Moon of Alabama, 1/31/25

At the time of writing the above I did not know that the idea for this campaign came from RAND, the Pentagon’s think tank which often proposes strategic ideas. In a commentary about Russian/North Korean and Chinese cooperation published on October 11, three days before the start of Zelenski’s campaign, a RAND analyst wrote:

What Should the United States Do?

Given the differences in the objectives of Russia, China, and North Korea, the United States should be mounting major information operations against these three countries to highlight their differences and fuel distrust among them.
…
[T]he United States should recognize that North Korean military advisors are supporting Russian use of North Korean military supplies in occupied areas of Ukraine.
…
This new cooperation between Russia and North Korea is hardly a signal of a budding long-term alliance and U.S. information campaigns could help speed its demise.

Just three days later the Military Intelligence of the Ukrainian army, headed by General Budanov, started to ‘leak’ claims to the Ukrainian press about North Korean troops in Russia.

Since launching the first rumors of 1,500, then 3,000 North Korean soldiers in Russia the CIA trained head of the Ukrainian military special service General Budanov increased the number from hot air to 11,000 North Korean soldiers.

But even NATO denied to have any knowledge of such a force.

As I summarized at that time:

Shortly after RAND proposed a U.S. information operation campaign around the theme of North Korean soldiers in Russia the Ukrainian military intelligence service under CIA trainee Budanov started to spread rumors of North Korean soldiers soon to fight on the Russian side. The numbers claimed by Budanov have since steadily increased. South Korean intelligence, also associated with the CIA, and U.S. media have joined the campaign. The chair of the House Intelligence Committee is milking the campaign to make political points.

Evidence that was supposed to support the claims has been exposed as being fake. The whole story is thus based on nothing but ‘intelligence’ rumors which are following a RAND proposed script. Don’t fall for it.

The story continued to grow through repetition. Media quoted each other with each adding bits of bullshit from their usual ‘security sources’. What failed to turn up though was evidence.

After being repeatedly questioned about the lack of evidence for their claims, Ukrainian politicians presented their solution:

Today the Ukrainian Minister of Defense, Rustem Umerov, has given a hint how Ukraine will handle this issue (machine translation):

Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov confirmed the words of the head of the National Security and Defense Council’s Center for Combating Disinformation, Andriy Kovalenko , that the first “small-scale fighting” had already taken place between the Ukrainian Armed Forces and North Korean soldiers, and the Koreans had suffered losses.
…
Umerov also said that the Russian Federation disguises Koreans as Buryats, so the dead and prisoners must be identified before Ukraine calls the number of enemy losses.

Buryats are a Mongolic people in Siberia who are part of the Russian Federation. Many of them have joined the well paid ranks of Russian forces. Umerov’s plan was thus obvious:

As soon as some Buryat soldier of Russia will turn up dead, the Ukrainian military will present him as a disguised North Korean soldier. Some black and white photos will be found of a similar looking person in North Korean uniform …

“There is your prove. Now send soldiers and weapons.” will Umerov say.

There have since been several attempts by Ukrainian special services to reinforce their media campaign. Russian passports from dead Russian soldiers were presented as ‘fake documents’ carried by ‘North Koreans’. They even captured a Buryat:

On Oct. 28 (local time), Jonas Ohman, head of the Lithuanian NGO Blue/Yellow, which provides aid to Ukraine and its military, informed local media outlet LRT, stating, “The first encounter between a Ukrainian unit we support and North Korean soldiers occurred on the 25th in Kursk. To my knowledge, all of the North Korean soldiers, except for one, were killed. The surviving soldier was found carrying identification as a Buryat.”

Other ‘evidence’ included hand written letters, allegedly by North Korean soldiers, written in South Korean type and style.

Even Wikipedia had to admit:

As of January 2025, there has been no independent confirmation of the Buryat Battalion’s existence [,allegedly consisting of soldiers from North Korea,] outside of Ukrainian sources.

The nonsense of this scheme has become too obvious.

Now the CIA, with the help of the New York Times, is shutting it down.

The ‘North Korean soldiers’ are leaving the battlefield the same way they came – ever unseen.

