YouTube link here.
By Ted Snider, Antiwar.com, 2/3/25
A leaked document has given us a first glimpse at Trump’s peace plan for Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian online newspaper Strana, U.S. officials handed the plan to European diplomats who then passed it on to Ukraine.
The existence of the plan has not been verified, and Andriy Yermak, head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, has said “no ‘100-day peace plan’ as reported by the media exists in reality.”
If the plan is real, if it is being put on the table by the Trump administration as a finished product that, if rejected, will lead to more sanctions on Russia and more weapons for Ukraine, as Trump has threatened, then the war will go on, and Trump’s promise to quickly end the war will vanish in a puff of delusion. But if the plan is put on the table as a starting point for negotiations, then there is hope. And there is suggestion that it is a starting point.
Here is an item by item analysis of what each side may consider acceptable in the plan and what each side may insist on negotiating further.
The process begins with an immediate phone call between Trump and Putin followed by discussions between Washington and Kiev. That the plan may be intended as a starting point for negotiations is suggested by the fork in the schedule that negotiations will continue if common ground is found or pause if it is not. Further negotiations would lead to an Easter truce along the front line, an end of April peace conference, and a May 9 declaration of an agreement.
Russia has said that the Istanbul agreement could still be “the basis for starting negotiations.” In June, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin set out a peace proposal based on the Istanbul agreement, but adjusted for current territorial realities. Putin’s proposal had four points. Ukraine must abandon plans to join NATO, they must withdraw from the four annexed territories, they must agree to limits on the size of their armed forces, and they must ensure the rights of ethnic Russians in Ukraine.
The alleged Trump plan can be evaluated by comparison to Putin’s proposal and to recent statements made by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
1. Ukrainian troops must withdraw from Kursk at the time of the April Truce
This would be acceptable to Russia who would insist on Ukrainian troops leaving its territory.
For Ukraine, this would be a difficult concession, not because of the withdrawal but because of the timing. Aside from the strategically catastrophic hope that the Kursk invasion would divert Russian troops away from the Donbas, the point of taking Russian territory was to use it to barter for the return of Ukrainian territory. Giving up the bargaining chip before the negotiations begin would nullify Ukraine’s hope of using it to force the return of more of its land.
This could be a bitter pill for Zelensky. Recent polling has shown that Zelensky could well lose that election.
Elections would be welcomed by Russia who see Zelensky’s government as intransigently hostile and anti-Russia. This would legally transfer hope for regime change to Ukrainians.
Ukraine was willing to abandon its NATO hopes in Istanbul. Though accepted by Kiev as inevitable, it would now be a painful concession. In the absence of NATO membership, it would be a hard sell to Ukrainians that the war after the Istanbul talks was worth the devastation.
For Russia, this point is key, and there can be no negotiations without it. It would be the key accomplishment to get the two sided promise that Ukraine will not ask for membership and NATO will not offer it.
This item is acceptable to both. EU membership will be necessary for Zelensky to present to Ukrainians as something that was worth fighting for. Ukraine is now free to pursue its ambitions to turn west and join Europe.
Though Russia had concerns in 2014 with the EU’s Association Agreement with Ukraine because of its implied integration of Ukraine into the European security and military architecture, Putin has long left EU membership on the table for a postwar Ukraine, and that was specifically agreed to in the Istanbul agreement.
While Ukraine will welcome this, it may not be enough. Russia will have a hard time with this one.
This is like “the Israeli model” that then Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett says Putin and Zelensky were both open to in the early days of the war. But, in the absence of NATO, Zelensky has been adamant about U.S. supported security guarantees. And, already by Istanbul, Russia was demanding limits on Ukraine’s armed forces. At the very least, modernized Ukrainian weaponry would have to be defensive with a cap on firing into Russian territory.
This item goes not far enough for Russia and too far for Ukraine. Zelensky has accepted that “De facto, these territories are now controlled by the Russians. We don’t have the strength to bring them back.” So, he will accept not attempting to return the occupied territories militarily. He has also insisted that Ukraine would never officially recognize Russian sovereignty over those lands. But the added clause, that he will not attempt to return them diplomatically, may be going further than Zelensky has been willing to go. In the case of Crimea, he has reserved the right to try to bring territory back diplomatically.
