By Andrew Korybko, Substack, 1/19/25

The Russian and Iranian presidents met in Moscow last Friday to sign an updated strategic partnership pact that can be read in full here and was reviewed here. The run-up to this development was marked by predictable hype about it being a game-changer, which hasn’t subsided in the days since, but this is an inaccurate description of what they agreed to. The only way in which this might ring true is with regards to gas, not geopolitics, for the reasons that’ll now be explained.

To begin with, Russia and Iran already had close military-technical cooperation before they updated their strategic partnership last week as proven by the rumors of Russia relying on Iranian drones in Ukraine. They also agreed to revive the previously stillborn North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC) shortly after the special operation began and the West imposed unprecedented sanctions against Moscow. Therefore, these parts of their updated strategic partnership aren’t anything new, they just aim to strengthen them.

About that, this agreement is fundamentally different from last summer’s Russian-North Korean one in that there aren’t any mutual defense obligations as clarified in Article 3. They only committed to not aid any aggression against the other, including assistance to the aggressor, and to help settle the subsequent conflict at the UN. That was already the case in their relations so explicitly clarifying it is redundant. Under no circumstances will Russia go to war against Israel and/or the US in support of Iran.

After all, “Russia Dodged A Bullet By Wisely Choosing Not To Ally With The Now-Defeated Resistance Axis” over the past 15 months as Israel single-handedly destroyed that Iranian-led regional network, so it naturally follows that it won’t risk World War III in defense of an even weaker Iran. Moreover, Russia didn’t risk war with either of them amidst last December’s American- and Turkish-backed regime change in Syria, not to mention the ongoing special operation where it has direct national security interests.

Putin is therefore very unlikely to break from this precedent, which observers can confidently conclude by dint of him declining to include any North Korean-like mutual defense obligations in Russia’s updated strategic partnership pact with Iran, which should hopefully put to rest some folks’ wishful thinking. It should also be said that the timing of this document’s signing is important too since it took place after Israel defeated the Resistance Axis and as the region correspondingly enters a new geopolitical era.

The parties had been negotiating their updated pact for several years already, and while work had finally ended last fall, Putin specifically requested during the Kazan Summit that Pezeshkian “pay a separate visit to our country to sign this document and other important documents in a ceremonial atmosphere.” Some at the time casually dismissed this as some form of protocol, but in retrospect, it’s arguably the case that Russia didn’t want to sign such a partnership pact until regional hostilities finally abated.

That’s understandable too since he foresaw that the West and some in Israel would interpret that development as supposedly being aimed against them, with the resultant spin complicating any potential peace talks over Ukraine and risking a crisis in relations with Israel. Putin remains committed to resolving the NATO-Russian security dilemma over Ukraine through diplomatic means and spent the past quarter-century expanding ties with Israel so he wasn’t going to jeopardize either in this way.

From the Iran side, Pezeshkian represents the “reformist”/“moderate” faction of the Iranian policymaking elite, and they too might have been concerned that this development would be interpreted by the West and some in Israel as being aimed against them. Such perceptions could spoil any chance of reviving nuclear talks with the US, and it was still uncertain who the next American President would be, so he and his ilk might have also calculated that it’s better to wait until regional hostilities finally abated.

Observers will note that Pezeshkian gave his first interview to foreign media since the US presidential election just days before traveling to Moscow, during which time he reaffirmed his intent to resume talks with the US. The timing strongly suggests that he wanted to preemptively counteract whatever spin hawkish elements in the new administration might try to put on his country’s updated strategic partnership pact with Russia. This might have even been coordinated with Russia to a degree too.

Moving along to the NSTC component of their updated strategic partnership pact, it’s much more substantive since the aim is to increase their measly $4 billion mutual trade, which will help Russia more easily reach other Global South markets while providing relief for Iran’s sanctions-beleaguered economy. If successful, and it’ll take some time to see either way, then the NSTC can serve as a new geo-economic axis connecting the Eurasian Heartland to West Asia, South Asia, and eventually ASEAN and East Africa.

Once again, these plans were already underway for almost three years before they finally signed their long-negotiated updated strategic partnership pact so none of this is exactly new, it just bears mentioning in the larger context considering that part of this newly signed document concerns the NSTC. Much more important than the military and connectivity parts by far is their ambitious gas plans since Russia and Iran have some of the world’s largest reserves, with the latter’s largely remaining untapped.