North Korean Troops No Longer Seen on Front Lines Fighting Ukraine (archived) – New York Times, Jan 31 2024
North Korea sent its best troops to aid Russia in its war against Ukraine. But after months of suffering severe losses, they have been taken off the front line.

North Korean soldiers who joined their Russian allies in battle against Ukrainian forces have been pulled off the front lines after suffering heavy casualties, according to Ukrainian and U.S. officials.

The North Korean troops, sent to bolster Russian forces trying to push back a Ukrainian offensive inside Russia’s borders, have not been seen at the front for about two weeks, the officials said after requesting anonymity to discuss sensitive military and intelligence matters.

Well – that sentences is formally correct. But it would be even more precise to say that ‘North Korean troops have not been seen at the front – since ever.’

The CIA/NYT can’t go there (yet). They still add to the stupid claims:

Many of the soldiers are among North Korea’s best-trained special operations troops, but the Russians appear to have used them as foot soldiers, sending them forth in waves across fields studded with land mines to be mowed down by heavy Ukrainian fire.

Well, where are the pictures and videos of North Korean troops ‘sent forth in waves’ and ‘mowed down by heavy Ukrainian fire’?

In a war where every ground move is surveilled by dozens of drones how come there is not even one video that shows evidence of such a scene?

For now the RAND/Ukraine (dis-)information campaign of ‘North Korean’ soldiers fighting Ukraine has been shut down. U.S. ‘officials’ however keep the door open to relaunch it at a convenient time:

The American officials said the decision to pull the North Korean troops off the front line may not be a permanent one. It is possible, they said, that the North Koreans could return after receiving additional training or after the Russians come up with new ways of deploying them to avoid such heavy casualties.

Maybe a month, a year, or ten from now we will be again told about these imagined ‘enemies’ from North Korea which unite with Russians to ‘fight us’.

Posted by b on January 31, 2025 at 14:48 UTC | Permalink

Russia Matters, 2/3/25

1. “Russia is close to achieving a decisive edge on the energy front of the Russo–Ukrainian war,” argues Theresa Sabonis-Helf of Georgetown University. According to Sabonis-Helf’s estimates in War on the Rocks, Russian attacks have damaged Ukraine’s electrical grid so much that it has become 70% reliant on three complexes of nuclear reactors. “These reactors are increasingly threatened by the instability of the grid itself and could become unsafe to operate, forcing a shutdown and grid collapse,” she warns. Moreover, with Ukraine having submitted to heightened oversight by IAEA, “the decision to shut down its nuclear plants if the perceived risk becomes too high may not be entirely its own,” this Georgetown University professor observes in her data-rich commentary. “We now find ourselves in a moment in which a slow war of attrition could come to an abrupt end, resolved by the triumph of cold and darkness,” she warns.
2. The seizure of Velyka Novosilka, which has been described as a “most important fortified area” of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Donetsk region, underscores the effectiveness of a tactic that Russian forces have been employing to take towns: using its personnel advantage to attack relentlessly, gradually trapping Ukrainian forces in a pincer movement and forcing them to retreat to avoid encirclement, according to NYT’s Constant Méheut. Russia’s seizure of this eastern Ukrainian town “followed a familiar pattern: relentless infantry assaults, devastating casualties, collapsing Ukrainian defenses and their eventual retreat” with the battlefield dominated by drones, and armor playing a minimal role, according to the Economist’s article on this battle, entitled “Amid talk of a ceasefire, Ukraine’s front line is crumbling.” “It would not be accurate to claim that the Russians don’t know how to fight,” Maj. Ivan Sekach of Ukraine’s 110th Brigade, acknowledged in an interview with NYT.

Note: “Frank discussion” is diplomatic speak for “they argued.” – Natylie

Intellinews, 1/30/25

Russian forces have begun withdrawing from Syria, with two cargo vessels, the Sparta II and Sparta, departing from the port of Tartus on January 30, carrying significant military equipment.

The Russian withdrawal follows what appears to be failed negotiations with Syria’s new interim President, Ahmed al-Sharaa, who formally took the position late on January 29. Al-Sharaa has reportedly demanded the extradition of former President Bashar al-Assad, who fled to Moscow in December following the collapse of the Baathist regime. Russia reportedly refused the demand to return the former Syrian leader. 

