Moscow Times: Russia’s Richest Have Gained $22.5Bln Since Start of 2025

Moscow Times, 6/2/25

Moscow Times is a western owned media outlet.

Russian billionaires have collectively gained $22.5 billion since the start of the year, according to the Bloomberg Billionaires Index.

The ranking of the world’s top 500 richest people includes 22 Russians whose combined wealth stood at $317.7 billion as of Monday.

Metals tycoon Vladimir Potanin remained Russia’s richest person, with his net worth rising by $3.82 billion since January to $31.7 billion.

He was followed by Lukoil founder Vagit Alekperov, whose net worth rose by $561 million to $25.9 billion, and mining magnate Vladimir Lisin, who retained third place with $24.2 billion despite losing $1.62 billion in five months.

The only Russian billionaire to lose more than Lisin was fertilizer tycoon and AS Monaco football club owner Dmitry Rybolovlev, whose wealth dropped by $1.77 billion to $9.21 billion, placing him in the bottom five.opinionRussia’s Potato Dilemma Risks Causing a Health CrisisRead more

Russia’s wealthiest woman Tatiana Kim lost $597 million and ranked 21st with a net worth of $6.77 billion, just ahead of metals tycoon Iskander Makhmudov, who rounded out the list at $6.74 billion.

Makhmudov, whose fortune rose by $3.61 billion, was among the top gainers after Potanin and Alisher Usmanov, whose wealth grew by $3.7 billion to $16.9 billion, making him the seventh-richest Russian.

Senator Suleiman Kerimov added $3 billion to reach $10 billion in 15th place. Industrialist Viktor Vekselberg earned $2.25 billion to reach $9.54 billion, while tech entrepreneur Pavel Durov earned $2.03 billion and ranked 10th with a net worth of $13 billion.

After Potanin, Alekperov and Lisin, the top five wealthiest Russians also included Novatek gas major chairman Leonid Mikhelson, whose fortune rose by $860 million to $23.2 billion, and industrialist Alexei Mordashov, who lost $598 million and was valued at $22.6 billion.

Popular Mechanics: In a First, America Dropped 30,000-Pound Bunker-Busters—But Iran’s Concrete May Be Unbreakable, Scientists Say

By David Hambling, Popular Mechanics/Yahoo News, 6/24/25

On Saturday, June 21, 2025, following a spate of unprecedented aerial attacks that Israel carried out against Iran just days before, the United States joined the war and used bunker-busting bombs to strike three key Iranian nuclear sites and their underground bunkers: the Fordow fuel-enrichment plant, the Natanz nuclear facility, and the Isfahan nuclear technology center.

Operation Midnight Hammer, the Pentagon’s codename for the strikes on Iran, marks the first-ever use of the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP), a colossal 30,000-pound bomb that only the B-2 stealth bomber can carry. As such, America has been regarded as the only country capable of taking out Iran’s underground nuclear facilities, and therefore its nuclear program—but if it actually accomplished that feat is yet to be seen.

While President Trump declared that the operation “completely and totally obliterated” the sites, Iranian officials downplayed the attacks. As of publication time, it’s unclear the level of damage inflicted based on satellite imagery alone, but a CNN report published on Tuesday afternoon claims that the strikes on Iran did not destroy the country’s nuclear program and has instead only set it back by a matter of months, according to early U.S. intelligence.

If history serves as any indication, there is a chance Iran’s underground nuclear facilities could be partially or wholly intact. That’s because up until now, in the quiet arms race between concrete and bombs, the concrete has been winning.

In the late 2000s, for instance, rumors circulated about a bunker in Iran struck by a bunker-buster bomb. The bomb had failed to penetrate—and remained embedded in—the surface of the bunker, presumably until the occupants called in a bomb-disposal team. Rather than smashing through the concrete, the bomb had been unexpectedly stopped dead. The reason was not hard to guess: Iran was a leader in the new technology of Ultra High Performance Concrete, or UHPC, and its latest concrete advancements were evidently too much for standard bunker busters.

Stephanie Barnett, Ph.D, of the University of Portsmouth in the U.K. is involved in developing stronger concrete to protect civilian buildings from terrorist attacks, and has heard about Iran and its ultra-tough concrete. While civilian audiences have been enthusiastic about the advancements in concrete, she occasionally hears less positive responses from military personnel attending her presentations.

“One officer told me, ‘If you make this stronger blast- and impact-resistant material, we need to think about how to get through it,’” Barnett says.

The U.S. Air Force introduced its first modern bunker buster in 1985. General-purpose bombs have a thin steel casing filled with explosives, while bunker busters have a narrower profile, with a thicker casing and less explosives. This design concentrates all the weight on a smaller area, making it an ice pick rather than a hammer, so the bomb can smash through concrete or burrow through earth to strike deeply-buried targets.