It was explained in late August why “Russia Might Soon Redirect Its Gas Pipeline Plans From China To Iran & India”, namely due to the continued pricing dispute with the People’s Republic over Power of Siberia 2 and the latest gas MoUs at the time with Iran and then Azerbaijan. These combined to create the credible possibility of Russia replacing its hitherto eastward export focus with a southward one instead. Their updated strategic partnership pact confirms that the southern direction is now Russia’s priority.

Putin said during his press conference with Pezeshkian that he envisages beginning exports at just 2 billion cubic meters (bcm) a year, presumably due to the lack of infrastructure in northern Iran, before eventually scaling it to 55 bcm. That’s the same capacity as the now-defunct Nord Stream 1 to the EU. His Energy Minister later told reporters that the route will run through Azerbaijan and that negotiations are in their final stages over pricing. Their successful conclusion would revolutionize the industry.

Russian investment and technology could unlock Iran’s enormous gas reserves, thus leading to those two creating a “gas OPEC” for managing global prices amidst the Islamic Republic’s entrance to the market. While they have a self-interested incentive to keep them high, plunging the price could deal a powerful blow to America’s fracking industry and its associated LNG exports, thus imperiling its newfound European market dominance brought about by sanctions, the Nord Stream terrorist attack, and Ukraine.

Additionally, Russian gas projects on Iran’s side of the Gulf could supply nearby India, and/or a swap arrangement could be agreed to whereby Iran provides gas to it on Russia’s behalf even sooner. For that to happen, however, India would have to defy existing US sanctions on Iran or secure a waiver. Trump 2.0 might be convinced to respectively turn a blind eye or extend such in order for India to purchase this gas instead of China, the latter of which is already defying such sanctions on the import of Iranian oil.

Part of Trump 2.0’s expected “Pivot (back) to Asia” is to obtain predominant influence over China’s energy imports, which includes cutting off its supply through a carrot-and-stick approach of incentivizing exporters to sell to other clients instead and creating obstacles for those that don’t. Some possibilities for how this could look with regards to Russia were explained here in early January, while the Iranian dimension could work as described above, albeit in exchange for US-Iranian talks making progress.

Even if India decides not to risk the US’ wrath by unilaterally importing Russian-produced Iranian gas in the event that Trump 2.0 isn’t convinced about the merits of having it replace China as Iran’s top energy client and thus threatens harsh sanctions, then China can just buy it all instead. Either way, Russia’s help in unlocking Iran’s largely untapped and enormous reserves will have a seismic effect on this industry, with the only questions being what prices they agree to and who’ll purchase most of it.

The answer to both is of immense importance for American interests since constantly low prices could kill its fracking industry and inevitably lead to the loss of its newly captured European market while China’s large-scale import of this resource (let alone on the cheap) could further fuel its superpower rise. It’s therefore in the US’ interests to boldly consider coordinating with the potentially forthcoming Russian-Iranian “gas OPEC” as well as allowing India to replace China as Iran’s top energy client.

Circling back to the headline, it’s indeed the case that the updated Russian-Iranian strategic partnership pact is poised to be much more of a game-changer in the global gas industry than for geopolitics, though its revolutionary impact on the aforesaid could have some geopolitical consequences in time. Even so, the point is that the pact isn’t geopolitically driven like some enthusiasts imagined before its signing and others still counterfactually insist afterwards since Russia won’t defend Iran from Israel or the US.

Russia and Iran “reject unipolarity and hegemony in world affairs” as agreed upon in their newly signed pact, but they’re not going to directly oppose it via joint military means, only indirectly via energy-related ones and by strengthening their economies’ resilience. The future of their strategic partnership is bright, but in order to fully appreciate its prospects, observers must acknowledge its non-military nature instead of continuing to fantasize about a joint war against Israel and/or the US like some are doing.

I discuss Suzanne Massie in my book and made major use of her excellent book “Land of the Firebird” as a source on the tsarist Russian period. Last summer, I finally got around to reading her memoir about her time as an advisor to Reagan on Russian/Soviet issues and how she’d developed her interest in Russia. I’d wanted to interview her about her books and reached out to the two different email addresses on her website, but never got a response. It had occurred to me that she must be in her 90’s and maybe wasn’t in any condition to give an interview. I’m sad that I wasn’t able to talk to her. She sounds like she was a wonderfully interesting woman who played an important role at a crucial time in getting a US president to see “the enemy” as human (as opposed to an ideological blob thousands of miles away) and having legitimate interests that had to be considered. – Natylie

Meduza, 1/27/25

Suzanne Massie, an American writer and scholar of Russian history who served as an adviser to U.S. President Ronald Reagan during the final years of the Cold War, died on January 26. She was 94 years old.

