A coalition of North American human rights organizations has released a report on the impact and consequences of US sanctions. The report is based on wide-ranging research and interviews with citizens in countries which are suffering under US sanctions.
The report reveals a reality which western media rarely or never reports.
One finding is that US sanctions hurt the poor, have resulted in thousands of deaths and “humanitarian exemptions” do not work. Another finding is that more than 70% of the world nations officially condemn US sanctions as violating international law and the UN Charter.
The report will be distributed at the United Nations and to US Congressional offices. We encourage social justice, human rights, and legal organizations to study and take up this issue. The 35-page report, with its extensive references, is appropriate for college courses.
LONDON, ENGLAND – FEBRUARY 05: Wikileaks founder Julian Assange speaks from the balcony of the Ecuadorian embassy where he continues to seek asylum following an extradition request from Sweden in 2012, on February 5, 2016 in London, England. The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has insisted that Mr Assange’s detention should be brought to an end. (Photo by Carl Court/Getty Images)
By Zach Dorfman, Sean D. Naylor and Michael Isikoff, Yahoo News, 9/26/21
In 2017, as Julian Assange began his fifth year holed up in Ecuador’s embassy in London, the CIA plotted to kidnap the WikiLeaks founder, spurring heated debate among Trump administration officials over the legality and practicality of such an operation.
Some senior officials inside the CIA and the Trump administration even discussed killing Assange, going so far as to request “sketches” or “options” for how to assassinate him. Discussions over kidnapping or killing Assange occurred “at the highest levels” of the Trump administration, said a former senior counterintelligence official. “There seemed to be no boundaries.”
The conversations were part of an unprecedented CIA campaign directed against WikiLeaks and its founder. The agency’s multipronged plans also included extensive spying on WikiLeaks associates, sowing discord among the group’s members, and stealing their electronic devices.
…No politician or member of the U.S. foreign and security establishment has ever even attempted to explain why Russian involvement in Ukraine — with its territorial issues, its huge Russian minority, and deep historic, cultural, and emotional ties to one another — somehow implies Moscow’s desire to attack Poland or Romania, which contain no Russian minorities or territorial disputes. The justification for this belief in the Washington establishment is instead based on little more than memories of the 1940s, together with an assumption of innate, blind Russian tendencies to aggression.
Moreover, as far as Ukraine itself is concerned, the suggestion of a resemblance between U.S. “deterrence” there and deterrence in Poland and Romania is based on a very dangerous misconception. Romania, Poland, and the Baltic States are NATO members, covered by the Article 5 guarantee in the NATO Treaty whereby the United State is legally obliged to fight for them if they are attacked.
Ukraine is not a NATO member, and even if a U.S. administration were willing to make an immediate offer of membership, this would certainly be blocked by the other European NATO partners. The United States is not therefore legally bound to defend Ukraine, and already proved in 2014 that it would not in fact do so in any conflict with Russia (just as it failed to fight for Georgia in 2008). A promise of U.S. “deterrence” in Ukraine is therefore essentially a lie — and a very dangerous one, if a Ukrainian government were to believe it and act accordingly.
The Baltic States are in a somewhat special category. Unlike Poland and Romania, they were part of the USSR and they contain large Russian ethnic minorities. However, no territorial dispute exists between Russia and the Baltic States. Russia has certainly complained strongly against the partial disenfranchisement of these minorities in Latvia and Estonia (contrary to both promises made to Russia before independence and to basic principles of the European Union), but it has never on any occasion threatened to invade them. There have been cyber-attacks, probably with Russian state backing or encouragement — but these cannot be deterred by stationing U.S. troops in the Baltic. Nor have the Baltics given Russia any excuse to invade, because ethnic relations there, though sometimes tense, have always been overwhelmingly peaceful.
And once again, nobody in Washington who has written on potential Russian aggression against NATO members has ever explained what Russia could possibly hope to gain from such an attack, and whether any benefit would outweigh the immense risks and losses involved: the danger of nuclear war, shattering economic crisis, crippling sanctions, a consolidation of the U.S.-European alliance against Russia, and the end of Russian gas exports to Europe.
And for what? Occupied territories constantly roiled by massive public unrest or even guerrilla warfare, and the expenditure of colossal amounts of money that Russia does not have? If Soviet proxies failed to govern the Baltic States and Eastern Europe in the 1980s, why on earth would Moscow think that it could govern these countries today? It cannot be stated too strongly: the idea of a Russian conventional attack on NATO is the product of a combination of sincere paranoia and cynical military-industrial manipulation in the West; while other forms of “non-conventional” Russian pressure cannot by definition be deterred by new U.S. conventional forces…
(Old) Arbat Street, Moscow; photo by Natylie Baldwin, May 2017
By Natylie Baldwin. Originally published by Oped News, 9/19/21.
We hear a lot about Russia being a dictatorship under Vladimir Putin. It is said frequently by U.S. media commentators that there is no democracy, free media, or substantive rule of law in the country. The reality is much more complicated. Moreover, what Russians actually think about these aspects of their country and what the historical context of democracy is in Russia is rarely explored in any depth.
The History of Russian Dictatorship and Democracy
A 2015 poll by the western-funded Levada Center revealed that 66 percent of Russians feel free, and 68 percent don’t believe it is likely that Russia will return to dictatorship. Russians have a thousand year history of authoritarian rule and they know what real dictators act like. Despite the relentless focus most western media has on the travails of a small group of liberal oppositionists who are actually unpopular in Russia, life under Putin represents the most democratic period (however flawed) in Russian history, excerpt for very brief periods after the February 1917 Revolution and the perestroika/glasnost period under Mikhail Gorbachev. The former lasted less than a year and the latter about 5-7 years.
