The meeting of the defence ministers of the Pentagon’s Ukraine Defence Contact Group in the “Ramstein” format in Brussels on January 14 failed to make any major announcement on the supply of offensive weapons to Kiev.
But the US President Joe Biden is expected in Poland early next week and may have another face-to-face meeting with Ukraine President Vladimir Zelensky. Biden probably intends to make a splash before declaring his candidacy for the 2024 presidential election.
The Biden Administration hopes to push Germany to the war front in Ukraine but the meeting in Brussels ended up inconclusively. Later, the press conference by the US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin had an air of vacuity, of empty-headedness, devoid of content.
Against this murky backdrop, all that the NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg would say was that the supply of military aircraft to Ukraine is being discussed, but this is not an urgent problem. According to him, the current conflict is a “struggle of logistics” and ammunition, so the alliance needs not so much to provide Ukraine with new weapons, as to make sure that everything that has already been delivered works. Stoltenberg stressed the need to deliver on the promises regarding German Marder infantry fighting vehicles, American Bradley, as well as Germany’s Leopard 2 tanks.
The single biggest announcement by Austin on Tuesday was about a decision by the Norwegian government that it will provide 7.5 billion euros in military and civilian assistance to Ukraine over the coming five years. He called it “a very significant commitment.”
Austin pretended it never occurred to him why Norway is making such a grand gesture, which is in reality a pathetic act of atonement for destroying the Nord Stream gas pipelines. Therein hangs a tale.
Of course, the Ramstein meeting did not discuss the bombshell report by Seymour Hersh, an investigative journalist with a track record of breaking major stories, on how the US reduced Germany’s Nord Stream gas pipelines to “a hunk of metal at the bottom of the sea” — to borrow the immortal words of Victoria Nuland, US Undersecretary of State — as the conflict in Ukraine was raging.
According to Hersh’s source, the decision to sabotage the pipeline came directly from President Biden and the subsequent top secret debate within the US administration lasting some 9 months was on how to achieve the goal without getting caught.
Hersh’s report on February 8 disclosed wrote that it was the Norwegian navy which finally found the optimal location for blowing up the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines. Thus, on September 26, 2022, a Norwegian Navy P8 surveillance plane dropped a sonar buoy in a seemingly routine flight, triggering high-powered C4 explosives that had been planted on the pipelines.
Hersh has since explained to the German newspaper Berliner Zeitung that Norway was particularly interested in successfully pulling off the plot against the Nord Stream pipelines.
In his words, “Norway was interested in income growth, and hence in increasing the volume of its energy supplies to the EU, to the same Germany. And what do we see after the mission? Norway has made it. It’s (energy) exports grew against the backdrop of significant hostility towards Russia.”
Norway was attracted to Biden’s sabotage project like a fly to the honeypot, since it stood to gain fabulously in financial terms if it helped the US military to destroy Nord Stream pipelines near Danish waters, and replace Russia as Germany’s principal source of piped natural gas.
To be sure, Norway has made a kill. The loot is estimated to be worth over $100 billion so far! Norway supplied 33 percent of Germany’s gas needs in 2022, making it the country’s largest supplier.
Experts estimate that “Norway’s position as a key provider of energy to Germany is set to further increase in the years to come, including from new Arctic fields coming on line and new discoveries above the Arctic Circle… Expanded production above the Arctic Circle, arriving from the Irpa field 340 km west of Bodø scheduled to come online in 2026, as well as new discoveries in the Barents Sea including one made in 2022 adjacent to Goliat, will be key to maintaining peak production.
“With Germany largely disconnected from Russian pipeline gas, the door for Norway to further expand its market share and establish itself as the country’s primary gas supplier remains open.”
Ironically, at a joint press conference with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in August 2022, Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre claimed that “Norway delivers as much gas as possible to Germany.” Of course, what he didn’t tell Scholz was that Norway was about to execute a project to transform Germany, Europe’s largest consumer of natural gas, as a captive market for it very soon. Actually, Norway blew up the Nord Stream pipelines only a month later on September 22.
Norway is now burnishing its image as a rich country capable of the milk of human kindness, which is generously sharing a whopping 7.5 billion euros (out of the windfall profit of $100 billion from the German loot) with Ukraine. And Austin announces it as a grand gesture to thwart Russian “aggression”!
This sordid pantomime provokes an incredulous gasp. One cannot but take pity on the German nation which is saddled in these tumultuous times with a mediocre government of inexperienced, dubious politicians who dare not defend their country’s core interests against American bullying.
The Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov was spot on when he spoke at length for the first time about the Nord Stream pipelines and Seymour Hersh’s article at a working meeting on February 15 with heads of foreign media bureaus accredited in Russia:
“The main goal was to prevent Germany from feeling comfortable in the energy sphere and from receiving gas via these two pipelines, which were financed by companies in Russia, Germany, Austria and Italy… Germany has not simply been humiliated; it has been put in its place as a satellite of the United States…”
Norway is not squeamish about giving away a tiny portion of its loot from Germany, a NATO partner Germany. Maybe, it is indulging in an act of atonement over a fiendish crime perpetrated on a neighbour and ally. Maybe, the Biden team urged Norway to burnish its credentials as a Good Samaritan. And Austin hailed it as a solid outcome of the Ramstein meeting at Brussels.
Panelists: • Kerry Buck: Former Canadian Ambassador to NATO (2015-18); Senior Fellow, University of Ottawa • George Beebe: Director of Grand Strategy, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft; Former Chief of Russia Analysis Group, CIA (2005-07) • Daniel Fiott: Head of the Defence & Statecraft Programme, Brussels School of Governance • Leigh Sarty: Former Deputy Head of Mission, Canadian Embassy in Moscow (2012-16) • Paul Robinson: Senior Fellow, Institute for Peace & Diplomacy; Professor of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa
Moderator: • Zachary Paikin: Research Fellow, Institute for Peace & Diplomacy; Researcher, Centre for European Policy Studies
The following is a transcript of an interview with CIA director William Burns that aired on “Face the Nation” on Sunday, Feb. 26, 2023.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Mr. Director, thank you for making time.
CIA DIRECTOR BILL BURNS: Nice to be with you, Margaret.
MARGARET BRENNAN: You’ve got the whole world to watch right now, so I know you’re a busy man. I want to start on Ukraine and Russia with this anniversary. On the cusp of Russia’s invasion, you flew to Kyiv and you told President Zelenskyy, tell me if this is right, the Russians are coming to kill you. Was that the very first thing you said?
DIRECTOR BURNS: It wasn’t the very first thing I said to President Zelenskyy, but President Biden had asked me to go to Kyiv to lay out for President Zelenskyy the most recent intelligence we had, which suggested that what Vladimir Putin was planning was what he thought would be a lightning strike from the Belarus border to seize Kyiv in a matter of a few days, and also to seize an airport just northwest of Kyiv called Hostomel, which he wanted to use as a platform to bring in air- airborne troops, as a way again, of accelerating that lightning conquest of Kyiv. And I think President Zelenskyy understood what was at stake and what he was up against. Our Ukrainian intelligence partners also had good intelligence about what was coming as well. But I do think that the role of intelligence in this instance, what we’re able to provide to President Zelenskyy, not just on that trip, but you know, throughout the course of the war, have helped him to defend his country with such courage and tenacity. And I think that made a contribution early, you know, just before the war started.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Being able to share that intelligence?
DIRECTOR BURNS: Yes.
MARGARET BRENNAN: You also have said, and tell me if this is correct, that it was only a group of about three or four people around Vladimir Putin, who knew that he was actually planning this invasion?
DIRECTOR BURNS: No, I think that’s true. I mean, I had watched over the years, especially over recent years, as Putin had narrowed his circle of advisers, and it was a circle in which he prized loyalty over competence. It was a group of people who tended to tell him what he wanted to hear, and- or at least had learned over the years that it wasn’t career enhancing to question his judgments as well. And so that was one of the deepest flaws I think, in Russian decision-making just before the war as it was such a close circle of people reinforcing one another’s profoundly mistaken assumptions.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Does he take counsel from anyone these days?
DIRECTOR BURNS: I think he’s become increasingly convinced that he knows better than anyone else what’s at stake for Russia. I think his sense of destiny, and his appetite for risk has increased in recent years as well. And I think he had convinced himself by the fall of 2021, a few months before he launched his invasion, that his strategic window was closing for asserting control over Ukraine, which he thought was absolutely essential to Russia’s future as a great power and to his future as a great Russian leader as he saw it. And so he had also convinced himself that early 2022 was a favorable landscape, tactically, for Russia to launch such an invasion.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Why?
DIRECTOR BURNS: He believed that Ukraine was weak and divided, he thought the West was distracted, and he thought he had modernized the Russian military to the point where it was capable of a quick, decisive victory. Of course, it turned out that each of those assumptions was profoundly flawed.
MARGARET BRENNAN: You recently went back to Kyiv and you met with President Zelenskyy. And three months ago, I understand you met with Russia’s top spy chief. Is there any kind of opening that you are finding here? Any kind of opportunity?