Massie was the author of books including Land of the Firebird: The Beauty of Old Russia, which Reagan used to prepare for his meeting with Gorbachev at the Geneva Summit of 1985, and The Living Mirror: Five Young Poets from Leningrad, in which she profiled future Nobel Prize winner Joseph Brodsky. She also made significant contributions to the book Nicholas and Alexandra, by her then-husband, Robert K. Massie.

During Reagan’s presidency, Massie met with him over 20 times, telling him stories of her personal experiences with Soviet citizens and advocating for more communication between Washington and Moscow. She also shared Russian jokes and phrases with Reagan, including the phrase “Trust, but verify,” and made multiple back-channel trips to the Soviet Union to deliver messages for his administration. A 1993 article in The Atlantic referred to her as “The Woman Who Ended the Cold War.”

Massie continued to travel to Russia throughout the last decades of her life. In 2021, she asked Vladimir Putin for Russian citizenship in a TV interview on the state media network NTV. She was granted Russian citizenship later that year.

By Pietro Shakarian, ACURA, 1/20/25

At the end of 1829, the social scene in St. Petersburg was abuzz about a charming young Persian prince, who had traveled from Tabriz to the Russian Imperial capital with gifts for Tsar Nicholas I and the Romanov family.  The journey of Iran’s Khosrow Mirza, the seventh son of Crown Prince `Abbas Mirza, was intended to repair relations between Tehran and Petersburg, following the murder of the diplomat and writer, Aleksandr Griboedov. The mission was major diplomatic success and set the stage for a long-term rapprochement between Russia and Persia, following two major wars over control of the Caucasus in the early 19th century.

Almost 200 years later, Russia and Iran have never been closer.  On January 17, 2025, Iran’s affable reform-minded president, Masoud Pezeshkian, arrived in Moscow to a red-carpet reception.  After a warm meeting and over three hours of talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin, the two leaders signed the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between their respective countries.  The signed pact envisions an intensification of ties between Moscow and Tehran to a degree unprecedented in the history of Russo-Iranian relations.  The document was the result of months of intensive diplomatic work by both the Russian and Iranian sides.  It also reflected a significant deepening of relations that had been occurring steadily over the past decade, augmented by Russo-Iranian cooperation within BRICS and coordination on several major flashpoints—Ukraine, Syria, Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh), Gaza/Palestine, and Lebanon.

Prior to this groundbreaking event, Western—especially British—media outlets made persistent attempts to dismiss the obvious deepening of ties between Moscow and Tehran. Publications such as The Guardian sought to play-up the supposed points of disagreement between the sides on issues such as the rising tensions over the southern Armenian province of Syunik (Zangezur).  Still others have speculated, without any understanding of the internal dynamics of the Iranian Islamic Republic, that Pezeshkian was on course to lead a rapprochement with the West, especially the US.  Yet, to any serious observer of Russo-Iranian relations, it was abundantly clear that such speculation was completely divorced from reality.  The signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership treaty between Putin and Pezeshkian ran this point home, amplified by the obvious warmth between the two leaders.

The preamble of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership treaty defines relations between the Iranian and Russian peoples as being “deeply historical,” stressing the “closeness of cultures and spiritual-moral values.”  It emphasizes the need to elevate Russo-Iranian relations to a “new level” (“novy uroven’”) and to give them a “comprehensive, long-term, and strategic character.”  The treaty itself is valid for 20 years but is automatically extended every five years, ensuring that it remains more or less perpetually effective, unless one of the signatories withdraws from it.  In the run-up to the signing of this landmark accord, analysts in both the East and West widely speculated on its potential nature. Some believed that the treaty would only be of an economic or cooperative nature.  Others speculated that it would be purely focused on defense—to such a degree that the treaty itself could even be called a “defense pact.” In fact, the treaty, being comprehensive, includes elements of both.  Its 47 articles cover everything from cooperation in the defense and energy spheres, to mutual support against sanctions, to the promotion of Persian literature and language in Russia and Russian literature and language in Iran.