Dmitry Peskov has declined to comment on the specifics of any deal between the two sides and the departure from Tartus of the Russian military, which now needs to access Russian ports via Istanbul’s Bosphorus or around the Nordic countries.

The Russian foreign ministry later wrote: “During a frank discussion of the entire range of issues in Russian-Syrian relations, the desire to continue to build bilateral multifaceted cooperation based on the principles of traditional friendship and mutual respect between Russia and Syria was emphasised.”

The two bases were crucial to the Russian presence in the region but are also key logistical nodes for its wider operations in the region and Africa.

A Russian delegation, including two presidential special representatives – Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and Alexander Lavrentiev – met with the new Syrian administration in Damascus on January 28.

Recently released verified footage showed columns of Russian vehicles moving north towards the port following the “frank discussions between the two sides.”

This marked the first such meeting since Assad’s departure. They met with Sharaa (previously wanted by the US for a $10mn bounty) and interim government members, including Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani and Health Minister Maher al-Sharaa.

Russia’s Foreign Ministry stressed continuing bilateral cooperation based on “traditional friendship and mutual respect.”

“The importance of the Syrians themselves resolving their internal problems through the establishment of a sustainable political process within the framework of an inclusive dialogue with the participation of the entire spectrum of political forces was emphasised,” it said.

The ministry also indicated a potential willingness to provide “necessary assistance in post-crisis reconstruction” while maintaining that Syria’s internal issues should be resolved through “inclusive dialogue with participation from all political forces.”

The situation puts at risk Russia’s significant military presence in Syria, including the naval base in Tartus and the Khmeimim air base near Latakia.

While Russia could theoretically seek new bases in Libya, such moves could face opposition, with Turkey already reportedly moving Syrian fighters into North Africa.

The withdrawal appears to present two possibilities: either Russia has found the new regime’s conditions unacceptable, or the military withdrawal is a temporary measure during negotiations.

Based on the Foreign Ministry’s carefully worded statements, Russia appears unwilling to extradite Assad but may be open to discussing other forms of cooperation.

By Gordon Hahn, Russian & Eurasian Politics, 2/2/25

U.S. President Donald Trump is apparently intent on achieving peace at a rapid pace, having set a 100 day window for accomplishing this exceedingly complex political task. Aside from such a time table’s lack of realism, there are other factors that will render it soon out of date. Primary is the deteriorating state of the Ukrainian army’s capacity to hold back the powerful Russian armed forces now arrayed against it. The front may suffer a catastrophic collapse before Trump’s presumed deadline, giving Russia an even greater upper hand in talks.

The collapse of Ukraine’s defense fronts along all or nearly the entire line of combat – which stretches from Kherson just north of Crimea to the east, then north through Donetsk to Kharkiv and Sumy – appears imminent. Some fronts may hold longer but are unlikely to survive 2025. All last year, Russian territorial gains and, for the most part of the year, Ukrainian casualties have increased with each passing month, as I predicted would be the case over a year ago (https://youtu.be/P_MJi5H6HKU?si=rxRiaE0EglSgbclw at the 1:00:45 mark). The territorial advance now is accelerating at an ever more rapid pace and could lead to major breakthroughs to the Dnepr (Dnieper) River at any time now.

At the same time, the state of the Ukrainian military is disastrous. The military mobilization passed and being carried out this year with such a debilitating effect on the economy and society is failing to replace current losses at the front with completely inexperienced recruits with low to no morale (www.youtube.com/watch?v=r8yMTGKURYU). There are reportedly no more volunteers, and by spring some Ukrainian officials report the situation will be irretrievable. Moreover, almost all new recruits are old or unmotivated, The Economist reports (https://ctrana.one/news/475629-nekhvatka-soldat-v-vsu-stanet-kritichnoj-vesnoj-the-economist.html).