While the same general-purpose bombs from the 1990s are being used today, bunker busters had to go through several generations of upgrades. In the early 2000s, the Air Force even developed a special type of steel for the purpose, known as Eglin Steel, in association with steel specialist Ellwood National Forge Company.

Eglin Steel is a low-carbon, low-nickel steel with traces of tungsten, chromium, manganese, silicon, and other elements, each contributing a desirable property to the whole. Eglin Steel is the gold standard for bunker-busting munitions, although in recent years it has been supplemented by new USAF-96 steel, which boasts similar performance but is easier to produce and work with.

Materials scientists distinguish between the two qualities of toughness and hardness, and it is the balance between them that drives arms races between weapons and armor.

Poll: Record number of Russians want the war to end, Putin Remains Popular

Intellinews, 6/3/25

A record number of Russian citizens now want the war to end, according to a new poll by the independent pollster, the Levada Center, the Moscow Times reported on June 3.

The poll, conducted between May 22 and 28 across 50 Russian regions, found that 64% of respondents favoured peace negotiations—up six percentage points from March. Meanwhile, support for continuing the war fell to 28%, down from 34% in the same period.

Support for ending the conflict has grown steadily over the past two years. In May 2023, 48% of Russians said the war should continue. By May 2024, that figure had dropped to 43%.

The latest data was published shortly after the second round of direct peace talks between Ukraine and Russia took place in Istanbul on May 16, raising hopes that a negotiated end to the hostilities could appear soon.

While no ceasefire agreement was reached, the negotiations resulted in a new 1,000 for a 1,000 prisoner exchange and the repatriation of 6,000 bodies of fallen Ukrainian soldiers.

Levada’s survey also highlights demographic and political divides. Support for peace is highest among women (73%), young people under 24 (77%), and residents of smaller towns and villages (67%). It is also prominent among respondents who believe Russia is moving in the wrong direction (76%) and those who disapprove of President Vladimir Putin’s performance (77%).

Conversely, backing for continued military action is stronger among men (39%), those aged 55 and older (35%), and Moscow residents (40%). Among those who say the country is headed in the right direction, 32% support the war, as do 30% of those who approve of Putin’s leadership.

A majority—73%—of respondents said Russia and Ukraine should address the “root causes” of the conflict before agreeing to a ceasefire – a phrase often repeated by Putin as the reason to delay ceasefire talks. Just 18% believed a truce should come first.

Only 3% of those surveyed viewed Russia as an obstacle to peace, while 36% blamed Ukraine and 36% pointed to European countries. 14% said the United States bore responsibility for blocking peace efforts.

Putin remains popular

While support for bringing the war to end may be rising, as the conflict moves into its fourth year, that has not affected Putin’s personal popularity.

The level of trust in Putin among the Russian public remains steady and is currently 81%, while 82% of respondents approve of his job performance, a survey conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) showed between May 23-25 of 1,500 respondents, TASS reported on May 30.

A total of 57% of those polled said they approved of the Russian government’s handling of the country (a 1% increase), while 61% approved of Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin’s performance (a 3% increase).

Support for the government also remains unusually strong with some fluctuations. The ruling United Russia party fell by 2% to 46%. Support for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) rose by 1% to 8%, while support for the [right wing nationalist] Liberal Democratic Party of Russia remained at 10%. The A Just Russia-For Truth party’s support held steady at 3%, while support for the New People party increased by 1% to 2%.

Mark Curtis: Blair & Major Reassured Russia About NATO

By Mark Curtis, Declassified UK, 5/19/25

Declassified British files shed further light on the controversial question as to what assurances were made to Russia by U.K. officials about the expansion of NATO into eastern Europe.

The documents show then Prime Minister John Major telling Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov in February 1997 that “if he were Russian he too would be concerned by the possibility that NATO might move up to Russia’s borders.”

But Major added that “NATO has no intention of doing this” and was “not seeking to box in Russia.” 

Briefing notes drawn up by No. 10 Downing Street [the prime minister’s office] for Major’s phone call with Primakov stated: “We are not seeking to encircle Russia with NATO members.”

Primakov in 1991. (RIA Novosti archive /Prihodko / Wikimedia Commons /CC-BY-SA 3.0, CC BY-SA 3.0)

The following month, Major wrote to Russian President Boris Yeltsin saying: “I am well aware of Russian concern that NATO enlargement may mean that NATO forces will effectively move nearer your own borders. I well understand the fears that may be aroused in Russia.”