Defense Cooperation

As Iran’s top diplomat Abbas Araghchi stressed, the treaty itself does not represent a “military alliance.”  Nevertheless, mutual defensive cooperation stands front and center in the text, with the first several articles being devoted entirely to that issue. The centrality of defense is undoubtedly informed by the recent challenges faced by Moscow and Tehran in their common geographic neighborhood.  Iran’s area largely corresponds to the vast Iranian plateau of Eurasia, touching many areas of mutual concern with Russia.  Shaped like an elegant Persian ewer, the country stretches from the Caucasus in the north, to the Persian Gulf in the south, and to Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent in the east.  The fact that Iran sits adjacent to the former Soviet republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia makes it an ideal partner for Russia, as the Kremlin aims to bolster security along its Eurasian perimeter amid increased pressure from the West. Moscow and Tehran likewise share significant common interests in the Middle East and the Levant, enhanced by the recent fall of the embattled government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria.

These common areas of interest are reflected in the relevant articles on defense cooperation in the treaty.  Section 1 of Article 3 obliges the parties to strengthen relations on the basis of “sovereign equality, territorial integrity, independence,” and “non-interference in the internal affairs of both sides.”  Section 3—a cornerstone of the treaty—prohibits the parties from supporting potential aggressors who might attack one of the two signatories. This section is especially significant in light of recent Israeli threats against Iran. Section 4 of Article 3 further obliges the parties against supporting separatist movements on each of the other’s territory. Given that Russia and Iran are large, multiethnic “civilizational” states, this section is certainly applicable to both sides.  However, it is especially relevant for Iran, given post-Soviet Azerbaijan’s irredentist designs on Iranian Azerbaijan (the historical Atropatene of antiquity).  As an Iranian Azerbaijani himself, Pezeshkian is particularly sensitive to Baku’s efforts to stir up separatism in his native province.  In recent years, Ilham Aliyev’s Azerbaijan has been actively encouraged in these aggressive irredentist endeavors by the Israeli and American governments.  Supported by copious amounts of “caviar diplomacy,” dubious “academics” like the Atlantic Council’s Brenda Shaffer have been particularly vocal about the cause of “Southern Azerbaijan” (Baku’s official irredentist name for Iran’s northern provinces).

Section 4 of Article 3 thus represents a strong refutation of these efforts to “balkanize” Iran.  In Persian eyes, it is also perceived as a significant symbolic gesture on the part of Moscow, due to the historical legacy of Russian and Soviet interventions in Iran’s internal affairs. Especially noteworthy in this respect is the Iranian memory of Stalin’s support for the breakaway Azerbaijani and Kurdish republics in northern Iran after World War II.  The latter history still resonates among many Iranians and was even represented by Marjane Satrapi in her graphic novel (later film) Persepolis. Significantly, Pezeshkian’s hometown, Mahabad, once served as the center for the short-lived Kurdish Republic, backed by Stalin. Nevertheless, it must be stressed again that Section 4 is arguably just as relevant to Russia as it is to Iran, given recent calls by certain Western politicians and pundits for the dissolution or “breakup” of the Russian Federation.

Article 4 of the treaty focuses on deepening cooperation in the intelligence sphere, while Article 5 is entirely devoted to military cooperation.  The latter envisions a deep and all-encompassing collaboration between Tehran and Moscow in all military spheres, stopping just short of an outright military alliance.  It obliges both parties to conduct joint military exercises on their respective territories as well as “beyond their borders” in accordance with international law.  Section 4 calls for cooperation against common military and security threats, as well as larger threats to regional security.  In a similar vein, Section 2 of Article 6 envisions annual meetings on bilateral military-technical cooperation.  Article 7 focuses on joint cooperation in the fight against terrorism, human trafficking, illegal migration, and more, while Articles 10 and 11 focus on cooperation in the spheres of arms control and information security respectively.

