CBS News 60 Minutes, 4/13/25

The Ukrainian president faces a critical moment in his alliance with the United States. In an interview this past Friday, Volodymyr Zelenskyy invited President Trump, here, to Ukraine, to see how Russia’s unprovoked invasion, three years ago, continues to threaten the peace of the Western world. Zelenskyy is navigating a sharp turnabout in Washington. The United States had been leading nato in arming Ukraine and isolating Russia. but since taking office, President Trump has praised the Russian dictator Vladimir Putin and criticized Zelenskyy. this past Friday, a Trump official met Putin in Russia about the same time we sat down with Zelenskyy in his hometown. It had been a week since Russia killed 9 children on a playground.

Scott Pelley: You seem to have a real hatred of Vladimir Putin.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (Translated): Putin? 100% hatred. Not even 99.9%. Though this doesn’t mean we shouldn’t work to end the war as soon as possible and transition to diplomacy. But how else can you see a person who came here and murdered our people, murdered children? We’re inside a school bomb shelter right now. The bomb shelter of a school.

The bomb shelter classrooms beneath the city of Kryvyi Rih were silent. School 41 was mourning its students killed on April 4. Swing sets pierced by shrapnel stood where Zelenskyy laid his memorial to the nine children and 10 others cut down by a Russian missile. He asked us to look at their faces and told us that while the great powers endlessly debate war and peace, these children will never speak again.

Scott Pelley: Mr. President, what does an atrocity like this tell you about the progress of the war?

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy: It means that we can’t trust Russia. We can’t trust negotiations with Russia.

Russia strikes Ukrainian cities daily. 1,700 attacks on schools, 600 children dead. 780 hospitals and clinics attacked. 13,000 civilians killed. And up to 100,000 Ukrainian soldiers dead, all for Vladimir Putin’s vanity war to expand Russia to NATO’s doorstep.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (Translated): Our people have paid the highest price possible. There is no higher price. We have given all our money–all we have in terms of finances. But most important, we gave [the lives of] our people.

Those were the points Zelenskyy struggled to make in February as President Trump opened negotiations with Russia and, initially, excluded Ukraine. Then, Trump rewrote history, saying, falsely, that Ukraine had started the war and calling the democratically elected Zelenskyy…

President Trump on February 19: A dictator without elections. Zelenskyy better move fast or he’s not going to have a country left. Gotta move, gotta move fast ’cause that war is going in the wrong direction.

Scott Pelley: When President Trump called you a dictator and said that Ukraine started this war, what did you think?

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (Translated): I believe, sadly, Russian narratives are prevailing in the U.S. How is it possible to witness our losses and our suffering, to understand what the Russians are doing, and to still believe that they are not the aggressors, that they did not start this war? This speaks to the enormous influence of Russia’s information policy on America, on U.S. politics, and U.S. politicians.

And Zelenskyy told us he heard Russia’s narrative from Trump officials in that disastrous Oval Office meeting in February.

Trump in Oval Office meeting with Zelenskyy: You’re gambling with World War III.

Zelenskyy grew tense as President Trump said both sides were suffering, Ukraine’s people and the Russian invasion force.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (Translated): It’s a shift in tone, a shift in reality, really yes, a shift in reality, and I don’t want to engage in the altered reality that is being presented to me. First and foremost, we did not launch an attack [to start the war]. It seems to me that the Vice President is somehow justifying Putin’s actions. I tried to explain, “You can’t look for something in the middle. There is an aggressor and there is a victim. The Russians are the aggressor, and we are the victim.”

Vice President Vance suggested that Putin could be trusted and it was Zelenskyy who was creating a false narrative.

Zelenskyy in Oval Office meeting: Have you ever been to Ukraine that you see what problems we have? Come once.

Vance in Oval Office meeting: I’ve actually, I’ve actually watched and seen the stories and I know what happens is you bring people, you bring them on a propaganda tour, Mr. President.

Scott Pelley: Would you invite President Trump to Ukraine?

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy: With pleasure. Please.

This, Zelenskyy apparently wanted President Trump to hear in English.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy: We want you to come, and I think to come and to see. You think you understand what’s going on here. Okay, we respect your position. You understand. But, please, before any kind of decisions, any kind of forms of negotiations, come to see people, civilians, warriors, hospitals, churches, children destroyed or dead. Come, look, and then let’s — let’s move with a plan how to finish the war. You will understand with whom you have a deal. You will understand what Putin did. And we will not prepare anything. It will not be theater, with preparing actors in the streets and the [city] center. We don’t do this. We don’t need it. You can go exactly where you want, in any city which been under attacks. What I said to them, just to come and to understand.

