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Racket News, 3/7/25

By Matt Taibbi and Greg Collard

Where to find relevant documents, videos, translations, and procurement statistics for the conflict that began with a Russian incursion in February, 2022

On February 24th, 2022, at 5:30 AM Moscow time, Russian President Vladimir Putin gave a televised speech announcing a “special military operation.” Here is that address, with English subtitles:

(Go to original page – link above – to view video – NB)

Minutes later, explosions were recorded in Dnipro, Kharkiv, and other locations across Ukraine. This footage was shot near the Antonov Airport in Kyiv:

(Go to original page – link above – to view video – NB)

Many would call this the beginning of the Ukraine war. Others would say it started weeks, months, years, or even decades earlier. This is why any effort at a “timeline” for this war is controversial.

Academics like Jeffrey Sachs and John Mearsheimer would say a disagreement about NATO expansion dating to the early 1990s, before the Soviet collapse, is necessary context. The United States Department of Defense, meanwhile, marks the same date of February 24th, 2022, and specifically Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s order sending 7,000 troops to Europe, as the first event in its “Ukraine Events” timeline.

Both old and new materials appear below, in a collection that as always favors full primary source materials over links. When possible, we’ll provide brief context, with contemporary critics given voice.

This list is not meant to be comprehensive and will be continually updated. If you think we left out something important, we want to hear from you. More to the point, if you think something relevant has been overlooked for a reason, we want to hear that complaint. Please let us know what we missed and send what you have to library@racket.news.

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February 9th, 1990

Memorandum of conversation between Secretary of State James Baker and Mikhail Gorbachev. Prepared by the State Department and public via a FOIA address, the heavily redacted document nonetheless contains an oft-cited passage from Baker: “We understand that not only for the Soviet Union but for other European countries as well it is important to have guarantees that… not an inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction.”

Bakergorbachev

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February 9th, 1990

Conversation between James Baker and Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze, which repeats the formulation. “There would, of course, have to be iron-clad guarantees that NATO’s jurisdiction or forces would not move eastward. And this would have to be done in a manner that would satisfy Germany’s neighbors to the east.” This memo was written by former CIA analyst Melvin Goodman, who confirmed the story to Matt Taibbi for Rolling Stone in 2017:

Bakershevardnadze

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February 12, 1990

Notes of Shevardnadze aide Teimuraz Stepanov-Mamaladze, saying, “If [unified Germany] stays in NATO, we should take care about non-expansion of its jurisdiction to the east.”

Document 10 01 Teimuraz Stepanov Mamaladze Notes

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July 16, 1990

Ukraine issues a Declaration of Sovereignty, part of which involves an agreement “not to accept, produce, or acquire nuclear weapons.” It’s the first step to becoming a full non-nuclear weapon state in the Non-Proliferation Treaty some years later. Had it not made this move, Ukraine would have been the third most heavily armed nuclear power in the world. It had 176 long-range ballistic missiles and 42 nuclear bombers containing roughly 1,900 nuclear warheads.

December 1, 1991

Ukrainians overwhelmingly vote for independence in a referendum. The lowest votes are in Sevastopol and Crimea, but even those are majority votes in favor of secession from the USSR. Supreme Soviet Chairman Leonid Kravchuk is elected president.

Ukrainian Independence Referendum – Seventeen Moments In Soviet History

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120191ukrainereferendum

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October 19, 1993

White House staff secretary John Podesta and deputy Todd Stern outline a new two-track policy, one that imagines welcoming former Soviet satellites into NATO without a firm timetable, and a second that creates a “Partnership for Peace” that could include “all European states.” National Security Adviser Anthony Lake explains to Bill Clinton, “All your advisors agree that doing anything at this stage to indicate that NATO’s border will move closer to Russia and Ukraine without at the same time including those two states would have major negative consequences within both.”

Podestalnn

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October 22, 1993

Russian President Boris Yeltsin meets with Secretary of State Warren Christopher and, upon being told about the NATO expansion, reportedly says, “This is genius!” Some reports claim Yeltsin was drunk and misunderstood, believing the “Partnership for Peace” would take place instead of wider NATO growth. Subsequent Russian cables show a different reaction.

