The Nation, 1/17/24

Grigory Yavlinsky is the founder of Russia’s leading and oldest democratic opposition party, Yabloko, which is the only party in Russia calling for a cease-fire. The interview was conducted by The Nation’s longtime contributor Nadia Azhgikhina at Yabloko’s Moscow offices.

Q: At the end of 2023, the Russian media talked a lot about Yavlinsky’s “peace program” and about your midnight December 19 meeting in the Kremlin with Putin to discuss it. What is the essence of this program?

Right now, we need to reach a cease-fire agreement. That means talking about the disengagement of heavy weapons and troops, setting demarcation lines, ensuring international observation and control, and so on. Until the killing of people is stopped, it is impossible to talk about any positive prospects. I believe that the most important thing today is to stop the killing of people. Isn’t that clear? Over the past year, there have been no significant changes on the battlefield. The Ukrainian counteroffensive ended in nothing. But recently I read in the Western press that the number of people killed every day has increased significantly. That is, people on both sides are dying every day. For what?

I am amazed that there is not one major, influential politician in the world today who would put people’s lives first, before geopolitical projects. They talk about anything at all but people’s lives; that doesn’t matter. Yes, politicians seem to be sorry, but at the same time they speak directly about the necessity to continue the war until some “victorious end.” The preservation of human life is not the main criterion for them.

That is why people are dying every day. And on top of that, Ukraine is losing its prospects. I am a Russian politician, and Russia started this conflict, so it is not for me to talk about Ukraine’s problems. But personally, Russia and Ukraine are very dear to me, they are like my right and left hands. What is happening is incredibly painful for me. And I will do everything to stop the deaths of both Russians and Ukrainians. Cease-fire first and foremost.

A cease-fire is not a border treaty. There has been no peace treaty between North and South Korea for 70 years. There is no treaty between Russia and Japan, and no one has been bothered by it for years. The peculiarity of Russia’s conflict with Ukraine is that the situation is such that nothing else is possible. Everything else—other negotiations, discussions, truce—will be possible much later and only on the basis of a cease-fire agreement.

Q: With US involvement?

In one form or another, US participation is important. It can’t be done without the US. It would be good if China were not left out. Putin is explicitly saying that we are not interested in territories. He is interested in dialogue with the White House about Russia’s role, NATO, arms, etc.

Q: Your opponents say: You can’t have a cease-fire because Russia will then go farther. Let Russia first withdraw from Ukrainian territories. Putin cannot be trusted.

In such a situation and with such participants, it is not a matter of faith. It is necessary to make concrete decisions and in such a way as to minimize the possibility of their violation. This is politics. For example, we should realize that Russia has nuclear weapons, and the solution of territorial problems should be achieved through long and complex negotiations, not by force. In the meantime, people are just being killed.

I would say to my opponents: If you are in favor of continuing the war, go to the line of contact yourself and send your children there. It is easy to criticize from a cozy office or a European restaurant. You have to realize that Putin doesn’t really need any respite. He is actively exporting oil despite the sanctions. He can build any kind of factory. He doesn’t even need mobilization—he will promise contract workers the kind of pay they never dreamed of, and people will go on their own. What breathing space does he need? Ukraine objectively does not have as much strategic depth as Russia. It is organized differently, and the West’s help is not unlimited, especially since the Middle East has now become a serious problem for the West, a conflict that could escalate into a very dangerous one. In this context, what is happening in Ukraine has come to be perceived as a distant “local” conflict. Few American citizens actually care where exactly the border between Russia and Ukraine will be. People simply don’t want war, even though not a single American is officially fighting in Ukraine.

Q: Why do so many people today not want to talk about peace? Are they more afraid of talking about peace than they are of war?

Talking about peace is talking about official and mutual recognition of borders. So far there is no basis to talk about it. There are no prerequisites for a full-fledged peace now. That is why I am only talking about a cease-fire, i.e., that we should stop killing people. After that, they can take even 20 years to negotiate the terms of peace. Let me remind you about Finland. When, in 1939, the Red Army captured an important piece of Finnish territory, Marshal Mannerheim sat down at the table with the prime minister and the president and convinced them to stop in order to save the country and preserve the future. As a result, the country, its army, and its leadership were preserved. It is a difficult choice. But it is there for now. A peace treaty is a distant prospect. Two things are extremely important now. The first is to stop killing people immediately. The second is to preserve prospects, the opportunity to move into the future. Can’t 80 percent of Ukraine be oriented toward joining the EU?

Things will be very difficult in the returned territories. There is a lot of destruction and land mines. What will be done with the unfortunate population? Find out who sympathized with the Russians and punish them? This has already happened in liberated settlements and cities. What to do with people? Put them in jail? Is it not clear that there will be guerrilla warfare? An endless story… And Crimea? It’s no secret that today the majority of people there really support Russia.

Q: There was at least one moment when a cease-fire seemed to be possible.

Right. In November–December 2022, after the successful Ukrainian operation near Kharkiv and Kherson. Then there was a moment when both sides could have said something provisionally satisfactory to their peoples: Moscow something about the annexed territories, and Zelensky to declare that he had preserved the country, the sovereignty of the nation-state and was joining the EU. But this important moment was missed.

Q: What did Putin say in response to your proposal?

He was silent.

Q: But he listened to it?

Yes, he did. I told him I’m personally ready to negotiate an immediate cease-fire.

Q: You’re probably the only one everyone would talk to today, including in Ukraine and in the United States.

I am ready to do everything possible to stop the killing of people.

Q: Yabloko is the only party that openly calls for peace. You refused to participate in the presidential election, for the first time.

Actually, I refused for the first time in 2004—it was obvious then what was going on. There have been seven presidential elections in Russia since 1991. I participated three times. In 2000, I came third out of 11 candidates. Now it’s kind of a referendum, a plebiscite on Putin’s support, not a competitive election, and presidential spokesman Dmitri Peskov has already announced the results. Nevertheless, I still offered to informally collect signatures for my program, the peace program. We decided that if 10 million signatures were collected, that is, about 10 percent of voters who support my nomination, I would run despite all the difficulties. In two months, we collected about one and a half million signatures.

Q: Probably there were many voters afraid to leave their passport data on the signature sheets, I know such people.

That’s right, people are afraid to declare their opposition to the current government. Fear. It has enveloped the entire country in recent years. We live in a condition of fear.

Q: Why is it back? Why are the worst features of the Soviet past returning? During perestroika, there was confidence that we were free of the heavy legacy, that there was no return to it. How did this happen?

Because in the 1990s we carried out mistaken reforms, even criminal ones, and deceived people, deceived their hopes. It is well known what gross mistakes and crimes were committed. Mikhail Poltoranin, a Russian official close to Yeltsin, wrote in his memoirs how he tried to persuade Yeltsin in the fall of 1991 to appoint me as his deputy in charge of reforms. Yeltsin said: Yavlinsky will do what he thinks is necessary, but I need IMF loans, and they have a completely different reform plan. So, he appointed Gaidar [who pursued “shock therapy reform”]. And those were the wrong reforms. Of course, by and large it was not about the IMF. The problem was the lack of understanding of the essence of what had to be done, and the lack of political will of the Russian leadership in the first place.

On January 2, 1992, Russia announced “price liberalization”! This in a country without a single private enterprise at the time; there were only state monopolies. By the end of the year, hyperinflation reached 2,600 percent! That is, prices rose 26 times. Enterprises stopped, there was a gigantic decline in production, unemployment, crime. My 500 Days program provided for the use of people’s financial savings during the Soviet period for the privatization of small and medium-sized enterprises, the emergence of real private business, the creation of an inter-republic banking union, the implementation of an economic treaty between the former union republics, with which in the autumn of 1991, 13 republics out of 15 agreed in one way or another. All that was crossed out. In 1993, people protested the situation. The protest was crushed with the shooting and destruction of the Russian Federation parliament.

Q: People become disillusioned with democracy because of failed economic reforms.

