. To fully grasp the current situation, prognosis, and risks associated with the potential loss of Pokrovsk, we need to step back from the tactical level and shift our focus slightly eastward, starting with Avdiivka.

Before falling to Russian forces in February 2024, the Avdiivka area played a key role for Ukrainian troops for nearly a decade, serving as a fortress that secured vital logistical routes in the Donetsk oblast. It was also seen as a potential foothold for future Ukrainian efforts to deoccupy Donetsk.

Unsurprisingly, since 2022, Russia has committed substantial resources to capture Avdiivka, raising questions about whether the heavy losses incurred were justified even among Russians.

The goal of the operation was not merely to capture Avdiivka itself, but to gain access to the operational space behind it. Once Avdiivka was secured, it provided the Russians with multiple options and maneuverability.

This is a key aspect because, if we examine the war theater solely from a tactical standpoint – focusing on individual tree lines or single settlements – we may miss the broader operational objectives of the enemy and the potential consequences for Ukraine if these objectives are achieved.

The backbone of Ukraine’s logistics in Donetsk Oblast is under threat

Pokrovsk, a town with a pre-war population of 60,000, is situated west of Avdiivka at a crucial crossroads of multiple railroad lines. It has become a key delivery and railroad distribution hub, facilitating the supply of Ukrainian forces across a broad frontline, from Vuhledar to the north of Donetsk and beyond.

Currently, only two places in the Donbas serve this vital function – Pokrovsk and Kramatorsk. The significance of the location and length of the supply line becomes clear when viewed on a map:

When assessing the situation, we should remember that Russia doesn’t need to capture Pokrovsk to gain control over the railroad. Mere proximity to the town enables Russian forces to target trains and vehicles with artillery, mortars, and drones, effectively rendering the railroad hub unusable. It’s highly likely that train operations in the town have already been suspended due to these risks.

The significance of Pokrovsk extends beyond its rail connections; the town is also situated at an important road juncture, playing a similar role to the railroads in the transportation and distribution of supplies across the entire frontline.

The road linking Pokrovsk to Kostyantynivka has long been a target of Russian offensive efforts. Cutting off this road would complicate the resupply of troops engaged in the Bakhmut-Horlivka sector.

The potential loss of Pokrovsk poses a serious operational threat to the logistics of the entire region, disrupting supply lines from Vuhledar in the south to Horlivka in the north. The loss of both the road and railroad would exacerbate the situation for Ukrainian forces in the Donbas, leading to the potential loss of Kurakhove, Vuhledar, and areas both south and north of Toretsk.

Another significant concern is the political aspect: Pokrovsk is located just over 20 kilometers from the administrative border of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Given that Russian forces re-entered Kharkiv Oblast from the north in May 2024, there is little reason to believe that Putin plans to halt at the administrative borders of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.

If Pokrovsk falls, Russian forces would face minimal obstacles in advancing toward Dnipro, potentially extending their control into another administrative region of Ukraine and broadening the list of occupied oblasts.

Russia’s rapid advance in Donbas undeterred by Ukraine’s invasion of Kursk Oblast

Since the fall of Avdiivka, Russian forces have advanced more than 25 kilometers westward into Ukrainian territory. The concern is not about the territorial losses, but the pace at which Russian forces are moving through fortified areas.

Starting from July, the rate of Russian advancement in this region has accelerated, allowing them to bypass multiple defensive lines that Ukraine hastily constructed after the fall of Avdiivka.

The Finnish OSINT group Black Bird has mapped Ukrainian defenses visible through satellite imagery, helping to visualize the situation. As seen on their map, Russian forces have moved beyond several defensive positions, and with the full control of Novohrodivka, only one defensive line remains before reaching the outskirts of Pokrovsk itself.

Satellite imagery analysis of the seized positions shows evidence of artillery shelling and bombing, though not as extensive as in other frontline areas. This likely suggests that Ukrainian troops in the Pokrovsk direction were forced to retreat multiple times, lacking sufficient forces and resources to mount an organized defense.

While there have been many discussions and concerns about the lack of fortifications behind Avdiivka, which are entirely valid, the major issue remains the shortage of available manpower and units to defend those positions. No matter how well-constructed or numerous the defenses are, if they are only staffed at 10-20% of the required capacity, it’s unsurprising that Russian forces are able to overrun them so quickly.

Typically, in situations like this, both Ukraine and Russia deploy additional forces to stabilize the problematic part of the frontline. This often involves pulling one or more battalions from quieter sectors and redirecting them to more critical areas. However, after Ukraine was compelled to redeploy its resources to the Kharkiv Oblast and then to Sumy for the Kursk operation, the number of available units for such stabilization efforts was significantly reduced.

As a result, Ukraine was unable to stabilize this section of the frontline, just like in other areas such as Toretsk and New York, where Ukrainian forces also faced significant challenges and were forced to retreat.

Is the fall of Pokrovsk imminent?

Does this mean that Pokrovsk is definitely lost? No, it does not, but the likelihood of such an outcome continues to grow, given the balance of forces on the ground and the concentrated Russian firepower in the Pokrovsk area. Despite Ukrainian attempts to divert Russian forces from Pokrovsk with the Kursk incursion, Russian leadership remains reluctant to redeploy a significant number of forces from this front, even at the expense of reputational and political costs.

It is imperative for Ukrainian forces to prevent a swift and easy takeover of Pokrovsk, as this could buy Ukraine the necessary time to organize a defense beyond the Pokrovsk area—an opportunity missed in a similar situation in Avdiivka. If Russia exhausts its forces to capture Pokrovsk, it may lack the resources or morale to advance further.

Furthermore, Ukraine has demonstrated a capacity for sudden and effective counterattacks against overextended enemies, an approach that has proven effective given the Ukrainian forces’ greater mobility and more decentralized approach compared to Russian forces.

The Ukrainian leadership has several options to stabilize the line, including deploying newly formed brigades, repositioning forces from the Kursk and Kharkiv areas, or pulling battalions from more stable fronts. Whether the Ukrainian command will take these steps remains to be seen, but such a scenario cannot be ruled out.

As of today, the situation around Pokrovsk is dire and dangerous, with the potential to create a serious operational catastrophe if the town is lost.