Commanders at the front, such as commander of the drone battalion of Ukraine’s 30th mechanized brigade, confirm that the 2024 mobilization has been an absolute failure, and there are now too few men to replace battle losses (https://ria.ru/20250113/mobilizatsiya-1993456847.html?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fdzen.ru%2Fnews%2Fstory%2F1af5d353-85ec-5374-a9d8-e07753fbda13). The mobilization that does occur is carried out by harsh, frequently violent measures. Verkhovna Rada deputy Aleksandr Bakumov from Zelenskiy’s own ‘Servants of the People’ party declared in session that mobilisation in Kharkiv Region is coerced, resembling filtration of Ukrainian population (referring to practice of detaining, beating, and torturing citizens of occupied areas in an ostensible search for fighters and collaborators), with exits from the city blockaded by ‘recruitment’ press gangs and lawyers of mobilized men get beaten. Small businesses are undergoing mass closures because of lack of workers willing to go outside for fear of being pressed into the army. Others have reported falsification of data to justify recruitment (https://ctrana.one/news/478468-v-verkhovnoj-rade-zajavili-o-bespredele-ttsk-v-kharkove-video-vystuplenija.html and https://x.com/leonidragozin/status/1881280945644605814). There are numerous reports and videos of violence being used by recruitment gangs. In addition, many men are fleeing the country in greater numbers in order to avoid Ukraine’s desperate and draconian  forced mobilization measures, sometimes at great risk to their lives and to sociopolitical stability. Most recently, Western governments have reportedly been pressuring Kiev to extend the mobilization to the age cohort of 18-25, which would bring a near catastrophic demographic collapse to a population already depleted by some 30 percent because of war deaths and emigration (https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-war-biden-draft-08e3bad195585b7c3d9662819cc5618f). Even the recrutiment centers themselves are attempting to avoid the draft. When Rada deputies proposed closing the personnel shortage by creating a brigade from among the mobilization gangs, the chairman of the mobilization centers claimed there were not enough of them to form a full brigade (https://ctrana.one/news/475129-v-ttsk-objasnili-pochemu-nelzja-vsekh-ikh-rabotnikov-poslat-na-front.html). Low numbers of volunteers and failed mobilization are creating distortions in force structure. ‘Zombi-brigades’ or ‘paper brigades’ are partially-manned units merely called brigades in order to impress Western donors and facilitate corruption for commanders who seize the salaries designated for non-existing personnel (https://ctrana.one/news/476359-bezuhlaja-raskritikovala-komandovanie-vsu-za-situatsiju-s-brihadoj-anna-kievskaja.html).

The large number of desertions from the Ukrainian military, a phenomenon wholly ignored in the Western media for three years, were revealed finally in November to have exceeded 100,000 since the war began (https://apnews.com/article/deserters-awol-ukraine-russia-war-def676562552d42bc5d593363c9e5ea0). This would amount to perhaps more than 10 precent of the Ukrainian army at its present size, given Zelenskiy’s recent claim it numbers 800,000 (https://t.me/stranaua/183652). Moreover, more than half those desertions occurred in the first ten months of 2024 alone (https://apnews.com/article/deserters-awol-ukraine-russia-war-def676562552d42bc5d593363c9e5ea0). This is already desertion on a massive scale and includes mass desertions (https://www.ft.com/content/9b25288d-8258-4541-81b0-83b00ad8a03f; https://ctrana.one/news/476730-zhurnalist-bojko-rasskazal-o-problemakh-v-vsu.html). Military blogger Yurii Butusov, Servants of the People deputy Maryana Bezuglaya, and others reported late last year on the desertion of an entire 1,000-man brigade trained in France immediately upon their arrival at the front. This may have been a case of a commander’s unsuccessful attempt to form what are called ‘zombi-brigades’ (https://ctrana.one/news/476748-jurij-butusov-zajavil-o-massovom-dezertirstve-v-brihade-vsu-anna-kievskaja.html and https://ctrana.one/news/476359-bezuhlaja-raskritikovala-komandovanie-vsu-za-situatsiju-s-brihadoj-anna-kievskaja.html). Indeed, military personnel have questioned the recent practice of creating new brigades when existing ones are woefully undermanned, apparently suspecting the corruption scheme lurking behind this practice (https://ctrana.one/news/474755-v-vsu-objasnili-zachem-sozdavat-novye-brihady-vmesto-popolnenija-sushchestvujushchikh.html). One Ukrainian commander told a Polish newspaper that sometimes in battle there are more deserters than killed and wounded (https://t.me/stranaua/180095).

