By Tarik Cyril Amar, RT, 2/4/25

Russia’s Investigative Committee has announced the initiation of a criminal investigation into the killing of civilians in a small village in Kursk Region.

The region on the border with Ukraine is, of course, the site of the worse than pyrrhic incursion which Kiev launched into Russian territory last August. Since initially being overrun, the territory under the control of Ukrainian forces has unsurprisingly been shrinking under a Russian counterattack, while Kiev has been wasting its soldiers’ lives on yet another strategically absurd and tactically mulish to-the-last-man stand in classic Zelensky style.

Against this grim backdrop, the village in question, Russkoye Porechnoye, was under temporary Ukrainian occupation before being liberated by Russian forces. Entering the settlement, those forces reported finding evidence of the crimes that are now under investigation.

Specifically, Russian prosecutors charge Ukrainian forces with severely abusing and killing 22 civilians (11 men and 11 women) in Russkoye Porechnoye. They have also identified five individual Ukrainian servicemen as perpetrators: they go by the field pseudonyms of “Kum” (godfather), a platoon commander, “Motyl” (moth), “Provodnik” (conductor), and “Khudozhnik” (artist) and belong to Ukraine’s 92nd assault brigade. A fifth man, Evgenii Fabrisenko, is of special importance as he is the only one – at least until now – who has been apprehended by Russian forces.

His confessions, partly shown on Russian primetime news and on widely watched talk shows, seem to be a key source for information on the other perpetrators. Apart from providing details about the cruel abuses – including rape – and killings in Russkoye Porechnoye, Fabrisenko also claims that the perpetrators received an order from their battalion commander to “cleanse” the settlement. That is an important detail since it implicates the commander in the crimes even if he was not personally present.

At this point, the Russian authorities have launched an investigation, named suspects, and made specific accusations. It is true that, at the same time, Russian media and politicians treat the crimes already as fact: Dmitry Peskov, spokesman for Russian President Vladimir Putin, for instance, has underlined that the atrocities of Russkoye Porechnoye must be acknowledged and widely publicized, even if the West and Ukraine pretend to be deaf to this kind of news. Maria Zakharova, spokeswoman for the Foreign Ministry, has denounced the crimes as typical of the “terrorist and Neo-Nazi” Kiev regime, which, she stressed, is supported by the West.

But the investigations have not been completed, and trials have not yet taken place. At least until then, conclusive assessments of what exactly happened in Russkoye Porechnoye and who precisely took part in it are out of reach. It should be noted, however, that things can get even worse: Russian prosecutors speak of five identified perpetrators at least. Others might still become targets of investigation. The battalion commander, in any case, seems liable to be charged under the command responsibility principle.

Even without speculating, we do know a few things already: very serious, detailed allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity have been made. Russian prosecutors and media are showing us pieces of evidence and of the confessions of one of the accused. Leading Russian politicians have invested their credibility into supporting these allegations.

Even if some of the rhetoric around the case in the Russian media is, unsurprisingly, intense (it would be everywhere), there is no good reason to simply dismiss all of the above as “fake.” Yet that is what Ukraine and the West have done. Intriguingly, with few exceptions that seem to almost fulfill an “alibi” function, this wholesale dismissal has mostly taken the form of keeping quiet about the case: try googling for “News” about “Russkoye Porechnoye” in Russian and in, for instance, English, and the pattern is clear. That may still change in the future, but it is already a fact that the initial Western and Kiev response has been what the Germans call “totschweigen,” that is, hushing something up until it is – or at least seems – dead.

In that regard, as a minimum, both Peskov and Zakharova have an important point: even if Western and Ukrainian observers and politicians want to contradict Russia’s version of events, their silence is entirely inadequate, in three regards:

First, despite endless Western mainstream media brainwashing there is no a priori reason to simply dismiss the Russian accusations because they also carry an inevitable political charge: In general, facts can do so and still be facts. In the case of Russia, specifically, its record of telling or not telling the truth is, actually, no worse than that of the West or Ukraine (witness the ludicrous Western and Ukrainian lying about the Nord Stream sabotage or Western denialism about Israeli genocide), to say the very least.

It is true that Amnesty International has criticized prior Russian judicial procedures against Ukrainian POWs as unfair. In 2023, a UN commission of enquiry found that “Russian authorities have used torture in a widespread and systematic way in various types of detention facilities.” Yet even if you believe all of the above, it is reasonable – and not “whataboutism,” that last refuge of the special pleader – to apply the same standards to every state: The Ukrainian army, for instance, has an extensive and well-documented record of horrendous and pervasive illegality, including kidnapping, assassinations, “renditions,” and torture. And yet no one in the Western mainstream media would simply dismiss without further ado allegations that its officials make about others’ crimes.   

