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Levada Center (machine translation), 3/5/25

Denis Volkov in a comment for Forbes about the hopes of Russian public opinion regarding the completion of the special operation.

The majority of Russian citizens are in favor of starting peace talks. 70% of respondents believe that it is necessary to negotiate, first of all, with the United States, hence the optimism associated with the first steps of the new administration. At the same time, half of the respondents still admit that it will not be possible to agree on a peace agreement without the participation of Ukraine.

Russian society is increasingly seized by the hope that the “special operation” in Ukraine may end this year. Such sentiments were manifested in the discussion of expectations for the future, ideas about the possible duration of the conflict, increased attention to the American presidential election, where all eyes were on Donald Trump, who promised to end the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 24 hours after taking office. And although there was no quick solution, the mood of the American president made an increasing number of Russians believe that a peaceful settlement between Russia and Ukraine is possible.

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The sheer number of publications about Trump and his remarks in the official Russian media (at times it seemed as if Trump had won the election in Russia rather than in the United States) suggested that Russian elites sympathized with the president-elect and did not rule out a deal with him, which is why the ground is being prepared for a positive public perception of future negotiations. One way or another, by the end of the third year of the conflict, all conversations in Russia revolve around the idea of ​​its possible end – against the backdrop of increased interest in what is happening in Ukraine and attention to the words of the US president.

Focus group participants throughout the second half of last year insisted that “Trump is a businessman” and “you can negotiate with him” – unlike Biden, who, due to his age, seemed to most Russians to be an independent figure, subject to the influence of anti-Russian American elites. Therefore, the appearance of a bright, energetic president in the White House gave at least some hope for the end of the conflict. As respondents said: “Trump promised to end the war, so we are waiting for Trump.”

Is it any wonder that the overwhelming majority of Russians (85%) reacted positively to the Russian-American talks, which started in Riyadh and continued in Istanbul. Moreover, throughout the three years of the conflict, more than half of Russians continued to advocate for improving relations with the United States and the West. Despite the prevailing opposition to America and Europe, most wanted a de-escalation of international tensions, especially amid increasing talk of the possible use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the prevailing idea was that Russia wanted to negotiate, and the West did not. And now Trump’s election has created a sense that the West’s position may finally change.

It should be noted that, despite the desire for détente and the sympathy of Russians for Trump, the ideal form of relations between Russia and the United States is not seen by the majority as friendship between the two countries – over the past 30 years, significant mistrust has accumulated in Russian-American relations, which is difficult to overcome – but as non-interference in each other’s affairs. People in focus groups have repeatedly expressed the view that it would be good if, after the deal is concluded, Trump “backed off” and “would take care of his own problems,” so that “America would not interfere with us,” and “would stop interfering in our affairs.” But first, a deal must be made.

The majority are in favor of negotiations

Overall, the idea of ​​ending the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and moving to peace talks is currently supported by about 60% of Russians. Similar figures began to appear in polls in the second half of 2024, although after the Ukrainian army’s attack on the Kursk region, the number of supporters of negotiations decreased for some time. Throughout the conflict, the share of those in favor of a peaceful settlement almost never fell below half of the population, and in recent months their number has begun to grow. At the same time, support for negotiations should be perceived as the most general desire to end the conflict and stop the bloodshed. The most frequently heard argument in favor of this – in focus groups and in responses to an open-ended question – is the words that “people must stop dying” and that too many have already died on both sides.

Behind these words there is also hidden anxiety among people that the continuation of military actions could lead to an expansion of the conflict. This, in turn, could mean a new mobilization, which most would very much like to avoid. Therefore, the sooner peace comes, the lower the risks for every Russian family. The growing number of supporters of negotiations is caused not only by general fatigue from the conflict, but also by the changed rhetoric of the Russian authorities, who have been constantly signaling Russia’s readiness for negotiations in recent months. And such talk influences public opinion, preparing it for a possible settlement of the conflict.