However, he added:

“But let me assure you that such fears are quite without foundation.”

The reason was that

“NATO has no intention of stationing large conventional forces or nuclear weapons on the territory of new members.”

Major also reassured Yeltsin that NATO would only deploy “a modest amount of NATO infrastructure… such as storage facilities and command and control arrangements.”

The declassified files released to the National Archives covering 1996-97 are full of references by U.K. officials to Russian “concern,” “negative attitudes,” “fears,” “hostility” and “resentment” about NATO enlargement.

At the time, NATO’s expansion was being considered for only a small number of central European countries, not former states in the old Soviet Union, such as Ukraine — which was an even more sensitive issue to Moscow.

An August 1996 paper drawn up by Downing Street clearly noted Russia’s policy of “not allowing Ukraine or the Baltic States to join NATO.” 

‘Enlarge NATO anyway’

 Major in February 1993, during a visit to the Clinton White House. (White House Photograph Office/Wikimedia Commons /Public Domain)

U.K. officials believed the Russians reluctantly “tacitly accept that enlargement will go ahead” — subject to their opposition to nuclear and conventional force deployments — “but cannot say so publicly.”

In December 1996, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin told Major in private: “Russia could not stop NATO enlarging, but this would create a fragile situation which could explode.” 

Major assured him: “We did not wish to do anything to unsettle Russia.”

[See: Tangled Tale of NATO Expansion at Heart of Ukraine Crisis]

The files show that Britain was intent on expanding NATO to include “some” central/eastern European countries.

A policy paper drawn up in September 1996 said U.K. objectives were “to enlarge NATO to the East” and “secure Russian acquiescence in enlargement … But if Russian acquiescence is not possible, for NATO to enlarge anyway.”

The paper was drawn up by Foreign Office official Matthew Rycroft, who in 2003 would be former Prime Minister Tony Blair’s private secretary during the war in Iraq.

‘Full Account of Russia’s Place’

Yeltsin waving at reporters in Moscow in August 1991. (Kremlin.ru /Wikimedia Commons /CC BY 4.0)

In the month Blair succeeded Major as prime minister, May 1997, Britain’s ambassador to Russia, Andrew Wood, cabled London saying: “NATO enlargement [is] a painful issue with domestic implications.”

He added: “The Russians are virtually at one in regarding the coming enlargement of NATO as a humiliating defeat, and in supposing that the West either consciously or unconsciously intends it to be seen as such.”

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However, Yeltsin also conveyed, in a phone call with Blair the same month, that he understood that “there was no turning back” on enlargement. But he again insisted that nuclear weapons should not be sited in new NATO members and that there should be “no permanent deployment of conventional forces.”

[See: Boris Yeltsin Privately Supported NATO Expansion Despite Public Stance]

A British prime minister again offered assurances to Moscow. A briefing for Blair’s meeting with Yeltsin in May 1997 stated on the subject of NATO enlargement: “We will not allow Russia’s legitimate security interests to be damaged in this process.”

It added that “an enlarged NATO will mean more security in Central Europe. This is in Russian as well as NATO interests.”

Blair told Yeltsin “he was aware of the view Russia took on NATO enlargement” and that “arrangements for the future had to take full account of Russia’s place and weight in Europe.”

Later that year, in October, Yeltsin told Blair again in a phone call that “he continued to oppose enlargement of NATO, which was a mistake. Europe should not be divided.”

At the time discussions were taking place about a comprehensive security system for Europe, replacing the old East-West divide and giving Russia a place in that system. It was clear, however, that NATO, led by the U.S., privileged expanding the organisation over bringing in Russia into a new European security architecture.

At NATO’s summit in Madrid in July 1997, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were invited to begin accession talks, and they joined NATO in 1999. A further wave of accession occurred in 2004 when Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia all joined NATO.

U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen giving a press statement on July 8, 1997, in Madrid, about NATO’s decision to invite Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to begin negotiations to join NATO. National Security Advisor Samuel Burger on left, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on right. (DoD/ R. D. Ward/Wikimedia Commons / Public Domain)

By 2017, NATO had established a “forward presence” policy in eastern Europe, deploying battalion-size battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. NATO claims this was needed in response to Russia’s “aggressive actions against its neighbours,” notably its [supposed] 2014 invasion of Crimea. 

Opposing Ukraine

British files from 2001 show that Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev warned NATO that any further enlargement would be “a major political error” requiring Moscow to take “appropriate steps.”

By 2002, when Britain was supporting a new wave of central/eastern European states becoming members of NATO, Blair’s government was explicitly opposed to Ukraine joining the organisation, the files show.