Desertions are one symptom of lax discipline and especially low morale increasingly plaguing the Ukrainian army. Commanders are reporting that 90 percent of their troops on the frontlines are new, coercively mobilized men (https://ctrana.news/news/475190-v-vsu-sejchas-vojujut-v-osnovnom-zhiteli-sel-horodskim-lehche-sprjatatsja-ot-ttsk.html; https://t.me/rezident_ua/25314 (video); and https://ctrana.one/news/476730-zhurnalist-bojko-rasskazal-o-problemakh-v-vsu.html). Sources in the Ukrainian General Staff report similarly (https://ctrana.one/news/476708-kuda-ischez-million-ukrainskikh-soldat.html). Thus, desertions are accompanied by unauthorized retreats, which are increasing in frequency. For example, hundreds ran from battle at one point last autumn in Vugledar (Ugledar) before it fell (www.ft.com/content/9b25288d-8258-4541-81b0-83b00ad8a03f). Vugledar was once a solid stronghold, which in 2023 Russian forces stormed tens of times with no results. Ukrainians soldiers are refusing to carry out operational orders because they amount to suicide operations and are beginning to surrender as whole units, in one case nearly a full battalion (e.g., 92nd Combat). Indeed, refusals to follow orders or undertake counteroffensive measures are increasing. In one recent case, the Azov Brigade’s chief of staff, Bogdan Koretich, accused a Ukrainian general of such poor command that he was described as being responsible for more Ukrainian war dead than the Russians, forcing his removal (www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/06/24/7462293/). At lower levels, commanders are being fired in large numbers (https://strana.news/news/467266-itohi-852-dnja-vojny-v-ukraine.html). One reason for the disintegrating discipline and morale is that there is no relief for troops, as there is no long term‚ demobilization or time away from the front other than that coming from episodic brief rotations of troops—a consequence of insufficient troop numbers. Soldiers and their relatives have been lobbying for well over year for a law on demobilization that would routinize long rotations for troops to visit home, but no such law is visible on the horizon. Such would likely lead to a fatal troop shortage and the Ukrainian army’s full rout on the battlefield.

However, perhaps the main problem in the Ukrainian army, as in the rest of Ukrainian state and society, is corruption. It is endemic and omnipresent in arms production and procurement, mobilization (draft evasion by bribe), purchasing of leave and absence from the front, and manning brigades. One Ukrainian Defense Minister told a journalist that the problem is catastrophic“ (https://ctrana.one/news/476708-kuda-ischez-million-ukrainskikh-soldat.html). Independent Rada deputy Anna Skorokhod claims that only 15 percent (!) of servicemen on the personnel roles are serving at the front, with large numbers either non-existent (dead souls) in service or having bribed their way into hiding somewhere in the rear (https://ctrana.one/news/476708-kuda-ischez-million-ukrainskikh-soldat.html). 

This is how Ukrainian officers describe the mass-scale of corruption in the army. Ukrainian army captain: “Due to false reports about the presence of personnel, the commanders of the directions receive false information. And they operate with ‚dead souls‘, developing combat plans. For example, somewhere the Russians have broken through a section of the front, the commander gives an order to a certain brigade to send a battalion with an attached group to reinforce. In fact, the battalion has been gone for a long time, its number is no more than a company — some have bought off their way to the rear or deserted. As a result, there is nothing to close the breakthrough, because of the threat, the flanks of neighboring brigades begin to crumble.”