Yes, you’re right. In addition, the government fraudulently transferred large state property to people close to them via the “loans for shares” program. This is how the oligarchs appeared, and corruption became the foundation of Russia’s economic system. A tiny group of oligarchs enriched themselves, merging power and property. The separation of powers, an independent court, a real parliament, an independent press, trade unions, real democracy were contraindicated and categorically unacceptable for the state corporate-criminal system.

The third circumstance is that during the 10 years of reforms after 1991, there was never an official state and legal assessment of Stalinism and the Soviet period in general. It is not surprising that the practices of that time have returned.

Under these conditions, in the 2000s the authorities imposed a formula on people, which many obeyed: “Mind your own business and do not interfere in politics. Nothing depends on you anyway. Democracy is just empty words.” High oil prices made it easier as people began to live better.

In my opinion, Russia has a lot of wonderful people, but as a result of all this there is no civil society. Today the country is experiencing the collapse of the failed post-Soviet modernization.

Q: Can there be a way out today?

We can talk about a way out when they stop killing people. Now the situation is worse than in December of last year. At that time, there were publications about the possibility of starting negotiations on a cease-fire. But Ukraine attacked a Russian warship. Russia responded with a missile attack. Then there was a strike on the Russian city of Belgorod. And so on since January first, almost every day. The situation is moving backward.

Q: What don’t Americans understand about Russia? What would be important to do to improve relations, to ease the dangerous confrontation?

We need to talk. Dialogue with Russia cannot be avoided. Sanctions have not worked because Russia is part of the world economy. The world economy cannot live without Russia. For example, all this time, gas from Russia continues to flow through Ukraine to Europe. There are many other examples. Russia is not going anywhere. This must be understood.

Second. We need to think about the future. I would not be surprised if an even more aggressive dictator emerges in the Russian political field, with a real claim to power.

And third. By the middle of the 21st century, the European Union will not be able to separate itself not only from Ukraine, but also from Russia and Belarus. It will have to look for some effective form of integration. This is an imperative, which must be met, otherwise Europe will not be able to become a serious center of economic power, competing with North America and Southeast Asia.

Q: Lately, the fear of the nuclear threat seems to have disappeared from the agenda, and war itself looks like a computer game to many. Is it the result of the war generation being gone? The generation of Khrushchev and Kennedy?

The digitalization of consciousness is hugely important. Thirty years ago, experts thought that digitalization would mean the free exchange of opinions and ideas, but that is not what has happened. Everything negative that was in people came out and became extremely loud, flooding social media. This digitally disordered and dangerous world is becoming a reality. That’s how populists and ignoramuses enter politics.

Q: But a living human voice, it seems to me, can stand up to hype and strong arm populism. I see how the voice of Yabloko is a sign of hope and a reference point for many people in Russia. Looking at you, some people are no longer afraid. What gives you hope? What do you see as the party’s main task today, and your own?

We are trying, doing everything possible and even seemingly impossible to create a civil society in Russia. We believe it is important that a real public opinion appears and that it becomes a factor influencing what is happening. We persistently talk to people and continue to insist that the most important thing today is to stop killing people. We believe that politics has only one main and indisputable goal—it must serve people, individuals, their interests.

I love my country, my people. What is happening today in Russia and Ukraine is a terrible tragedy for me. I want the killing to stop, and I want Ukraine and Russia to be preserved as modern states, to have a future.

Q: What gives you strength?

The memory of my comrades who gave their lives so that the country would be free.

Also, I am sure that at some point a window of opportunity will open. I vividly remember the feelings of a dead end in the early 1980s. What was there to hope for? But suddenly Gorbachev came and the modernization of the country began. The window of opportunity will definitely open. But you have to be ready for it.

Link to full show on Rumble here.

Link to excerpt from same program on YouTube here.

By Ted Snider & Nicolai Petro, Libertarian Institute, 1/18/24

The essential argument used to avoid negotiation and continue support for the war in Ukraine is based on a falsehood. That falsehood, repeated by President Joe Biden, is that when Vladimir Putin decided to invade, he intended to conquer all of Ukraine and “annihilate” it.