With his invitation on its way, he switched to Ukrainian.

Scott Pelley: Does the United States have your back?

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (Translated): (PAUSE) Even in this pause of mine there’s a problem. Because I want to answer truthfully and quickly that the United States is our strategic, strong partner. But the pause is doubt. I don’t doubt that the people of America are with us. But in a long war, many details are forgotten. In Europe everyone fears that the United States may drift away from Europe.

Scott Pelley: Can you do without the United States?

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (Translated): I think without the United States we will suffer great losses. Human and territorial. So, I wouldn’t like to consider that. But this is our destiny, our land, our life. One way or another, we will end this war.

The U.S. has donated about $175 billion in aid. Roughly 100 billion of that was military, most of which was spent in the U.S. on manufacturing American weapons.

Scott Pelley: What would you say that the American people have gotten for that money?

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (Translated): We have always believed that this is our shared struggle, that Ukraine is defending our shared values, that we are defending Europe as a whole. I can only thank the people of the United States of America for their support, their strong support. But the people dying right now, with all due respect to the U.S. and Europe, the ones dying right now are Ukrainians. This is why I say that by giving us weapons, other countries are protecting their own people.

But in the Trump administration, U.S. aid has all but stopped. Last month the White House announced partial ceasefires, but they haven’t happened. And now, Trump says he is losing patience with Putin.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (Translated): Putin can’t be trusted. I told that to President Trump many times. So when you ask why the ceasefire isn’t working – this is why. Putin never wanted an end to the war. Putin never wanted us to be independent. Putin wants to destroy us completely – our sovereignty and our people.

Putin’s troops occupy about 20% of Ukraine. The 600-mile front is largely frozen – World War I trench warfare plus drones. It’s estimated that as many as 200,000 Russian troops have been killed.

Scott Pelley: What does a just peace look like to you?

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (Translated): To not lose our sovereignty or our independence. We, no matter what, will take back what is ours because we never lost it – the Russians took it from us, the temporarily occupied territories. We will not recognize [as Russia] those territories that the Russians temporarily occupy. We will bring them back. When or how, I cannot say. [But] what we can’t bring back are the human [lives]. There’s only one thing that can be done, justice. We cannot let go the issue of justice. Those who killed must pay for the murders.

Zelenskyy told us any true ceasefire must include a guarantee of Ukrainian security. He imagines an international peacekeeping force and would like the U.S. to be part of it.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (Translated): This could mean a [force] protecting airspace and providing air defense, which may consist of airplanes rather than boots on the ground.

Trump in campaign speech: I will end the war in Ukraine immediately I will get it done while I’m president-elect.

During his presidential campaign, Trump boasted he would end the war before Inauguration Day. Instead, today, Palm Sunday, Russian missiles struck the Ukrainian city of Sumy — at least 32 civilians are dead, including another 2 children.

Scott Pelley: In your view, what is at stake in this moment?

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (Translated): Security. The security of the world is at stake. If we do not stand firm, he will advance further. It is not just idle speculation; the threat is real. Putin’s ultimate goal is to revive the Russian Empire and reclaim territories currently under NATO protection. And the United States being part of NATO means it will be involved in any potential conflict. Considering all of this, I believe it could escalate into a world war.

Scott Pelley: A risk to the world.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (Translated): Yes, for the world. There won’t be a safe place [not a] safe place for [anyone].

By Mark Episkopos, Responsible Statecraft, 3/31/25

Alexander Vindman’s recent book, “The Folly of Realism,”throws down the gauntlet, as the name suggests, at the “realists” he thinks were responsible for failing to deter Russia and seize opportunities for defense cooperation with Ukraine.

According to Vindman, the former National Security Council official who testified against President Trump during his impeachment trial in 2019, this “realist” behavior incentivized Moscow’s continued imperialist predations, culminating in the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Vindman’s proposed antidote to what he considers the lapses of the past three decades is Benjamin Tallis’ framework of “neo-idealism,” a lightly repackaged menagerie of post-Cold War transatlanticism’s greatest hits that is bizarrely presented as a novel outlook on the international system.

