By Ivan Safranchuk, Russia in Global Affairs, September/October 2022

Safranchuk is a Candidate of Political Sciences, Director and Leading Researcher at the Center for Eurasian Studies of MGIMO University, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Associate Professor of the Department of International Relations of the National Research University Higher School of Economics.

The Cuban Missile Crisis holds a special place in the history of the Cold War. Then the USSR and the USA in practice found the limits of their direct confrontation. Of course, there were practitioners on both sides who were ready for more decisive action, but at the level of political leadership, the understanding prevailed that the superpowers had come to the brink. Then there is a nuclear war with unacceptable consequences for anyone.

This general awareness helped to move towards the conceptualization of mutual nuclear deterrence, on the basis of which the process of nuclear arms control was launched. The task of the latter was to carry out this very deterrence more rationally and safely.

From the point of view of the realistic school of the theory of international relations, the Cuban Missile Crisis can be understood as the establishment of a balance of power. Further, it was strengthened (although attempts were made to win back unilateral advantages), the rivalry proceeded within its framework. The liberal-idealist school interprets the Cuban Missile Crisis as such a convincing demonstration of the danger of confrontation in the nuclear age that opponents had to go beyond actions based on selfish interests and turn to the idea of ​​the common good – the prevention of nuclear catastrophe .

On the one hand, the Cuban Missile Crisis remained in the history of the Cold War as a dangerous culmination of a confrontation that must not be repeated. On the other hand, as great-Power rivalry has grown in the twenty-first century, there has been a sentiment that a new crisis that will have the same functional consequences as the Caribbean is inevitable, if not necessary.

“Red Lines”

In practice, Russia and the United States have already stooped to the lower level of relations. But even the Ukrainian crisis did not become “Caribbean”. One can, of course, expect that the “real Caribbean” is yet to come. On another line of rivalry, the Sino-American one, there is a rapid aggravation, but even there there are no signs of a “Cuban Missile Crisis”. Therefore, it is appropriate to hypothesize that technically the “new Cuban Missile Crisis” happened, but never became the “real Caribbean”, that is, it went according to a different scenario and did not lead to the structural consequences that the original provoked at one time.

In October 1962, the United States essentially marked its “red line”, the crossing of which could lead to a direct military clash – it was implied that escalation to the nuclear level was almost inevitable. The USSR did not cross this “line”, although it put forward symmetrical conditions regarding American nuclear missiles in Europe.

In early 2022, Russia, in turn, also drew a “red line” – the non-admission of Ukraine to NATO. However, the US refused to promise that it would not cross it.

Instead, Washington has begun to challenge the legitimacy of Russia’s red line.

It should be noted that the question of the legality of the designation of the “red line” is irrelevant. In 1962, the United States had no formal right to restrict military-technical cooperation between the USSR and Cuba, and Moscow accused the American leadership of piracy. But these rhetorical exercises and appeals to the legitimacy of actions served only as an external entourage. The United States firmly declared its understanding of national interests and readiness to protect them by any means. The Soviet Union denied the legitimacy of the demands, but recognized the “red line” drawn, understanding the decisiveness of the opponent’s mood. The United States did not recognize the Russian “red line – 2022”.Functionally, this is the main thing, and all the talk about the illegality of the designation of red lines is generally meaningless.

The same practice of denying “red lines” is being adopted by the United States in the Taiwan Strait. For China, the “red line” is the inevitability of reunification (while the PRC showed great flexibility regarding its timing and forms). However, the Americans’ emphasis on the topic of inviolability of the “status quo” with the still remaining formal recognition of the “one-China” principle means that Washington will oppose the PRC in implementing the unification course.

The refusal of the United States to recognize Russian or Chinese “red lines” can easily be explained by the emotional and psychological background that was cultivated after the Cold War. Much has been said in recent decades about American leadership and superiority. Rhetorically placing themselves on the pedestal of the world hierarchy, Americans cannot make concessions to those who challenge them and set conditions for them. There are also arguments about how much the world has changed, about new problems, about the inadmissibility of returning to the past. And within the framework of such a narrative, the “red lines”, again, cannot be perceived as anything other than a historical relic.Therefore, it is natural for the United States to dismiss the restrictive conditions set by someone else.

Balance by someone else’s hands

But that doesn’t seem to be the only point. In practical policy, the United States has moved to actions close to what American professor John Mearsheimer called “offshore balancing.” This refers to indirect (by proxy) regional balancing/containment, that is, the creation of a balance in important parts of the world based on the relations of regional players. Never mind that none of the significant figures in the foreign policy establishment has openly accepted such a concept.