Thus, if you take allegations out of Kiev, Washington, or, say, London seriously enough to give them at least a hearing, you’ll have to do the same for Moscow. You won’t have to – and should not – believe anyone without evidence, but you cannot quickly decide to disbelieve anyone just because you feel you are “on the other team” either.

Second, there is no reason to consider Ukrainian soldiers immune to committing crimes. The West may have turned a blind eye to plenty of very questionable behavior – to put it mildly – by its proxy’s forces, from shelling civilians in Donbass to mistreating Russian POWs. And the Kiev regime has invested heavily in a deliberate attempt to “sell” its war effort as unrealistically kind and innocent.

Yet we still have some evidence independent of any Russian claims: Early in the war, Western media and Amnesty International, for instance, still dared to report Ukrainian crimes. In addition – and again despite the West’s massive efforts at obfuscating and “normalizing” this fact – Ukrainian troops do include substantial numbers of men with extremely violent, far-right ideologies.

In addition, the Ukrainian public sphere has been subjected to a systematic dehumanization campaign, in which all Russians have been depicted not merely as enemies but as monstrous and inferior (often using slurs, such as “vatnik,” a demeaning term implying backwardness; “rashist,” a contraction of “Russian” and “fascist”; or “Orc,” borrowed from Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings). The systematic adoption of this language by the political elite and the mass media has had real effects. As Al Jazeera reported as early as May 2022, even a humble sales clerk in Kiev knew and shared its message: “They’re orcs because we don’t consider them human.”

Indeed, many Western “friends” of Ukraine had nothing better to do than to excuse, encourage, and even adopt this foul rhetoric. Those who may wish to justify such talk as a virtually inevitable consequence of war will still have to admit that it can have severe consequences beyond words: soldiers – that is men with arms who can end up in positions where they have the upper hand over civilians without arms – taking this dehumanizing language seriously will feel free, even encouraged to commit atrocities.

And, finally, the third reason why we cannot simply dismiss the Russian accusations is that crimes have victims. If the Russian accusations are borne out, then it will be principally unjust to pretend that the crimes against these victims do not exist or do not matter simply because they are “on the other side.” Because that would imply that these victims do not matter. Yes, there is a fundamental ethical issue here.

It bears repeating that, if we think in large numbers – and this has become a war of very large numbers indeed – then it is still likely that the preponderant majority of Russian and Ukrainian soldiers are not criminals. They are now at war, and they live and die violently. I know Russian and Ukrainian and I have met many Russians as well as Ukrainians. Call me naïve if you wish, but I will hope until the opposite is proven that, on both sides, most of those fighting are not rapists or murderers. And when this war will be over, everyone will need to remember this, if they want a better future. Yet everyone will also have to be honest about not only the crimes they accuse others of but also those that some on their own side will have committed.

And as far as the West is concerned, those honest enough to face reality will find that no one has remained innocent. The West – its politicians, intellectuals, and media representative – in particular, will have to admit its abysmal, essential contribution to making this war happen and keeping it going. The psychological shock delivered by this predictable, late (as always), and inevitable (in the long run) discovery will produce ongoing denial, but also, hopefully, at least some soul-searching. Because a West that always claims the moral high ground must finally understand itself: it is no better than others, and, given its extremely aggressive conduct since the end of the Cold War – not to adopt a longer, also plausible perspective – it may well be worse.

By Seymour Hersh, Substack, 3/10/25

Much narrower talks are now under way [between the US and Russia]. What follows is a report from inside a series on-and-off talks between some Americans and Russians that have been going on since it became clear in 2023 there would be no victors in the war.

One American knowledgeable of the current talks told me that they now have the attention of senior Trump Administration officials. It is understood that any settlement that emerges will not include a post-settlement role for Zelensky. His term as Ukraine’s president expired last spring, but the Ukrainian constitution bars elections while the country is under martial law. Zelensky has long been long known by American intelligence to be among a group of political officials and military leaders siphoning millions of dollars from American and European war aid. At one point, I was told that Zelensky was warned by William Burns, director of the Central Intelligence Agency under Biden, that the corrupt generals and political figures involved in skimming funds were angry because Zelensky himself was taking too big a cut.

