Russia Matters, 2/2/24

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy summoned Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (ZSU) Valerii Zaluzhnyi on Jan. 29 to tell the general he was being fired. At the meeting, Zaluzhnyi was offered the post of secretary of the national security council, but he turned it down, according to The Economist.[1] Two days after the meeting, the general, still in command of ZSU, published an essay with CNN, in which he said that bureaucracy is holding back Ukraine’s defense industry and “a new philosophy of training and warfare” is needed in 2024. By doing so, he “doubled down on a confrontation with Zelenskyy over military leadership,” according to Bloomberg. Zelenskyy and Zaluzhnyi have recently sparred on whether to mobilize an additional 500,000, with the president arguing that his government lacks the money to sustain such a mobilization. Zelenskyy has also been reportedly discontent with both the insufficient progress of ZSU’s counteroffensive last year and Zaluzhnyi’s acknowledgement of stalemate on the battlefield. In addition, some members of Zelenskyy’s staff have reportedly become weary of Zaluzhnyi’s growing popularity as he has become the most trusted figure in Ukraine. The removal of Zaluzhnyi, which was yet to be formalized as of Feb. 2, but which Kyiv has already informed Washington about, would cause an uproar within both Ukraine’s civil society and ZSU’s rank-and-file, according to FT. Nevertheless, two generals are being mentioned as contenders to replace Zaluzhnyi, commander of the ground forces Oleksandr Syrsky and military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov, according to the Economist and WP.

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According to an article by Seymour Hersh dated 2/1/24, one of the main reasons Zelensky wants to fire Zaluzhny is because the general has been conducting secret talks with western military and intelligence officials about a path toward a negotiated end to the war, which Zelensky opposes:

Zelensky’s desire to fire his commanding general is the result, some Americans believe, of his knowledge that Zaluzhny had continued to participate—whether directly or through aides is not known—in secret talks since last fall with American and other Western officials on how best to achieve a ceasefire and negotiate an end to the war with Russia. It was those talks that led Zaluzhny to declare to the Economist that the war was stalemated. Zelensky has talked of mobilizing 500,000 more soldiers, via another draft, and to try again this spring to launch another counteroffensive against the Russians. Ukraine, of course, would need renewed funding from the Biden administration to do so. It is not clear that Republicans in Congress are prepared to finance another counteroffensive, but there is little doubt that the Biden administration would lobby hard for the funds. (On Thursday, the EU approved funding for Ukraine in excess of 50 billion euros.)

All of this comes at a time when there has been renewed interest among some in the American military and intelligence community in finding a way to both support significant reform in the Ukrainian government and support Zaluzhny’s efforts for far-reaching talks with Russia about a settlement in the war. A few hints of the details were provided last week to the Washington Post in a story headlined “In Ukraine, U.S. dials back plans to take turf.” The article left open the possibility of Ukraine undertaking future military action against Russia. The Post reported that the key elements are support for Ukraine’s battered industrial and export base and funding for the political reforms required for full integration into Western Europe.

According to Hersh’s sources, various western officials, including current CIA director William Burns, have communicated to Zelensky in recent months that continued western support is dependent upon four things: implementing serious reforms to address corruption, a meaningful audit of all government funding, serious investment in building up Ukrainian infrastructure and economy, and defense of the country.

The current plan evolved among experts in the intelligence and military bureaucracy without input from the White House, the State Department, or the National Security Council. “It stems from the American and Ukraine general staffs and it is putting investments” from private industry, the official said, “and not solely government funding and grants as the ticket out.

In a December 1, 2023 article, Hersh claimed that, according to his sources, Zaluzhny had also been conducting secret talks with Russian Chief of General Staff of the armed forces Valery Gerasimov:

The ingredient that triggered the private talks is a shared understanding that Putin would not object to a settlement that fixed borders according to where the troops were in place when the peace talks ended. Russia would be left with unchallenged control of Crimea and, pending an election to be held under martial law in March, with essential control of the four provinces, or oblasts, that Russia annexed last year: Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and the still embattled Kherson. In return—in a concession not foreseen—Russia, that is, Putin himself, would not object to Ukraine joining NATO.

Though Hersh has an excellent reputation as an investigative reporter, his understanding of Russian politics and society seems to be rather shallow and he seems to have an overreliance on mainstream media sources and his own insider government sources in forming his view of Russia and its leadership. I think this may make him vulnerable at times to unwittingly publishing what amounts to information warfare from western insiders. While it’s possible there have been talks between Zaluzhny and Gerasimov to get a feel for how a negotiated settlement could be worked out, I don’t find it credible that Putin would allow Ukraine to join NATO even if Crimea and the four oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia were agreed to be part of Russia. NATO membership – de facto or de jure – was a repeatedly stated red line over the course of many years and It’s the main reason Putin felt the need to conduct the “special military operation.” Even if Putin were foolish enough to think a smaller Ukraine would be less of a long-term threat on behalf of NATO shenanigans, I don’t think it would fly politically among Russians, especially among Russian families who have lost loved ones in the fighting. My sense is that most Russians don’t care about taking any more territory but It would be tough to spin Ukraine ultimately joining NATO as a Russian victory worthy of the sacrifice, especially when Russia has gained the upper hand.