Russia Matters, 5/19/25

1. Donald Trump’s Monday call with Vladimir Putin yielded no breakthrough on Russia-Ukraine war with Putin rejecting an unconditional full ceasefire again and Trump asserting that, going forward, Moscow and Kyiv will need to negotiate conditions directly, perhaps, in the Vatican in what Financial Times reporters interpreted as a signal that Washington is “stepping back from a role as a mediator.” Putin was first to offer his take on the call, which lasted for more than two hours, telling Russian media that Russia has stated readiness to work with the Ukrainian side on a memorandum regarding a possible a peace treaty “with a number of positions to be defined.” These positions, according to the Kremlin’s account of Putin’s remarks to the media included “the principles for settlement, the timeframe for a possible peace deal, and… a potential temporary ceasefire, should the necessary agreements be reached.” Trump’s account of the call appeared to be more upbeat than that of the Russian counterpart. “The tone and spirit of the conversation were excellent,” U.S. leader wrote on Truth Social. He also wrote that “Russia and Ukraine will immediately start negotiations toward a Ceasefire and, more importantly, an END to the War” and that “the conditions for that will be negotiated between the two parties, as it can only be, because they know details of a negotiation that nobody else would be aware of.” Ominously, perhaps, Trump also wrote that “the Vatican, as represented by the Pope, has stated that it would be very interested in hosting the negotiations.” Trump’s remarks, in the view of Financial Times’ reporting team, indicate the Trump administration is done trying mediating between Moscow and Kyiv.¹ The Monday call was preceded by the direct Russian-Ukrainian talks, which took place in Istanbul on Friday. Those talks did not significantly advance the peace negotiations either, although both sides agreed on what would become the largest prisoner-of-war exchange since the start of the war. The outcome of the Friday meeting represented a “tactical win for Mr. Putin, who managed to start the talks without first agreeing to a battlefield cease-fire that Ukraine and almost all of its Western backers had sought as a precondition for negotiations,” according to NYT.
2. Putin may be thinking that Russia will outlast Ukraine in his war, and he has a reason to do so, according to FT’s Gideon Rachman. This columnist cites “sources” as estimating that “Ukrainian casualties are running at roughly two-thirds the level of Russia’s… while its population is roughly a quarter that of Russia’s.” “Putin [therefore] has reason to believe that he would ultimately prevail in a war of attrition,” in spite of Russia’s “staggering losses,” according to Rachman.² Putin has also managed to consolidate the public at home as he aims to “outlast Ukraine and the U.S.,” according to Amy Knight’s commentary in Wall Street Journal.
3. A group of CSIS military fellows have inferred insights for future conflicts from the Russia-Ukraine war and they include that West’s “incremental escalation—providing support and then pausing to gauge the Russian reaction before providing more advanced support—contributed to the absence of a nuclear detonation in this conflict.” Another insight is that “Despite rapid advances, the use of unmanned sea and aerial drones today is still an evolution, not a revolution, of warfare” with tanks remaining “relevant.” The Russia-Ukraine war also indicates that “Future success in contested environments will depend not only on moving supplies but on mastering data, defending networks, and leveraging innovation across all domains.”
4. Ukraine’s defense industry keeps churning more and more lethal products with value of the latter increasing by 3400% since the beginning of the war, according to Wall Street Journal. “The value of weapons Ukraine’s defense industry can make has ballooned from $1 billion in 2022 to $35 billion over three years of war… Last year Ukraine said it produced more artillery guns than all NATO countries combined,” according to WSJ. “More than 40% of the weapons used on the front line with Russia are now made in Ukraine” and in “some areas, such as drones, unmanned ground systems, and electronic warfare, the figure is close to 100%,” WSJ reported. At the same time, Ukraine’s efforts to procure arms abroad have not been all exemplary. A Financial Times investigation “has uncovered how hundreds of millions of dollars Kyiv paid to foreign arms intermediaries to secure vital military equipment has gone to waste over the past three years of war.”
5. Trump’s Golden Dome will press Russia into a new arms race, forcing it to devote yet more resources to its strategic forces at a time when the country can least afford it, according to James D.J. Brown of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. So far, the significant increase in Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons “that the Pentagon predicted five years ago has so far not materialized,” according to Hans M. Kristensen of FAS and his colleagues’ report: “Russian Nuclear Weapons, 2025.”