Areas of Mutual Interest

Articles 12 and 13 of the treaty refer to the need for defense and security cooperation in specific areas of the Russian and Iranian geographic neighborhood.  In particular, one of Russia’s leading scholars of the Caucasus, Sergey Markedonov, has referred to Article 12 as being “of fundamental importance.”  This particular article obliges the two signatories to “promote the strengthening of peace and security in the Caspian region, Central Asia, Transcaucasia, and the Middle East” and unequivocally calls on the sides to “cooperate with the objective of preventing the interference” and “destabilizing presence” of “third states.”  With regard to Transcaucasia, the unnamed “third states” undoubtedly include the US, the UK, Israel, the members of the EU, and almost certainly Turkey.  This article will likely be welcomed by Georgia’s Irakli Kobakhidze but will give pause to Armenia’s Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijan’s Ilham Aliyev.  Pashinyan’s flirtations with the US and the EU and Aliyev’s extensive cooperation with Israel and Turkey put Yerevan and Baku at odds with Tehran and Moscow by the terms of this specific article.

Article 13 focuses exclusively on the Caspian region, an area of particular relevance to both Russia and Iran not only in terms of security, but also energy and north-south economic and transport cooperation.  This article alone contains four sections, reflecting the great importance that Moscow and Tehran attach to the Caspian as a common zone of cooperation.  It also reflects Iran’s plans to transform itself into a regional and international gas hub, a vision that Russian elites once invoked in reference to Turkey, during a period when relations between Moscow and Ankara were warmer.  Foreign interference is no less relevant in the Caspian, given the significant interest of the American and British war parties and energy industries in the region.  BP, for example, holds a 30% interest in the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline.  These forces also share the long-term interest in developing a Trans-Caspian pipeline, by expanding the BTC across the Caspian to access the energy riches of Central Asia, especially Turkmenistan, to “contain” Russia, Iran, and China.  Yet, despite the significance that the Caspian region is accorded in the treaty, it was not mentioned at all by Putin or Pezeshkian in their press conference.  By contrast, the Middle East was mentioned six times, while the Caucasus was mentioned three times.

Article 14 of the treaty is likewise relevant to recent developments in the Caucasus, obliging the parties to facilitate the expansion of trade between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).  Of particular significance in this regard is the common border between Iran and EAEU member Armenia, in the mountainous province of Syunik, a region of major historical, spiritual, and cultural importance for the Armenian people. Azerbaijan seeks to claim this vital link between Iran and the EAEU as the “Zangezur corridor,” a vision known by Iranians as “NATO’s Turan Corridor.”  The aim of the “Kuwait on the Caspian” would be to secure a direct link with its Nakhichevan exclave and, by extension, NATO member Turkey, granting NATO open access to the Caspian Sea. Empowered by his belief that he can get anything he wants through military aggression, Aliyev has constantly threatened to forcibly seize this territory from Armenia, thus making Syunik another major potential flashpoint in Eurasia. The issue has profound security implications for Iran and Russia and, as the seriousness of the treaty’s language attests, this point is certainly not lost on Moscow or Tehran.

From Sanctions Support to the Shahnameh

Subsequent articles call for deepening bilateral economic, trade, energy, and transportation ties.  Section 2 of Article 16 calls for establishing “direct ties” between Russian federal subjects and the provinces (ostân-hâ) of Iran.  Article 19, with four sections, details mutual cooperation against sanctions, including an obligation not to join any international sanctions against either signatory, as well as a guarantee against “unilateral coercive measures.”  Article 20 builds on these points by detailing options to bypass SWIFT.   In particular, Section 2 calls for creating a “modern payment system independent of third countries.”  Article 23 pledges mutual assistance in the development of the peaceful use of atomic energy, while Article 25 calls for simplifying customs procedures between the two countries. Several additional articles articulate extensive cooperation in the science, healthcare, and education spheres.  In terms of culture, Articles 32 and 34 call for the promotion of Russian and Persian literature and language in both countries. In the sphere of mass media, Article 33 calls for countering “disinformation and negative propaganda” aimed against the signatories.  The concluding articles call for additional cooperation in several spheres, from tourism to sports to water resource management.

On the whole, all of these articles reflect the fact that the Russo-Iranian Comprehensive Strategic Partnership treaty is indeed just that – an all-encompassing document providing the basis for even deeper ties between two giants of Eurasia.  Tellingly, as Markedonov also noted, the treaty itself reflects already much of what Russo-Iranian relations had become in recent years.  Now, however, everything is codified on paper.  The text is rich in significant points, but the most significant aspect of the document is what it represents and implies as a whole.  Much like the Chinese-brokered Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, the Russo-Iranian treaty represents yet another major indication that today’s world is fundamentally multipolar.  Any serious student of history or international relations would do well to pay attention and study this document very closely.  It is of immense importance, not only for Russia and Iran, but also for the changing landscape of global affairs more generally.