Ukrainian Armed Forces General Staff source: “If we take how many Russian troops we have at the front on paper, then if the Russians have an advantage in numbers, it is less than twofold. But that is on paper. In practice, the situation is different. Let’s imagine a separate section of the front. According to the papers, there are 100 people on our side, and 150 on the Russian side. That is, the enemy’s advantage is insignificant. With such numbers, it is quite possible to keep the defense. But during a real battle, the situation is radically different. At most 40 of our 100 people participate in it. And often even less. The rest are deserters, who simply refuse to fight, and the like. And Russians have 140-145 out of 150 people going into battle. In total, the advantage has already more than tripled. Why does this situation exist? Our army was initially based on a core of volunteers, ATO veterans, and highly motivated soldiers who went into battle without coercion and took the initiative. Russians had a big problem with motivation from the very beginning. But they worked on this issue and gradually created their own military-repressive system of coercion. And it works by sending soldiers into battle and stopping cases of insubordination and desertion. We did not create anything like this. And I doubt that we are even capable of creating such a system. Our state system is too weak and too corrupt for this. And now that the volunteers have died, died of injury, or simply burned out, and the army is being replenished with fake conscripts who have close to zero motivation, there are no ways to force them to fight. A separate problem is the quality of the command staff and the combat management system. There are also very big failures here, because many experienced commanders died and worthy replacements do not always come after them.” (https://ctrana.one/news/476708-kuda-ischez-million-ukrainskikh-soldat.html).

This is a state of corruption, low morale, and incapacity reminiscent of the late, recently collpased Syrian army of Bashir al-Assad.

This sort of Ukrainian army along with its collapse comprises multiple threats to both the Maidan regime and the Ukrainian state beyond that posed by the advancing Russian army. I wrote some time back: “With the front collapsing and the army on the verge of dissolving, Zelenskiy’s post-Maidan regime is deeply divided and in danger of dissolution, which could bring state collapse, internecine warfare, and widespread chaos” (https://gordonhahn.com/2024/12/10/the-second-great-ukrainian-ruin-revisited/). The troops of a collapsed Ukrainian army will become a force that can sow chaos and/or be marshalled by a military or civilian leader towards the execution of a coup and perhaps a neofascist revolution or by peripheral and local figures to establish separate fiefdoms. Recall that during the Maidan demonstrations, leaders in Lvov and elsewhere first broached the idea of separating from then Yanukovych-controlled Ukraine. After the Maidan revolt and Yanukovych’s overthrow, it was Crimea and Donbas that moved towards separatism. Trump and his counterparts in Moscow, Kiev, and Brussels will need to make peace expeditiously in order to achieve a peace that avoids the long standoff and prospects for a new war in Ukraine that will be inherent in any unilateral, Russian imposed peace and Ukrainian capitulation and/or conquest as well as the danger of state collapse that could precede a Russian all-out victory. Indeed, it appears only Trump’s rapid peace can preempt the Ukrainian army’s full rout and collapse and save what remains of the Ukrainian state.

Two points to make. First, if you receive funding from a foreign government, you are not independent and those in alternative media need to stop referring to these outlets and organizations as independent. Second, as detailed by Sarah Lindemann-Komarova, a writer who has been living in Russia for decades, the majority of civil society in Russia is domestically funded and only a small percentage – the percentage that the west constantly focuses on – is foreign funded. So hysterical claims that “independent” Russian civil society will be gutted by the lack of US funding is nonsense. – Natylie

By Mark Tubridy, The Moscow Times, 1/30/25

The Trump administration’s abrupt freeze on foreign aid has plunged exiled Russian NGOs and media outlets into uncertainty, jeopardizing their funding and posing what some describe as the greatest challenge to Russian civil society since the Kremlin enacted its “undesirable” organization law a decade ago.

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued a sweeping directive last Friday, pausing all foreign aid for 90 days. The move aims to give the Trump administration time to review which programs align with the president’s “America First” agenda and determine which should continue receiving U.S. funding. Organizations have been issued stop-work notices on existing projects, along with a suspension of further disbursements.

The freeze has affected a broad range of initiatives, from landmine removal efforts in Iraq and HIV/AIDS treatment programs in Zimbabwe to typhoon emergency relief in the Philippines and wartime civilian programs in Ukraine. While Rubio later granted a waiver for “life-saving humanitarian assistance,” the vague wording has only deepened confusion, leaving organizations scrambling to determine whether their work qualifies.

For Russian NGOs and independent media operating in exile, many of which cannot generate revenue from donations or advertising inside Russia due to their designation as “foreign agents” or “undesirable organizations,” the sudden cutoff of U.S. funding is potentially devastating.

“This is the biggest funding crisis for Russian civil society since 2015, when Russia’s law on ‘undesirable foreign organizations’ forced several Western private foundations to shut down their Russia programs,” a Washington, D.C.-based source familiar with U.S. government funding for Russian organizations told The Moscow Times.