RT, 5/18/25

Russia is seeking to achieve “lasting and sustainable peace” by eliminating the root causes of the Ukraine conflict, President Vladimir Putin has said, in an extract of an interview released by Russia 1 TV on Sunday.

In a clip posted by journalist Pavel Zarubin on Telegram, Putin stated that Russia has “enough strength and resources to bring what was started in 2022 to its logical conclusion” while accomplishing Moscow’s key goals.

Russia wants to “eliminate the causes that caused this crisis, create conditions for long-term sustainable peace and ensure the security of the Russian state and the interests of our people in those territories that we always talk about,” he added.

The president was apparently referring to Crimea, the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics, and the regions of Kherson and Zaporozhye, which overwhelmingly voted in favor of joining Russia in referendums in 2014 and 2022.

People in these former Ukrainian territories “consider Russian to be their native language” and see Russia as their homeland, he said.

Commenting on the ongoing diplomatic engagement with the US to settle the conflict, Putin acknowledged that “the American people, including their president [Donald Trump] have their own national interests.”

“We respect that, and expect to be treated the same way,” he added.

Putin’s remarks come on the heels of the first direct Russia-Ukraine talks since 2022. As a result of Turkish-mediated negotiations in Istanbul, both sides agreed to exchange lists of conditions for a potential ceasefire, conduct a major prisoner swap, and discuss a follow-up meeting. The Kremlin has not ruled out direct talks between Putin and Ukraine’s Vladimir Zelensky if the ongoing peace efforts result in progress and firm agreements.

Following the talks, US President Donald Trump announced he would hold a phone call with his Russian counterpart on Monday, which would focus on trade and resolving the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov discussed the Istanbul negotiations with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who welcomed the results of the talks.

***

By Donald Trump, Truth Social, May 17, 2025

@realDonaldTrump

I WILL BE SPEAKING, BY TELEPHONE, TO PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN OF RUSSIA ON MONDAY, AT 10:00 A.M. THE SUBJECTS OF THE CALL WILL BE, STOPPING THE “BLOODBATH” THAT IS KILLING, ON AVERAGE, MORE THAN 5000 RUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN SOLDIERS A WEEK, AND TRADE. I WILL THEN BE SPEAKING TO PRESIDENT ZELENSKYY OF UKRAINE AND THEN, WITH PRESIDENT ZELENSKYY, VARIOUS MEMBERS OF NATO. HOPEFULLY IT WILL BE A PRODUCTIVE DAY, A CEASEFIRE WILL TAKE PLACE, AND THIS VERY VIOLENT WAR, A WAR THAT SHOULD HAVE NEVER HAPPENED, WILL END. GOD BLESS US ALL!!!

***

Kremlin Names Condition for Putin-Zelensky Meeting

Sputnik, 5/17/25

MOSCOW (Sputnik) – A meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky is possible if delegations of both countries reach certain agreements, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Saturday.

“There have been a lot of questions on the topic of a possible meeting between the presidents of the two countries, Ukraine and Russia, Zelensky and Putin,” Peskov told reporters.

“Such a meeting as a result of the work of the delegations of the two sides is possible when certain agreements of these delegations are reached,” he added.

“We consider it possible. But it is precisely as a result of work and upon reaching certain results in the form of agreements between the two sides,” the Kremlin spokesman said.

Russia and Ukraine have agreed to exchange the lists of ceasefire conditions and the Russian side is working on it, he explained.

“[Russia and Ukraine] really agreed to exchange the lists of ceasefire conditions. The work is continuing, it is being carried out. The Russian side has prepared such a list and will hand it over, with exchange with the Ukrainian side,” Peskov said.

At the same time, the work on the resolution of the conflict in Ukraine has just started and it will be continued, Peskov added.

Moscow considers the candidacy of Kiev’s signatory as the main and fundamental thing when signing documents between the Russian and Ukrainian delegations during the negotiations, Peskov said.