It is worth adding that it is categorically wrong to oppose the supporters of negotiations and supporters of the authorities, as some researchers and publicists do. Polls show that support for negotiations prevails even among loyalists and for all three years it was they who made up the majority of supporters of the end of hostilities. Another thing is that they believe that it is the country’s leadership that should determine when and under what conditions to conclude a peace agreement. “It would be good if the conflict ended as soon as possible,” but “we are small people, let the big people decide,” “Putin has all the information, he knows better,” they say in focus groups.

Less than a third of Russians oppose negotiations and support the continuation of hostilities over the past couple of months, despite the fact that on average throughout the conflict there were about 40% of the population. Their main argument is that “you can’t stop halfway”, “you need to finish what you started”, because “so much has already been sacrificed”. It should be emphasized that loyalists also prevail in this group. The positions of those who criticized the authorities “from the right”, demanding more decisive action (Igor Strelkov became a symbol of this position), have always been marginal on the scale of the entire society and hardly exceeded 5-6% of the total population.

Interestingly, some Russian liberals who do not accept negotiations until Ukraine wins are also in the camp of opponents of a peaceful settlement today – the most prominent exponents of these ideas are the organizers of opposition rallies in Berlin. In society, their share is about the same 5-6%. Such unity between liberals and the far right should not be surprising: a similar situation was already observed in 2023, during the days of Prigozhin’s rebellion, when some supported Yevgeny Prigozhin himself, while others simply wanted the defeat of the regime. Be that as it may, both of these positions remain marginal.

Negotiations – with whom?

Let us return, however, to the desire for peace negotiations prevailing in society. According to the majority (70%), such negotiations should be conducted primarily with America – we have repeatedly said that the majority of the Russian population perceives the current conflict as a confrontation between Russia and the West under the leadership of the United States, in which Ukraine plays only a subordinate role. Such perceptions of what is happening prevailed in Russian society even before the outbreak of hostilities against the backdrop of the escalation at the end of 2021. Since then, these views have only strengthened.

Only half of the respondents consider it expedient to negotiate with Ukraine, and only a quarter consider it expedient to invite Europe to the table. With all the perception of Ukraine as subordinate to the West, there is an understanding that the signing of a peace agreement cannot do without its participation. At the same time, there is a strong feeling in society that Ukraine does not want to negotiate and therefore it is useless to negotiate with it now.

The perception of Europe’s role during the conflict gradually changed. If at the very beginning the EU countries were perceived as completely dependent on the United States, acting under its dictation, then over the past year and a half, the share of those who saw European leaders, such as French President Emmanuel Macron or the head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, with their own position on the Ukrainian conflict, even tougher towards Russia, has been gradually growing in Russian public opinion. than the United States.

The negotiations that began between the Russian and American delegations and the apparent divergence of the public positions of the United States and Europe regarding the scenarios for ending the conflict finally consolidated this idea. It got to the point that the attitude of Russians to the United States today for the first time turned out to be better than to the European Union – 30% against 21% in February 2025. It is very interesting how sustainable this new trend will be.

From a position of strength

Although support for a peaceful settlement prevails in society, the majority has no desire to make peace at any cost. Thus, with a gradual increase in the number of supporters of negotiations, the number of people who are ready to do this at the expense of the return of new territories is decreasing. Most likely, this dynamics is explained by the fact that three-quarters of respondents today are confident that Russia is winning on the battlefield. About the same number – 72% – believe that military operations are going well for Russia, although the occupation of part of the Kursk region and regular raids by Ukrainian drones inspire some concern. And this is the highest figure since the spring of 2022, until the retreat of the Russian army from Kherson and the Kharkiv region. And since Russia is gradually gaining the upper hand, negotiations can be conducted from a position of strength.

And while the number of people willing to make concessions for a peace deal has risen slightly over the past six months, from 20 percent to 30 percent, much of this remains just a declaration, because Russian public opinion is becoming increasingly intractable on major issues that will require an agreement with Ukraine. Thus, the number of people who are ready to admit the idea of ​​Ukraine’s membership in NATO or the return of the DPR and LPR or the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions to Ukraine is systematically decreasing. Today, between 70% and 80% of Russians, depending on the question, consider such conditions unacceptable for Russia.