Pietro A. Shakarian, PhD is a historian of Russia and the Soviet Union and a postdoctoral fellow at the Centre for Historical Research at the National Research University–Higher School of Economics in St. Petersburg, Russia.

By Ian Proud, Responsible Statecraft, 1/24/25

Russia has spent the past five months swallowing up ever bigger tracts of Ukrainian coal, lithium, and uranium in the Donbass. Yet Western politicians still cling to the belief that they will be able to tap these resources to repay Ukraine’s ever mounting pile of debt. This is economic madness.

In the summer of 2024, most Western politico-military commentators were predicting that Russia was focussed on storming the strategically important military hub of Pokrovsk in Donetsk. Russian troops had advanced slowly, inexorably westward in a straight line following the bloody attritional battle for Avdiivka which was captured in February 2024.

But from August, Russian tactics shifted. First from the south of Donetsk they stormed Vuhledar, literally translated as “Gift of Coal,” a site of significant reserves, capturing it on October 1. That opened the way to swallow up large swaths of land in the south. Following the apparent encirclement of Velyka Novosilka in the past two days, one of Ukraine’s three licensed blocks of extractable lithium is now within short reach in Shevchenko.

Russian armed forces skirted Pokrovsk, instead battling through Selydove and in a straight line for about 20 miles, capturing a Uranium mine in a village called Shevchenko (not the same Shevchenko where the lithium is located). In recent weeks, Russian forces have taken Ukraine’s most important mine for coking coal in Pishchane and two related coking coal shafts in Udachne and Kotlyne. Together, these mines alone had produced the coking coal for 65% of Ukraine’s steel production. There are now fears that Ukrainian steel production could plummet to 10% of its prewar level in 2025.

Since President Trump was elected in November, and the prospect of an enforced ceasefire grew brighter, Russia’s advance has progressively accelerated. Today it is on the verge of completing its capture of the coal-rich bastion of Toretsk, the only town on the line of contact that hadn’t moved since 2014.

That’s bad news for Ukraine, not just because of a potential loss of further territory.

Prior to the crisis in Ukraine starting in late 2013, the extractives sector accounted for over a third of total exports, with agricultural products a third of that value. Today, the situation has been flipped, with agriculture by far the largest export sector.

By capturing every coal, uranium, and lithium mine that they can, Russia is cutting off an important source of Ukrainian wealth. Ukraine faces deeper current account deficits as its agriculture sector is unable to make up the difference for lost exports of minerals, especially with President Zelensky wanting to give away Ukrainian grain to Syria.

Fitch ratings has predicted Ukraine will record current account deficits of 6.5% of and 5.7% of GDP respectively in 2024 and 2025.

As I have pointed out before, with Ukraine still cut off from international lending markets because of its junk sovereign credit rating, that means the only way it can make up the difference is foreign aid or loans from foreign governments. With debt now about 100% of GDP, Ukraine has had to dip into the domestic bond market.

However, as Ukrainian banks are largely state owned, that amounts to borrowing from itself. Ukraine’s central bank governor has denied that the country will need to print money in 2025 to keep the lights on. If it does, hyperinflation and a collapse of the hrynia will beckon, rendering Ukraine’s debt impossible to pay, at which point Western governments will need to bail the country out.

Fear not, though, as Western politicians have a cunning plan to repay Ukrainian debt. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) has been outspoken this year in saying that Ukraine could pay back U.S. loans with its mineral wealth. He first raised this in a CBS interview in February 2024 as Congress worked hard to unlock former President Biden’s $61 billion aid package to Ukraine. He repeated this position one month later in Kyiv. Standing beside President Zelensky, he said, “they’re sitting on trillion dollars of minerals that could be good for our economy.”

A month later, Congress passed the long-delayed $61 billion U.S. aid package to Ukraine. That included just $9 billion in forgivable loans, short of the two-thirds Sen. Graham had hinted at in February.

Nonetheless, it marked another step on the road towards shouldering more debt onto Ukraine in the belief that this might one day be repaid in Ukrainian uranium, lithium, and other bountiful minerals. This was solidified by the G7 Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration loan of $50 billion agreed in June 2024, to which the United States contributed $20 billion at the end of 2024.