Document 08 Secretary Christopher S Meeting With

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January 10, 1994

President Bill Clinton announces a new Partnership for Peace, in which NATO membership is open “to all the former Communist states of the Warsaw Pact, along with other non-NATO states.” Asked who is the enemy, he answers, “Well, there will be different enemies.”

The President’s News Conference | The American Presidency Project

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January 14, 1994

Kravchuk, Yeltsin, and Clinton sign the “Trilateral Statement.” Ukraine surrenders warheads and receives financial compensation from the United States and fuel rods for nuclear power plants from Russia. In return, the U.S. and Russia pledge to “reaffirm their commitment to seek immediate UN Security Council action to provide assistance to Ukraine, as a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, if Ukraine should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.”

Between the Baker-Gorbachev discussions about NATO and the later Trilateral Agreement, both Ukrainian and Russian politicians will come to believe they were lied to by American diplomats.

Trilateralstatement

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June 28, 1996

Ukraine adopts a new constitution, breaking from its Soviet legal legacy. It enshrines Ukrainian as the sole state language and outlaws foreign military bases, leaving the status of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, based in Sevastopol, uncertain.

Ukconstitution

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April 24, 1997

Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and leaders of 19 NATO countries sign a “Distinctive Partnership” agreement. Kuchma had previously declared that Ukraine made a “strategic choice of integrating in European and Transatlantic structures.” Two NATO officers, one civilian and one military, are stationed in Kyiv, and “the NATO Allies have officially designated the Yavoriv defence training area, west of Lviv, as a [Partnership for Peace] training centre.”

Distinctivepartnership

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May 27, 1997

NATO member states and Russia sign the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation. It says NATO is undergoing “a historic transformation — a process that will continue,” in which its “political functions” will expand. New member states will not feature any “threatening build-up of conventional forces” and as matters stood, would seek to avoid “additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.”

Natoreformagreement

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May 29, 1997

Russia and Ukraine sign the Black Sea Accords, under which Russia leases the Sevastopol base from Ukraine for 20 years. The status of Crimea, which was given to Ukraine by Soviet leader Nikita Khruschev in 1954, continues to be a source of tension for some Russians, with nationalist politicians beginning to make demands that it be returned.

Blackseafleetagreement1997(in Russian)

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June 26, 1997

50 prominent American policymakers, including Democrats like Bill Bradley and Gary Hart, sign a joint letter to Clinton opposing NATO expansion in favor of preserving the START II denuclearization. “NATO expansion will make it much more difficult to establish the atmosphere of trust required for Moscow to agree to additional transparency measures,” they wrote.

Opposition To Nato Expansion | Arms Control Association

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July 25, 1998

Vladimir Putin, a former first deputy mayor of St. Petersburg, is hired to be head of the FSB by Boris Yeltsin. Putin, who helped his former boss Anatoly Sobchak escape corruption charges, makes a name for himself by suppressing investigations of Yeltsin. On March 18, 1999, a video of “a person, resembling [General Prosecutor Yuri] Skuratov” is shown on television cavorting with “two girls of easy behavior.” Putin says Skuratov, who was investigating Yeltsin, must resign.

February 23, 1999

NATO officials after meeting at the Château de Rambouillet in France propose an eponymous peace agreement to Serbia, seeking to end hostilities with Albanian neighbors. It declares that the “use of force in Kosovo shall cease immediately” and explains that a NATO-based authority called KFOR will police the territory of the former Yugoslavia to maintain the peace.

990123rambouilletaccord

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Levada Center (machine translation), 3/5/25

Denis Volkov in a comment for Forbes about the hopes of Russian public opinion regarding the completion of the special operation.

The majority of Russian citizens are in favor of starting peace talks. 70% of respondents believe that it is necessary to negotiate, first of all, with the United States, hence the optimism associated with the first steps of the new administration. At the same time, half of the respondents still admit that it will not be possible to agree on a peace agreement without the participation of Ukraine.