Also, if we take out of brackets the idea of ​​the exchange of prisoners of war, which is supported by both sides (in Russia, it is 92% of respondents), the most popular conditions for concluding a peace agreement in Russian society are unlikely to find understanding from the Ukrainian side. Thus, the absolute majority of Russians – more than 80% – would like to guarantee the rights of the Russian-speaking population and protect the status of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine. It was the protection of compatriots that our respondents saw as the main goal of the “special operation” over the past three years.

Moreover, about 70% of Russians would like to establish a friendly government in Ukraine, ensure the neutral status of Ukraine, and lift Western sanctions. However, on the latter question, even a large proportion of Russians (77% in February 2025) believe that Russia should continue its policy despite the sanctions: if they cancel it, it’s good, if they don’t, that’s fine.

Such sentiments coincide with the statements of the Russian authorities, but completely contradict the position of the Ukrainian leadership. And if there are no grounds for a compromise between the parties to the conflict, the wait for the much-desired end of the bloodshed may drag on.

Rutherford Institute, 3/20/25

NEWARK, NJ — At a time when non-citizens are being targeted and deported for engaging in lawful, nonviolent political speech protected under the First Amendment, The Rutherford Institute is warning American citizens who criticize the government that they could be next in line for punishment and retaliation. In a joint amicus brief in Mahmoud Khalil v. Donald Trump, The Rutherford Institute, FIRE and a coalition of leading civil liberties groups are challenging the Trump Administration’s detention of Mahmoud Khalil, a permanent U.S. resident who was arrested, transported to a private prison, and is pending deportation based solely on his involvement in nonviolent, anti-war protest activities at Columbia University, which is protected political speech under the First Amendment. The legal coalition argues that the government’s actions directly contradict the U.S. Supreme Court, which ruled in 1945 that freedom of speech is accorded to citizens and non-citizens alike who reside in the U.S., and deporting Khalil based on his peaceful, nonviolent, political speech would violate the Constitution.  “If non-citizens can be deported for engaging in lawful, nonviolent political speech, who’s next? The case of Mahmoud Khalil—a lawful U.S. resident facing deportation for peaceful protest—sets a dangerous precedent for free speech rights. The First Amendment protects everyone in the U.S., but this case threatens to undermine that fundamental freedom,” said constitutional attorney John W. Whitehead, president of The Rutherford Institute and author of Battlefield America: The War on the American People. “In other words, a threat to Khalil’s rights is a threat to the rights of anyone who dares to disagree with the government.” On March 8, 2025, agents from the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) arrested Mahmoud Khalil with no prior notice at his apartment, and initiated proceedings to deport him from the United States. At some point in the night, DHS transferred Khalil, a lawful permanent resident of the U.S., to New Jersey and later to Louisiana. Khalil, a recent graduate of Columbia University in New York City who was born to Palestinian refugees in Syria and is married to a U.S. citizen expecting their first child, was targeted by the Trump Administration because of his moral and vocal stance in opposition to Israel’s military operations in Gaza. As part of his pro-Palestine advocacy, Khalil had led several Palestine-focused student groups and organized educational events about Palestine, publicly denounced antisemitism, and called on Columbia to divest from its financial ties to Israel. Notably, while the Trump administration has defended its actions by claiming that Khalil’s views are contrary to America’s foreign policy interests, it has not alleged that Khalil engaged in any acts of vandalism, physical violence, or unlawful occupations of buildings, which are not forms of protected speech, nor has it accused him of breaking any laws. The legal coalition’s amicus brief was filed in support of Khalil’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, asking for release from custody while the proceedings are pending. The amicus brief argues that deporting any non-citizen whose views are considered to be against America’s foreign policy interests, as determined by the subjective judgment of a current or future Secretary of State, places free expression in mortal peril, and is similar to laws of censorial regimes in China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. Ronnie London, Conor Fitzpatrick, Will Creeley, and others at FIRE (the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression) advanced the arguments in the Khalil v. Trump amicus brief. The Rutherford Institute, a nonprofit civil liberties organization, defends individuals whose constitutional rights have been threatened or violated and educates the public on a wide spectrum of issues affecting their freedoms. This press release is also available at www.rutherford.org.

