By Connor Echols, Responsible Statecraft, 10/10/25

Former German Chancellor Angela Merkel sparked controversy in Europe this week when she appeared to blame eastern European states for helping to instigate the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Merkel claimed in an interview with Hungarian media that, in June of 2021, she began to feel that Russian President Vladimir Putin “was no longer taking the Minsk Agreement seriously,” referencing a series of treaties that aimed to end the war between Russia and Ukraine in the Donbas. “That’s why I wanted a new format where we could speak directly with Putin as the European Union,” she said.

But that proposal stalled due to opposition from the Baltic states and Poland, who “feared we would not be able to develop a common policy towards Russia,” according to Merkel. “Then I left office and Putin’s war began,” she said.

The comments provide rare, new insights into the deterioration in Western relations with Russia that reached a crescendo in February 2022, when Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Merkel’s account adds credence to arguments that the West failed to pursue all diplomatic avenues to prevent the war, which has now turned into a protracted conflict.

Eastern European leaders responded to the interview with indignation, arguing that efforts to negotiate with Putin were in fact to blame for the war. “I consistently told her that you cannot deal with Putin ‘in good faith,’ but she believed that the Baltic states were wrong,” said former Latvian Prime Minister Krisjanis Karins, who served in that role from 2019 to 2023. “Putin acts the way he acts, and the only options for the West are either to submit or to resist.”

“Russia’s war against Ukraine is driven by one thing and one thing only: its refusal to accept the Soviet Union’s collapse and its unrelenting imperialist ambitions,” said Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna. “Russia alone is to blame for this aggression.”

Notably, Merkel didn’t place all of the blame on eastern Europe. The former chancellor also cited the pandemic as an aggravating factor in the deterioration of Western ties with Russia. “If you cannot meet, if you cannot discuss differences face to face, you won’t find new compromises,” she said.

Merkel appeared less hopeful about the possibility of diplomacy with Russia today, after more than three years of war in Ukraine. “Times have changed now, and we need to think about what position will best help us achieve peace,” she said. In Merkel’s view, that means that Europe will have to act “as a real deterrent” to Russia by strengthening its military position and supporting Ukraine.

ACURA, 10/7/25

It is with deep sadness that we inform you that our stalwart Board Member, David C. Speedie, passed away on Thursday, October 2nd, at the University of Virginia Hospital. David was being treated for prostate cancer, and was scheduled to begin chemotherapy shortly. However, in spite of the accurate diagnosis, the cancer had become metastatic and difficult to control.

David was Senior  Fellow and Director of the Program on US Global Engagement at the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Policy in New York from 2007 to 2017.  Prior to that he chaired the Program on International Peace and Security at the Carnegie Corporation in New York from 1992 to 2007. David had also served as Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F Kennedy School of Government.

He was a thoughtful and tireless advocate for global peace who had a keen interest in improving US Russia Relations.  A prolific writer and lecturer on the need for diplomacy and cross-cultural understanding, David traveled to Russia frequently.  He was a close associate of our founder, Stephen F. Cohen.

Those who knew David will remember him not only as a brilliant man but as a decent and empathetic one.  We will miss David greatly.

-Krishen Mehta for the Board

Russia Matters, 10/10/25

1. Russian strikes in recent days have wiped out more than half of Ukraine’s domestic natural gas production, according to Bloomberg.Oct. 5 saw Russia launch its largest air attack in weeks on Ukraine, firing 53 missiles—including two Kinzhals—and nearly 500 attack drones across nine regions, killing five and damaging energy facilities nationwide. Five days later, Russia unleashed one of its largest attacks on Ukraine, launching around 465 drones and 32 missiles, according to Ukrainian officials.¹ The Oct. 10 attack caused temporary power outages for over one million people nationwide in Ukraine. Also this week, Russia reported a growing number of Ukrainian drone attacks deep inside its territory, with some reaching nearly 2,000 kilometers (1,200 miles) from the Ukrainian border, in the Ural Mountains and the oil-rich region of Tyumen.
2. In the past week, Sept. 30–Oct. 7, 2025, Russia gained 34 square miles of Ukraine’s territory, up from the previous week’s gain of 13 square miles, which constitutes an increase of 162%. In the past four weeks (Sept. 9–Oct. 7, 2025), Russian forces gained 166 square miles of Ukrainian territory, a slight increase from the 160 square miles they gained during the previous four-week period (Aug. 12–Sept. 9, 2025), according to the latest issue of the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. This week has also seen Vladimir Putin claim that Russian forces had captured almost 1,930 square miles (5,000 square kilometers) of land in Ukraine in 2025. According to data from DeepState, which is associated with Ukraine’s MoD, however, from Jan. 1, 2025, to Oct. 5, 2025, Russia gained approximately 1,217 square miles (3,152 square kilometers) of Ukrainian land.
3. Donald Trump said Oct. 6 that he has “sort of made a decision” about selling long-range Tomahawk missiles to NATO countries in order for them to be supplied to Ukraine, Axios reported. Trump also said he wants to know what the Ukrainians plan to do with the missiles before he supplies them. Following Trump’s comments, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov warned that supplying Tomahawks, which he stressed could carry nuclear warheads, would constitute a “serious escalation.” Senior Russian lawmakers broadened the warnings: Andrei Kartapolov promised a “tough, ambiguous, measured and asymmetrical” response. Andrei Zhuravlyov suggested Russia should strike Poland’s Rzeszow air base, a key Western transit hub for arms, if deliveries proceed, while Leonid Slutsky claimed Trump risked a third world war. In his comments on Tomahawks, another senior Russian MP Alexei Zhuravlev referenced Russia’s recent military cooperation agreement with Cuba and implied that Russia can deploy missiles to Cuba close to the United States. Putin weighed in, too, asserting on Oct. 9 that Russia will strengthen air defense.
4. Trump on Oct. 5 praised Putin’s proposal to extend New START’s limits for one additional year after its planned February 2026 expiration, describing the Russian offer as a “good idea.” Trump did not indicate if the U.S. would attach new conditions or whether it has formally responded to Moscow. Nevertheless, the Kremlin welcomed Trump’s positive remarks, with Putin’s spokesman Peskov calling them grounds for optimism and possible new talks that could sidestep the Ukraine conflict. Speaking on Oct. 10, Putin himself said it would be a shame if the United States declined to extend the warhead limits, but that such a refusal would not be critical for Moscow. Putin has not indicated whether he is open to restoring inspections or data sharing under the treaty, while his Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov emphasized that Moscow’s proposal is not to renew the treaty, but to maintain its quantitative limits for one year post-expiry, provided the U.S. does not take destabilizing actions in offensive or strategic air defense fields.²

By Dr. F. Andrew Wolf, Jr., Global Research, 9/30/25

F. Andrew Wolf, Jr. is director of The Fulcrum Institute, a new organization of current and former scholars, which engages in research and commentary, focusing on political and cultural issues on both sides of the Atlantic. After service in the USAF (Lt.Col.-Intel) Dr. Wolf obtained a PhD-philosophy (Wales), MA-theology (Univ. S. Africa), MTh-philosophical theology (TCU-Brite Div.). He taught philosophy, humanities and theology in the US and S. Africa before retiring from university. He is a regular contributor to Global Research.

The past several weeks has witnessed tensions between EU political elites and the Kremlin escalating, needlessly. A contrived drone incident in Poland, Estonian airspace allegedly being violated by Russian planes, and East European politicians urging NATO to shoot down Russian aircraft — it all points to a deliberate attempt to provoke Moscow and garner Washington’s attention.

But this sudden propensity toward provocation says less about Moscow and more about EU insecurity. With US security guarantees steadily declining, the bloc’s governments are grasping at an old but favorite retreat: the myth of the “Russian threat.”

It is a conjured story that has lingered in European consciousness for more than five centuries, and it speaks clearly to Western Europe’s insecurity – rather than any Russian territorial ambitions.

There are reasons why the EU’s desperate posturing is laced with deceit. Washington’s inclination towards underwriting European security is diminishing. Western media suggests that US officials have told their European counterparts that direct military aid to Eastern Europe may soon be scaled back. Political elites in the Baltics and some former Soviet republics view this as an untenable situation. Hence, the group’s foreign policy initiatives are routinely directed towards provoking a response from Russia, hoping to extract security guarantees and military resources from the US.

Furthermore, and this is the fallacy of the EU position, the latter has no alternative strategy. Without US acquiescence, it cannot conceive of a foreign policy beyond merely provoking the Russian “Bear.” Reintroducing Russia as its “existential” nemesis provides a convenient way to gain Washington’s attention – and money if possible.

The irony is glaring: Russia has no interest in the territory of its smaller neighbors, because it is not in its best interest to do so. The Baltics, Poland, and Finland engaging for decades in anti-Russian rhetoric notwithstanding, Moscow seeks no revenge or a reckoning — again, because it’s not in its interest to so engage. Their relevance in world affairs is negligible. But for the political elites, clinging to the myth of Russian aggression has become the only recourse they, shortsightedly, believe is available to them. 

The Genesis of Russophobia

The roots of this myth lie in neither the Cold War nor the 19^th century “Great Game” rivalry between empires; rather, its emergence can be traced to the rather cowardly insecurity of Baltic barons and the opportunism of German knights in Livonia and Prussia.

In the late 15^th century, Polish monarchs considered sending German knights to fight the expanding Ottoman Empire. The idea was horrifying to them. For centuries, they had lived comfortably in the Baltics while merely skirmishing with Russian militias. The Ottoman Turks was altogether different. The memory of Nicopolis was still a vivid memory – Ottoman forces executed virtually all captured knights.

Unwilling to face a real threat and a formidable enemy, the Livonian and Prussian knights initiated a propaganda campaign. The goal was to persuade the balance of Europe that Russia was an enemy as dangerous, and perhaps even more so, than the Ottomans. The strategy succeeded: Rome granted indulgences and support, ensuring the knights could remain at home, while still enjoying the prestige of crusaders fighting a “holy war.”

The myth was born: a confluence of fear, opportunism, and financial gain. Eventually, Western Europe (particularly France and Britain) absorbed the deception into a broader scheme of Russophobia – a blend of contempt and anxiety over a vast empire they could neither conquer nor ignore. And in the 20^th century England’s academics, especially through its Rhodes Scholar program, indoctrinated generations of America’s best and brightest who became influential in advising presidents and secretaries of state in US foreign policy. Russophobia crossed the Atlantic.

Reflections of the Past

Today, history repeats itself. Once more, Russia’s neighbors (anxious and insecure) seek protection from an Atlantic suzerain preoccupied with larger challenges. Five centuries ago, the Ottomans consumed Europe’s attention; today, it is China – the true strategic rival of the United States.

Little has changed, however, with European elites. They cannot imagine a political identity without playing the role of “victim.” Their economies and influence are far too insignificant, so they inflate the specter of Russian aggression in a futile attempt to remain relevant to Washington and Brussels.

Russia’s foreign minister Sergei Lavrov told the United Nations this week that Moscow has no intention of attacking Europe or NATO countries. Moscow has not the desire and certainly not the need to “invade” the Baltics or Poland. In the 15th century, Ivan III was concerned with issues of trade, economic relations, and Orthodox Christian Church leadership — not with conquest for the sake of territorial gain. Today, Russia’s aims are equally pragmatic: stability, sovereignty, and relations built around trade.

Poland vs the Rest of Europe

The contrast with Poland is instructive. In the 15th century, Poland agitated for war with Russia. In the 21st, it has chosen a more cautious course, focusing on steady economic growth and avoiding reckless entanglements. Unlike the Baltics, Warsaw has built a measure of gravitas in European politics. That success has made it a target of envy in Berlin, Paris, and London, who would prefer Poland to be dragged into open confrontation with Moscow.

But Poland’s refusal to adopt the euro (much like Britain and the northern countries) has made it resilient, mitigating the leverage of German and French economic dominance. And Washington is equally reluctant to risk a “European entanglement” that would distract from its priorities in the Pacific. 

What History Teaches

The myth of the Russian threat was not born of Russian ambition but of broader European insecurity and avarice. European elites in the 21st century perpetuate the deception to distract their own populations from witnessing their own weakness and irrelevance.

What began as propaganda in Cologne in the 16^th century still shapes West European discourse, today. But deceit cannot alter reality once it is recognized for what it is – a “lie.” Russia seeks not conflict — only to secure its interests. Europe and Britain understand this – it just doesn’t fit their political agendas.

It is self-defeating for the EU to cling to invented peril; it distracts attention from the real domestic challenges facing it. And in doing so, it risks repeating the same missteps that have dogged its politics for half a millennium – a reticence to deal with actual, rather than virtual, reality.

By Dave DeCamp, Antiwar.com, 10/12/25

The Trump administration has been providing Ukraine with intelligence to carry out long-range drone attacks against Russian energy infrastructure, the Financial Times reported on Sunday, citing multiple US and Ukrainian officials.

The report said that the US intelligence helps Ukraine “shape route planning, altitude, timing and mission decisions, enabling Ukraine’s long-range, one-way attack drones to evade Russian air defenses.”

A US official told the paper that Ukraine selects the target for the strike, then the US provides information on its vulnerabilities. However, other officials said the US has actually been setting out target priorities for the Ukrainian military, meaning the US is choosing what to strike.

One of the FT’s sources described Ukraine’s drone force as the “instrument” the US is using to achieve the goal of undermining the Russian economy and pushing Russian President Vladimir Putin toward a settlement to end the war. The US has spent billions helping build up Ukraine’s drone program, an effort backed by the CIA.

The report said that the US began supplying Ukraine with the intelligence following a July phone call between President Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, during which Trump reportedly asked if Ukraine could hit Moscow if the US provided longer-range weapons. In August and September, Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian energy infrastructure significantly escalated.

US-backed attacks on Russian territory always risk a major escalation between Russia and NATO, and the FT report noted that the Biden administration refrained from supporting such strikes on Russian energy infrastructure. President Biden did support Ukrainian strikes on Russian border regions using ATACMS, US-provided missiles that have a range of about 190 miles.

President Trump reportedly halted the ATACMS strikes, but The Wall Street Journal recently reported that he has now signed off on supporting long-range missile strikes inside Russia. His administration is considering supplying Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles, which are nuclear-capable and have a range of over 1,000 miles, though it remains unclear if it’s a realistic option since the Ukrainian military lacks a way to fire them.

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Dave DeCamp is the news editor of Antiwar.com, follow him on Twitter @decampdave.