Link to YouTube video here.

from Geoffrey Roberts:

When Stalin told a delegation from the Finland-USSR society that he proposed to give Finland more time to pay its reparations to the Soviet Union, the Finns said that would be generous.

Stalin replied:

“It’s calculation, not generosity – a generosity of calculation. When we treat others well, they are nice to us. Our generosity makes up for the policy of Tsarist autocracy. Its policy towards Finland, Romania and Bulgaria made their peoples enemies of Russia. We want neighbouring countries and peoples to have a good attitude towards us.”

“Это не великодушие, а расчет, великодушие по расчету. Когда мы к другому хорошо относимся, и они к нам хорошо относятся…Своим великодушием мы рассчитываемся за политику царского самодержавия. Царское самодержавие своей политикой по отношению к Финляндии, Румынии, Болгарии вызвало вражду народов этих стран к России. Мы хотим, чтобы соседние страны и народы к нам хорошо относились”.

Reference courtesy Vladimir Pechatnov.

Geoffrey Roberts

Member of the Royal Irish Academy

Emeritus Professor of History, University College Cork

www.geoffreyroberts.net

By Nate Bear, Substack, 8/28/25

I am republishing this essay with Nate Bear’s permission. Nate is very passionate in describing the Gaza genocide and what it means for the future of liberalism. To quote Nate Bear: “Gaza should, and I believe will, mark the end of liberalism.” I just ordered a book by Philip Pilkington titled: “The Collapse of Global Liberalism: And the Emergence of the Post-Liberal World Order.” I have not had time to read the book, but the idea that 500 years of “liberalism” is ending cannot be discounted. What will or should replace liberalism is the question. There are several appealing aspects of “liberalism”, including freedom of speech and association, due process, equal justice under law, and the rule of law, but these concepts are increasingly under assault as wealth and power, not majority rule, dominate what’s left of our “democracy”. Let me know what you think of Nate Bear’s essay and ideas. – Sylvia Demarest

The September deadline set by France, the UK, Australia and Canada for Israel to stop its genocide and commit to a two-state solution is fast approaching. And looming alongside this deadline is a final crisis of legitimacy for western liberalism.

Firstly, let’s just reflect on how utterly absurd these conditions are: we’ll recognise your right to your own independent state ONLY IF YOUR HOLOCAUSTERS KEEP HOLOCAUSTING YOU. They are making the creation of an entity which, legally, according to the 1948 partition agreement should have existed for the last seventy seven years anyway, contingent on more slaughter.

The pitiful centrist impulse to triangulate every issue has never been more pathetically, tragically and infuriatingly on show. The belief that you can carrot-and-stick your way to a liberal sweet-spot solution on every issue, even an actual holocaust, is such an odious reflex.

Gaza should, and I believe will, mark the end of liberalism. You can’t support an openly declared final solution, announce two years later that recognition for the victims is literally contingent on the final solution proceeding, while continuing to trade on the same old lines about human rights, equality, justice.

Gaza has shown it all up as a sham. The events of the last nearly two years have driven a stake through the dank, rotten heart of this liberal ideology.

The truth is that (neo) liberalism encases supremacist attitudes in pro-social language and symbols despite being, today, an inherently and aggressively anti-social, racist and violent ideology. I don’t particularly want to get into history, definitions and changing use here. You can argue that classical liberal thinkers like Thomas Paine or John Locke would be horrified by genocide, permanent war and the surveillance state.

But what is inarguable is that liberalism in the twentieth century, particularly the second half of the twentieth century, has been dominated by violent centre-right and centre-left liberals. These groupings and their acolytes broadly agree on free markets, freedom of suffrage (what they call democracy), some forms of social justice and equal rights, and they agree on a geopolitical story of the world. They both identify the same good guys and the same bad guys and also believe in the need to forever expand the military and surveillance state to defeat the bad guys. And both these parties, from those in western Europe to those in North America, believe that to do this, killing lots and lots of people is frequently justified.

No one with any understanding of recent history could deny this.

Over the last eighty years, liberals of the centre-right and centre-left, Democrats and Republicans, Labour and Conservative parties, have dropped nuclear bombs on Japanese cities, sanctioned the murder of one million civilians in Indonesia, and from Vietnam to Korea to Libya to Iraq have invaded, raped and pillaged.

And while Gaza is of a piece with recent liberal history, I don’t think we can see it as simply another mass murderous episode in western imperialism. Because what has emerged over the past two years is something unique.

Gaza breaks what was already an ultra violent mould.

Never in the modern era have we seen two million people be cut off from the outside world, trapped, unable to leave, starved and systematically murdered while made homeless and living in tents. Never in the modern era have we seen everything be taken from a people, every university, bakery, school, cafe, office, park, restaurant. Every standing home. We’ve not seen a state destroy so much infrastructure that it has ended the ability of an entire society to function as such. No running water, no sewage systems, no grid electricity. Almost everything in Gaza has been turned to dust and rubble. Never have we seen a starving people trapped in a tiny patch of eviscerated land and watched as their holocausters baited them with food, only to gun them down for fun. Guns supplied by our governments, with our money. Never have we seen so many doctors, nurses and journalists torn apart by jets from the sky while holding nothing but the tools of their work, their stethoscopes and cameras. Jets supplied by our governments with our money. Never have we seen people with Down’s Syndrome ripped apart by attack dogs or teenagers assassinated by drones while in wheelchairs.

No, this is heinous and new, even by western imperialism’s barbarous standards.

You have to go back to ancient Greece or the crusades and the sacking of cities to find something comparable.

The fact that the resistance continues to inflict casualties on the invaders under these conditions is a marvel of the human spirit and should be celebrated as such.

And we certainly haven’t seen violence, war crimes and unspeakable atrocities on this scale captured so frequently on camera in such fine-grained graphic detail.

On top of this, every single stage of this genocide was openly declared by Israel. Israeli politicians said there were no civilians in Gaza, that everyone was guilty, that they’d starve them, burn them and destroy everything. They said the goal was to drive them out of Gaza, to ethnically cleanse Gaza. They said it brazenly, week after week. And then they did it. And they did it with the support of liberals. Trump has overseen eight months of genocide. Biden and Harris oversaw fifteen months. The Conservative party oversaw nine months of genocide. Starmer’s Labour Party has supported Israel through thirteen months of slaughter. The liberals in Australia and Canada don’t even have the excuse that it started on someone else’s watch. They’ve backed this genocide from the start.

Then a few weeks ago, when this dishonest threat to recognise Palestine was made, Israel’s finance minister said they’d step up the holocaust in response and make sure there was nothing left to recognise. Knowing they wouldn’t be stopped, they proceeded to do just that, with zero reaction from the complicit liberal cowards in London, Ontario, Canberra and Paris.

Liberalism doesn’t have a future after this. Not an energised one, at least. Gaza signals the final crisis of legitimacy for liberalism and its supposed international order. Spiritually, it’s over. It will take time for pro-genocide liberals to face the consequences, time for their political groupings to be defeated and made irrelevant. International institutions ruled by liberals will not evaporate over night. But no one will now take their orders from liberals. No one will be lectured to about democracy, human rights, and freedom. The global multilateral institutions run by pro-genocide western liberals will find it increasingly difficult to maintain their legitimacy in the post-Gaza holocaust era. The global south has been watching, and through the expansion of BRICS and the formalisation of new agreements, is now organising. Domestically, as we saw in the US last November, liberal bases in the west will no longer come out in sufficient numbers to keep reanimating the corpse of liberal technocratic management.

The centre could never hold. Among the dead of Gaza lies the liberal project, the only deserved victim of this genocide.

We are left then with two possible futures: a radically pro-social and communitarian one, focused on justice and equity for all, or an authoritarian cesspit of racism, war, and eugenics, administered by the tools of the outsourced surveillance state. We know these are the choices, because we’ve already seen it play out. Trump’s victory was in fact the first sign that Gaza heralded these binary futures. The causes of Harris’s loss were contested by liberals, but the polls in the weeks after were clear: her support for genocide was a priority issue for enough people who otherwise would have voted for her, and Trump snuck through.

Without viable pro-social, anti-imperial alternatives, expect this pattern of pro-genocide liberals losing to proto-fascists to be repeated throughout the west.

The answer in the face of these frightening dynamics is, obviously, not to run back to the genocidal warmongering liberals who landed us here.

The answer is to help shape those radical alternatives.

The stakes couldn’t be clearer, the lines sharper than ever.

Lt. Col. (Ret.) Daniel Davis, Military.com, 8/25/25

Earlier this year, speaking at a press conference in Qatar, President Donald Trump categorically declared that “nobody can beat us.” He continued, “We have the strongest military in the world, by far. Not China, not Russia, not anybody!”

We do have a strong military, but we are woefully unprepared to fight a modern war. That’s because, despite all of the major technological advances in warfighting in recent years, manpower is still absolutely critical, and understanding how those boots on the ground interact with emerging drone warfare is still in its infancy in the U.S. military.

Ground warfare has evolved over the past three and a half years since Russia invaded Ukraine. I’ve spent considerable time studying this conflict from strategic, operational and tactical angles, and I’ve conducted multiple interviews with combatants on both the Russian and Ukrainian sides. The picture that emerges explains not only why Russia’s progress is slow and Ukraine is gradually losing ground, but also why the U.S. would face serious challenges if forced into a similar fight today.

Some have argued that Russia has failed to completely conquer Ukraine because Russian generals and soldiers are of poor quality. That conclusion ignores the genuinely game-changing nature of drones on the conduct of land warfare.

There isn’t one category or type of drone that is game-changing by itself, but rather the categories of drones and the ways they can be employed in concert with other drones and legacy platforms and soldiers. There are primarily four main classes of drones: first-person view (FPV) drones that fly explosive charges directly into vehicles or soldiers, bomber drones that fly over a target and release bombs, missile-carrying drones, and reconnaissance drones.

Despite endless talk about game-changing weapons, only the widespread deployment of drones has truly altered the nature of this war. Armored vehicles remain essential for transporting infantry to the front, but they can’t move in large numbers without suffering catastrophic losses. Traditional armored charges – such as the type I participated in during Desert Storm’s Battle of 73 Easting – are deadly in today’s battlefield conditions. Russia has increasingly turned to motorcycles to improve frontline mobility – not because they offer protection, but because their speed and maneuverability improve their chances of defeating drone attacks. No armored vehicle can dodge an FPV or fiber optic-guided drone, but a motorcycle might.

As a result, every inch of ground in modern war is contested: by various types of drones, artillery strikes, missiles, rockets, air attacks, armored vehicle cannons, and infantry attacks. Both sides in the Russia-Ukraine War have suffered high vehicle losses. Fighters from both Russia and Ukraine have told me that stepping out of a trench – for any reason, even to eat or relieve themselves – is extraordinarily dangerous.

Any movement above ground can be spotted and targeted by drones within minutes. Reconnaissance drones scan likely targets and guide attack drones to strike. Others simply loiter above the battlefield, waiting for an opportunity.

This is why manpower is still the decisive factor: Drones and air attacks can be devastating, but it takes boots on the ground to either take territory or hold it. This is where Russia’s biggest advantages have come into play in this war of attrition. Russia has millions more men of military age to draw from than Ukraine, and Moscow has chosen to limit its manpower losses and play up its firepower advantages.

Rather than launching costly frontal assaults, Russian forces now frequently flank Ukrainian positions and cities, saturating them first with artillery and glide bombs, then using drones to pin down defenders, and only then send in the infantry to seize territory.

This has sobering implications for the United States and NATO. We do not know how to fight this kind of war. Only recently has the Pentagon begun taking drone warfare seriously – something that should have happened after the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. Better late than never, perhaps, but the deeper problem is cultural and doctrinal. We still think in terms of maneuver warfare, “shock and awe,” and rapid dominance. Those concepts no longer apply in peer-on-peer conflicts like this one.

Russia needed nearly two years to discard its outdated views on modern war. It adapted. We haven’t. Earlier this month, the Ukrainian military even mocked the U.S. Army’s newly updated field manual for the “Tank Platoon,” saying flat-out that our doctrines are detached from current battlefield realities.

Today’s U.S. armed ofrces no doubt have skills, quality personnel, and good equipment. But we are far behind in understanding how to fight modern wars. It took both Russia and Ukraine the better part of a year and a half to fully recognize how all the classes of drones have changed the nature of war. Both sides paid an exorbitant price in blood to learn those lessons.

The U.S. Army has studied the conflict and just last month published a compendium on examining the changing nature of war. That’s useful and good. But intellectual knowledge alone won’t help you in the next fight. We’ve got to make profound and fundamental changes now to have a chance to avoid disaster when next we fight on the ground. If the Pentagon was taking this seriously, leaders wouldn’t have merely published a report. They would be urgently changing our fighting doctrine, systems of equipment, types of ordnance and the like to enable and equip our troops to successfully wage war in this new world of conflict.

Yet there is little evidence they’ve done any of those things.

History is filled with the wreckage of once-powerful armies that failed to change with the times and suffered avoidable defeats in subsequent wars. If we are to avoid that sad tradition, major changes must be made, immediately and with urgency. Otherwise, we will pay in blood later for what we should have done today.

By Tarik Cyril Amar, RT, 8/25/25

In some important ways that Western information warriors love to miss, Russia and the West are quite similar. Like the West, Russia has a typically modern state, even if today it functions much better than its Western counterparts.

Russia’s economy is capitalist like almost everywhere else on the planet now, even if the Russian state – because it functions better – has reasserted control over the rich, while the West, sick with neoliberalism, lets them dominate and damage national interests. This is one reason, incidentally, why Russia has withstood unprecedentedly savage Western economic warfare and has a far more effective military-industrial complex than the West.

Finally, while Russia spans Europe and Asia, it is also a major force within that specific cultural tradition whose origins we associate with Europe, or more broadly, the West, from novels to classical conservatories.

Yet, in other respects, there are principal differences between Russia and the West. Please forget, for a moment, about the usual suspects (Russian Orthodoxy versus the rest, for instance, or the usual speculations about space, climate, and mentality). Instead, let’s be concrete and very contemporary: Let’s ask what differences matter most to the issue of finding (or not) a valid peace for the Ukraine conflict. Then two things emerge, one obvious and the other a little less so.

What is easy to spot is that Russia is united and the West is not. In part, this is simply due to the fact that Moscow rules over one country, while Washington, the de facto capital of the West as a geopolitical entity, rules – and exploits ever more crudely – a complicated outer empire of formally independent nation-states that are de facto its clients, satellites, and vassals.

While the US exerts a great deal of brute power over its domain, in reality, the latter is as potentially fissiparous as every empire before. If you think that the mere assertion of unity and control is the same as reality, ask the Soviets about their luck with that idea. Except you can’t, because one day they were there and the next – as if by foul magic – they were not.

What is harder to notice – but never to be unseen once you do – is that the political establishments of Russia and the West now have fundamentally different patterns of learning.

In short, Russia’s is normal in that it has a learning curve, and one with a nice upward bend: That is why its opponents find it impossible to massively deceive it, as occurred in the late 1980s and much of the 1990s.

The current learning pattern of Western, especially the European elites, on the other hand, is highly unusual: it forms, in effect, a flat, closed circle. On that trajectory, things sort of move, but they never really change.

The current state of the attempts to end the Ukraine conflict via negotiation and compromise perfectly illustrates this difference. Indeed, both Russia and the West are displaying their respective learning or for the West, really, non-learning patterns in exemplary fashion.

On Russia’s side, the hard lessons of systematic Western bad faith – from no-NATO-expansion promises to Minsk II – have been fully absorbed. As a result, Moscow, even while open to talks and a solution by realistic agreement, does not make the mistake of being swayed by emotions, hopes, and momentary vibes (the “Alaska vibe,” for instance), as happened to Russia (and before that, the Soviet Union) around the time of the end of the Cold War, with extremely painful consequences.