By Morvan Lallouet, Moscow Times, 2/16/25

Morvan Lallouet is the co-author of “Navalny: Putin’s Nemesis, Russia’s Future?” (Hurst and Oxford University Press, 2021). He currently works with the CORUSCANT research collective, the European branch of the Russia Program, at Paris 8 University.

In the year since Alexei Navalny’s death, his most important legacy, the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK), has been rocked by scandal and criticism. It was once the most influential and powerful organization in the Russian opposition, which the regime started to destroy in the wake of Navalny’s return to Russia in 2021 — possibly aiming to bring the homefront to heel in preparation for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Most of its leaders have relocated abroad, from where the FBK continues to investigate corruption and agitate Russians on social media.

Besides his ever-debated forays into nationalism, Navalny and his team always managed to evade major scandals. Those put forward by the Kremlin to persecute and discredit him always appeared shallow, if not completely bogus. But that all changed last fall when Maxim Katz released a devastating investigation. A former professional poker player turned successful political organizer, Katz shares a long history with Navalny’s team. He had a prominent role in Navalny’s 2013 run for Moscow mayor until he was fired. Katz claims that was because Navalny’s right-hand man, Leonid Volkov, harassed his then-girlfriend, while Navalny called him a “dishonest con man.” Since then, reciprocal acrimony has not abated. Rather, it has increased.

Now the FBK finds itself engulfed in the biggest scandal since its founding. The substance of Katz’s investigation is that the American branch of the FBK, the Anti-Corruption Foundation (ACF), had been registered by a former banker, Alexander Zheleznyak, who also served as its treasurer. At the same time, the ACF was funded by his former business associate, Sergey Leontiev. When the bankers fled Russia after they were charged with embezzling their customers’ money in wide-scale financial fraud, Katz said they used the FBK to launder their reputation abroad.

The defense offered by the FBK appears rather unconvincing. They claim that working with Zheleznyak was expedient in times of trouble — as if the FBK could not find better sponsors in the U.S. They question Katz’s political motives and also attempt to claim that the bankers did not steal any money. Katz’s attack is certainly motivated by his long-standing competition with the FBK. But appeals to the letter of the law certainly do not fit well with what Navalny stood for. His fight for justice and truth was not limited to the strict enforcement of the law. He actually criticized Katz for claiming that using legal loopholes for tax optimization was just fine.

On the face of it, Leontyev and Zheleznyak’s business appears to be both illegal and immoral. It would probably be deemed so in the West too. Even if there was no quid pro quo exchanging reputation for money, the optics are terrible: Zheleznyak and Leontiev are precisely the kind of people that the FBK investigates. While it is likely that they were prosecuted because they supported Navalny, this does not mean they did not commit actual crimes in a financial system that the Central Bank has been trying hard to clean up. That the bankers are crooked and that their prosecution is politically motivated can be both true at the same time.

The scandal is all the more damning since the FBK had been warned. In 2023, it was revealed that Volkov had endorsed the removal of oligarch Mikhail Fridman from EU sanctions lists, reopening old speculations that Navalny was backed by Fridman’s Alfa group for which Vladimir Ashurkov, one of Navalny’s most prominent allies, used to work. The whole scandal was blamed on Volkov as he acted on his own–and took a short leave from the Anti-Corruption Foundation.

This time, the whole organization is involved in the scandal which has been significant enough to alienate some of the FBK’s oldest and most reliable sponsors. Among them is the entrepreneur and philanthropist Boris Zimin, who had bankrolled the Foundation since its inception.

So far, Yulia, Navalny’s widow, has remained above the fray. She admitted that working with Zheleznyak was a mistake, though denied that they did so to “launder” the banker’s reputation. It will fall upon her to restore the organization’s reputation, but it remains to be seen whether she, a newcomer to politics, can deliver.