As to the specifics of the discussions now under way, the current objective “is short-term and pragmatic—stop the shooting. Putin is in. He sees the domestic political benefit of winning back the ‘Russian’ provinces and giving the arrogant Ukrainians a bloody nose as well as an economic solution to Russia’s inflation driven-economy.” The Russian delegation to the talks seeks “no long-term solution to the historic hatred and mistrust” between the two countries. Vice President Vance, who has been involved in some of the discussions, believes implicit deterrence of any future Russian military action against Ukraine will come through American “corporate interests and US involvement in redevelopment across the board.”

The insider said that “the task for Vance now is tell Europe, ‘Don’t do it’”: don’t offer renewed arms and rebuilding funds for a Ukraine government still led by Zelensky. The insider told me that his bet is that Zelensky “will cave to reality and sign. Russia wants Zelensky gone, but the US says it is up to the Ukrainians. Vance sees that American domestic critics will blame Trump for a sellout to Russia because of his love for Putin.”

In the end, the insider said, Zelensky will stay for a while but be replaced within a year and shooting will stop.

He added, “I hope.”

YouTube link here.

Strana, 3/11/25, Translated by Geoffrey Roberts

Ukraine has agreed to the US proposal for a 30-day ceasefire.

Vladimir Putin and other representatives of the Russian government have repeatedly stated they are against a ceasefire and favour a “long-term peace agreement”, conditional upon the transfer of the entire territory of four regions of Ukraine, recognition of them as Russian territory, neutral status, etc.

The prevailing opinion among commentators is the Kremlin will reject the ceasefire proposal (as we have already written, this is exactly what Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is counting on, who initially did not want to talk about any ceasefire).

However, there are signals in the media that Putin may agree to a ceasefire. They have not been officially confirmed by the Kremlin, but this option cannot be 100% ruled out.

The key question is what will US President Donald Trump offer Russia in exchange for this?

If he lifts sanctions along with a ceasefire plus something else, that could be a strong argument.

In addition, there are other arguments:

1. The Russian Federation has the initiative at the front, and is achieving success, but this comes at a high price. To continue the war and achieve the goals declared by Moscow, even greater sacrifices and efforts will be needed. It will be necessary to declare mobilisation and completely transfer the economy to a war footing, cutting social and other items in favour of military spending (and the budget is already overstrained). In place of mobilised citizens, Russia will import migrants in ever greater numbers. All this could have grave consequences for the internal stability of the Russian Federation. Besides, according to all polls, a majority of Russians are for a ceasefire, provided that Russia retains the territories it has already captured.

2. Refusal to agree a truce could have negative foreign policy consequences for Russia. The United States will increase sanctions pressure, increase arms supplies to Ukraine, and a split in the West along US-Europe lines will become less likely due to the return of the “common enemy” in the person of Putin. In addition, the reaction of the global South could also be negative. Above all, China, which has long been calling for a speedy ceasefire. On the other hand, the end of hostilities will create an opportunity for Russia to begin normalising relations with both the United States and Europe. Moscow would be able to play a strong game in relation to growing contradictions between the United States, Europe and China.

3. Importantly, Russian troops have almost completely regained control over the Kursk region and the withdrawal of the UAF from there is only a matter of time. This removes one of the main arguments for the Kremlin against ending the war along the front line – the presence of the UAF on the internationally recognised territory of the Russian Federation.

4. The end of the war along the front line (if Ukraine’s armed forces are completely driven out of the Kursk region) will be a military victory for Russia, since it was able to capture part of the territory of a neighbouring state without losing its own.

5. The achievement of the political goals of the Russian Federation (both in domestic policy in Ukraine and in relations with NATO) can be achieved without military action. Trump already has a clear position on Ukraine’s non-accession to the Alliance. And other countries do not want to take it, so as not to run into the threat of war with the Russian Federation. As for internal processes in Ukraine, any prospects for normalising relations between Kyiv and Moscow are tied to one key point – ending the war.

We will find out about Putin’s decision out in the coming days. Perhaps he will refuse. Perhaps he will support a truce. Or perhaps he will set conditions for a ceasefire. But that will be a matter for negotiation. The main thing is a real readiness on both sides for a truce – which is still in question for Zelensky as well as Putin. Moreover, the “war party” in the West and in the Russian Federation will probably try to do everything possible to disrupt attempts to agree a truce.

As for the fact that the truce is not permanent, but temporary, the likelihood of a new war starting in 30 days is actually not very high. The balance of power between the parties is such that if hostilities resume, they will again turn into a war for one or two settlements without much meaning or prospects for a successful breakthrough – as is now obvious to everyone.