“We do not support Ukraine’s request to join MAP,” the Foreign Office noted in 2002, referring to NATO’s Membership Action Plan, which provided advice to countries aspiring to join NATO.

Though Kyiv was pushing strongly for an enhanced relationship with NATO, Ukraine’s bid was “premature” in the British view since the country was “far from meeting criteria expected of aspirants.”

The U.K.’s chief diplomat at NATO, Emyr Jones Parry, noted that Ukraine was “on notice that deepening relations with NATO will require more democratic and other reforms.”

But also critical for British officials was the impact on relations with Russia. U.K. strategy was “to steer Ukraine away from any suggestion of membership except in the very long term” given the “serious impact on NATO relations with Russia.”

“Ukraine membership of MAP would greatly complicate our handling of the new Nato-Russia relationship and would raise serious Russian concerns about Nato’s strategy,” reads a 2002 briefing note for the prime minister.

Barrier to Russia

U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair and Russian President Vladimir Putin, 2000. (Kremlin.ru / Wikimedia Commons / CC BY 4.0)

At the time, the Labour government was seeking a “transformed relationship between Russia and the Alliance,” a process which was described as “truly historic.” Indeed Blair was courting Vladimir Putin after MI6 had helped him into power in 2000.

British officials were impressed with Moscow’s declared support for the U.S. following the 9/11 attacks in September 2001 and sought a new strategic relationship.

Though British officials opposed Ukraine joining NATO at this time, some spotted the country’s geopolitical importance. 

Roger Liddle, Blair’s special adviser, wrote that Ukraine played a key role as a supply route for Russian gas. But also Ukraine could act “as a formidable barrier to any resurgence of Russian Imperialism to the West.”

At its Bucharest summit in 2008, NATO pledged that both Ukraine and Georgia would eventually become members.

Mark Curtis is the co-director of Declassified U.K., and the author of five books and many articles on U.K. foreign policy.

This article is from Declassified U.K..

Andrew Korybko: NATO’s Procurement Corruption Scandal Might Delay Its Rapid Militarization Plans

By Andrew Korybko, Substack, 6/18/25

NATO’s next summit will be held from 24-25 June at The Hague and almost certainly see the bloc expand upon its preexisting rapid militarization plans. Trump is demanding that all members spend 5% of GDP on defense as soon as possible, which Politico recently reminded everyone in their article about this is divided between 3.5% on “hard military spending” and 1.5% on defense-related issues like cybersecurity. Here are three background briefings on NATO’s rapid militarization plans to bring readers up to speed:

* 19 July 2024: “The EU’s Planned Transformation Into A Military Union Is A Federalist Power Play

* 24 October 2024: “NATO’s Military Schengen

* 7 March 2025: “The ‘ReArm Europe Plan’ Will Probably Fall Far Short Of The Bloc’s Lofty Expectations

In short, the EU wants to exploit false fears of a future Russian invasion to further centralize the bloc under that pretext, with the “military Schengen” (for facilitating the free flow of troops and equipment between member states) and the €800 billion “ReArm Europe Plan” being its tangible manifestations. The first will create the desired military union while the second will then result in there being an urgent need for some mechanism to organize the division of defense investments between all members.

It’s here where the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) is expected to play a major role owing to the lack of any alternatives and the difficulty in getting members to agree on creating a new EU-wide one due to some states’ sovereignty concerns. Per the NSPA’s website, “[its] objective is to obtain the best service or equipment at the best price for the customer by consolidating requirements from multiple nations in a cost-efficient way through its turnkey multinational acquisition framework.”

The problem though is that the NSPA has been embroiled in a procurement scandal over the past month. To their credit, Deutsche Welle published a fair and detailed report about what happened, which can be summarized as employees passing along information to defense contractors in exchange for funds that were partly laundered to them through consultancy companies. The NSPA reportedly initiated the investigation itself, but that might not be sufficient for controlling the damage from this scandal.

While it’ll continue functioning, some member states might now be hesitant to rely more on its services than is absolutely necessary to avoid having to pay more for whatever it is that they’re looking to buy if more corrupt employees unluckily happen to service their request. Of course, the NSPA’s initiative to investigate itself – which led to three arrests thus far and has spread to several countries, including the US – might reassure some states, but few will likely take any more chances than they have to.

If enough NATO members practice this approach in understandable pursuit of their financial self-interest, especially if segments of the public pressure them to do so in order to not risk wasting taxpayers’ hard-earned funds, then this could collectively complicate NATO’s rapid militarization plans. It remains to be seen what effect it’ll ultimately have, but the NSPA’s procurement corruption scandal couldn’t have come at a worse time, and it’s important not to let the elite sweep it under the rug for convenience.