Russian society is increasingly seized by the hope that the “special operation” in Ukraine may end this year. Such sentiments were manifested in the discussion of expectations for the future, ideas about the possible duration of the conflict, increased attention to the American presidential election, where all eyes were on Donald Trump, who promised to end the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 24 hours after taking office. And although there was no quick solution, the mood of the American president made an increasing number of Russians believe that a peaceful settlement between Russia and Ukraine is possible.

Request for Discharge

The sheer number of publications about Trump and his remarks in the official Russian media (at times it seemed as if Trump had won the election in Russia rather than in the United States) suggested that Russian elites sympathized with the president-elect and did not rule out a deal with him, which is why the ground is being prepared for a positive public perception of future negotiations. One way or another, by the end of the third year of the conflict, all conversations in Russia revolve around the idea of ​​its possible end – against the backdrop of increased interest in what is happening in Ukraine and attention to the words of the US president.

Focus group participants throughout the second half of last year insisted that “Trump is a businessman” and “you can negotiate with him” – unlike Biden, who, due to his age, seemed to most Russians to be an independent figure, subject to the influence of anti-Russian American elites. Therefore, the appearance of a bright, energetic president in the White House gave at least some hope for the end of the conflict. As respondents said: “Trump promised to end the war, so we are waiting for Trump.”

Is it any wonder that the overwhelming majority of Russians (85%) reacted positively to the Russian-American talks, which started in Riyadh and continued in Istanbul. Moreover, throughout the three years of the conflict, more than half of Russians continued to advocate for improving relations with the United States and the West. Despite the prevailing opposition to America and Europe, most wanted a de-escalation of international tensions, especially amid increasing talk of the possible use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the prevailing idea was that Russia wanted to negotiate, and the West did not. And now Trump’s election has created a sense that the West’s position may finally change.

It should be noted that, despite the desire for détente and the sympathy of Russians for Trump, the ideal form of relations between Russia and the United States is not seen by the majority as friendship between the two countries – over the past 30 years, significant mistrust has accumulated in Russian-American relations, which is difficult to overcome – but as non-interference in each other’s affairs. People in focus groups have repeatedly expressed the view that it would be good if, after the deal is concluded, Trump “backed off” and “would take care of his own problems,” so that “America would not interfere with us,” and “would stop interfering in our affairs.” But first, a deal must be made.

The majority are in favor of negotiations

Overall, the idea of ​​ending the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and moving to peace talks is currently supported by about 60% of Russians. Similar figures began to appear in polls in the second half of 2024, although after the Ukrainian army’s attack on the Kursk region, the number of supporters of negotiations decreased for some time. Throughout the conflict, the share of those in favor of a peaceful settlement almost never fell below half of the population, and in recent months their number has begun to grow. At the same time, support for negotiations should be perceived as the most general desire to end the conflict and stop the bloodshed. The most frequently heard argument in favor of this – in focus groups and in responses to an open-ended question – is the words that “people must stop dying” and that too many have already died on both sides.

Behind these words there is also hidden anxiety among people that the continuation of military actions could lead to an expansion of the conflict. This, in turn, could mean a new mobilization, which most would very much like to avoid. Therefore, the sooner peace comes, the lower the risks for every Russian family. The growing number of supporters of negotiations is caused not only by general fatigue from the conflict, but also by the changed rhetoric of the Russian authorities, who have been constantly signaling Russia’s readiness for negotiations in recent months. And such talk influences public opinion, preparing it for a possible settlement of the conflict.

It is worth adding that it is categorically wrong to oppose the supporters of negotiations and supporters of the authorities, as some researchers and publicists do. Polls show that support for negotiations prevails even among loyalists and for all three years it was they who made up the majority of supporters of the end of hostilities. Another thing is that they believe that it is the country’s leadership that should determine when and under what conditions to conclude a peace agreement. “It would be good if the conflict ended as soon as possible,” but “we are small people, let the big people decide,” “Putin has all the information, he knows better,” they say in focus groups.