The source, who spoke on condition of anonymity, estimated that as many as 90 organizations could be affected. While some receive funding from private donors and European governments, many are losing a significant share of their budgets due to the Trump administration’s freeze.

“The consequences will vary by organization, depending on their financial situation and alternative funding sources,” the source said. “But most will at minimum have to scale back operations and lay off staff. Some of the largest and most prominent independent Russian media outlets and civil society groups could be forced to shut down entirely.”

Kovcheg (The Ark), an exiled nonprofit that provides support to anti-war Russians both abroad and inside Russia, said it was notified earlier this week by U.S. donors that some of its funding had been paused due to the State Department directive.

“We’re still in a better situation than most NGOs because we cover half of our budget through crowdfunding, but still, I need to cut a team and [some of] our activities,” Anastasia Burakova, who heads Kovcheg, told The Moscow Times.

Burakova added that donor organizations she had spoken with seemed uncertain about what would happen next. “They don’t have a clear idea of whether the programs will continue after the audit or which areas the new administration will support,” she said.

Almut Rochowanski, a nonprofit consultant with years of experience working with Russian human rights activists, recalled the “existential panic” that followed Russia’s 2012 “foreign agent” law in the context of both the current foreign aid freeze and suspension of U.S. federal domestic funding, which was temporarily blocked.

“It was revealing. It showed that access to foreign money was seen as the single most decisive factor for their continued work and existence,” Rochowanski told The Moscow Times.

A journalist who founded an independent Russian news outlet now operating in exile described the “emotional rollercoaster” he and his team experienced upon learning that a “significant portion” of their funding had been frozen.

“It’s not like we were entirely dependent on American grants… It just so happened that at this moment, we were more reliant on U.S. funding, and everything hit at once,” the journalist said on condition of anonymity to discuss internal matters. “Almost overnight, the [money] was frozen.”

Despite the setback, he said his team would “keep fighting” and look for alternative funding sources. “If not, we’ll have to close, because, at this point, there’s simply nothing left to pay people with,” he added.

Some Russian organizations noted that while they do not rely directly on U.S. funding, they receive grants through intermediaries that do — causing the freeze’s effects to spill over to them.

“Some of the donors where you didn’t know who their source was… turned out to be one way or another linked to the same basket,” the head of a Russian nonprofit operating in exile said, requesting anonymity.

“Our donors told us to wait. They say they don’t know how long the pause will be,” the nonprofit head added. “So everything is on hold.”

Given the sweeping nature of the State Department directive, Russian independent media and NGOs are far from the only ones in the region to be impacted.

Ukrainian newspapers receiving funding from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have also said they were forced to suspend ongoing projects as a result.

And in an opinion column this week, The Kyiv Independent’s Chief Editor Olga Rudenko described how the U.S. funding freeze had left programs — including humanitarian relief, mental health support, media initiatives and community development projects — without critical financial backing.

Most Russian organizations contacted by The Moscow Times declined to comment on the freeze’s impact, with some stating they were still assessing how it would affect their operations.

“Russian media outfits probably understand that openly flaunting the fact that they are funded by Western governments might alienate their audiences,” Rochowanski said, pointing out that even anti-Kremlin Russians do not always view the West as a benign actor.

“They may also want to be careful because drawing unwanted attention from the Russian authorities could lead to threats against their reporters and sources,” she added. “For those same reasons, Ukrainian media can be quite open about how they are funded by Western governments.”

With U.S. funding on hold, some organizations are turning to European institutions for support, with discussions of potential emergency funding underway, according to the Washington, D.C.-based source.

The European Federation of Journalists urged potential European donors to step in and fill the gap left by the withdrawal of U.S. funding. While it did not specifically mention Russian organizations, the federation emphasized the reliance of Ukrainian news publications and exiled Belarusian media on U.S. financial assistance.

Still, even if civil society organizations manage to secure stopgap funding during the three-month freeze, there is growing concern that if the Trump administration’s review leads to long-term cuts, many will not survive.

“In the long term, if U.S. government funding isn’t restored, Russia’s independent civil society as a whole will be greatly diminished,” the Washington, D.C.-based source warned.