DIRECTOR BURNS: No, I mean, the conversation that I had with Sergei Naryshkin, the head of Russia’s external intelligence service, was pretty dispiriting. You know, my- my goal was not to talk about negotiations, that’s something that Ukrainians are going to need to take up with the Russians when they see fit. It was more than anything else, what the President asked me to do, which was to make clear to Naryshkin and through him to President Putin, the serious consequences should Russia ever choose to use a nuclear weapon of any kind as well. And I think Naryshkin understood the seriousness of that issue and I think President Putin has understood it as well. I think it’s also been very valuable that the Chinese leadership, that Prime Minister Modi in India have also made clear their opposition to any use of nuclear weapons.
MARGARET BRENNAN: And you made clear to him that a nuclear weapon of any kind, a tactical nuke on the battlefield, would be treated by the United States with the utmost severity?
DIRECTOR BURNS: Absolutely, absolutely. And we’ve continued to make that very clear. And I think that direct message is going to continue to be important, as are the messages that come from other world leaders, whether it’s President Xi or anyone else.
MARGARET BRENNAN: There’s not a lot of contact with Russia right now.
DIRECTOR BURNS: There’s not a great deal, you’re right.
MARGARET BRENNAN: But you still have that line of communication with your counterpart?
DIRECTOR BURNS: Yeah and I- and I think even in the most deeply adversarial relationships, and that’s certainly what our relationship with Russia is today, it’s important to have those lines open, and the President believes that.
MARGARET BRENNAN: What do you walk away from those conversations with? You said it was dispiriting, why?
DIRECTOR BURNS: Well, because I think the, you know, it’s- there was a very defiant attitude on the part of Mr. Naryshkin as well, a sense of cockiness and hubris. You know, a sense, I think, reflecting Putin’s own view, his own belief today that he can make time work for him, that he believes he can grind down the Ukrainians that he can wear down our European allies, that political fatigue will eventually set in. And in my experience, Putin’s view of Americans, of us, has been that we have attention deficit disorder, and we’ll move on to some other issue eventually. And so Putin, in many ways, I think, believes today that he cannot win for awhile, but he can’t afford to lose. I mean, that’s his conviction. So instead of looking for ways to either back down or find a famous off ramp, you know, what Putin has done is double down. At each instance notwithstanding, you know, what is by any objective measure a strategic failure so far for Russia.
MARGARET BRENNAN: He doesn’t seem to have that assessment, though, I mean, 97 percent of his ground forces in Ukraine. It’s a meat grinder, does he just look at his population and say, I have enough young men I can continue to send off to die? I mean, what is the price that makes him change his mind?
DIRECTOR BURNS: Putin is certainly not a sentimentalist about the loss of Russian life or, you know, the huge losses that he’s taken in terms of Russian armaments, as well during the course of the war. But there’s a lot of hubris that continues to be attached to Putin and his view of the war right now. And I think, what’s going to be critical as we look ahead in 2023 and provide all the material and intelligence support that we can for our Ukrainian partners, is to puncture that hubris on Putin’s part and regain momentum on the battlefield. Because I really do believe, much as a- as a recovering diplomat, I’d like to see opportunities for negotiations. I don’t think the Russians are serious today. And I think, you know, it’s only progress on the battlefield that’s going to shape any improved prospects for negotiations down the road. That’s going to be the Ukrainians call. I think, as the President has made clear, it’s our job not just as an intelligence community, but as a government to provide all the support we can to the Ukrainians, so that they can strengthen their hand on the battlefield and ultimately at the negotiating table.
MARGARET BRENNAN: So Russia controls 18 percent of Ukraine. At what point does Putin say I can’t win?
DIRECTOR BURNS: I think–
MARGARET BRENNAN: You must have gamed that out.
DIRECTOR BURNS: I think Putin is, right now, entirely too confident of his ability, as I said before, to wear down Ukraine, to grind away and that’s what he’s giving every evidence that he’s determined to do right now. At some point, he’s going to have to face up to increasing costs as well, in coffins coming home to some of the poorest parts of Russia because many of the conscripts, you know, who are being thrown as cannon fodder in the front and the Donbas as well, come from Dagestan and Buryatia, the poorest parts of Russia as well. There’s a cumulative economic damage to Russia as well. Huge reputational damage, I think to Russia. It has not exactly been a great advertisement for Russian arms sales. So this is going to build over time, but right now, the honest answer, I think Putin is quite determined.
MARGARET BRENNAN: You said- I want to ask you about what appears to be potentially a new line of ammunition weapons for Russia. It looks like the U.S. was caught by surprise that China was actually considering providing lethal support. You said as recently as February 2, that Xi Jinping was reluctant to provide military assistance. What changed?