Prioritizing Social Justice
Most American politicians and commentators tend to assume that a democracy must be a system similar to what the U.S. has which reflects neoliberal American values. This means a free market economy with a political system that favors the individual and minimal socioeconomic protections from the state. Russians, however, prioritize values differently and this affects what democracy will look like to them.
Surveys consistently show that Russians value social justice over individual achievement and political rights. In 2014, Russians were asked whether they would rather live in a society that prioritized social equality or individual attainment of success. Over 60 percent chose the former. Another Levada poll from this month revealed that only 16 percent favor a western style democracy compared to 49 percent who favor a system more like the Soviet one. Furthermore, 62 percent favor an economic system based on state planning and redistribution compared to 24 percent who prefer a free market economy. Russian youth also support a robust socioeconomic system provided by the state. In focused surveys, one of a handful of things Russians across the political spectrum agreed on included the need for strong welfare state programs.
Agreement on these points among traditionalists, Putin supporters, youth and liberals underscores that these values don’t simply reflect a throwback to the communist era – although that is a factor for some older people who have positive memories of the state social programs of that period. There is a long history of valuing the collective good that predates communism. In fact, the collective is mentioned in the Kremlin’s new National Security Strategy as an important traditional value. Though the Soviet lifestyle may have been austere with few consumer goods compared to the U.S., in the context of Russian history, the era represented great material progress for the average Russian who had previously toiled as a peasant.
Sharon Tennison, founder of the citizen diplomacy group Center for Citizen Initiatives, has traveled regularly all over Russia since 1983 and described the Russian ethos on democracy and social justice:
“Most [Russians] are interested in something akin to a social democracy with elected leaders, social services such as free and excellent education for all (including higher education), some form of dependable public health care along with private health care for those who can afford it, and a high level of classical culture nationwide… .Democracy is developing in Russia, but it always will be laced with socialism.”
The Legal System
Until the post-Soviet era, there was not a long tradition of Russians being viewed as citizens with individual rights but they were instead granted some degree of social protections and stability in exchange for acquiescence to authoritarian rule. There was the concept of group rights and duties in the tsarist era up until the 1860’s and then dependent rights in the Soviet era, which meant that citizens were granted socioeconomic rights in exchange for performing their duties to the state.
Russia’s first constitution came about as the result of the Russian Revolution of 1905. But it was effectively revoked in 1917, along with several legal reforms instituted by Tsar Alexander II in 1864, including the right to trial by jury with independent judges overseeing cases.
The current constitution of 1993 resulted from the dramatic showdown between then-president Boris Yeltsin and the parliament. Yeltsin had dissolved parliament after members refused to continue to allow him to rule by decree, threatening impeachment for abuse of power. The confrontation ended with a military attack on the parliament building, leading to hundreds of casualties. Yeltsin then suspended the existing constitution.
In order to prevent any future such challenge to presidential power, Yeltsin engineered the design of a constitution with a defanged parliament that would essentially serve as a rubber stamp for the president’s prerogatives. This event, along with the economic devastation and criminal chaos that marked Yeltsin’s rule, meant that the period of democratic possibility begun under Gorbachev had largely evaporated.
Though it doesn’t fit with the overly simplistic portrayal in western media, Putin did begin a process of expanding the rule of law and broadening individual legal rights during his first two terms as president.
He oversaw the implementation of the rights of habeas corpus and trial by jury, and increased rights to exculpatory evidence. After certain reforms made by Putin to the criminal code, acquittal rates in bench trials doubled and acquittal rates in jury trials tripled, contributing to a 40 percent drop in the overall incarceration rate and a 95 percent drop in the juvenile incarceration rate since 2001.
He also introduced Justices of the Peace (JP’s) into the system. JP’s act as judges in the lowest tier of courts and preside over approximately 75 percent of civil cases and 45 percent of criminal cases, with most of the latter resolved through plea bargaining. A years-long academic study of Russia’s court system showed that JP’s demonstrate independence and base their decisions on the written law in the vast majority of cases. Exceptions involve the very small percentage of cases that are politically sensitive, particularly to the Kremlin.
There have been setbacks in recent years, especially regarding public protests and foreign-funded NGO’s. However, most civil society work is actually funded domestically. Sarah Lindemann-Komarova, a community organizer in Siberia who studies Russian community activism and funding, explains that the vast majority of civil society groups in Russia are unaffected by the crackdown: “For most community development groups and actually most NGOs it was never an issue. Very few organizations got western support and even fewer now.”
The Media
A few foreign-funded media outlets have been harassed or forced to shut down, and the legal criteria for potentially being labeled a foreign agent as an individual journalist is very broad. The Presidential Council on Human Rights is proposing amendments to soften the law by only allowing the designation to originate from routine government inspections rather than reports from individuals and organizations.
In spite of this, overt censorship in Russia is still fairly limited. A variety of opinion is represented in domestic Russian print media, including criticism of Putin and the government. Even on pro-government Russian TV, which is mostly consumed by older citizens, it is not unusual for a pro-Western viewpoint to be included on political talk shows. And Russians still have access to Western media through both the internet and satellite.
In short, skepticism is warranted when we encounter the overly simplistic manner in which Russia is often portrayed by much of the U.S. political class and establishment media. Russians have their own ideas about what constitutes the kind of society they want to live in.