Less than a third of Russians oppose negotiations and support the continuation of hostilities over the past couple of months, despite the fact that on average throughout the conflict there were about 40% of the population. Their main argument is that “you can’t stop halfway”, “you need to finish what you started”, because “so much has already been sacrificed”. It should be emphasized that loyalists also prevail in this group. The positions of those who criticized the authorities “from the right”, demanding more decisive action (Igor Strelkov became a symbol of this position), have always been marginal on the scale of the entire society and hardly exceeded 5-6% of the total population.

Interestingly, some Russian liberals who do not accept negotiations until Ukraine wins are also in the camp of opponents of a peaceful settlement today – the most prominent exponents of these ideas are the organizers of opposition rallies in Berlin. In society, their share is about the same 5-6%. Such unity between liberals and the far right should not be surprising: a similar situation was already observed in 2023, during the days of Prigozhin’s rebellion, when some supported Yevgeny Prigozhin himself, while others simply wanted the defeat of the regime. Be that as it may, both of these positions remain marginal.

Negotiations – with whom?

Let us return, however, to the desire for peace negotiations prevailing in society. According to the majority (70%), such negotiations should be conducted primarily with America – we have repeatedly said that the majority of the Russian population perceives the current conflict as a confrontation between Russia and the West under the leadership of the United States, in which Ukraine plays only a subordinate role. Such perceptions of what is happening prevailed in Russian society even before the outbreak of hostilities against the backdrop of the escalation at the end of 2021. Since then, these views have only strengthened.

Only half of the respondents consider it expedient to negotiate with Ukraine, and only a quarter consider it expedient to invite Europe to the table. With all the perception of Ukraine as subordinate to the West, there is an understanding that the signing of a peace agreement cannot do without its participation. At the same time, there is a strong feeling in society that Ukraine does not want to negotiate and therefore it is useless to negotiate with it now.

The perception of Europe’s role during the conflict gradually changed. If at the very beginning the EU countries were perceived as completely dependent on the United States, acting under its dictation, then over the past year and a half, the share of those who saw European leaders, such as French President Emmanuel Macron or the head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, with their own position on the Ukrainian conflict, even tougher towards Russia, has been gradually growing in Russian public opinion. than the United States.

The negotiations that began between the Russian and American delegations and the apparent divergence of the public positions of the United States and Europe regarding the scenarios for ending the conflict finally consolidated this idea. It got to the point that the attitude of Russians to the United States today for the first time turned out to be better than to the European Union – 30% against 21% in February 2025. It is very interesting how sustainable this new trend will be.

From a position of strength

Although support for a peaceful settlement prevails in society, the majority has no desire to make peace at any cost. Thus, with a gradual increase in the number of supporters of negotiations, the number of people who are ready to do this at the expense of the return of new territories is decreasing. Most likely, this dynamics is explained by the fact that three-quarters of respondents today are confident that Russia is winning on the battlefield. About the same number – 72% – believe that military operations are going well for Russia, although the occupation of part of the Kursk region and regular raids by Ukrainian drones inspire some concern. And this is the highest figure since the spring of 2022, until the retreat of the Russian army from Kherson and the Kharkiv region. And since Russia is gradually gaining the upper hand, negotiations can be conducted from a position of strength.

And while the number of people willing to make concessions for a peace deal has risen slightly over the past six months, from 20 percent to 30 percent, much of this remains just a declaration, because Russian public opinion is becoming increasingly intractable on major issues that will require an agreement with Ukraine. Thus, the number of people who are ready to admit the idea of ​​Ukraine’s membership in NATO or the return of the DPR and LPR or the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions to Ukraine is systematically decreasing. Today, between 70% and 80% of Russians, depending on the question, consider such conditions unacceptable for Russia.