During this same period, the shift in focus towards Ukraine giving up its natural resources to secure Western aid gathered steam. In October 2024 when President Zelensky unveiled his so-called victory plan, giving up Ukraine’s natural resources became codified. He claimed that Ukraine would sign an agreement with the U.S., EU and others that would allow for use of Ukraine’s natural resources, which were worth “trillions of dollars.”

Just last week, shortly before President Trump’s inauguration, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer penned a “100-year partnership deal” between the United Kingdom and Ukraine. While the document has yet to be made public, 10 Downing Street said that it would cement the UK as “a preferred partner for Ukraine’s energy sector, critical minerals strategy and green steel production.”

US and UK politicians see great potential profit in accessing Ukraine’s wealth when war finally comes to an end, with Forbes Ukraine valuing minerals at $14.8 trillion.

However, just over half of that is located in the four eastern Ukrainian regions that Russia has occupied and where it gains new ground each day.

Back in August, in a typically foul-mouthed tirade, former Russia President Dmitry Medvedev took to his Telegram channel, among other things, to pillory Sen. Graham, who he called a “fat toilet maggot.” He continued, “To get access to the coveted minerals, the Western parasites shamelessly demand that their wards wage war to the last Ukrainian… ‘You’ll have to pay off your debts very soon. Hurry up, dear friends!’”

Leading European politicians still urge Ukraine to continue its war using credit in the hopes it might be repaid with a stock of natural resources that Russia captures with ever greater speed and covetousness. That is the economic equivalent of Russian roulette with a fully-loaded revolver that President Putin is gladly pointing at us.

President Trump’s efforts to end this madness can’t come soon enough.

By Gordon Hahn, Russian & Eurasian Politics, 1/16/25

Westerners are fond of citing a statement falsely attributed to Russian President Vladimir Putin that “Ukraine is not even a state.” This quote is marshaled in order to support the equally false and truly absurd claim that Putin’s decision to undertake his ‘special military operation’ and invade Ukraine on February 24, 2022 was intended to conquer all of Ukraine in an effort to conquer all of the former Soviet states and Russian Imperial territories before moving into Europe. In actuality, the West has treated Ukraine as a less than sovereign, independent state and as a tool – a sacrificial lamb — for the attainment of maximum U.S./Western hegemony in Eurasia by way of NATO expansion. Now, as the fateful and potentially fatal war for Ukraine – the NATO-Russia Ukrainian War – approaches its end game, the statement attributed to Putin may become a simple, if sad, statement of fact. And the wiping of the Ukrainian state off the map of eastern Europe, western Eurasia, and the world is more likely to come as a result of Western actions as it is of Russian forces’ drive westward.  

It is the U.S. and West that drove NATO expansion despite the Ukrainian constitution’s now former clause stipulating the country’s non-bloc, neutral status but repealed by Volodomyr Zelenskiy’s predecessor in Ukraine’s Office of the President, Petro Poroshenko, and despite the Ukrainian population’s divided, if not majority opposition opinion to Ukraine’s membership in NATO.

It is the U.S. and the West that refused to negotiate NATO expansion and a general European security architecture and instead push Ukraine forward to the frontline in NATO’s confrontation with ‘Putin’s Russia’, despite the West’s own claims that Putin and his Russia were dangerous and expansionist.

It is the U.S. and the West that conned Zelenskiy into continuing the war with Russia that Moscow escalated after losing all hope in January 2022 for any negotiations with the West over these issues. Putin opted to engage in coercive diplomacy by initiating the ‘special military operation’ and invading Ukraine and almost simultaneously offering peace talks to Ukraine in February 2022 in order to achieve with Kiev the kind of security agreement that eluded Moscow in relations with the West. The Minsk, then Istanbul talks that resulted reached a preliminary agreement only to see the West scuttle the agreement by refusing to provide the security guarantees envisaged in it any by dispatching then British Premier Boris Johnson to issue the NATO message that Kiev should fight and Washington and Brussels would provide everything Ukraine needed ‘for as long as it takes.’ The Western-Ukrainian relationship that has developed in the course of the war is reminiscent of that of a vassalage—Ukraine being the vassal with little to no sovereignty.