This round of scandal also reflects a fundamental change in the treatment of Navalny’s organization by the opposition media. Navalny ran a tight-ship operation, one that controlled the FBK’s public image, enjoyed widespread support among liberal journalists and was quick to ostracize critical journalists.

Back then, Navalny, the FBK and the liberal press belonged to the same world, that of the tusovka, the Moscow-based “clique” that shared a common liberal outlook. But that was not all they shared. Even though Navalny was a lawyer and surrounded himself with lawyers, his work was that of an investigative journalist. He even claimed that he started his investigations on his blog because he found the Russian press lacking. In a word, Navalny and journalists were colleagues, as Oleg Kashin pointed out.

Manifestations of this closeness — or coziness — were many. But it has always been striking how little interest the Russian press showed in the most obscure pages of Navalny’s biography, like his business career in his youth. This is not to imply that it was outright criminal or even shady. But that no one really dug into what Navalny’s business actually was during the “wild 1990s” is intriguing.

With him gone, his organization has become just one group among others. His successors do not and will not enjoy the same tolerance from the opposition media. After a lengthy investigation on Zheleznyak and Leontyev by The Insider, an outlet that entertained close links with the Navalny team, the Sota website has now claimed that due to errors in the FBK’s donation systems, Russian law enforcement has access to the personal information of thousands of Russians who gave money to the FBK — an extremely serious crime, given the FBK’s designation as an “extremist” organization. Sota’s message — “The work of the leading force of the opposition must be closely analyzed” — could not be clearer: the FBK is now fair game.

Navalny and his team had always been fair game for the rest of the liberal opposition, as they never enjoyed unanimous support. Far from it. But with the clique scattered across the world and Navalny gone, divisions and criticisms have turned even more vicious. Relentless and unremitting, with daily skirmishes on X, the war between Katz and the FBK appears nowhere near a truce and has turned to attrition. In their latest counterattack, the FBK released an investigation into Katz’s wife and her alleged business dealings with Kremlin-connected structures.

Does this matter? Division is probably the default mode of the zero-sum game of politics. Only pressure from the base or the promise of victory can force unity upon power-hungry, self-interested politicians. When there are no elections and there is a scant chance to win, politics will turn evermore solipsistic. Exile can only reinforce this trend, as politics in exile is by definition politics without voters. Social media and the competition for scarce resources certainly do not help either. Despite appalled questions from Russians about whether such bickering is really worth it while Ukraine is being devastated, they are yet to be heard. In the meantime, there are indications that ordinary Russians are tired of the infighting. And on the ground, the rank and file of the Russian opposition is overwhelmed by depression and despondency — after all they had to go through, the death of Navalny has left them lonesome. Unity is the holy grail of Russian liberalism. But is anybody at the top really searching for it?

By Ted Snider, Antiwar.com, 3/18/25

On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine with a small force of around 142,000 troops. Not enough to conquer Ukraine, the invading force was sufficient to persuade Ukraine to the negotiating table. Russian President Vladimir Putin has claimed that was the original goal of the military operation: “[t]he troops were there to push the Ukrainian side to negotiations.”

And it nearly worked. Within weeks, in Istanbul, a negotiated peace was within reach. It was only after the United States, the UK, Poland and their NATO allies pushed Ukraine off the path of diplomacy and onto the continued path of war that Putin mobilized more troops and more resources.

As Alexander Hill explains in the newly published book, The Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies, in the initial phase of the war, Russia struggled without the advantage of overwhelming numerical superiority and without committing their latest, most advanced equipment. With the U.S. and its NATO partners providing the Ukrainian armed forces not only with their most advanced weapons systems, but with the intelligence to effectively use them, Ukraine actually had “an overall technological edge during the initial phases of the war.” But the Russian armed forces proved to be very adaptable. They adopted new tactics and a much more methodical approach to the war, introduced advanced weapons systems, and demonstrated a capability to adapt to and destroy the most advanced Western weapons and equipment.