Fully squaring all the historical misjudgments presented in these 240 pages demands an exegesis of at least as many pages, and not just because there are so many — though one certainly doesn’t find themselves pressed for material — but because Vindman’s central arguments flow from larger, decades-long narratives about Russia and post-Cold War U.S. policy that simply do not stand up to scrutiny.

Nuclear policy emerges as one of the main causal drivers of Vindman’s story. No one can quarrel with the proposition that successive administrations took seriously the cause of nonproliferation in the post-Soviet sphere — they had every reason to — and that nuclear concerns shaped U.S. engagement with the Russian Federation to a significant even if not decisive degree.

But to suggest, as Vindman does, that the thrust of early U.S./NATO policy toward Russia boils down to nuclear concerns is to lapse into a narrowly tendentious reading of events that history doesn’t lend itself to.

Vindman, who interviewed the officials involved in negotiating the 1994 Budapest Memorandum from the U.S. side, was careful not to retread the solecisms so heartily indulged by many of his allies and fellow travelers. He concedes, and not insignificantly so considering how deeply this narrative has entrenched itself in recent years, that the signed memorandum did not contain U.S. security guarantees to Ukraine in exchange for relinquishing its supposed nuclear arsenal.

“There’s no question in my memory and in my mind that the Ukrainians understood completely the difference between security assurances and Article 5 security guarantees. And they understood they were getting security assurances,” Vindman quoted Nicholas Burns, Senior Director for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia Affairs at the National Security Council, as saying.

These assurances, as I explained with my colleague Zach Paikin, did not commit the U.S. to undertake any specific commitments beyond what it agreed to in previous treaties. Indeed, it’s precisely because the memorandum was not legally binding and contained no concrete defense commitments that it did not have to be ratified by the Senate, as all treaties must be.

But this whole “denuclearization” business calls for a greater degree of technical scrutiny than Vindman affords it. Three of the 15 states that emerged from the Soviet collapse — Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus — did not in fact “inherit” thousands of nuclear weapons. These were Soviet nuclear weapons, stationed across the Soviet Union but controlled from Moscow. After the Soviet collapse, these became Soviet nuclear weapons left over on the territories of former Soviet soviet states.

It was never established that Ukraine exercised legal, political, or operational control over these weapons, nor that the nascent Ukrainian state disposed of the considerable resources required to maintain them. Ukraine did not, in this sense, possess a nuclear inheritance that could be bartered away for Western security guarantees or anything else.

What we have before us, then, is not a geostrategic question but a largely operational challenge of removing these weapons, to which Ukraine had no recognized claim, from Ukrainian territory in an orderly way. This rather unremarkable process, though unquestionably a major part of the story of 1990s U.S.-Russia relations, is lent a degree of long-term political significance by Vindman that it simply doesn’t deserve.

So, what, then, is the larger picture and how does it fit into Vindman’s argument that the West’s woes stem from a decades-long policy of, if not appeasing, then at least turning a blind eye to “Russian ambition and exceptionalism?”

One cannot help but escape the sense that Vindman’s story suffers from the plight of Alexander the Great, who wept that he had only one world to conquer. His analysis is strongly tinted by the endless, yet strategically vacuous, expressions of goodwill, optimism about Russia’s Western path, and other such millenarian effusions that characterized U.S.-Russia relations up to the mid-2000’s.

But in the most important ways, U.S. policy has been guided all along by something quite similar to Vindman’s neo-idealism. The Soviet collapse gave Western leaders a generational opportunity to go about the difficult but necessary task of building a new security architecture that includes mechanisms not just to deter Russia, but also to engage it in ways that do not lead to security spirals in Eastern Europe. U.S. policymakers, less driven by balance of power concerns than they were enchanted by the seductive vision of a Europe “whole and free,” brushed aside the concerns of George Kennan, Robert McNamara, and a great many others to greenlight the limitless expansion of NATO, an alliance explicitly arrayed against the Russian Federation’s Soviet predecessor.

It seems to be a source of consternation for Vindman that Ukraine was not invited into NATO in those early days. Vindman’s implication that Ukraine was thus abandoned to Russia’s sphere of influence incorrectly frames the problem at hand. Washington’s fervid devotion to NATO’s “open door” membership policy and dogged refusal to countenance any framework for delimiting NATO’s boundaries shows that the lack of progress in this area was purely tactical in nature and certainly not grounded in systemic realist thinking.