“When signing the documents to be agreed upon by the delegations, the main and principal thing for us is who exactly will sign these documents from the Ukrainian side,” Peskov said.

A change in the composition of the Russian delegation to the negotiations with Ukraine is not being discussed, he said, adding that the talks will continue.

“At the moment, there is no discussion of this. In fact, the work has just begun and will continue,” Peskov said.

He also said that it is important to implement the agreements reached during the recent talks.

“For now, we must follow through on what the delegations agreed upon yesterday. This primarily involves fulfilling the exchange of 1,000 for 1,000 war prisoners, and exchanging the lists of the main conditions discussed yesterday, as my colleague Russian presidential aide Vladimir Medinsky said,” Peskov added.

The negotiations between Russia and Ukraine are held behind the closed doors, and this practice should continue in the future, the Kremlin spokesman said.

There have not been any contacts between Moscow and Washington after the talks between Russia and Ukraine in Istanbul, Peskov said.

“No, there have not been any contacts,” he said.

At the same time, if Putin and US President Donald Trump find it necessary to have a telephone call, the Kremlin will inform about that, Peskov added.

Following Friday’s meeting of the Russian and Ukrainian delegations in Istanbul, Russian presidential aide Vladimir Medinsky, who led the Russian delegation, said that the sides agreed to prepare detailed lists of conditions for a ceasefire.

Well, John Helmer’s report of an in person meeting between Trump and Putin in Abu Dhabi on May 15th or 16th did not pan out.

I don’t know if Helmer’s sources were faulty or if it was really believed that this might happen but circumstances changed in such a way as to nix the meeting. Trump had mentioned the possibility recently of meeting Putin and then said he wasn’t going to right now. It’s possible this was a result of Trump’s impulsivity.

Interestingly, my former editor at RT told me, without elaboration, that Helmer was not a credible person and made me remove him as a source on a proposed piece I wrote back in 2021. Other people knowledgeable about Russia have said they think he is a credible journalist.

I know that he has managed to tick off both western establishment types and some in the Russian government. I typically think it bodes well for a journalist if they piss off everyone.

In any event, this purported meeting did not happen and we’re left to speculate.

By Ben Aris, Intellinews, 5/1/25

The extreme sanctions imposed on Russia have hit industrial sectors the hardest, which have been almost entirely dependent on imports of high quality foreign made machinery for almost all of the last three decades since the fall of the Soviet Union.

The problem is that because of the timing of the collapse of the USSR, Russia missed out on two revolutions in precision tool making and is now hopelessly behind. Machine imports made up about half of all imports for decades.

China didn’t face this dislocation and has rapidly closed the gap with the West. China already leads in green tech development and production and recently overtook the US in EV manufacturing as well. In April it shocked the world with DeepSeek, an AI as powerful as ChatGPT, and then with the commercial production of a five-nanometre microchip that is as small as anything the US or Taiwan can produce that came entirely out of left field. And it was created entirely using Chinese machinery – a capacity that China was thought to be years away from. The chip, known as the Kirin 9000S, was developed by Huawei’s subsidiary HiSilicon, in partnership with Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC).

Russia is still far away from this level of sophistication, but sanctions have accelerated its own development with simpler, but still important, technologies. Russian President Vladimir Putin boasted recently that sanctions have strengthened, not weakened, Russia by driving Russian innovation as companies invest and adapt to find domestically sourced solutions to their problems. And his boast is not entirely idle. While Russia is still generations away from producing its own competitive microchip, difficult-to-make technologies like high-efficiency gas turbines that have long been out of reach for domestic producers are starting to catch up with their Western peers.

From cheese to turbines

The classic example of this process is cheese. When Putin imposed agri-sanctions on EU imports in retaliation for the first round of Western sanctions on Russia following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, cheese disappeared from Russian supermarket shelves.

Cheese was almost entirely imported as European-made cheese was of a higher quality and lower price than anything Russian firms could make. But cut off from supplies completely, some Russian entrepreneurs threw themselves into the business and two years later Russia had a flourishing domestic cheese production sector, albeit still not quite as fine as their European analogues, but good enough to restock the shops.