By the time the Ukrainian counteroffensive had failed to meet any of its goals, the tide had turned, and Russia was irreversibly winning the war.

At the beginning of the war in Istanbul, before the inconceivable loss of life, a negotiated end to the war could have been signed. Three years later, after the loss of more land and hundreds of thousands more lives and limbs, a similar negotiated peace will be signed, only adjusted to the current realities on the ground. Ukraine could have had a similar deal but maintained all their territory but Crimea. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers have died or been injured in vain in pursuit of America’s fantasy of a NATO without limits and a weakened Russia.

Russia went to the negotiating table in Istanbul in a weaker position than it goes to the table today. It has survived the war of sanctions and isolation and won the war against Ukrainian soldiers and NATO weapons on the battlefield. Russia will be willing to enter a ceasefire, but only if they can accomplish without fighting everything they can accomplish with fighting.

Tragically, three years later, the ceasefire talks will pick up where the Istanbul talks left off. Everything in between was in vain. Witkoff has said that “[t]here were very, very what I’ll call cogent and substantive negotiations framed in something that’s called the Istanbul Protocol Agreement. We came very, very close to signing something.” He then added that “I think we’ll be using that framework as a guidepost to get a peace deal done between Ukraine and Russia.”

And if you don’t believe that the remaining differences could have been bridged and a peace signed in Istanbul, then get ready for a very long war. Because those are the very same points that will need to be negotiated if the current ceasefire proposal is to succeed.

After all the loss of land and loss of life, Ukraine will still surrender territory and NATO membership. They will not receive a security guarantee that involves a U.S. military commitment. Kursk has collapsed in a costly strategic failure and the Ukrainian armed forces are barely hanging on across the full length of the 1,000-mile front in eastern Ukraine. Russia is not going to stop the war without receiving a signed agreement from the U.S. and NATO that there will be no Ukraine in NATO nor NATO in Ukraine. And they are not going to stop the war without Crimea and at least some of the four oblasts they have annexed and a guarantee in the Ukrainian constitution of the protection of the rights of ethnic Russians in the territory that remains in Ukraine.

Putin has made clear that the idea of a ceasefire and a negotiated peace is “the right one” and that Russia “support[s] it” but that “there are questions we need to discuss” and that any ceasefire negotiations would need to address the “original causes” of the war.”

It seems clear that, before the U.S. pressured Ukraine into expressing a “readiness to accept the U.S. proposal to enact an immediate, interim 30-day ceasefire,” they had already laid the groundwork by discussing with Russia, who can go on fighting to achieve their nonnegotiable goals, what those nonnegotiable goals are.

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has confirmed, for example, that the Saudi Arabia talks with Ukraine included discussions about “territorial concessions.” On Sunday, U.S. President Donald Trump said that when he next talks to Putin, “we will be talking about land, we will be talking about power plants.” He said “they were already discussing ‘dividing up certain assets’.” U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has already said  that any thoughts of recovering Ukraine’s lost territory is “an unrealistic objective” and an “illusionary goal.”

And, most importantly, Hegseth has also stipulated that Trump “does not support Ukraine’s membership in NATO as part of a realistic peace plan.” And Trump has shared that verdict with his NATO allies. On March 14, when NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte was asked if Trump had taken NATO membership for Ukraine off the table in negotiations, he simply replied, “Yes.”

From the time Ukraine was nudged away from the negotiating table in Istanbul to the time it will return to the negotiating table, all the loss of life and land was in vain. It is preestablished that Ukraine will not recover all of its territory, and it is preestablished that they will not become a member of NATO. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers have died for nothing but the pursuit of American hubris. And that should make Americans very angry.

Ted Snider is a regular columnist on U.S. foreign policy and history at Antiwar.com and The Libertarian Institute. He is also a frequent contributor to Responsible Statecraft and The American Conservative as well as other outlets. To support his work or for media or virtual presentation requests, contact him at tedsnider@bell.net.