The British approach has long assumed that there should be no dominant force on the continent capable of challenging a global maritime power. For these purposes, London implemented a strategy of direct balancing, which can already be called classical. Not being able to defeat everyone alone, Britain could provide its fleet (the strongest in the world) to one of the coalitions of warring powers, thereby making a decisive contribution to its victory and becoming entitled to a significant part of the dividends. Such a strategy was successful, but did not solve the problem of the costs of participation in a major war. As a result of the two world wars, Britain, although it was on the side of the victors, lost its position in world affairs.The task of the United States is not to repeat this experience. Therefore, instead of the British direct (with their own hands) global balancing, the Americans are engaged in indirect (by proxy hands) regional balancing / deterrence.

During the Ukrainian crisis of 2022, the United States also used a “homemade billet” – it imposed unprecedented economic sanctions on Russia. And despite the fact that they stopped hiding this “blank” since the end of last year, its practical implementation still seemed incredible to many. Now the prevailing opinion in the West is that a geo-economic siege will ensure the achievement of geopolitical goals, that is, deprive Russia of resources for the continuation of the geopolitical conflict. However, we can assume the opposite: in fact, the geopolitical dimension of the Ukrainian crisis was only a pretext to launch a geo-economic blitzkrieg, to justify it. That is, the geo-economic dimension is the main one, and the geopolitical dimension is the official one, not vice versa.

The aggravation of the crisis around Taiwan, despite the different entourage, is following a trajectory similar to the Ukrainian one. The United States does not recognize the Chinese “red lines”, leads the PRC to the need for aggravation, which, on the one hand, justifies the political and military-technical pumping of Chinese opponents, and on the other hand, can legitimize unprecedented measures of pressure – the opening of a geo-economic front.

Theoretically, the scheme for Washington is a win-win. Their regional vassal, who bears the brunt of the burden of deterring the United States’ global rivals, will either prove to be a geopolitical hero and survive, with broad American support, in a battle with a stronger adversary, and then offshore balancing will work . Or he will become a geopolitical suicide bomber, whose suffering can be maximally propagated and justified by measures of geo-economic coercion that are unthinkable in a normal situation.

In any case, the goal of the United States is not to negotiate with rivals on the basis of the balance of power, but to show them their place in the global system and force them to stay in this place.

Therefore, the recognition of the “red lines” of Russia or China, their independently formulated ambitions for the United States is unacceptable.

A Settlement Without America

Russia and China hoped to create conditions for deals with Washington that would correspond to the ideas of Moscow and Beijing about their worthy place in history and modernity. By and large, both countries were sympathetic to the reluctance of the United States to part with its dominant position, but considered it a temporary phenomenon, a coincidence of circumstances after the Cold War and believed that it was simply unreasonable to claim its long-term consolidation. Therefore, the task was to bring the United States to the agreements, if necessary, to force them by creating counter threats and demonstrating its own economic and geopolitical significance.

For a long time, it may seem that a sufficient level of pressure has not yet been created for Washington to agree to equal agreements with Russia or China. And in light of this, a tipping point of escalation that would be the “moment of truth,” the “new Cuban Missile Crisis,” was considered necessary. However, the way the United States behaves in the Ukrainian and Taiwan crises gives reason to believe that they are fighting not for the conditions and parameters of compromises with Russia or China, but for the fact that there were no agreements and could not be.

Russia and, apparently, China also face the question of basic goal-setting. Should attempts to force the United States to accept itself as equal partners and push them towards mutually acceptable settlements of controversial and conflictual issues, or to seek to resolve critical security and economic issues without American participation?

It is clear that in the acute phase of the crisis, the United States imposes its participation. By acting directly, although formally indirectly (“by proxy”), the United States deprives Russia (potentially in the Taiwan crisis – and China) of the opportunity to respond directly and adequately, but at the same time gives grounds to block the participation of the United States outside the acute phase of the crisis.

Taking America out of the game can be a goal for Russia, the main international outcome of the Ukrainian crisis, and in the event of a further aggravation of the Taiwan crisis, for China.

The active involvement of the United States in regional situations does not allow a transition to a non-military settlement, and it would be acceptable to the main regional players, although painful for some of them. So far, the only realistic option is a decisive military victory over the American vassal, which deprives both the defeated and his patron of the right to vote on the subject of the conflict over the exhaustion of the subject as such. This scenario can be considered a minimum program. And the maximum goal for both Russia and China is to acquire the ability to politically resolve complex situations (preferably at the pre-war stage, but at least at the post-war stage) without American participation, and not at the expense of agreements with them.

Taking the United States out of the game may seem unattainable and, therefore, a false basis for practical goal-setting. But what are the alternatives? Either Washington’s no more likely coercion to equal agreements, or implicit agreement to compromise with retreat beyond its own “red lines”, or a fixation on military means.

This paper uses the results of the project “Contemporary Great Power Rivalry: Theoretical and Practical Aspects”, carried out within the framework of the research program of the Faculty of World Economy and International Politics of the National Research University Higher School of Economics in 2022.