Cheese is pretty easy to make, but gas turbines are another kettle of fish. Russian power firms like Silovye Mashiny (Power Machine), owned by oligarch Alexey Mordashov, is the leading producer of equipment for power stations, but it could never match the quality of Siemens high efficiency gas turbines that are at the heart of gas-fired power stations, despite heavy investment and a joint venture with Siemens pre-war.

Siemens came to virtually monopolise the gas turbine business in Russia. According to Siemens’ annual reports and press statements, it earned €1.3bn in revenues from Russia, or about 1% of its global sales but was also a strategically important market due to the long-term energy and infrastructure maintenance contracts.

Russia’s dependence on Siemens was much more significant, as its high efficiency turbines have a notable economic impact because the fuel savings are on a scale that directly affects GDP figures. However, after the war in Ukraine began, Siemens suspended its operations in May 2022, leaving Russia without access to the German-made turbines it depends on.

That has just changed.

Specialists from the United Engine Corporation (UEC), part of the Rostec State Corporation, have completed testing of the second prototype of the new AL-41ST-25 industrial gas turbine engine. The engine was manufactured at UEC-UMPO in Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan, that is almost as good as anything Siemens makes.

The AL-41ST-25 is a fully domestically produced industrial turbine designed to replace foreign equivalents in Russia’s fuel and energy sector. It has a capacity of 25 MW and features enhanced efficiency, reliability and environmental sustainability.

The prototype consistently met its specified performance parameters in all operating modes, according to Rostec, matching the performance of the German-made equivalents.

It will now be installed at a compressor station in the Republic of Tatarstan, where the first prototype is already in operation as part of a gas pumping unit and has shown reliable performance, the Russian company said.

According to its designers, the turbine can outperform most existing domestic models in terms of efficiency, with a current rating of 39.1% and a potential for phased improvement to 40%. The AL-41ST-25 is the first Russian development to offer this combination of technical specifications.

On a side-by-side comparison, the Russian turbine still has some work to do. The AL-41ST-25 falls into the lower end of the medium industrial turbine power segment and is smaller than both of Siemens’ equivalent SGT-700 (33-34 MW) and SGT-800 (47.5-62 MW) in terms of output.

But the key breakthrough is that AL-41ST-25 is also most as efficient as the Siemens’ two turbines: 39.1% against 40% and 41.5% respectively.

Closing the gap with the German technology clears the way to replace every German turbine in every Russian power station and begin the process of weaning Russia off its dependency on imported foreign machinery as soon as production of the turbines can be scaled up. Its new found prowess in mechanical engineering means an assault on all sorts of higher quality machinery can also be launched. This process will take years to complete, but in this sense Putin is right: sanctions have provided the spur Russian innovation needed to accelerate innovation and upgrade its outdated technology.

By Andrew Korybko, Substack, 4/25/25

How likely is it that a potentially ultra-nationalist Germany “relitigates its borders or forgoes EU-style deliberation in favor of military blackmail”?

Foreign Affairs warned earlier this month that an emboldened and remilitarized Germany could pose another challenge to European stability. They’re convinced that former Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s “Zeitenwende”, or historic turning point, “is real this time” in the sense that his successor Friedrich Merz now has the parliamentary and popular support to transform their country into a Great Power. While this would allegedly benefit Europe and Ukraine, it wouldn’t be without three serious risks. [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/germany/zeitenwende-real-time]

According to the article’s two authors, these entail: Russia waging more hybrid war on Germany; Germany’s rise possibly provoking more nationalism in surrounding countries; and this potentially leading to an explosion of ultra-nationalism in Germany. The catalyst for all of this is the US’ gradual disengagement from NATO brought about by the Trump Administration’s reprioritization of the Asia-Pacific. As American influence recedes, it’ll create political and security voids that others compete to fill.

To be sure, the article itself is more about promoting the alleged advantages of Germany’s delayed implementation of Scholz’s “Zeitenwende”, which the authors praise as long-overdue and a natural response to the aforesaid catalyst seeing as how Germany is already the EU’s de facto leader. At the same time, touching upon the risks bolsters their credibility in some readers’ eyes, enables them to subtly throw shade on Trump, and presents the authors as prescient in case any of the above occurs.