There is also the peccadillo of democratic values, defense of which is supposed to be NATO’s entire raison d’être. In point of fact, polling shows most Ukrainians had no desire to join the alliance until as late as the mid 2010s, when it became impossible due to outstanding territorial conflicts with Russia.

Vindman’s indictment of what he wants the reader to believe passes for “realism” — more on that shortly — hinges on viewing Russia as an innate aggrandizer emboldened by the failure of successive U.S. administrations to deter it.

It all falls apart upon the most basic attempt at a more sophisticated structural analysis — one which would find that Russia’s behavior is consistent not with a grand strategy of conquest for its own sake but with what most realists would identify as balancing behavior in response to the eastward expansion of Western military and security institutions into the post-Soviet sphere, and Russian actions intended to preemptively deny such expansion.

Trudging through this book, with its unique blend of endless encyclopedic tedium heaped on top of the analytical equivalent of a children’s pop-up story, can be best likened to navigating a swamp that’s shallow yet impossibly vast. But this rather unpleasant journey at least gives the reader ample time to meditate on the book’s central conceit.

Vindman unfortunately displays a woefully inadequate grasp of that which he tries to impugn: at no point does he demonstrate anything more than a cursory understanding of realist approaches to the issues he tries to elucidate.

One is left grasping in vain for any evidence that Vindman can pass the simple theoretical Turing Test of explaining any school of realism — let alone to distinguish between them — to the satisfaction of a realist. But Vindman’s underlying thrust is not to meaningfully engage with realist arguments on Ukraine’s post-Soviet transition, 1990’s U.S.-Russia relations, or nuclear proliferation in the former Soviet sphere.

Instead he wants to launder what has largely been an idealist, atlanticist handling of these issues since 1991 by pinning the neoconservatives’ manifold sins and lapses on a haphazard cluster of ideas and approaches clumsily christened by him as “realism.” There was no realism in the strategically shortsighted decision — condemned by many realists at the time — to enable successive waves of NATO expansion and encourage, against genuine U.S. and European security interests, the integration of post-Soviet states into the West’s collective defense umbrella.

The well-established idealist framing of American engagement with competitors as a manichean confrontation between democracy and autocracy is anathema to realism and, indeed, to a healthy understanding of U.S. national security priorities.

But it is true that actual realist ideas are rapidly making their way back into the foreign policy discourse after decades in the wilderness. As is always the case after an exiled intellectual movement rediscovers the levers of power, there will and should be a vigorous debate on what form these ideas will take when filtered through the vicissitudes of American politics and applied to the pressing challenges of our time, including the Russia-Ukraine war and the broader task of building a sustainable architecture of European security.

And whatever missteps are made along the way pale in comparison to a disastrous status quo that can be described by many names. Realism, it is not.

RT, 4/11/25

The discussions between Russian President Vladimir Putin and White House special envoy Steve Witkoff on Friday involved “aspects of the settlement of the Ukraine conflict,” the Kremlin has announced, declining to provide further details.

Witkoff visited Russia on Friday and met with Putin in St. Petersburg. The meeting lasted over four hours and the content of the talks has been largely kept under wraps by Moscow and Washington.

However, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt addressed the issue during a press briefing earlier in the day when asked by a reporter about the purpose of Witkoff’s visit to Russia.

According to Leavitt, the visit was aimed at facilitating direct US communications with the Kremlin as part of a broader effort to negotiate a ceasefire and eventual peace agreement in the Ukraine conflict.

The Trump administration faced growing internal divisions this week after Witkoff allegedly proposed a ceasefire plan that would recognize Russian control over four eastern regions claimed by both Moscow and Kiev, Reuters reported on Friday citing anonymous sources.

During a White House meeting with President Donald Trump last week, Witkoff argued that recognizing Russian ownership of Lugansk, Donetsk, Zaporozhye, and Kherson was the swiftest path to halting the war, the outlet’s sources said. General Keith Kellogg, Trump’s Ukraine envoy, reportedly pushed back, stressing Ukraine would not accept full territorial concessions.

White House explains purpose of envoy’s Russia visitREAD MORE: White House explains purpose of envoy’s Russia visit

The meeting reportedly concluded without a decision from Trump, who has repeatedly said he wants to broker a ceasefire by May. Witkoff subsequently traveled to Russia on Friday for talks with Putin.

The episode has deepened rifts within the Trump administration, as officials debate how to resolve the Ukraine conflict, Reuters wrote. Witkoff’s approach, previously outlined in a March interview with Tucker Carlson, has reportedly alarmed both Republican lawmakers and US allies.

“They’re Russian-speaking,” Witkoff told Carlson of the eastern territories. “There have been referendums where the overwhelming majority of the people have indicated that they want to be under Russian rule.”

Several Republicans reportedly contacted National Security Adviser Mike Waltz and Secretary of State Marco Rubio to raise concerns about Witkoff’s stance, criticizing him for echoing Russian rhetoric.

A recent dinner with Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev, who until recently was under US sanctions, further stirred controversy. Originally planned at Witkoff’s home, it was moved to the White House after security concerns were raised.

Despite criticism, Witkoff retains strong backing from Trump and some administration officials. Waltz praised his efforts, citing his business background and recent diplomatic activity, including securing the release of US citizen Marc Fogel from Russia.

By Brian McDonald, Twitter, 3/17/25

Trump’s decision to dismantle Voice of America and RFERL isn’t some grand Kremlin conspiracy—it’s basic housecleaning. 🧹These outlets were supposed to serve U.S. foreign policy interests, but instead, they became ideological echo chambers that alienated their target audiences and undermined Washington’s own strategic objectives.. 🤦‍♂️

Look at the website of their parent body, the
@USAGMgov
, and it says that these outlet’s activities must “be consistent with the broad foreign policy objectives of the United States.” But they have not been for some time now.

Once upon a time, American-funded media broadcast messages of freedom, prosperity, and shared values, convincing millions behind the Iron Curtain that the West offered a better future.🇺🇸✨That was the point—soft power at its most effective. But fast-forward to today, and what do we see?

Instead of fostering goodwill or even basic engagement, these media turned into hyper-woke culture war machines, promoting “decolonization” narratives, gender ideology, and separatist movements that have zero appeal to ordinary Russians.🇷🇺 Instead of making a case for the West, they told Russians that their culture was inherently oppressive, that their literary greats were villains, and that their national identity needed to be dismantled. 👎

Rather than persuading Russians that better ties with America were possible, they actively pushed Moscow and Beijing closer together.🇷🇺🤝🇨🇳 Imagine the absurdity: U.S. foreign policy has been trying to negotiate with Russia, while its own government-funded broadcasters is telling Russians that their entire history was toxic and needs to be erased. You don’t need to be a foreign policy genius to see how self-defeating that is.🙃

Worse still, these outlets didn’t just lose the plot—they went rogue. 😵‍💫 They gave platforms to outright separatists and extremists, advocated for the breakup of Russia, and churned out narratives that had nothing to do with America’s interests and everything to do with the obsessions of an unaccountable media class.

A U.S. propaganda machine that once helped win the Cold War🏆 ended up hijacked by activists who were more interested in lecturing Russians about transgender rights than in actually advancing U.S. diplomacy.🏳️‍⚧️🤡

So why were these outlets axed? Simple.✅ They had completely abandoned their mission. The U.S. government doesn’t need to pay for expensive media networks that do nothing but inflame tensions, sabotage diplomatic efforts, and alienate the very people they were meant to reach.🚫

Trump’s move isn’t a “gift to Putin”—it’s a much-needed correction.🔥 I If America wants to regain influence, it needs to stop funding ideological vanity projects that serve no purpose other than making their own staff feel morally superior.

By Uriel Araujo, InfoBrics, 4/11/25

Uriel Araujo, PhD, anthropology researcher with a focus on international and ethnic conflicts

Bohdan Krotevych, a notorious former Ukrainian commander and ex-chief of staff of the far-right Azov Brigade, has publicly called for the removal of General Oleksandr Syrskyi, Ukraine’s armed forces commander, accusing him of endangering soldiers’ lives with “borderline criminal” orders and outdated tactics, the Guardian reports.

Krotevych, who resigned in February (allegedly to speak freely), criticized Syrskyi for micromanaging the military and issuing directives that force troops to rest dangerously close to the front lines, such as 50 meters away, rather than in safer rear areas. He argues that Syrskyi’s lack of strategic innovation—relying on throwing more troops into battles or withdrawing them only when overwhelmed—has contributed to Ukraine’s losses in 2024 and 2025, including advances by Russian forces in Donbas and Kursk.