Institutional War Theory, 2/21/25

As I stated in an earlier piece, “There is zero evidence to support any of the casualty estimates published regarding the Russo-Ukrainian War.”1 I stand by this claim. Reading the Wikipedia page on the subject reveals a slew of activists who fail to distinguish what they want to be true from what is true.2 If someone wants to argue that Russia has suffered greater casualties in the war, they can find dozens of estimate supporting that claim. Similarly, if someone wants to argue Ukraine has suffered greater casualties, they have a whole menu of estimates to choose from.

This agenda-driven information environment is nothing new in war. Since the beginning of mass media and propaganda, almost all armies exaggerated enemy losses while strictly censoring friendly losses. Their fans and haters parrot the number that suits their agenda, portraying their preferred winner as invincible and their preferred loser as tactically inept and disposable. During WWII, Nazi Germany exaggerated Soviet losses to a cartoonish extent. Similarly, Israel today is exaggerating Hamas losses. Reporting on both conflicts have genuinely permanently altered the conventional public understanding of the truth.4

Since many people have strongly held beliefs about loss ratios, it is hard to cut through the nonsense of both sides and actually come to a realistic picture of the truth. I will do my best to clear up the confusion with respect to the Russo-Ukrainian War. A few recent pieces of media by Oleksii Arestovych, UALosses, and Defense Politics Asia (DPA) provided interesting insights into how casualty exchange ratios can be realistically estimated using a combination of verified casualty figures and some extrapolation. UALosses makes a compelling case, but Arestovych and DPA’s claims deserve some scrutiny.

In a somewhat recent interview with Patrick Bet-David, exiled Ukrainian politician Oleskeii Arestovych claimed Russia is certain to have suffered greater casualties because “The attacker always loses more than the defender.”5 This claim has zero basis in military history. It is a myth that originated from the doctrinal necessity of a 3:1 manpower ratio needed to guarantee an army could capture and hold territory.6

Indeed, the opposite of Arestovych’s claim is often true. For example, two of the largest land operations ever conducted, Barbarossa (1941) and Bagration (1944), each had 2:1 casualty exchange ratios in favor of the attacker. In Barbarossa, the Germans managed to kill 566,000 Soviets while only sustaining 182,000 KIA (killed in action).7 Similarly, during Bagration, the Soviets managed to kill 381,000 Germans while only sustaining 180,000 KIA.8 While modern weapon systems are more precise and lethal, and surveillance certainly makes maneuver less stealthy, there is no reasonable basis to expect the casualty exchange ratios to be the exact opposite of the historical precedent merely because of a misconception. Therefore, we must examine the verified figures and extrapolate ratios from them.

I assessed in early January 2025 that the verified casualty exchange ratio was ~1:1. Given the available verified evidence at the time, this was a reasonable thing to believe since the verified Russian fatalities from Mediazona9 and the verified Ukrainian fatalities from UALosses10 each stood at approximately 70,000. Mediazona and UALosses only count dead fighters that they have independently verified by name, so these are infinitely more useful numbers than estimates put out by governments or newspapers, which are worth as much as the paper they are written on.

In my estimate, I included the caveat that it is unlikely Russian losses exceeded Ukrainian losses since Russia has had artillery superiority over Ukraine since the start of the war and drone superiority for the second half of the war. Since these two weapon systems are understood to be responsible for the majority of casualties in this war, it is reasonable to predict greater casualties on the disadvantaged side. I did not have clear evidence of greater Ukrainian losses, but I argued it could be assumed given the context.

UALosses announced that they have changed their verified count to include MIA (missing in action), in addition to KIA. This was justified on the belief that verified KIA figures alone are “no longer representative of the real level of losses.” While the new figure has a “lower degree of confidence,” it is more likely to be accurate since “bodies are retrieved only a quarter of third of the time, which precludes official status as KIA.”11 Given this change, it is no longer possible to directly compare UALosses to the Mediazona count.

Previously, since UALosses was a count of dead regular army troops and since Mediazona had the total dead regular army troops (once you subtract PMC and inmate PMC volunteers, which are not counted in UALosses), a casualty exchange ratio of ~1:1 was observable throughout the entirety of the war. There is no verified count of PMC or foreign volunteers KIA on the Ukrainian side, so the default Mediazona figure cannot be compare to UALosses in good faith.

