Strana.UA, Translated by Geoffrey Roberts, 5/22/25

Ukrainian military and volunteers are increasingly talking about the multiplying number of Russian combat UAVs on the front line, as well as increasingly intense attacks on the rear, which are destroying the logistics of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

“Strana” talked to UAF soldiers and found out what is currently happening at the front in terms of the use of drones. According to them, the Russians have a particular advantage in fibre-optic-controlled drones.

“Meat assaults”, says Sergeant K. of a UAF drone platoon, “when the Russians threw themselves into frontal attacks on our positions without drone support, still occur sometimes, but less and less often. Now the assaults usually begin differently. First, the Russians launch reconnaissance drones. Our positions are then attacked with FABs and artillery. Then the Russians immediately send FPV strike drones into the air, which destroy anything still moving after the shelling. They have more and more strike drones on fibre optics, which are not hindered by anti-drone measures. Only then do they throw in assault groups of 4-5 soldiers on motorcycles and quad bikes or simply on foot, whose task is to get to our strongholds and clear the positions. At the same time, if a year ago we had a clear advantage in UAVs, now the Russians have at least parity, and in some areas a very significant advantage. What is especially alarming is that the range of strikes is increasing. Drones are already striking at distances of tens of kilometres, destroying our logistics wholesale.”

Ukrainian military also report that the Russians have launched a hunt for the crews of Ukrainian UAVs – for the pilots’ mobile command posts.

“Our drone pilots are a priority target for Russian UAVs”, said a junior sergeant with the call sign V, who is fighting in the Kupyansk direction. “Most of the frontline drones operate in the near rear. The Russians identify command posts with their reconnaissance drones and then strike them with FABs, artillery or attack drones. Hence our pilots’ hunting time has decreased sharply compared to a year ago. