I could really relate to some points made by the author below about talking to people that we may not agree with politically and that approaching someone with curiosity and empathy goes a long way.

It’s always been odd to me that people would cancel or disown a family member or good friend because they don’t agree with some or all of their politics. One side of my family was Democrat and one side was Republican. Both of my parents were independents. I was exposed to many opinions that I didn’t agree with – sometimes quite passionately – and I wasn’t afraid to debate the merits of an issue with a friend or family member I disagreed with. That didn’t mean we walked away no longer loving each other or dismissing the relationship. In fact, I’m pretty close to this day to two relatives that I debated quite vociferously with in my younger years. We still have political disagreements.

I don’t drive and have used Uber/Lyft extensively for years, so I’ve had may interesting conversations with a cross-section of people who are Uber or Lyft drivers. It’s not unusual for politics to get brought up somehow. Sometimes I can figure at the beginning of such a conversation that I’m probably not going to agree with the person on much. In such cases, I have put on my journalist hat and approached the person with curiosity rather than judgment or a need to win some point. In those cases, I have often had very insightful conversations. I’ve found that when you approach someone you disagree with with curiosity you will often discover that the person actually has more nuanced views than you are assuming or that their reason for holding those views is not what you may think.

Similarly, I’ve taken two different approaches at jobs over the years about how much I discuss my political views or even mention my side gig as a writer since I write about a topic that is considered controversial. At some jobs I have not really talked about it. And at other jobs I decided to go ahead and be fairly open – after I’ve worked there for a little while and people have come to view me as a person rather than a political view. My experience has been that people respect and gravitate toward me more when I’m open about myself. That was an eye opener for me.

What has been your experience with friends, relatives and coworkers that you politically disagree with? Do you keep mum about it? If so, how has that worked out? – Natylie

By Dr. Jordan Grumet, Psychology Today, 3/20/25

America is more politically divided than ever. It seems like every conversation, every interaction, and every social media post is another battle in a never-ending war of ideological difference. We live in an era when political identity has become paramount, defining friendships, communities, and even family relationships. But what if I told you that the key to healing these divisions isn’t more debate, more news consumption, or more attempts at persuasion? What if the solution to our political woes is purpose?

In the past, I’ve defined the difference between big-P Purpose and little-p purpose. Big-P Purpose is goal-oriented: It’s about the large-scale ambitions we set for ourselves, the missions we dedicate our lives to. Little-p purpose, on the other hand, is process-oriented. It’s about the daily activities that light us up, that engage us so deeply that we lose track of time. It’s in these moments, when we’re truly absorbed in something we love, that we feel most alive. But purpose doesn’t just bring personal fulfillment; it connects us to others. And that connection is the key to repairing the fractures in our society.

When we engage in activities that bring us joy, we naturally seek out others who share our enthusiasm. These communities of internal purpose are different from traditional identity-based communities. They’re not based on external factors like race, geography, or political affiliation. Instead, they form around shared passions: hobbies, creative pursuits, professions, or intellectual interests. These communities become spaces where people from vastly different backgrounds and belief systems come together, united by a common love for what they do.

And when that happens, something remarkable occurs.

The Power of Connection Over Division

Let me share a personal story:

I’ve always been deeply interested in personal finance. It’s something that excites me, that makes me feel engaged and fulfilled. Because of this, I’ve joined various communities of personal-finance writers, podcasters, and bloggers. A few months ago, I attended a conference where I reconnected with many friends from these circles. One evening, I found myself sitting across from a close colleague, someone I deeply respect and admire.

As the conversation drifted, we began discussing the upcoming presidential election. It didn’t take long to realize that we held completely opposite political views.

Now, if this had been an interaction with a stranger on social media—someone whose political stance I disagreed with—I probably would have dismissed them outright. Maybe we would have argued for a few minutes before walking away, both feeling more entrenched in our own beliefs. But, because this was someone I already shared a strong bond with—someone I had worked with, laughed with, and learned from—I listened.

Instead of shutting the conversation down, I leaned in. I asked questions I might never have asked a stranger. I was genuinely curious about his perspective, about why he held the beliefs he did. And because he respected me as well, he did the same. What followed was one of the most illuminating political discussions I’ve ever had.

I walked away from that conversation with a deeper understanding of an opposing viewpoint—one I had previously dismissed. It didn’t change my mind, but I did develop a greater appreciation for the complexities of the issues at hand. More importantly, I realized how rare and valuable that experience was in today’s world.

Why We’re Failing at Political Discourse

Our political climate today isn’t just divided; it’s toxic. And one of the biggest reasons for this is that we don’t see each other as part of the same community. Instead, we see political opponents as the other.

When we encounter people who disagree with us, we don’t approach them with curiosity. We approach them with suspicion or even hostility. We assume their beliefs come from ignorance, bad intentions, or some deep moral failing. And because of that, we don’t talk with each other. We talk past each other.

The result? We retreat further into our ideological bubbles, reinforcing our own views while demonizing those on the other side. We become more convinced that we are right and they are wrong, and any hope of productive dialogue disappears.

But what if, instead of engaging with others purely on the basis of politics, we first connected through something deeper—something that excites and inspires us?

How Purpose Can Heal Political Divides

When we build relationships based on shared purpose rather than shared ideology, something powerful happens. We begin to see each other as human beings first, rather than political labels. We form bonds that make us more willing to listen, to engage in meaningful discussions, and to challenge our own assumptions.

This doesn’t just apply to personal relationships; it applies to society as a whole.

Imagine if, instead of being divided into rigid political factions, more people were deeply involved in communities centered around little-p purpose. Imagine if more of us regularly engaged in activities that brought us joy and fulfillment and, in doing so, connected with people from all walks of life. These communities would provide a space where difficult conversations could happen organically—not through forced debates or confrontational arguments but through the kind of trust and mutual respect that only comes from genuine human connection.

This is how we bridge divides. Not by arguing louder. Not by consuming more news. Not by reinforcing our own echo chambers. But by building relationships around something bigger than politics.

The Path Forward

If we truly want to fix America’s political dysfunction, we don’t need more pundits, think pieces, or televised debates. We need stronger communities. We need places where people can come together—not just to discuss political issues, but to share passions, collaborate, and create together.

The best way to get there? Pursue your own little-p purpose. Find the activities that light you up, that make you come alive. Seek out others who share those interests and build relationships within those spaces. Because when we do that, we create the conditions for the kinds of conversations that can actually change minds—not through shouting matches, but through trust, respect, and human connection.

Purpose isn’t just the key to personal fulfillment. It’s the key to healing our political divides. And in a world that feels more fractured than ever, that may be the most important thing we can do.

Russia Matters, 4/11/25

1. Vladimir Putin hosted Steve Witkoff to discuss Ukraine and, possibly, Iran, but so far details of the meeting, which was not announced in advance and which was not followed by any media opportunities, have been scarce in the public domain. Putin hosted Wiktoff in St. Petersburg on April 11 in what became their third meeting to explore ways Russia and the U.S. could move toward putting an end to the Russian-Ukrainian war as well as, possibly, the Iran issue, but as of 4:00 p.m. (UTC−05:00), no details were reported on either what exactly the two discussed or whether and what the outcomes of the four-hour meeting may have produced. Prior to the meeting, Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov cautioned reporters that it was unlikely to produce “decisive results.”¹ At the beginning of the meeting, Peskov said “the negotiation process itself is a closed process,” making clear that the sides were not going to reveal details to the public. Indeed, after the meeting was over, neither Putin nor Wiktoff made any public comments, with Trump’s envoy leaving the venue. Commenting on the contents of the talks after the meeting was over, Peskov only said that the talks focused on “aspects of a peaceful settlement in Ukraine.” According to pro-Kremlin Russian political expert Sergei Markov, however, Putin and Wiktoff also discussed Iran’s nuclear program, which is something that Witkoff is to discuss during the next leg of his trip on April 12 in Oman. Unlike Putin’s previous two meetings with Witkoff in Moscow,² Russian TV showed the beginning of the meeting, which took place in the Boris Yeltsin presidential library. The footage featured Putin and Wiktoff approaching each other in one of the library’s halls, smiling and shaking hands, with Wiktoff also placing his right hands on his heart. Prior to the meeting with Putin, in which Putin’s foreign policy aide Yuri Ushakov and his foreign investment envoy Kiril Dmitriev also participated,³ Witkoff held a separate meeting on April 11 with Dmitriev. The two have earlier met for talks in Saudi Arabia and then in the U.S.⁴ After the April 4 talks in Washington, Dmitriev was asked to take a message back to Putin that the U.S. “needs to know whether you’re serious about peace,” according to Marco Rubio as Trump grew impatient with Putin over the lack of momentum on negotiations toward a ceasefire.⁵ In his latest comments on the need to end the war, Trump wrote on TruthSocial on April 11: “Russia has to get moving.”
2. U.S. and Russian delegations led by Russia’s new ambassador to the United States, Alexander Darchiyev and U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Russia and Central Europe Sonata Coulter, respectively, claimed progress after meeting in Istanbul on April 10 for a second round of talks aimed at normalizing the operations of their diplomatic missions. At the meeting the U.S. delegation reiterated concerns about the current Russian policy prohibiting the U.S. Embassy in Moscow from employing local staff. In his turn, Darchiyev stated that the United States and Russia discussed and agreed to measures to facilitate the movement of diplomats and accelerate the granting of diplomatic visas, according to ISW. He also stated that the Russian delegation prioritized discussions about the return of confiscated Russian diplomatic property. While the talks were supposed to be focused on diplomatic missions only, the Russian delegation was also to ask the U.S. to lift sanctions against its flagship airline Aeroflot to resume direct flights with America, according to Reuters.
3. Russia gained 113 square miles of Ukraine’s territory (about 1 Nantucket island) in the past month, though its overall pace of advance declined this week, according to the April 9, 2025, issue of the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. Last week’s gain of 47 square miles (March 25–April 1) was followed April 2–8 by a gain of only 29 square miles, according to the card. This week, Ukraine again continued its fighting withdrawal from Kursk, giving up control of only a single square mile of territory there. At the same time, both Ukrainian and Russian sources confirmed that Ukrainian forces were operating in the neighboring Belgorod region of Russia this week, according to the card. The deceleration of the Russian army’s pace of weekly gains in Ukraine contrasts with Putin’s recent claim that the Russian armed forces are “set to finish them [Ukrainian forces] off.” Putin made this claim even though, as RM staff estimated in a recent news digest, it would take the Russian forces 15 years or more at their recent rate just to capture the entire regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, if the Russian forces were to focus only on these four regions. The gap between Putin’s claim and actual progress on the battlefield may have several causes. One may be that Russia was consolidating its forces in preparation for a major renewed offensive. Another, which may have been overlooked, is Putin’s desire to repeat his success in misleading Trump⁶ on the situation on key parts of the Russian-Ukrainian frontline. If key members of the Trump team take Putin’s most recent claims of imminent victory as fact, that would logically change the administration’s bargaining position in ceasefire or peace negotiations, and it would represent a smart, cheap, low-risk strategy to gain more from a favorable shift in the U.S. position through disinformation than through military achievements on the battlefield.*
4. Bridget Brink, the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, is stepping down following increasing policy disagreements with Donald Trump’s administration, people familiar with her decision told FT. Her departure also comes amid a deterioration in her working relationship with Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the people said. Ukrainian officials said they saw Brink as being too critical of them, particularly of the country’s efforts to root out entrenched corruption, according to FT.
5. The price for Brent fell to a four-year low of below $60 a barrel this week after China and the U.S. escalated their tariff war⁷ and the OPEC+ group pledged to boost output next month, according to Bloomberg. However, the plunge won’t be a game changer for Russia’s ability to finance its war machine as rising revenue from non-energy sectors and rainy-day reserves help offset losses, this news agency estimated. While Russia’s National Wealth Fund has slimmed down since the start of the invasion, it’s still sufficient to make up any shortfall in oil revenue for the next 18–24 months should Russia’s crude cost around $50 a barrel, according to estimates by Bloomberg Economics.
6. The share price of JPMorgan’s EMEA Securities Trust, formerly JPMorgan Russian Securities, trades at five times its net asset value (NAV), having nearly tripled in the last six months, according to investment writer Max King’s estimate published by British weekly investment magazine MoneyWeek.

By Ian Proud, Substack, 3/19/25

In a recent interview, Boris Johnson admitted that the Minsk 2 agreement fell apart because ‘the Ukrainian nationalists couldn’t accept the compromise’ that President Zelensky wanted to agree with President Putin. It also failed because sanctions policy against Russia both disincentivized Ukrainian compliance, and actively incentivised Ukrainian non-compliance.

Claiming that Russia reneged on the Minsk Agreements has been a standard attack line from the west in the past, including from Johnson. Johnson has simply revealed what many already knew, that it was also wilfully inaccurate.

A lot of people talk about the so-called Minsk Agreements, but few understand the background. They refer collectively to three sets of peace proposals between June 2014 and February 2015, which culminated in the signature of the second Minsk agreement, commonly known as Minsk 2. They had several aims, including to end the fighting in the Donbas, the limitation on the use of heavy weapons by both sides and to seal Ukraine’s border. Critically, all three proposals sought to maintain the territorial integrity of Ukraine by offering some form of devolution or special status to the separatist oblasts of Luhansk and Donetsk.

It’s important to state up front that the basis for the Minsk agreements was initiated by the Ukrainian side. After violence in the Donbas erupted in February 2014 following the deposal of former President Yanukovych, the separatist leaders in Luhansk and Donetsk orchestrated referenda on 11 May, which ruled in favour of self-rule.

These referenda voted in favour of separation from Kyiv but were roundly criticised as illegitimate. The Ukrainian armed forces went on the offensive in a so-called Anti-Terror Operation. However, on 21 June, President Petro Poroshenko advanced a peace plan that included creation of a military buffer zone on either side of the line of contact, the restoration of public services in Donetsk and Luhansk, an amnesty for separatists who had taken up arms.

Critically, the Ukrainian government advanced the notion that the two oblasts comprising the Donbas would be offered some form of special status. In addition to some form of self-rule, special status would also have afforded protection of the use of the Russian language. Special status would have kept Donetsk and Luhansk within the Ukrainian state.

This offer was welcomed by the Russian side and every indication at that time was that Russia’s primary goal was the protection of the Russian speaking population in Ukraine, with no desire to incorporate the Donbas given the huge cost.

By the start of July, the OSCE monitoring mission was reporting on an intensified Ukrainian military operation against the separatists. 5 July is the first time the OSCE reports on the deaths of civilians caused by the military operations, including the death of a five year old girl. By 6 July, Ukrainian forces have recaptured the towns of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. They approach Donetsk city and a fierce battle erupts around the airport which is destroyed. Fighting then breaks out on the outskirts of Luhansk city.

By mid-July heavy military equipment is being moved into the Donbas from Russia, to resupply the separatists. On 17 July amid heavy fighting, flight MH17 is downed with the deaths of all 298 persons on board.

Throughout this period, the Ukrainian military operation continues with barely any let up in intensity. Doctors in Luhansk report 250 deaths and 850 injuries, including civilians during June and July 2014. The OSCE mission moves out of Luhansk on 21 July because of heavy Ukrainian shelling of the city. Severodonetsk falls to the Ukrainian military advance on 22 July. On 29 July, Ukrainian troops at a checkpoint fire warning shots at an OSCE vehicle in Luhansk.

That day, Poroshenko announces a 20km ceasefire to allow access to the MH17 site which has been inaccessible because of ongoing military operations. In early august, Luhansk authorities report that citizens in the affected area are no longer receiving Ukrainian state salaries and pensions. Ukraine is now using military aircraft for strikes on targets in urban areas destroying electricity supply in Luhansk. On 10 August the head of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic proposes a ceasefire to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe. Shelling of urban areas continues from the Ukrainian side with reports of deaths and injuries to civilians.

On 16 August OSCE is trying to corroborate reports of Russian military convoys moving into the Donbas. Donetsk’s water supply is affected by Ukrainian shelling and further civilian casualties are reported. Towards late August, human rights abuses by ultra-nationalist Ukrainian Aidar battalion are being reported by the OSCE. Amnesty international later reports that Aidar has committed widespread abuses, including abductions, unlawful detention, ill-treatment, theft, extortion, and possible executions, some of which allegedly amount to war crimes. On 26 Augst there are reports that Ukrainian personnel are abusing members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarchy.

By late August, almost daily shelling of urban areas in Luhansk and Donetsk is taking place, basic services are disrupted and access to food is restricted. On 29 August, the Ukrainian army surrounds a town of Ilovaisk, with the order – according to the BBC – to ‘wipe out’ the separatists within. However, what are believed to have been Russian army formations have encircled the Ukrainian troops encircling the town. Up to 400 Ukrainian soldiers are killed in the ensuing firefight as they struggle to escape.

Amidst signs that the Russian army is playing a more direct role in the conflict, the first Minsk agreement is signed on 5 September. It contains similar provisions to Poroshenko’s earlier peace plan, including the decentralisation of power, an amnesty for separatists and an inclusive ‘national dialogue’.

The line of contact between the Ukrainian armed forces and the separatist controlled parts of the Donbas largely stays firm over the coming months. However, there are repeated violations of the ceasefire and casualties on both sides, including civilian casualties in the separatist areas. At the start of 2015, Wagner troops from Russia assist in closing a pocket along the frontline at Debaltseve, a small transport hub, in a bloody battle that lasts for several weeks.

This prompts German Chancellor Angela Merkel and President of France, Francois Hollande to become directly involved in mediation. They meet with Presidents Poroshenko and Putin in Minsk on 14/15 February 2015, leading to the signature of the second Minsk Agreement, which people often refer to as Minsk 2. Two days later, the UN Security Council unanimously endorses the Minsk 2 agreement.

This second Minsk agreement is similar to previous agreements but, at Russian insistence, contains more extensive language on the need for devolution in the Donbass, including through the creation of a new Ukrainian constitution. Clauses 4, 8, 9, 11 and 12 all contain detailed provision about sequencing in devolution and resealing the border between Ukraine and Russia.

From British Embassy contacts with Russian officials, it is clear that there is still no desire on the Russian side to annex the Donbas, and that Minsk II is seen as resolving an essentially Ukrainian domestic problem.

Throughout the seven-year period to the start of war in Ukraine in February 2022, President Putin talks often about the need for the Ukrainian side to meets its obligations on devolution under the Minsk II agreement.

But the Ukrainian government never fulfils its obligations. A law on special status was initially passed in Ukraine on 16 September 2014 after the first Minsk agreement was signed. This passed with a narrow majority of four votes. Promised elections in the Donbas were not held and the laws faced immediate resistance including street protests involving the same nationalist groups liked Svoboda, the right sector and others.

It is quickly clear that there is little political appetite in Ukraine to tackle the increasingly powerful nationalists head on and push forward with special status in the Donbas. The reading of the special status law in the Verkhovna Rada in 2017 causes scuffles to break out and further street protests in Kyiv. When newly elected President Zelensky proposes adoption of a devolution law in 2019 he faced further public protests by nationalist elements in Kyiv and elsewhere. He quickly abandons any attempt to advance the matter. Just three weeks before war breaks out, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba says in a press interview there will never be special status for the Donbas.

However, over the same period, European Union sanctions against Russia had been linked to the complete implementation of the Minsk agreement. Russia was not a party to most of the clauses of the Minsk agreement, which depended on Ukrainian policy in the Donbas. As such, Russia was on the hook for sanctions on the basis of decisions taken in Ukraine, in circumstances that disincentivised Ukrainian action. Clear action to make good on the promise of devolution in Donetsk and Luhansk would have led to widespread domestic political resistance in Ukraine while at the same time offering Russia sanctions relief. That was neither in Poroshenko nor Zelensky’s interest. Their lack of delivery on Minsk was also underwritten by the US and UK governments in particular that stuck to the narrative that Russia bore full responsibility for implementing Minsk. Western governments stay practically silent on the issue of Ukraine’s failure to meet its obligations.

The ‘Russia reneged on Minsk’ narrative remains powerful even today in western mainstream media coverage of the Ukraine war, in the context of efforts by the US to negotiate a peace. Boris Johnson has finally revealed the line to be wilfully inaccurate.

A copy of the Minsk 2 agreement is below. It is worth a read, to understand what exactly the Ukrainian government committed itself to deliver.

A list of measures to fulfil the Minsk Agreement, 15 February 2015

1. Immediate and comprehensive ceasefire in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine and its strict implementation as of 15 February 2015, 12am local time.

2. Withdrawal of all heavy weapons by both sides by equal distances in order to create a security zone of at least 50km wide from each other for the artillery systems of caliber of 100 and more, a security zone of 70km wide for MLRS and 140km wide for MLRS Tornado-S, Uragan, Smerch and Tactical Missile Systems (Tochka, Tochka U): -for the Ukrainian troops: from the de facto line of contact; -for the armed formations from certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine: from the line of contact according to the Minsk Memorandum of Sept. 19th, 2014; The withdrawal of the heavy weapons as specified above is to start on day 2 of the ceasefire at the latest and be completed within 14 days. The process shall be facilitated by the OSCE and supported by the Trilateral Contact Group.

3. Ensure effective monitoring and verification of the ceasefire regime and the withdrawal of heavy weapons by the OSCE from day 1 of the withdrawal, using all technical equipment necessary, including satellites, drones, radar equipment, etc.

4. Launch a dialogue, on day 1 of the withdrawal, on modalities of local elections in accordance with Ukrainian legislation and the Law of Ukraine “On interim local self-government order in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions” as well as on the future regime of these areas based on this law. Adopt promptly, by no later than 30 days after the date of signing of this document a Resolution of the Parliament of Ukraine specifying the area enjoying a special regime, under the Law of Ukraine “On interim self-government order in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions”, based on the line of the Minsk Memorandum of September 19, 2014.

5. Ensure pardon and amnesty by enacting the law prohibiting the prosecution and punishment of persons in connection with the events that took place in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine.

6. Ensure release and exchange of all hostages and unlawfully detained persons, based on the principle “all for all”. This process is to be finished on the day 5 after the withdrawal at the latest.

7. Ensure safe access, delivery, storage, and distribution of humanitarian assistance to those in need, on the basis of an international mechanism.

8. Definition of modalities of full resumption of socio-economic ties, including social transfers such as pension payments and other payments (incomes and revenues, timely payments of all utility bills, reinstating taxation within the legal framework of Ukraine). To this end, Ukraine shall reinstate control of the segment of its banking system in the conflict-affected areas and possibly an international mechanism to facilitate such transfers shall be established.

9. Reinstatement of full control of the state border by the government of Ukraine throughout the conflict area, starting on day 1 after the local elections and ending after the comprehensive political settlement (local elections in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions on the basis of the Law of Ukraine and constitutional reform) to be finalized by the end of 2015, provided that paragraph 11 has been implemented in consultation with and upon agreement by representatives of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the framework of the Trilateral Contact Group.

10. Withdrawal of all foreign armed formations, military equipment, as well as mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine under monitoring of the OSCE. Disarmament of all illegal groups.

11. Carrying out constitutional reform in Ukraine with a new constitution entering into force by the end of 2015 providing for decentralization as a key element (including a reference to the specificities of certain areas in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, agreed with the representatives of these areas), as well as adopting permanent legislation on the special status of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in line with measures as set out in the footnote until the end of 2015.

12. Based on the Law of Ukraine “On interim local self-government order in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions”, questions related to local elections will be discussed and agreed upon with representatives of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the framework of the Trilateral Contact Group. Elections will be held in accordance with relevant OSCE standards and monitored by OSCE/ODIHR.

13. Intensify the work of the Trilateral Contact Group including through the establishment of working groups on the implementation of relevant aspects of the Minsk agreements. They will reflect the composition of the Trilateral Contact Group.

By Kit Klarenberg, Substack, 3/23/25

March 17th marked the 80th anniversary of the creation of the Ukrainian National Committee. With the Red Army rapidly advancing on Berlin, Nazi officials released Ukrainian ultranationalist military units from their command, and recognised the Committee – and a newly-formed National Army under its control – as the legitimate government of Ukraine. It was hoped the UNC would continue Hitler’s crusade against the Soviet Union following Berlin’s rapidly impending defeat in World War II, which occurred two months later.

The UNC’s establishment was eagerly supported by notorious Ukrainian ultranationalist Stepan Bandera, founder of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B) and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), two ultranationalist factions heavily complicit in the Holocaust. As the mainstream media has acknowledged, his legacy endures in modern Ukraine, in the form of Neo-Nazi military units such as Azov Regiment, and he remains a much-celebrated figure in certain quarters of the country – much to the chagrin of Kiev’s Eastern European neighbours.

Bandera believed Nazi Germany’s UNC recognition would encourage American and British backing for OUN-B’s anti-Communist crusade, and Ukrainian independence. The Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR), which the OUN-B was instrumental in founding in 1944, was already in covert contact with London and Washington. As it was, no such formal support ever came to pass. Yet, little-known declassified CIA records expose the malign contours of a long-running conspiracy between Bandera and MI6 to destabilize the Soviet Union during the Cold War’s initial years.

This dark handshake only expired because MI6’s fascist asset was resistant to joining forces with other Ukrainian anti-Communist forces, therefore jeopardising plans by Washington and London for all-out war with Moscow in Donbass. That plot, intended to ultimately collapse the entire USSR, has eerie, direct echoes of the current Ukraine proxy war. So too Britain’s willingness, then and now, to go far further than the US in building alliances with the most reactionary, dangerous Ukrainian ultranationalist elements, in service of balkanising Russia.

‘Bandit Type’

MI6’s post-war relationship with Bandera began while he was exiled in post-war Munich, West Germany in 1948, via Gerhard von Mende. An ethnic German hailing from Riga, Latvia, von Mende has been described as an “enthusiastic Nazi” who headed Berlin’s Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territory, or Ostministerium. Among other connivances, von Mende was charged with recruiting fifth columnists from the USSR’s Central Asian republics, to undermine and attack Communist authorities. He has been credited with influencing subsequent British and American support for Islamic extremism.

Per a declassified CIA biography, after Nazi Germany’s defeat, von Mende was “interned as a ‘guest’” at the Agency’s Camp King, where Nazi officials and soldiers were interrogated and tortured. In some cases, inmates were unwittingly dosed with LSD under PROJECT BLUEBIRD, a forerunner of the CIA’s notorious MKULTRA mind control program. Subsequently, von Mende became an asset for West Germany’s Nazi-riddled BND, the CIA, and MI6, continuing to recruit anti-Communist assets in the USSR via a front company.

Through this position, von Mende was kept abreast of UPA activities and capabilities, and maintained an intimate personal relationship with Bandera. The Ukrainian fascist ideologue’s thuggish West German network was by then hard at work killing hundreds of local citizens suspected by the CIA and MI6 of harboring Communist sympathies. While the OUN-B chief’s “ask” of British intelligence was initially judged too high, that perspective rapidly changed. By 1949, MI6 was helping Bandera airdrop his chaos agents into Ukraine.

A year later, Britain’s foreign spy agency began formally training these operatives to gather intelligence and carry out sabotage and assassinations on Soviet soil. This sinister compact was established despite stern CIA and State Department opposition. The Agency considered UHVR, which by this point had cut ties with Bandera’s murderous ultranationalist mob, a far more palatable alternative. The group was now led by Ukrainian-Greek Catholic priest Ivan Hrinioch, a “longtime CIA asset”, and former high ranking OUN-B operative Mykola Lebed.

During World War II, Lebed oversaw the UPA’s massacre of tens of thousands of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia. However, he subsequently disavowed this genocidal carnage, and led UHVR’s push to unite Ukrainian emigres, who had fractured due to bloody, internecine squabbles towards the conflict’s end. Under the auspices of Operation AERODYNAMIC, for decades the CIA exploited UHVR to foment “nationalist flare-ups” throughout the Soviet Union, “particularly” in Ukraine, and “encourage divisive manifestations among” the population, to “exert pressure on the Soviet regime.”

By this time, Bandera had fallen out of favour with many Ukrainian nationalists more generally, even renounced by what remained of OUN-B’s Kiev-based leadership. This, his genocidal past, and overt anti-US actions and statements due to Washington’s refusal to publicly advocate for Ukrainian independence, all deterred the CIA from employing him. MI6 was unperturbed however, and pushed ahead with its Bandera operations. This created a ludicrous situation, with London and Washington supporting bitterly antagonistic Ukrainian nationalist factions, which frequently undermined and attacked each other.

As a British intelligence memo on “the crisis over Bandera” noted, by 1950 Ukrainian nationalist leaders had “become aware of the fact that the British and Americans were backing rival groups,” putting the agencies’ joint anti-Soviet projects at risk. It was decided to dispatch a cosigned message to UPA headquarters via Ukrainian CIA and MI6 agents parachuted into Lviv, calling for an end to “present disagreements” between opposing nationalist factions, which London and Washington professed to “deplore” and hoped “may be resolved.”

It signed off with the now-infamous, Bandera-coined nationalist slogan, “Glory to the Ukraine” (“Slava Ukraini”). The memo’s MI6 author moreover recalled an in-person meeting he had with Bandera in London. The spy described him thus:

“Convincing and sincere…a professional underground worker with a terrorist background and ruthless notions about the rules of the game, acquired by hard experience, along with a thorough knowledge of the Ukrainian people…a bandit type if you like, with a burning patriotism which provides an ethical background and a justification for his banditry.”

The MI6 operative cheerfully added that genocidal mass murderer Bandera was “no better and no worse than others of his kind I have had dealings with in the past,” and “genuinely grateful for the help given to him” by British intelligence, “but at the same time is certainly trying to get all he can out of it.” The CIA begged to differ however, commissioning a study of London and Washington’s conflicting positions on the “Ukrainian underground” and Bandera, and how to resolve this divergence.