DIRECTOR BURNS: Well, I mean, I think this is something we watch very carefully. And I think, you know, the Chinese weigh very carefully this issue. And we’ve certainly made very clear the seriousness of the consequences for our relationship, and I think for China’s relationship with our European allies as well.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Sanctions?
DIRECTOR BURNS: This is an issue that we watch very, very carefully. You know, and as Secretary Blinken has said, publicly, you know, we have begun to see- we have begun to collect intelligence suggesting that China is considering the provision of lethal equipment. That’s not to suggest that they’ve made a definitive conclusion about this, that they’re actually begun to provide lethal equipment, but it’s obviously something that we take very seriously and watch very carefully.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Secretary Blinken said that the U.S. had picked up information over the last couple of months. But picking up information over the last couple of months to thinking they’re actively considering it- I mean, how confident are you in the intelligence that this is something Xi Jinping himself may change his mind about?
DIRECTOR BURNS: Well, we’re confident that the Chinese leadership is considering the provision of lethal equipment. We also don’t see that a final decision has been made yet, and we don’t see evidence of actual shipments of lethal equipment. And that’s why, I think, Secretary Blinken and the President have thought it important to make very clear what the consequences of that would be as well–
MARGARET BRENNAN:To deter it.
DIRECTOR BURNS: Yeah, to deter it, because it would be a very risky and unwise bet.
MARGARET BRENNAN: So why would Beijing risk a tailspin in its relationship with the United States and with Europe by crossing this line?
DIRECTOR BURNS: It’s a good question, and that’s why I hope very much that they don’t.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Because it doesn’t necessarily seem in his best economic interest, certainly, if sanctions are the consequence. Do you think that Beijing benefits from having the West distracted and involved in a prolonged conflict in Europe?
DIRECTOR BURNS: I mean–
MARGARET BRENNAN: That that’s the aim?
DIRECTOR BURNS: It’s conceivable, but I think, there’s no foreign leader who’s watched more carefully Vladimir Putin’s experience in Ukraine, the evolution of the war, than Xi Jinping has. And I think in many ways, he’s been unsettled and sobered by what he’s seen. I think he was surprised by the very poor military performance of the Russians. I think surprised also by the degree of Western solidarity and support of Ukraine. In other words, the willingness of not just the United States, but our European allies as well to absorb a certain amount of economic cost in the interest of inflicting greater economic damage on Russia over time. So all of that, I think, has sobered Xi Jinping to some extent.
MARGARET BRENNAN: So you think this public- do you think the policy decision of public- publicly embarrassing the Chinese by saying we know what you’re thinking, why do you think that that will make a difference in Xi Jinping’s calculation?
DIRECTOR BURNS: I don’t think it’s a question of embarrassing anybody. It’s just a question of being very clear and direct about the seriousness of our concerns, as well–
MARGARET BRENNAN: Publicly.
DIRECTOR BURNS: Publicly as well. And privately because that’s a message that’s been delivered, you know, on a number of occasions before this.
MARGARET BRENNAN: What are the consequences for the conflict in Ukraine if this does happen? What does more ammunition and more weapons mean? Does this- Is it a game changer?
DIRECTOR BURNS: Well, I mean, obviously more ammunitions to the aggressor in this conflict to Vladimir Putin’s Russia, wherever it comes from, and we also have evidence that the Iranians are providing, you know, lethal equipment and munitions, that the North Koreans are doing the same thing as well. So wherever that lethal assistance comes from, it prolongs a vicious war of aggression.
MARGARET BRENNAN: German press is reporting China’s considering kamikaze drones, replacement parts for jets, other weaponry. Secretary Blinken just said ammunition and weapons, do you view those things differently in terms of- I mean, obviously, they’re used differently in the battlefield, but where is that line that they are crossing?
DIRECTOR BURNS: Well I mean I can’t comment on the specifics of what was reported in the German media as well. All I can say is, you know, we remain seriously concerned should China provide lethal equipment to Russia. As I said, we don’t have evidence of a final decision to do that today, we don’t have evidence that there’s actually been a transfer. And so all we’re trying to emphasize is the importance of not doing that.
MARGARET BRENNAN: The U.S. does have evidence that Chinese companies have been providing non-lethal support to Russian mercenaries, but it’s, you know, satellite imagery that helps target weapons. Isn’t that an indication of where their thinking is on this conflict, that they’re not actually peace brokers, but a party to it?
DIRECTOR BURNS: Well, I think it’s an indication that, you know, there is a strong partnership between China and Russia as President Xi, and- and Putin proclaimed just before the war started at the beginning of February. But I think the Chinese are also trying to weigh the consequences of, you know, what the concerns we’ve expressed are, you know, about providing lethal equipment as well. And weighing carefully, you know, where’s the point at which, you know, they would run into some pretty serious consequences and that’s what we’ve tried to make clear.
MARGARET BRENNAN: So this was testing the waters, in other words, for U.S. reaction to satellite imagery. To see if they can then go onto weapons–
DIRECTOR BURNS: Right, I mean, there’s a big distinction, in our view, and this is what U.S. policymakers have made clear between, you know, non-lethal equipment and lethal equipment as well.
MARGARET BRENNAN: So, how good is our visibility into Xi Jinping’s thinking and his decision-making process?
DIRECTOR BURNS: Oh, it’s always the hardest question for any intelligence service as well. You know, in- in an authoritarian system where power is consolidated so much in the hands of one man, but it’s something we work very hard at, and try to provide the President with the best insights that we can.
MARGARET BRENNAN: But you had such exquisite intelligence when it came to Russia and Vladimir Putin and his inner circle. Do we have that for Xi Jinping?
DIRECTOR BURNS: We work very hard to develop that.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Working on it?
DIRECTOR BURNS: I think we work very hard to develop the very best intelligence we can.
MARGARET BRENNAN: But I wonder if, when you’re talking about his thinking, and his decision making, if he suffers from the same kind of “Yes, man” culture that you said Vladimir Putin does. Because Xi Jinping got rid of a lot of people in his government.
DIRECTOR BURNS: Margaret, it’s a concern in any authoritarian system, and I think what we’ve seen in Beijing is President Xi consolidating power at a very rapid pace over the course of the more than a decade that he’s been in power as well. And as we’ve seen in, you know, in where Putin’s hubris has now gotten Russia, and the horrors that he’s, you know- you know, brought to the people of Ukraine. In that kind of a system, a very closed decision-making system when nobody challenges, you know, the authority of their insights of an authoritarian leader, you can make some huge blunders as well.
MARGARET BRENNAN: You’ve said Xi Jinping told his military to be prepared to invade Taiwan by 2027. The intel community seems a little bit more ambiguous in its conclusions here. Do you think it’s an outright invasion? Or do you think China’s more likely to slowly strangle democracy in Taiwan?
DIRECTOR BURNS: Well, first, I think we need to take very seriously Xi’s ambitions with regard to ultimately controlling Taiwan. That doesn’t, however, in our view, mean that a military conflict is inevitable. We do know, as has been made public, that President Xi has instructed the PLA, the Chinese military leadership, to be ready by 2027 to invade Taiwan, but that doesn’t mean that he’s decided to invade in 2027 or any other year as well. I think our judgment at least is that President Xi and his military leadership have doubts today about whether they could accomplish that invasion. I think, as they’ve looked at Putin’s experience in Ukraine, that’s probably reinforced some of those doubts as well. So, all I would say is that I think the risks of, you know, a potential use of force probably grow the further into this decade you get and beyond it, into the following decade as well. So that’s something obviously, that we watch very, very carefully.
MARGARET BRENNAN: I’d be remiss if I didn’t ask you when the intelligence community will have some insight into what Beijing was collecting with that spy balloon over the U.S.?
DIRECTOR BURNS: Well, I think we’ve already- I mean, the U.S. government, many of our partners have been bringing up from, you know, the seabed just off the coast of South Carolina as well, you know, a lot of materials from the platform that that balloon was carrying. It was clearly an intelligence platform as well. And I think we’ll be able to develop a pretty clear picture of exactly what its capabilities were.
MARGARET BRENNAN: But it will be awhile, won’t it?
DIRECTOR BURNS: It takes some time. But I think my understanding is that we’re managing to pull up quite a bit of evidence and material from that platform.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Do you think Xi Jinping knew that balloon was sent here?
DIRECTOR BURNS: I don’t know.
MARGARET BRENNAN: You have an idea?
DIRECTOR BURNS: I mean, this is something obviously we watch very carefully as well. I think the Chinese leadership obviously understood that they had launched this capability, that it was an intelligence platform, whether, when, and what the Chinese leadership knew about the trajectory of this balloon, I honestly can’t say.
MARGARET BRENNAN: You- I want to come back to something you just said about Iran. You’ve said in the past, there’s the beginnings of a full-fledged defense partnership between Russia and Iran. Exactly how far does the alliance go?
DIRECTOR BURNS: Well, it’s moving at a pretty fast clip in a very dangerous direction right now, in the sense that we know that the Iranians have already provided hundreds of armed drones to the Russians, which they’re using to inflict pain on Ukrainian civilians and Ukrainian civilian infrastructure. We know that they’ve provided, you know, ammunition for artillery and for tanks as well. And what we also see are signs that, you know, Russia is proposing to help the Iranians on their missile program and also at least considering the possibility of providing fighter aircraft to Iran as well. That creates obvious risks not only for the people of Ukraine, and we’ve seen the evidence of that already, but also risks to our friends and partners across the Middle East as well. So it’s, you know, quite disturbing set of developments.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Have Iran’s leaders made the decision to pursue a nuclear weapon?
DIRECTOR BURNS: To the best of our knowledge, we don’t believe that the Supreme Leader in Iran has yet made a decision to resume the weaponization program that we judge that they suspended or stopped at the end of 2003. But the other two legs of the stool, meaning enrichment programs, they’ve obviously advanced very far, you know, over the past couple of years–
MARGARET BRENNAN: 84 percent purity reportedly.
DIRECTOR BURNS: They’ve advanced very far to the point where it would only be a matter of weeks before they can enrich to 90 percent, if they chose to cross that line. And also in terms of their missile systems, their ability to deliver a nuclear weapon, once they developed it, has also been advancing as well. So the answer to your question is no, we don’t see evidence that they made a decision to resume that weaponization program. But the other dimensions of this challenge, I think, are growing at a worrisome pace too.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Israel has said they believe Iran has enough fuel for four bombs, and the enriched uranium that was found recently was at 84 percent purity- that’s very close to 90 percent, what you need for a nuclear weapon. So how far are they from testing? Or are you saying because they haven’t chosen to pursue a weapon that–
DIRECTOR BURNS: Right.
MARGARET BRENNAN: We’re not near that point?
DIRECTOR BURNS: Yeah. And they’re still a ways off, at least in our judgment in terms of their ability to actually develop a weapon. But their progress on enrichment is quite troubling, as I said before.
MARGARET BRENNAN: I have a lot of questions to still ask you, but I’m told we’re running out of time. I want to ask you, what keeps you up at night?
DIRECTOR BURNS: Oh, lots of things. It’s in the nature of this job. The job I’ve been proud to hold for the last couple of years as well. I mean, I think in the short term, there’s obviously a lot of concern about Putin’s war in Ukraine and doing everything that we can to support the Ukrainians. I’m very proud of the role that intelligence has played. I think we, not just at CIA but across the U.S. intelligence community, provided strong early warning of the invasion that was coming. I think we shared intelligence which helped the Ukrainians to defend themselves. I think the credibility of our intelligence has helped the President to build such a strong coalition. And I also think that the President’s decision to selectively and carefully declassify some of our secrets, some of our intelligence has had an important impact in the sense that it’s denied Putin the ability to shape false narratives, which I had seen him do too many times over the course of my experience with him in the last two decades. And it’s put him on the back foot, which is for Vladimir Putin that kind of uncomfortable and unaccustomed place to be. So I think for all those reasons, you know, I focus very intently on the role that intelligence plays in this conflict, and doing everything we can to support the Ukrainians and help the President shore up this, you know, remarkable coalition of countries supporting Ukraine.
MARGARET BRENNAN: You were the last American to speak with Vladimir Putin before this war.
DIRECTOR BURNS: I think the President talked to him on the telephone after that trip I made in you know, in early November of 2021, but you know with Putin and the conversation that I had in- in November, so several months before the war, you know, just left me with a very troubling impression that he was someone who had just about made up his mind to go to war at that point. And I had heard from him, before, a lot of what he had to say about Ukraine, his conviction that Ukraine is not a real country, you know real countries fight back. And that’s just what the Ukrainians have done, you know, so courageously over the course of the last year.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Yeah, he’d been telling you, it’s not a real country back in 2008.
DIRECTOR BURNS: Yes, yeah. No, it’s a consistent theme with him. But, you know, over the course, especially of the 15 years, since, you know, I was ambassador in Moscow, you have seen, you know, his views harden with regard to Ukraine. I think, as you know, he can’t conceive of Russia as a great power without controlling Ukraine’s choices. And I think as he’s looked at Ukraine’s evolution over the last decade, what he’s seen is Ukraine’s stubborn independence, it’s democratic progress, it’s movement toward the West in political and economic and security terms, largely accelerated by Putin himself through his aggression in Crimea in 2014. He’s seen that as a direct threat to the ambition that cuts to the core of his view as a Russian leader, and I think that’s the backdrop to the horrific aggression that he’s launched.
I’d love to hear from any recent Russia Studies students who’d like to weigh in in the comments section on this. – Natylie
Back in November 2013, I wrote an essay about the negative contribution of Russian area studies programs in major U.S. universities to the education of their candidates for Masters degrees and ultimately to the formulation of foreign policy with respect to Russia and Eurasia. At the same time, I noted that the fundamental issues which made Russian area studies worthless also were being remarked upon by academic observers in area studies programs relating to Latin America and other regions. These programs all were gutted of substantive knowledge about the lands and peoples of given areas to leave room in the curriculum for honing numerical skills that might be helpful in finding jobs for the graduates in commercial banks or international financial institutions; or to leave room for human rights studies that could provide entrée to jobs in global NGOs.
These changes were not fortuitous. They were completely in line with the universal values and democracy promotion agenda that since the end of the Cold War had almost completely vanquished the Realist School of international studies, with its focus on substantive knowledge.
In the case of Russian studies, already a decade ago the final blow against it was the reduction of the field to generating anti-Putin and anti-Russian propaganda. In effect, the masters of the discipline believed they knew everything there was to know about Russia and there were no questions left to study.
My conclusion in the given essay did not mince words:
“Given the venomous treatment of Russia by the present-day professoriate in the United States, it may not be a bad thing if we lose a generation of Russianists and the field starts over from ashes like the phoenix.”
See Chapter 7 in the collection Does Russia Have a Future? (2015)
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I arrived at these observations not abstractly but quite concretely as a result of spending some months on campus at one of the two original founding centers of Russian studies in the United States, what had come to be called the Harriman Institute at Columbia University in New York. I had accepted an honorary appointment there to do a small research project but also to present to the academic community a book of mine that appeared in print during my stay, Great Post-Cold War Thinkers on International Relations. This was my first venture in scholarly publications following my decamping from university life in 1975 for a career spent mostly in Eastern Europe and Russia as marketing manager and eventually as country manager serving major international concerns.
Indeed the Harriman Institute allowed me to deliver a lecture on my book, which was understandable insofar as the title did not give them a clue about its iconoclastic contents. And subsequently they published in their annual collection of essays an appreciation I wrote of George Kennan, who was then very much in scholarly discussion due to a recent authorized biography of Kennan by a Yale professor. But mostly during my stay at the Harriman Institute during the 2010-11 academic year I kept my eyes open, attended various Institute events and learned what I could about the latest curriculum changes in Area Studies which were stunning.
The atmosphere which I found at Columbia in 2010 was shocking. The anti-Russian consensus in the political direction at the Institute was so dominant that all public lectures were gatherings of the like-minded at which questions from the audience which were out of line immediately brought down upon the head of the questioner accusations of being a “Putin stooge.” In my understanding, Columbia had ceased to be a center of higher learning as regards Russia and was operating at the level of a kindergarten.
Turning from these subjective observations to the specifics of course requirements, I was stunned at the recent decisions taken in the university administration to sharply reduce language requirements for Area Studies candidates. In effect, one could now obtain a master’s degree and not possess the skills to do independent research in the field or even to understand what was going on in the target country(ies) from native language media and other sources.
This may have been understandable in terms of the momentary circumstances of 2010. Ever since the bombing of the Twin Towers and start of the War on Terror, the CIA, which had been a large employer of Russian studies graduates, had been firing not hiring such specialists while it moved to bulk up its Arabic language resources both internally and through outside contractors. Moreover, those in the university administration and in the Harriman in particular could tell themselves that the loss of language training for U.S.-born students would be more than compensated for by admission of native Russian speakers from the large numbers of immigrants from Russia who arrived in the 1990s and later.
Regrettably, that last calculation was plain stupid. First generation Americans from Russia could be counted upon as Russia haters, and that is not a good starting point for the end purpose of Area Studies. In that connection, I thought about the leading lights in the field when I was a student at Harvard in the 1960s and then later a post-doctoral fellow of the Russian Research Center in the 1970s: Adam Ulam, Richard Pipes, Zbigniew Brzezinski all were first generation Americans; all were Russia-haters who poisoned many minds of students and of government policy-makers during their decades at the top. Indeed, the present war in and about Ukraine was well prepared by Brzezinski in his infamous volume of 1997, The Grand Chessboard.
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What I have just described with respect to Columbia’s Harriman Institute in 2010-11 was by no means peculiar to that institution. The gutting of Area Studies was going on across the country. The reduction of federal financial aid to language studies took was particularly stunning in 2013, which prompted me to publish in the same year my essay calling for the whole program of Russian studies to die off and make way for some new shoots and new personalities.
Yet, from the perspective of 2023, the situation of Russian studies at Columbia 12 years ago looks pretty good. I continue to be a subscriber to the online weekly digest of events at The Harriman Institute and I see nothing to be optimistic about, even now that the succession of political scientists as chairman has been broken by the accession of a Literature scholar a year ago. By title of events sponsored, one might easily conclude that the Institute has become a center for Ukrainian studies. Russia and everything related to Russia has more or less been sent to hell.
Given that in a matter of months, Ukraine may disappear from the map of Europe while Russia, like it or not, will be with us for eternity, you have to ask what the value of newly minted Columbia degrees in Russia-Eurasia Area Studies will be – to the students themselves and to the nation at large.
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, 2/24/23
1. Respecting the sovereignty of all countries. Universally recognized international law, including the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, must be strictly observed. The sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all countries must be effectively upheld. All countries, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, are equal members of the international community. All parties should jointly uphold the basic norms governing international relations and defend international fairness and justice. Equal and uniform application of international law should be promoted, while double standards must be rejected.
2. Abandoning the Cold War mentality. The security of a country should not be pursued at the expense of others. The security of a region should not be achieved by strengthening or expanding military blocs. The legitimate security interests and concerns of all countries must be taken seriously and addressed properly. There is no simple solution to a complex issue. All parties should, following the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security and bearing in mind the long-term peace and stability of the world, help forge a balanced, effective and sustainable European security architecture. All parties should oppose the pursuit of one’s own security at the cost of others’ security, prevent bloc confrontation, and work together for peace and stability on the Eurasian Continent.
3. Ceasing hostilities. Conflict and war benefit no one. All parties must stay rational and exercise restraint, avoid fanning the flames and aggravating tensions, and prevent the crisis from deteriorating further or even spiraling out of control. All parties should support Russia and Ukraine in working in the same direction and resuming direct dialogue as quickly as possible, so as to gradually deescalate the situation and ultimately reach a comprehensive ceasefire.
4. Resuming peace talks. Dialogue and negotiation are the only viable solution to the Ukraine crisis. All efforts conducive to the peaceful settlement of the crisis must be encouraged and supported. The international community should stay committed to the right approach of promoting talks for peace, help parties to the conflict open the door to a political settlement as soon as possible, and create conditions and platforms for the resumption of negotiation. China will continue to play a constructive role in this regard.
5. Resolving the humanitarian crisis. All measures conducive to easing the humanitarian crisis must be encouraged and supported. Humanitarian operations should follow the principles of neutrality and impartiality, and humanitarian issues should not be politicized. The safety of civilians must be effectively protected, and humanitarian corridors should be set up for the evacuation of civilians from conflict zones. Efforts are needed to increase humanitarian assistance to relevant areas, improve humanitarian conditions, and provide rapid, safe and unimpeded humanitarian access, with a view to preventing a humanitarian crisis on a larger scale. The UN should be supported in playing a coordinating role in channeling humanitarian aid to conflict zones.
6. Protecting civilians and prisoners of war (POWs). Parties to the conflict should strictly abide by international humanitarian law, avoid attacking civilians or civilian facilities, protect women, children and other victims of the conflict, and respect the basic rights of POWs. China supports the exchange of POWs between Russia and Ukraine, and calls on all parties to create more favorable conditions for this purpose.
7. Keeping nuclear power plants safe. China opposes armed attacks against nuclear power plants or other peaceful nuclear facilities, and calls on all parties to comply with international law including the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) and resolutely avoid man-made nuclear accidents. China supports the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in playing a constructive role in promoting the safety and security of peaceful nuclear facilities.
8. Reducing strategic risks. Nuclear weapons must not be used and nuclear wars must not be fought. The threat or use of nuclear weapons should be opposed. Nuclear proliferation must be prevented and nuclear crisis avoided. China opposes the research, development and use of chemical and biological weapons by any country under any circumstances.
9. Facilitating grain exports. All parties need to implement the Black Sea Grain Initiative signed by Russia, Türkiye, Ukraine and the UN fully and effectively in a balanced manner, and support the UN in playing an important role in this regard. The cooperation initiative on global food security proposed by China provides a feasible solution to the global food crisis.
10. Stopping unilateral sanctions. Unilateral sanctions and maximum pressure cannot solve the issue; they only create new problems. China opposes unilateral sanctions unauthorized by the UN Security Council. Relevant countries should stop abusing unilateral sanctions and “long-arm jurisdiction” against other countries, so as to do their share in deescalating the Ukraine crisis and create conditions for developing countries to grow their economies and better the lives of their people.
11. Keeping industrial and supply chains stable. All parties should earnestly maintain the existing world economic system and oppose using the world economy as a tool or weapon for political purposes. Joint efforts are needed to mitigate the spillovers of the crisis and prevent it from disrupting international cooperation in energy, finance, food trade and transportation and undermining the global economic recovery.
12. Promoting post-conflict reconstruction. The international community needs to take measures to support post-conflict reconstruction in conflict zones. China stands ready to provide assistance and play a constructive role in this endeavor.