Although Krotevych is known to have in the past also reported General Yuri Sodol to the State Bureau of Investigation for “incompetent command”, the Guardian article highlights in fact a quite rare public and rather scandalous dissent from within Ukraine’s military ranks, shifting some blame for recent battlefield setbacks from external factors—like Russia’s numerical superiority—to internal leadership failures. Krotevych’s outspokenness underscores broader frustrations with Syrskyi, who has been criticized for his tactics since taking command in February 2024, despite earlier successes like the Kharkiv counteroffensive.

General Syrskyi is a four-star general and the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces since February 8, 2024. He has played key roles in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict, commanding the Kharkiv counteroffensive in 2022 as well as the Bakhmut one in 2023. Known for his strategic acumen, he has been both praised in Ukraine for battlefield successes and criticized for high-casualty tactics, earning nicknames like “General 200.”

Bohdan Krotevych, the whistleblower, in turn is a infamous figure in Ukraine’s military landscape, recognized for his role as a former commander and chief of staff of the Azov Brigade, a unit within the National Guard of Ukraine. Krotevych joined Azov in 2014 following Crimea’s status referendum and annexation to Russia.

The Azov Brigade itself, originally formed as a volunteer battalion in 2014, has been widely controversial due to its ties to far-right and neo-Nazi elements. Founded by neo-Nazi Andriy Biletsky, a figure with a documented history in ultra-nationalist and white supremacist circles, the unit has attracted individuals with extremist views from the very start.

Western media and analysts, including pre-2022 reports from CNN, Time etc, have noted and reported Azov’s neo-Nazi affiliations, though its integration into Ukraine’s National Guard and its role in fighting Russia have apparently shifted its public image (in the West at least) toward that of just a disciplined military force. Although the frequent appearance of Nazi swastikas and other such symbols on the uniforms of Azov’s soldiers (sometimes caught on live TV) remains an embarrassment.

Krotevych’s own far-right connections have been scrutinized. Critics point to his recommendation of a memoir by Albert Kesselring, a Nazi war criminal, to Azov recruits. He also took part in the 2014 Maidan coup as a member of the Right Sector—a radical nationalist group with far-right ultra-nationalist roots.

When accused of having political ambitions, Krotevych has been explicitly distancing himself from any alignment with Ukraine’s ambassador to the UK, Valerii Zaluzhnyi. Four-star General Zaluzhnyi, by the way, is General Oleksandr Syrskyi’s predecessor, viewed as a possible future contender for the presidency of Ukraine.

Zaluzhnyi, too, has been under scrutiny for far-right connections. He was photographed in front of a portrait of Stepan Bandera, the controversial Ukrainian nationalist figure, in a post shared by Ukraine’s parliament on X in January 2023 to mark Bandera’s birthday. The image sparked significant controversy, particularly in Poland, due to Bandera’s historical ties to ultra-nationalist groups and Nazi collaboration during World War II, involving the ethnic cleansing of Poles and Jews, as documented by historians such as Timothy Snyder. This remains a major issue with Polish-Ukrainian relations, as I’ve written. All of that is business as usual in post-2014 Ukraine.

It is true Krotevych’s resignation and outspokenness could suggest personal bias or a settling of scores (or political goals). His claims however do make sense. They resonate with some soldiers and analysts who have long criticized General Syrskyi’s “Soviet-style” approach, earning him monikers like “the Butcher” among detractors for high casualty rates, notably during the battle of Bakhmut in 2023.

As a former Azov Brigade commander with frontline experience, Krotevych has firsthand knowledge of combat operations and leadership dynamics, which should lend some weight to his operational critiques. Moreover, his specific examples, like the proximity of rest zones to combat lines, are plausible given documented reports of Ukraine’s strained resources and Syrskyi’s emphasis on holding ground at all costs. It was seen in Bakhmut, where Ukraine suffered heavy losses before withdrawing.

Independent analyses, such as those from military observers in Western media, have similarly noted Syrskyi’s preference for grinding, manpower-intensive tactics over maneuver warfare, which aligns with Krotevych’s charge of strategic stagnation.

Far-right extremism and corruption aside, the fact is that, despite billions in aid, Ukraine’s armed forces grapple with deep-rooted issues, from resource strains to criticized leadership tactics. And Washington has, as I wrote, even in September 2024, largely shifted this burden to Europe, and European leaders barely seem willing to shoulder it.

At this rate, the West’s proxy war in Ukraine against Moscow risks becoming Europe’s “Vietnam”—a prolonged, costly quagmire.