‘Political Overtones’

An ensuing appraisal repeatedly declared Bandera and OUN-B to be “completely unacceptable” to the CIA, “both from the political and the operational standpoints.” It proposed the Agency and MI6 take joint ownership of the UHVR and its anti-Soviet wrecking project in Ukraine, and “exchange political, operational and intelligence data resulting from these operations.” Meanwhile, the CIA would “take independent action to neutralize” OUN-B’s “present leadership”, including Bandera himself. It’s unknown if this was pitched to MI6, although London’s steadfast opposition was inevitable.

The “British position”, as described in the study, was Bandera’s “importance” had been serially “underestimated by the Americans, as a rallying symbol in the Ukraine, as leader of a large emigre group [and] as a leader favored by the homeland headquarters.” This didn’t tally with the reality on-the-ground as detected by the CIA, but MI6 had a vested interest in maintaining the fascist demagogue as an agent. An April 1951 Agency memo summarizing recent “talks” with British intelligence “on operations against the USSR” noted:

“[MI6 is] seeking progressively to assume control of Bandera’s lines…[MI6 argues] Bandera’s name still carried considerable weight in the Ukraine…[and OUN-B is] the strongest Ukrainian organization abroad, is deemed competent to train party cadres, [and] build a morally and politically healthy organization.”

By contrast, the CIA observed Soviet authorities “had been successful to a remarkable degree in transforming the mentality of the younger generation” of Ukrainians, resulting in them vehemently rejecting Bandera and his brand of rabid nationalism. While the Agency therefore favoured “political neutralization of Bandera as an individual”, MI6 balked, as this “would lead to a drying up of recruits” and “disrupt British operations.” However, the declassified papertrail shows London eventually tired of their fascist asset.

In February 1954, a senior MI6 official who led liaison with OUN-B for two decades made a “final attempt to bring Bandera to reason” in London, due to the genocidaire’s refusal to reconcile and unite with opposing Ukrainian nationalist elements. The high-ranking British spook offered him “one last chance” to make amends with émigré leaders. Bandera “refused this suggestion with arrogant finality,” thus making “the break” between Bandera and MI6 “complete.”

All British intelligence-run Ukrainian agents who remained loyal to Bandera were duly jettisoned. MI6 informed other nationalist leaders the agency “would not resume” its relationship with him “under any circumstances.” Bandera remained exiled in Munich, and continued to run belligerent cloak-and-dagger operations against the Soviet Union, while ratcheting up his anti-Western rhetoric. The CIA and MI6 viewed these activities as a significant problem, with no obvious solution.

As CIA records of a January 1955 “joint US-UK conference” put it, despite the “unanimous desire” of British and American intelligence to “‘quiet’ Bandera,” it was equally vital the KGB was “not allowed to kidnap or kill him.” This could make Bandera “a martyr” among Ukrainian ultranationalists, a prospect to be avoided if at all possible. Hence, London and Washington kept him alive and well, while permitting West Germany’s BND to run him as an agent. Their old friend Gerhard von Mende was his handler.

West German authorities wished to punish Bandera and his in-country network for crimes including kidnapping, but von Mende consistently intervened to insulate his compatriot from prosecution. A July 1959 CIA report noted the BND’s use of Bandera was such a “closely held” secret within the agency, it wasn’t even formally cleared with the West German government, “due to political overtones.” Despite this omertà, the BND moved to secure Bandera a US visa.

It was hoped he would connect with Ukrainian emigres Stateside, while ingratiating himself with the CIA and State Department. Per an October 5th 1959 Agency memo, the BND believed “it should be a simple matter” for the CIA “to influence the issuing of a visa” for Bandera, as “many less desirable and less ‘exploitable’ individuals” had already visited the country via Agency assistance. A formal request was resultantly submitted to Washington. Just 10 days later though, the KGB assassinated Bandera in Munich.

Despite their mutual wish Bandera not be “martyred” by Soviet intelligence, it is likely the CIA and MI6 breathed a collective sigh of relief upon news of his death. The OUN-B and UPA founder’s destabilising, disruptive influence within the Ukrainian anti-Communist underground was a significant impediment to Anglo-American spying agencies implementing a far grander plan than any they had hitherto tried. Namely, fomenting all-out war against the Soviet Union, using Ukrainians as footsoldiers.

This is the first instalment of a two-part investigation. Stay tuned.

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