Specifically, that means that the Russian leadership has made it clear that – after the Alaska summit as much as before – it will not make concessions on key aims. For instance, Moscow will not accept the idea of Ukraine getting NATO membership, even under another label. Likewise it will not tolerate troops from NATO countries in postwar Ukraine, and it will not give up on securing the rights of Russian speakers in Ukraine. Rather silly attempts to pressure the Kremlin into premature meetings with Ukraine’s past-expiration-date leader Vladimir Zelensky have also gone nowhere.

There are observers in the West who are immune to Western propaganda and assess Russia in a fair manner. Some of them have recently been worrying that Moscow might walk into Western traps, as happened at the end of the Cold War or in 2015 when Russia accepted the Minsk II agreement, which the West and Ukraine then abused. Yet the Russian leadership shows no sign of being in any danger of doing so this time.

The West, however, is stuck in its ways. At least as a whole, it has not yet learned a thing, it seems, from the ferocious crash of both its long-term post-Cold War strategy of expansion by cheating and its recent attempt to eliminate Russia as a great power through a proxy war using Ukraine. NATO kaput, really, but NATO isn’t noticing.

The most obvious sign that the West has not yet learned its lesson is its persistent habit of auto-diplomacy. The West is odd in that it does most of its intensely exciting negotiating with itself. While you may well think that that is because the West is – structurally – not united, that is, actually, not the real reason for this narcissistic habit.

In reality, the reason for this self-damaging refusal to face reality is something else. Namely, a deep, entirely misplaced, and pathologically unquestionable sense of superiority. It is as if the West were so powerful that it need not bother with what others have to say but only with its own soliloquy. A fantasy both absurd and highly detrimental.

Consider the so-called “Coalition of the Willing,” in essence, a loose ad-hoc grouping of mostly European (Canada does a Canada and can’t make up its mind) states that seem unable to stop planning – with whatever degree of sincerity – to somehow place their troops in postwar Ukraine, even if only with a US “backstop” no one can plausibly define.

Follow merely Western debates and mainstream media about this ongoing and confused effort and you will find it hard to even notice a rather important fact: Russia’s answer to any such scheme is a very hard no. And yet the West sticks with its geopolitical inner monologue: endlessly discussing a thing that – if its leaders ever actually listened to their Russian counterparts – they knew cannot be realized. Because insisting on realizing it means that Moscow will not settle but continue fighting – and winning.

That may, of course, be the real Western intention here: to produce a deal-breaker. But if that is so, then the next question is why the US tolerates this stalling and sabotage operation by its European vassals.

There are three possible answers to that question: Either the US is already secretly planning to override its European dependents and therefore does not care how they keep themselves busy with their fantasies. Or Washington is still as blind to reality as the Europeans. Or, finally, Trump and his team believe that they can use the Europeans’ ongoing chatter about their coalition-with-nowhere-to-go as some sort of leverage in negotiations with Moscow.

Of those three American postures, only one would be realistic and productive: the first. The other two would mean that Washington is as learning-incapable as Europe, because a US attempt to use the European talk as some kind of bluff to exert pressure on Russia would signal that Trump’s team has not come to terms with Russia’s resolve not to concede major war goals while winning on the battlefield.

Further examples could be added. For instance, Washington’s erratic statements and arms sales regarding Kiev either not being granted or needing a capability to strike deep within Russia. Or its latest attempt to once again operate with a deadline and vague warnings: this time, it’s two weeks and, so the US president has told us, within them he will decide what to do about Ukraine and America’s policy toward it. In essence, if there still is no progress toward a peace settlement, either double down again on confronting Russia, Biden-style, or abandon this terribly misguided proxy war to those Europeans who are too obstinate to finally drop it.

Trump’s recent decisions and actions seem to show that, with regard to the Ukraine war, the US is actually turning a corner and leaving that flat, closed circle of non-learning behind, in favor of becoming a country with a more normal foreign-policy learning curve, just like Russia. We can only hope that this saner attitude will prevail, even if Western Europe wants to stay behind in its impotent fantasy realm of splendid omnipotence.