Beginning with the first of the three, it’s predicable that Germany and Russia would carry out more intelligence operations against one another if the first plays the continent’s leading role in containing the second, which the latter would of course consider to be a latent threat for obvious historical reasons. The article omits any mention of the way in which his newfound German role would harm Russian interests and misportrays whatever Moscow’s response may be as unprovoked aggression.

They’re fairer with regard to the second risk of surrounding countries becoming more nationalistic as a reaction to an emboldened and remilitarized Germany but don’t elaborate. Poland is probably the most likely candidate though since such sentiments are already rising in society. This is a reaction to the ruling liberal-globalist coalition in general, its perceived subservience to Germany, and concerns that a possibly AfD-led Germany might try to reclaim what Poland considers to be its “Recovered Territories”.

The last risk builds upon that the authors expressed as the worst-case scenario of “a German military first strengthened by politically centrist, pro-European governments [falling] into the hands of leaders willing to relitigate Germany’s borders or to forgo EU-style deliberation in favor of military blackmail.” It’s this potential consequence that’s the most important to evaluate since the first two are expected to be enduring characteristics of this new geopolitical era in Europe while the final one is uncertain.

The outcome of Poland’s presidential election next month is expected to greatly determine the future dynamics of Polish-German relations. If the outgoing conservative is replaced by the liberal candidate, then Poland will probably either subordinate itself even more to Germany, rely on France to balance it and the US, or pivot towards France. A victory by the conservative or populist candidates, however, would lessen dependence on Germany by either balancing it with France or reprioritizing the US.

France is foreseen as figuring more prominently in Polish foreign policy either way due to their historical partnership since the Napoleonic era as well as their shared contemporary concerns about the threat that an emboldened and remilitarized Germany could pose to them. French in general are less worried about Germany relitigating their borders than some Poles are and are much more anxious about losing their chance to lead Europe either in whole or in part after the Ukrainian Conflict finally ends.

France, Germany, and Poland are competing with one another in this respect, with the most likely outcomes either being German hegemony via the “Zeitenwende” vision, France and Poland jointly thwarting this in Central & Eastern Europe (CEE), or a revived “Weimar Triangle” for tripartite rule over Europe. So long as the EU’s free flow of people and capital is retained, which of course can’t be taken for granted but is likely, then the odds of an AfD-led Germany relitigating its border with Poland are low.

That’s because like-minded Germans could simply buy land in Poland and move there if they wanted to, albeit while being subject to Polish laws, which aren’t different in any meaningful sense than German ones for all intents and purposes with respect to their daily lives. Additionally, while Germany does indeed plan to undergo an unprecedented military buildup, Poland is already in the midst of its own buildup and a more successful at that after having just become NATO’s third-largest military last summer.

The US is also unlikely to completely withdraw from Poland, let alone all of CEE, so its forces will probably always remain there as a mutual deterrent against Russia and Germany. Neither have any intent to invade Poland though so this presence would mostly be symbolic and for the purpose of psychologically reassuring the historically traumatized Polish population of their safety. In any case, the point is that the worst-case scenario that the authors touched upon is very unlikely to materialize.

To review, this is because: Poland will either subordinate itself to Germany after the next elections or rely more on France to balance it (if not reprioritize the US over both); the EU’s free flow of people and capital will likely remain at least for some time; and the US won’t abandon CEE. These will accordingly: appease or balance a possibly ultra-nationalist (ex: AfD-led) Germany; ditto; and deter any potential German territorial revisionism (whether via legal or military means).

Drawing to a close, it can therefore be concluded that the new order taking shape in Europe likely won’t lead to a restoration of interwar risks like Foreign Affairs warned is the worst-case scenario, but to the creation of spheres of influence without military tensions. Whether Poland stands strongly on its own, partners with France, or subordinates itself to Germany, no border changes are expected in either the western or eastern direction, with all forms of future German-Polish competition remaining manageable.