Its falsity has been exposed multiple times by military experts, who have pointed out, both before and after the invasion, that Russia could not have intended to conquer all of Ukraine because it did not invade with sufficient forces to do so. Indeed, this was a key reason why senior Ukrainian officials, and even President Volodymyr Zelensky himself, argued just days before the invasion that it would not occur.

The mistake that most analysts at the time made (these authors included), was to assume that since the troops mobilized by Russia did not suffice for a full scale occupation of Ukraine, no military operation, not even a limited one, was in the offing. It was only later that Western political leaders turned this mistake to their propaganda advantage by insisting that Russia had always intended to first take Kiev, then all of Ukraine, and ultimately even attack NATO.

But if basic military logic is taken into account, the fact that Putin committed only 120,000–190,000 men to his campaign and did not mobilize more resources until months later, after Kiev rejected the Istanbul peace deal, indicates that his objectives in Ukraine were limited and revolved around guaranteeing the security of the populations of Donbass and Crimea from Ukrainian assaults and Russia from NATO expansion. Given that Ukraine had cut off Crimea’s water and electricity years before, this required a land bridge to the region; hence, the illegal annexations of the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions.

We also have indirect confirmation that territory was not his objective from an unimpeachable source: NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg, who stated that Putin invaded Ukraine to prevent NATO’s expansion. This would explain why, as soon as these goals were within reach when Ukrainian officials initialed the draft of the Istanbul Agreement in March 2022, Putin halted his assault and withdrew Russian forces from Kiev, rather than move further into Ukraine.   

This background is important, because the argument for increasing Western military support for Ukraine relies so heavily on the claim that Russia always intended to expand further, attack NATO, and reestablish the Russian empire.

But, as noted scholar John Mearsheimer has pointed out, “there is no evidence in the public record that Putin was contemplating, much less intending to put an end to Ukraine as an independent state and make it part of greater Russia when he sent his troops into Ukraine on February 24th.” It was never one of Putin’s stated goals, nor was it ever taken seriously by the Ukrainian leadership. David Arakhamia, the head of Ukraine’s negotiating team in Belarus and Istanbul, recently revealed that the “key point” for Russia was Ukraine not joining NATO, and “everything else was simply rhetoric and political ‘seasoning.’”

Putin himself has consistently said that “this conflict is not about territory…[it] is about the principles underlying the new international order.” We should not take him at his word, but it is still worth asking: had Putin’s ambitions been territorial, would he have waited until 2014 to annex Crimea? Would the upper house of Russia’s parliament have rescinded Putin’s temporary authority to use troops in Ukraine in June 2015? Would he have opposed the 2014 independence referendums in Donetsk and Lugansk?

Looking back even further, if Putin had truly wanted to incorporate parts of the former Soviet Union, he had an ideal opportunity to do so in August 2008, when Russian troops were but an hour’s drive from the Georgian capitol of Tbilisi. He could have simply recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and then annexed them to Russia, but he did not. Reviewing Putin’s current behavior, therefore, former U.S. Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Stephen Bryen concludes that “Russia has no intention of expanding outside of the Ukraine conflict area.”

The false narrative about Russian intentions has served its essential purpose of rallying Western countries behind Ukraine. Continuing to insist on it now, however, risks involving NATO directly in the conflict, and threatens Ukraine’s very survival.

If the challenge the West faces in this conflict is defined as “existential,” then what choice does NATO have but to send its own military forces in to prevent Ukraine’s defeat? President Biden implied as much when he said, “If Putin takes Ukraine, he won’t stop there. It’s important to see the long run here. He’s going to keep going…Then we’ll have something that we don’t seek and that we don’t have today: American troops fighting Russian troops.”

At some point, a decision will have to be made to either greatly expand the West’s commitment, or abandon Ukraine to its fate. Alas, President Biden’s request for $61 billion in additional funding for 2024 does neither, since Ukraine needs at least five time that amount to win, according to its top military commander. With the Ukrainian counteroffensive already running out of steam due to a lack funding, lack of weaponry, and unsustainable losses, Ukraine will likely soon be facing a Russian counteroffensive.

Before such an assault, however, Russia might offer Ukraine new peace terms, albeit far less advantageous than the ones it offered in March 2022. If Ukraine balks, Russia will press its overwhelming advantage and take more territory, which it does not really want (for a good discussion of why, see former Ukrainian diplomat Rostislav Ishchenko), in order to force Ukraine to the negotiating table.

At that point, the West will be faced with a fateful choice: either accept Ukraine’s surrender or send in NATO troops. Either scenario is likely to lead to sharp divisions in the NATO alliance, since Hungary, Slovakia, and Turkey have all indicated that they want a peaceful resolution to the conflict, not escalation.

The one thing that escalation cannot guarantee, however, is Russia’s defeat. That is because, by confirming Putin’s narrative that NATO is intent on destroying Russia, his support both within Russia and around the world would likely skyrocket. A more divided West would thus be facing a more united Russia, this time supported openly by the BRICS countries, as well as many other major international actors currently on the sidelines. This would effectively turn the tables on America’s strategy of using Ukraine to contain China’s global ambitions. Instead, it would now be Russia and its allies using Ukraine to contain the global ambitions of the United States.

It was, in no small part, the West’s original false narrative about Russia’s goals in Ukraine that has led us to this dismal outcome; European security weakened, the specter of nuclear war, Ukraine destroyed, and America’s global standing undermined. It has already been used once before to scuttle the Istanbul Agreement, which could have ended the war before hundreds of thousands died. For peace negotiations to become an acceptable alternative to mutual annihilation, this falsehood must be exposed and discarded.

About Ted Snider and Nicolai N. Petro

Ted Snider is a regular columnist on U.S. foreign policy and history at Antiwar.com and the Libertarian Institute, and is a frequent contributor to Responsible Statecraft, The American Conservative, and other outlets. He can be contacted at tedsnider@bell.net Nicolai N. Petro is Professor of Political Science at the University of Rhode Island, and the author of The Tragedy of Ukraine: What Classical Greek Tragedy Can Teach Us About Conflict Resolution (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2023).

Russia Matters, 2/2/24

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy summoned Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (ZSU) Valerii Zaluzhnyi on Jan. 29 to tell the general he was being fired. At the meeting, Zaluzhnyi was offered the post of secretary of the national security council, but he turned it down, according to The Economist.[1] Two days after the meeting, the general, still in command of ZSU, published an essay with CNN, in which he said that bureaucracy is holding back Ukraine’s defense industry and “a new philosophy of training and warfare” is needed in 2024. By doing so, he “doubled down on a confrontation with Zelenskyy over military leadership,” according to Bloomberg. Zelenskyy and Zaluzhnyi have recently sparred on whether to mobilize an additional 500,000, with the president arguing that his government lacks the money to sustain such a mobilization. Zelenskyy has also been reportedly discontent with both the insufficient progress of ZSU’s counteroffensive last year and Zaluzhnyi’s acknowledgement of stalemate on the battlefield. In addition, some members of Zelenskyy’s staff have reportedly become weary of Zaluzhnyi’s growing popularity as he has become the most trusted figure in Ukraine. The removal of Zaluzhnyi, which was yet to be formalized as of Feb. 2, but which Kyiv has already informed Washington about, would cause an uproar within both Ukraine’s civil society and ZSU’s rank-and-file, according to FT. Nevertheless, two generals are being mentioned as contenders to replace Zaluzhnyi, commander of the ground forces Oleksandr Syrsky and military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov, according to the Economist and WP.

***

According to an article by Seymour Hersh dated 2/1/24, one of the main reasons Zelensky wants to fire Zaluzhny is because the general has been conducting secret talks with western military and intelligence officials about a path toward a negotiated end to the war, which Zelensky opposes:

Zelensky’s desire to fire his commanding general is the result, some Americans believe, of his knowledge that Zaluzhny had continued to participate—whether directly or through aides is not known—in secret talks since last fall with American and other Western officials on how best to achieve a ceasefire and negotiate an end to the war with Russia. It was those talks that led Zaluzhny to declare to the Economist that the war was stalemated. Zelensky has talked of mobilizing 500,000 more soldiers, via another draft, and to try again this spring to launch another counteroffensive against the Russians. Ukraine, of course, would need renewed funding from the Biden administration to do so. It is not clear that Republicans in Congress are prepared to finance another counteroffensive, but there is little doubt that the Biden administration would lobby hard for the funds. (On Thursday, the EU approved funding for Ukraine in excess of 50 billion euros.)

All of this comes at a time when there has been renewed interest among some in the American military and intelligence community in finding a way to both support significant reform in the Ukrainian government and support Zaluzhny’s efforts for far-reaching talks with Russia about a settlement in the war. A few hints of the details were provided last week to the Washington Post in a story headlined “In Ukraine, U.S. dials back plans to take turf.” The article left open the possibility of Ukraine undertaking future military action against Russia. The Post reported that the key elements are support for Ukraine’s battered industrial and export base and funding for the political reforms required for full integration into Western Europe.

According to Hersh’s sources, various western officials, including current CIA director William Burns, have communicated to Zelensky in recent months that continued western support is dependent upon four things: implementing serious reforms to address corruption, a meaningful audit of all government funding, serious investment in building up Ukrainian infrastructure and economy, and defense of the country.

The current plan evolved among experts in the intelligence and military bureaucracy without input from the White House, the State Department, or the National Security Council. “It stems from the American and Ukraine general staffs and it is putting investments” from private industry, the official said, “and not solely government funding and grants as the ticket out.

In a December 1, 2023 article, Hersh claimed that, according to his sources, Zaluzhny had also been conducting secret talks with Russian Chief of General Staff of the armed forces Valery Gerasimov:

The ingredient that triggered the private talks is a shared understanding that Putin would not object to a settlement that fixed borders according to where the troops were in place when the peace talks ended. Russia would be left with unchallenged control of Crimea and, pending an election to be held under martial law in March, with essential control of the four provinces, or oblasts, that Russia annexed last year: Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and the still embattled Kherson. In return—in a concession not foreseen—Russia, that is, Putin himself, would not object to Ukraine joining NATO.

Though Hersh has an excellent reputation as an investigative reporter, his understanding of Russian politics and society seems to be rather shallow and he seems to have an overreliance on mainstream media sources and his own insider government sources in forming his view of Russia and its leadership. I think this may make him vulnerable at times to unwittingly publishing what amounts to information warfare from western insiders. While it’s possible there have been talks between Zaluzhny and Gerasimov to get a feel for how a negotiated settlement could be worked out, I don’t find it credible that Putin would allow Ukraine to join NATO even if Crimea and the four oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia were agreed to be part of Russia. NATO membership – de facto or de jure – was a repeatedly stated red line over the course of many years and It’s the main reason Putin felt the need to conduct the “special military operation.” Even if Putin were foolish enough to think a smaller Ukraine would be less of a long-term threat on behalf of NATO shenanigans, I don’t think it would fly politically among Russians, especially among Russian families who have lost loved ones in the fighting. My sense is that most Russians don’t care about taking any more territory but It would be tough to spin Ukraine ultimately joining NATO as a Russian victory worthy of the sacrifice, especially when Russia has gained the upper hand.

By Ted Galen Carpenter, Antiwar.com, 1/10/24

There are multiple indications that members of the foreign policy establishment are increasingly worried that the American people are growing weary of Washington’s strategic overextension and the excessive costs in treasure and blood that role imposes.  Elites show their nervousness through desperate attempts to preserve the policy status quo.  One recent example was the effort in Congress to limit the president’s powers and options regarding NATO.

In December 2023, hawks finally achieved their goal when both the Senate and House approved a provision attached to the National Defense Authorization Act that would bar a president from withdrawing the U.S. from NATO without the approval of two-thirds of the Senate or separate legislation passed by both houses of Congress. Washington Post analyst Meagan Vasquez notes that “the bipartisan attempt to add checks and balances highlights the lengths Congress is willing to go to protect the U.S.-NATO relationship amid ongoing Russian aggression and after years of criticism of the military alliance during Trump’s presidential tenure.”

Yet even the Brookings Institution’s Michael E. O’Hanlon, a prominent establishment foreign policy figure, concedes that Congress is entering uncharted and controversial territory.  He points out “that there is precedent for presidents withdrawing unilaterally from treaties without consulting Congress. A chief executive conceivably could push back on efforts to restrict that [authority] particularly if the treaty addresses the United States’ defense posture abroad.  A “future president might challenge such an effort and invoke the president’s authorities as commander in chief under Article 2 of the Constitution.”

O’Hanlon is probably correct.  Indeed, a congressional-presidential collision is likely to take place even if critics of promiscuous military interventions do not attempt to end U.S. membership in NATO.  Members of the “NATO forever” crowd will react badly even if a president committed to a more restrained foreign policy merely attempts to reduce the U.S. military footprint in Europe.  Such a move would indicate a long overdue willingness on the part of an administration to move beyond burden sharing toward burden shifting with respect to transatlantic security policy.

Even a partial withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe would signal to the European members of NATO that going forward they would need to accept primary responsibility for their own defense and the continent’s security.  NATO partisans would regard such a policy change as undermining continued U.S. dominance of the trans-Atlantic security relationship.  That faction in Congress would almost certainly move to thwart a reformist administration.

U.S. hardliners already have demonstrated a determination to prevent any president from implementing a less interventionist policy elsewhere in the world.  In October 2019, congressional hawks led by neo-conservative Rep. Liz Cheney (R-WY) secured a resolution condemning President Donald Trump for even considering a partial withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria.  Fears that Trump might remove U.S. forces from Europe during a second term have become widespread in Washington.  Indeed, those worries on the part of America’s stodgy foreign policy elite were a major reason why Congress passed the new bi-partisan measure to prohibit the president from unilaterally exiting NATO.

It is notable that Congress has afforded presidents a great deal of latitude both with respect to the general handling of foreign policy and specifically in the use of U.S. forces on the world scene.  Yet that restraint seems to apply only when a president is willing to continue Washington’s interventionist foreign policy.  When merely a theoretical possibility of a less belligerent policy emerges, congressional hawks are prepared to severely restrict the president’s role as commander-and-chief of the military.

The controversy over whether the president has the authority to withdraw U.S. membership in NATO reflects a broader problem with U.S. foreign policy.  The core feature of Washington’s long-standing insistence on U.S. global primacy is a NATO under permanent U.S. dominance. That determination has been evident for decades.  Even when the Soviet Union disintegrated, there was vehement opposition from members of the foreign policy blob to dissolving an alliance whose overriding purpose was to counter Soviet power in Europe.  Clearly, that mission was no longer needed since the Soviet Union no longer existed.

Instead of accepting and adjusting to that existential change, the blob’s reaction was to find alternative missions for their sacred, but now obsolete, alliance.  Suggested new missions even included promoting student exchanges and coordinating environmental policies, measures for which a military alliance is not needed.  Worse, NATO enthusiasts sought to expand the alliance into Eastern Europe, thereby threatening non-Communist Russia’s security zone.  Such provocative actions eventually poisoned the West’s relations with Moscow.  The war in Ukraine and the resulting NATO-Russia confrontation is the alarming result.

The American people need to firmly rebuff the ongoing effort to make the current U.S. posture toward NATO permanent.  A smart foreign policy must be agile and willing to adjust to important changes in the international system.  The place to begin such badly needed policy reform is by rejecting the out-of-touch foreign policy establishment’s escalating campaign to freeze NATO in place.

Ted Galen Carpenter, Senior Fellow at the Randolph Bourne Institute, is the author of 13 books and more than 1,200 articles on international affairs. Dr. Carpenter held various senior policy positions during a 37-year career at the Cato institute. His latest book is Unreliable Watchdog: The News Media and U.S. Foreign Policy (2022).