For Russia, the de facto recognition of the territory it occupies will likely be enough. In his proposal, Putin insisted on the complete withdrawal from the territories while saying nothing about Ukraine officially recognizing Russian sovereignty over them. However, though Russia may be willing to negotiate over Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, they are less likely to accept only the lands east of the current front without it including all of the Donbas.
This item will likely be acceptable to Ukraine, especially since temporary duty on sales of oil will be used to restore Ukraine. It will likely be acceptable, at least as a starting point, for Russia.
Though difficult for Zelensky and some forces in Ukraine to accept, protection of language, religious and cultural rights is the second key Russian demand along with NATO.
The recognition that security guarantees is both key and difficult for both parties is realistic. Neither side will agree to a European security force: Russia because it goes too far; Ukraine because it goes not far enough.
If this plan is a final draft whose rejection means negotiations end, then the war will not end. But if Trump’s plan is intended as a starting point to negotiations – the most difficult of which may be the security guarantees – then there is hope.
Ted Snider is a regular columnist on U.S. foreign policy and history at Antiwar.com and The Libertarian Institute. He is also a frequent contributor to Responsible Statecraft and The American Conservative as well as other outlets. To support his work or for media or virtual presentation requests, contact him at tedsnider@bell.net.
By Ben Aris in Berlin, Intellinews, 1/31/25
Could Gazprom’s Nord Stream undersea gas pipelines, partially destroyed by saboteurs in September 2022, eventually be restarted? The idea of reconnecting Europe to the giant Russian Yamal gas fields has been introduced as a possible bargaining chip in the widely expected ceasefire talks between Russia and Ukraine. While political optics of such a deal are terrible, for the struggling European economies it is an economic no-brainer.
Denmark’s energy agency ordered the operator of the Nord Stream pipelines to cap the severed ends of the three destroyed pipelines this week to preserve their integrity, making it possible, in theory, to patch the holes created in a series of explosions in September 2022 and lift the pipes to the surface for repairs.
The idea of restarting Russian gas deliveries to Germany is clearly in the air and favoured by some in the German political firmament. Leader of Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland party (AfD) Alice Weidel told a party conference this week that “We will put Nord Stream back into operation, you can count on it!’ as the right have (correctly) identified the end of cheap Russian as being a major cause of the collapse of the German economy.
That has not gone down well with Ukraine’s supporters. The Baltic states have been adamant that all Russian gas imports should end. Polish President Andrzej Duda the same week that Germany “should not be tempted” to resume Russian supplies just because its economy is struggling; Germany’s economy has contracted for two years in a row and is predicted to shrink again this year. Rather than repair the €10bn pipeline that is capable of supplying 40% of Europe’s gas needs, Duda said that Nord Stream should instead be “dismantled.”
Detractors argue that resuming Russian gas deliveries threaten Europe with energy dependence, but also frame it as a military threat as the money it generates funds Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war machine. Russia’s Gazprom earned some €6.5bn from gas exports to Europe last year.
The loss of cheap Russian gas has been disastrous for Germany leading directly to its deindustrialisation as heavy industry has had to close down due to the soaring cost of gas and energy. The end of gas imports came just as the government decided to shutter its six powerful state-of-the-art nuclear power plant (NPP) in the midst of one of the worst energy crises this century in 2022 that turned Germany from a net exporter of energy into a net importer. That has put pressure on the rest of the EU, as Germany’s neighbours are forced to supply Germany with power under EU rules that have driven up costs in those countries as well. Sweden and Norway in particular are now suffering from power price inflation and have frozen plans to increase power links with Germany to cap exports capacity so they can use more of their domestic production capacity to meet their own domestic demand.
The upending of Germany’s energy security has led to the biggest collapse in German living standards since the Second World War and a downturn in economic output comparable to the 2008 financial crisis.
The downturn is having political consensus too. The funding of the war in Ukraine – Germany has been Ukraine’s most generous EU backer – has put intolerable strain on Germany’s finances that was already in a budget crisis after budget spending bumped up against borrowing limits imposed by the constitution by the so-called Schuldenbremse, or “debt brake” that limits government borrowing. At the end of last year, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced that Berlin has run out of money for Ukraine and will drastically reduce its contributions after this year. Tensions over money and wrangling over a €3bn aid package for Ukraine has already led to the collapse of the ruling coalition and German policy is in limbo as the country waits for a new government in a general election slated for February.
The quality of German life was already falling before the war started but has been made much worse by the various shocks the conflict has unleashed. The failure to protect German industry from the energy price spike may turn the 2020s into “a lost decade for Germany,” according to a recent paper published by the Forum for a New Economy, the Spectator reports. The economic malaise is fuelling the rise of the far-right AfD that won several key regional elections in November and is currently ranked second in popularity after the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU).
And Russia’s gas business is still doing well, despite the setbacks. Gas production rose 7.6% in 2024 y/y to around 685bcm, according to comments by Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak on January 30. This year Russia expects to increase gas production again. Pipeline gas exports also increased last year by 15.6% to over 119bcm, while LNG exports were up by a more modest 4% to 47.2bcm (21.2mn tonnes).
Despite the myriad sanctions on Russia, Europe bought 22.6bcm (17mn tonnes) of LNG from Gazprom in 2024, mostly via terminals in France, Spain and Belgium. Taking LNG and piped gas together, Russia’s export to Europe were up 20% year on year to about 50bcm – around a third of pre-war export volumes. This year imports of piped gas may fall after Ukraine walked out on a gas transit deal with Russia, but delivered via the one remaining route, TurkStream that runs through the Black Sea, continues to rise, as does shipped LNG deliveries.
Publicly, Germany has ended the import of Russian gas and the CDU leader Friedrich Merz, who is very likely to take over from Scholz in the upcoming elections, has called for all Russian gas imports to end. However, embarrassingly, Germany continues to be the biggest importer of Russian gas via the backdoor imports routed through French and Belgium ports among other alternatives. Despite the fighting-talk, Europe remains hooked on Russian gas.
Currently, Europe is still consuming half of Russia’s annual gas production. Although the volume of piped Russian gas has fallen dramatically over the last two years, the volume of Russia’s LNG exports to Europe have doubled in the last two years and are currently at an all-time high and still rising. Ukraine’s supporters wanted to include an LNG ban in the sixteenth package of sanctions under debate at the moment and due to be enacted in February, but that idea has already been dropped as unworkable, according to reports.
The Danish energy agency decision to cap the four strands of the Nord Stream 1 & 2 pipelines creates the possibility that the damaged pipes could relatively easily be patched, pumped dry and lifted to the surface for repairs at some point. The one strand that survived the 2022 bombings in September 2022 is still pressurised and could in theory be turned back on tomorrow to deliver a badly needed 25bcm of gas to the EU – half as much again as Ukraine was delivering until it turned off the spigot on January 1.
The idea of restarting Russia’s gas deliveries has been in the air for a while now. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Scholtz held their first phone conversation in two years in November to talk about the war. Not much was agreed, but amongst the points raised, Putin said that he was willing to restart gas deliveries to Germany through the working pipeline if there was an acceptable Ukrainian ceasefire deal.
Moon of Alabama, 1/31/25
At the time of writing the above I did not know that the idea for this campaign came from RAND, the Pentagon’s think tank which often proposes strategic ideas. In a commentary about Russian/North Korean and Chinese cooperation published on October 11, three days before the start of Zelenski’s campaign, a RAND analyst wrote:
What Should the United States Do?
Given the differences in the objectives of Russia, China, and North Korea, the United States should be mounting major information operations against these three countries to highlight their differences and fuel distrust among them.
…
[T]he United States should recognize that North Korean military advisors are supporting Russian use of North Korean military supplies in occupied areas of Ukraine.
…
This new cooperation between Russia and North Korea is hardly a signal of a budding long-term alliance and U.S. information campaigns could help speed its demise.Just three days later the Military Intelligence of the Ukrainian army, headed by General Budanov, started to ‘leak’ claims to the Ukrainian press about North Korean troops in Russia.
Since launching the first rumors of 1,500, then 3,000 North Korean soldiers in Russia the CIA trained head of the Ukrainian military special service General Budanov increased the number from hot air to 11,000 North Korean soldiers.
But even NATO denied to have any knowledge of such a force.
As I summarized at that time:
Shortly after RAND proposed a U.S. information operation campaign around the theme of North Korean soldiers in Russia the Ukrainian military intelligence service under CIA trainee Budanov started to spread rumors of North Korean soldiers soon to fight on the Russian side. The numbers claimed by Budanov have since steadily increased. South Korean intelligence, also associated with the CIA, and U.S. media have joined the campaign. The chair of the House Intelligence Committee is milking the campaign to make political points.
Evidence that was supposed to support the claims has been exposed as being fake. The whole story is thus based on nothing but ‘intelligence’ rumors which are following a RAND proposed script. Don’t fall for it.
The story continued to grow through repetition. Media quoted each other with each adding bits of bullshit from their usual ‘security sources’. What failed to turn up though was evidence.
After being repeatedly questioned about the lack of evidence for their claims, Ukrainian politicians presented their solution:
Today the Ukrainian Minister of Defense, Rustem Umerov, has given a hint how Ukraine will handle this issue (machine translation):
Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov confirmed the words of the head of the National Security and Defense Council’s Center for Combating Disinformation, Andriy Kovalenko , that the first “small-scale fighting” had already taken place between the Ukrainian Armed Forces and North Korean soldiers, and the Koreans had suffered losses.
…
Umerov also said that the Russian Federation disguises Koreans as Buryats, so the dead and prisoners must be identified before Ukraine calls the number of enemy losses.
Buryats are a Mongolic people in Siberia who are part of the Russian Federation. Many of them have joined the well paid ranks of Russian forces. Umerov’s plan was thus obvious:
As soon as some Buryat soldier of Russia will turn up dead, the Ukrainian military will present him as a disguised North Korean soldier. Some black and white photos will be found of a similar looking person in North Korean uniform …
“There is your prove. Now send soldiers and weapons.” will Umerov say.
There have since been several attempts by Ukrainian special services to reinforce their media campaign. Russian passports from dead Russian soldiers were presented as ‘fake documents’ carried by ‘North Koreans’. They even captured a Buryat:
On Oct. 28 (local time), Jonas Ohman, head of the Lithuanian NGO Blue/Yellow, which provides aid to Ukraine and its military, informed local media outlet LRT, stating, “The first encounter between a Ukrainian unit we support and North Korean soldiers occurred on the 25th in Kursk. To my knowledge, all of the North Korean soldiers, except for one, were killed. The surviving soldier was found carrying identification as a Buryat.”
Other ‘evidence’ included hand written letters, allegedly by North Korean soldiers, written in South Korean type and style.
Even Wikipedia had to admit:
As of January 2025, there has been no independent confirmation of the Buryat Battalion’s existence [,allegedly consisting of soldiers from North Korea,] outside of Ukrainian sources.
The nonsense of this scheme has become too obvious.
Now the CIA, with the help of the New York Times, is shutting it down.
The ‘North Korean soldiers’ are leaving the battlefield the same way they came – ever unseen.
North Korean Troops No Longer Seen on Front Lines Fighting Ukraine (archived) – New York Times, Jan 31 2024
North Korea sent its best troops to aid Russia in its war against Ukraine. But after months of suffering severe losses, they have been taken off the front line.
North Korean soldiers who joined their Russian allies in battle against Ukrainian forces have been pulled off the front lines after suffering heavy casualties, according to Ukrainian and U.S. officials.
The North Korean troops, sent to bolster Russian forces trying to push back a Ukrainian offensive inside Russia’s borders, have not been seen at the front for about two weeks, the officials said after requesting anonymity to discuss sensitive military and intelligence matters.
Well – that sentences is formally correct. But it would be even more precise to say that ‘North Korean troops have not been seen at the front – since ever.’
The CIA/NYT can’t go there (yet). They still add to the stupid claims:
Many of the soldiers are among North Korea’s best-trained special operations troops, but the Russians appear to have used them as foot soldiers, sending them forth in waves across fields studded with land mines to be mowed down by heavy Ukrainian fire.
Well, where are the pictures and videos of North Korean troops ‘sent forth in waves’ and ‘mowed down by heavy Ukrainian fire’?
In a war where every ground move is surveilled by dozens of drones how come there is not even one video that shows evidence of such a scene?
For now the RAND/Ukraine (dis-)information campaign of ‘North Korean’ soldiers fighting Ukraine has been shut down. U.S. ‘officials’ however keep the door open to relaunch it at a convenient time:
The American officials said the decision to pull the North Korean troops off the front line may not be a permanent one. It is possible, they said, that the North Koreans could return after receiving additional training or after the Russians come up with new ways of deploying them to avoid such heavy casualties.
Maybe a month, a year, or ten from now we will be again told about these imagined ‘enemies’ from North Korea which unite with Russians to ‘fight us’.
Posted by b on January 31, 2025 at 14:48 UTC | Permalink
Russia Matters, 2/3/25