Also, if we take out of brackets the idea of ​​the exchange of prisoners of war, which is supported by both sides (in Russia, it is 92% of respondents), the most popular conditions for concluding a peace agreement in Russian society are unlikely to find understanding from the Ukrainian side. Thus, the absolute majority of Russians – more than 80% – would like to guarantee the rights of the Russian-speaking population and protect the status of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine. It was the protection of compatriots that our respondents saw as the main goal of the “special operation” over the past three years.

Moreover, about 70% of Russians would like to establish a friendly government in Ukraine, ensure the neutral status of Ukraine, and lift Western sanctions. However, on the latter question, even a large proportion of Russians (77% in February 2025) believe that Russia should continue its policy despite the sanctions: if they cancel it, it’s good, if they don’t, that’s fine.

Such sentiments coincide with the statements of the Russian authorities, but completely contradict the position of the Ukrainian leadership. And if there are no grounds for a compromise between the parties to the conflict, the wait for the much-desired end of the bloodshed may drag on.

Rutherford Institute, 3/20/25

NEWARK, NJ — At a time when non-citizens are being targeted and deported for engaging in lawful, nonviolent political speech protected under the First Amendment, The Rutherford Institute is warning American citizens who criticize the government that they could be next in line for punishment and retaliation. In a joint amicus brief in Mahmoud Khalil v. Donald Trump, The Rutherford Institute, FIRE and a coalition of leading civil liberties groups are challenging the Trump Administration’s detention of Mahmoud Khalil, a permanent U.S. resident who was arrested, transported to a private prison, and is pending deportation based solely on his involvement in nonviolent, anti-war protest activities at Columbia University, which is protected political speech under the First Amendment. The legal coalition argues that the government’s actions directly contradict the U.S. Supreme Court, which ruled in 1945 that freedom of speech is accorded to citizens and non-citizens alike who reside in the U.S., and deporting Khalil based on his peaceful, nonviolent, political speech would violate the Constitution.  “If non-citizens can be deported for engaging in lawful, nonviolent political speech, who’s next? The case of Mahmoud Khalil—a lawful U.S. resident facing deportation for peaceful protest—sets a dangerous precedent for free speech rights. The First Amendment protects everyone in the U.S., but this case threatens to undermine that fundamental freedom,” said constitutional attorney John W. Whitehead, president of The Rutherford Institute and author of Battlefield America: The War on the American People. “In other words, a threat to Khalil’s rights is a threat to the rights of anyone who dares to disagree with the government.” On March 8, 2025, agents from the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) arrested Mahmoud Khalil with no prior notice at his apartment, and initiated proceedings to deport him from the United States. At some point in the night, DHS transferred Khalil, a lawful permanent resident of the U.S., to New Jersey and later to Louisiana. Khalil, a recent graduate of Columbia University in New York City who was born to Palestinian refugees in Syria and is married to a U.S. citizen expecting their first child, was targeted by the Trump Administration because of his moral and vocal stance in opposition to Israel’s military operations in Gaza. As part of his pro-Palestine advocacy, Khalil had led several Palestine-focused student groups and organized educational events about Palestine, publicly denounced antisemitism, and called on Columbia to divest from its financial ties to Israel. Notably, while the Trump administration has defended its actions by claiming that Khalil’s views are contrary to America’s foreign policy interests, it has not alleged that Khalil engaged in any acts of vandalism, physical violence, or unlawful occupations of buildings, which are not forms of protected speech, nor has it accused him of breaking any laws. The legal coalition’s amicus brief was filed in support of Khalil’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, asking for release from custody while the proceedings are pending. The amicus brief argues that deporting any non-citizen whose views are considered to be against America’s foreign policy interests, as determined by the subjective judgment of a current or future Secretary of State, places free expression in mortal peril, and is similar to laws of censorial regimes in China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. Ronnie London, Conor Fitzpatrick, Will Creeley, and others at FIRE (the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression) advanced the arguments in the Khalil v. Trump amicus brief. The Rutherford Institute, a nonprofit civil liberties organization, defends individuals whose constitutional rights have been threatened or violated and educates the public on a wide spectrum of issues affecting their freedoms. This press release is also available at www.rutherford.org.