Since the Battle of Avdiivka, Russia has been capturing Ukrainian territory at an accelerated rate and the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has been sending huge numbers of troops to plug gaps, increasing the number of targets for the Russians. These two facts have two expected results. (1) The locations in which people die tend to end up under Russian control. Therefore, a large portion of Ukrainian MIA soldiers are likely to have been KIA. (2) Ukrainian casualties are likely to increase in proportion to Russian casualties since they are filling gaps and increasing the volume of targets for Russian forces. Because of these two observations, it can be deduced that Ukrainian losses have likely increased in proportion relative to Russian losses since early 2024.

For that reason, I do not fault UALosses for changing their methodology. Yet, two facts muddy the use of its database as a “verified” casualty count. Some unknown percentage of those MIA are definitely still alive, either having fled or been captured. Additionally, it is no longer comparable to the Mediazona count since it is not simply the known number of cadavers. Therefore, it is now impossible to know the likely casualty exchange ratio purely from the verified numbers. It incorporates statistical assumptions, rendering it unverified and no longer useful as a tool for deducing a realistic ratio. Despite this, it is the only decent count we have.

Based on the current figures from Mediazona and UALosses, we have a casualty exchange ratio of 1:1.7 in Russia’s favor given that have definitely been 75,631 Russian soldiers killed in action and there have probably been 127,290 Ukrainian soldiers killed in action. For all we know, the Russian MIA could be equally substantial, reducing this figure back to 1:1, but this is unlikely for the reasoned stated above. My conclusion is the real casualty exchange ratio is somewhere between 1:1 and 1:1.5 in Russia’s favor.

In a recent vlog, Wyatt Mingji Lim of Defense Politics Asia, who I consider to be the single best analyst on the Russo-Ukrainian War, extrapolated significantly higher KIA figures on both sides, and used artificial intelligence to corroborate his figures. While AI language models are fallible, as anyone who has used them for math or coding is aware, Wyatt was nonetheless able to extract some interesting information using Grok 3.

Wyatt personally estimated that Ukraine has suffered 1.2 million KIA and that Russia has suffered 500,000. These figures are so much higher than the verified figures that I am reflexively skeptical of their veracity. Grok was similarly skeptical, but eventually came to a similar conclusion as Wyatt once he explained his logic. They both conclude Ukraine can hold on for, at most, another year before their manpower shortage will cripple their capabilities.12

Wyatt showed his process for training Grok to be critical of mainstream sources and deduce what a realistic figure is using population size and a detailed history of the war. He had the program calculate how much available manpower Ukraine likely had based on its population size and other factors, narrowing it down to roughly 2,000,000 men. Then he asked the program to calculate how much manpower would likely be lost through each offensive push and from holding the frontline. Accounting for a 30% attrition rate in offensives and cyclical daily frontline attrition, Grok came to a final tally of 900,000 Ukrainian KIA. It similarly calculated the Russian figures based on population, duration of offensives, and estimated daily attrition, coming to a total of 250,000 KIA.

My problem with this approach for casualty estimation is that, based on my experience using them, AI language models are polite and will concede to your argument if you point out their mistakes. They typically present the most widely read mainstream sources, which are quite often propagandistic, but then quickly abandon them as soon as you point out their flaws. This was certainly the case with Wyatt’s session on Grok 3. He pointed out that the mainstream sources were wrong, and the model quickly conceded to Wyatt’s numbers based purely on their logic, rather than finding supporting evidence. It is an interesting approach by Wyatt, but it doesn’t prove anything because we do not have verified evidence of anywhere near that many casualties.

Wyatt and Grok’s estimates are that Ukraine has suffered two to four times more casualties than Russia. While I also assess that Ukraine has suffered significantly more casualties than Russia (1.5 times), two to four times is beyond what I believe can be reasonably deduced given the available evidence.

I do not accept the premise that it is two to four higher because both army’s have used roughly equivalent style of warfare for the duration of the conflict with few exceptions. Both have been armed with huge volumes of precision explosive weaponry. Both have done occasional costly offensives that resulted in temporarily higher casualties like Russia’s initial invasion or Ukraine’s Kursk salient,14 but they both generally stayed safe. Therefore, I do not believe it can be argued, given the available evidence, that either side has suffered more than twice the casualties of the other.

If you, dear reader, think my conclusion is wrong, I would be happy to entertain arguments and accept additional sources. I do not claim to know the real answer here, but I encourage everyone to have a high degree of skepticism when they find a source claiming one side has suffered significantly greater casualties than the other.