It is the U.S. and the West that have refused to begin peace talks with Moscow or pressure Kiev to do so and instead continuously escalated a war that is attritting Ukraine both in terms of its population and its territory even as Russian forces’ drive westward accelerates with each passing month (as I predicted in January 2024; see https://youtu.be/P_MJi5H6HKU?si=rxRiaE0EglSgbclw at the 1:00:45 mark), despite Putin’s and other top Russian officials’ repeated statements that they are open to any negotiations.  

Now the Ukrainian state’s control over its territories is being whittled away by Russia’s mounting, if cautious offensive. It has been stated by Zelenskiy and Western leaders that Ukrainian forces’ ill-advised, costly, and failed incursion into Russia’s Kursk region in July 2024 provides Kiev with collateral to trade for its Russian-occupied regions. But Russia has stated that no talks with Kiev are possible so long as Ukrainian troops remain on Russian territory, and Russia’s advancing troops in Ukraine are moving deeper into regions beyond the Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporozhia regions Russia has laid claim to and annexed. Thus, rather than Ukraine being able to trade Kursk for one or more of those regions in any future talks, it will be Russia that will be able to demand concessions for the return of regions or parts thereof such as Kharkiv (Kharkov), Sumy, Dnipro (Dnepropetrovsk), Mikolaev, and even eastern Kiev.

Moreover, the danger of Russian forces crossing the Dnieper River into western Ukraine is just over the horizon. So it now is becoming more in NATO’s perceived self-interest in its pursuit of encroachment on Russia’s borders and encircling her to destroy what is Russia’s Ukrainian buffer than it is to preserve any Ukraine that is a non-bloc, neutral state. Russia has repeatedly declared that it is in its self-interestthat Ukraine be a non-bloc, neutral state and never become a member of NATO. This is because Russia prefers a buffer be situated between it and the Western alliance for all the obvious and not so obvious (to many) reasons. Therefore, the party in the NATO-Russia Ukrainian War that is most interested in destroying Ukraine as a state is not Russia but NATO.

The elimination of Ukraine will achieve the key goal that NATO’s expansion to Ukraine has been intended to achieve: NATO’s acquisition of members along all of Russia’s western and southwestern borders (the Transcaucasus). In comparison with having Ukraine as a member-state, Ukraine’s absorption by Russia has only two downsides for Washington and Brussels. First, they will have to forego the control over the Black Sea they coveted as the second goal of NATO expansion, though perhaps Georgia remains an option, however less liable in the wake of the recent elections and failed attempt to repeat the color of ‘rose’ revolution there. Second, there will be a blow to Western prestige in light of its failure to save Ukraine and deal a strategic defeat to Russia.

There are numerous ways in which the West or elements therein can facilitate or bring about Ukraine’s demise. The most likely is another scuttling of peace talks – this time those being worked on by the Trump Administration – forcing Ukraine to continue fighting a losing war of attrition with Russian advancing forces right up to the Polish, Hungarian, and Rumanian borders. This is precisely what hardline former Russian Security Council Secretary and FSB chief Nikolai Patrushev was warning in his much discussed Moskovskii Komsomolets interview. For Trump this will be a soon forgotten political defeat. But many in DC and Brussels will rejoice at the prospect of a long war for Russia that lasts until Putin’s physical or political health fails, sparking a power struggle that might offer the prospect of a Russian collapse on the Soviet model.

A less likely scenario would be the previous one with annexations of Transcarpathian and western provinces of Ukraine by Hungary, Rumania, and Poland added in. Elements in all three of these countries are pushing for returns of traditional national territories given to the USSR’s Ukraine SSR by Joseph Stalin after World War Two. Midwives of Ukraine’s dissolution could also emerge as a result of NATO’s insertion of troops into Ukraine west of the Dnieper, as was proposed by some earlier in the war. Recent talk of British and French ‘peacekeepers’ in Ukraine could perform the same function. Although this variation is unlikely, such a ‘protectorate Ukraine’ could eventually be dissolved and its parts incorporated by its neighbors as noted above.

With Ukraine’s disappearance, the Beltway and Brussels can and will assuage themselves with the knowledge that NATO has reached Russia’s borders in yet another sector and has the option of fomenting Ukrainian separatists inside Russia.

The one thing that would likely trump or delay the abovementioned scenarios, besides Trump and any innovative schemes his team might conjure up, is some form of direct Western intervention in the war on the ground. In this case, there is still no guarantee of Ukraine’s survival as Western and Russian troops rampage through the country in the long war over NATO expansion.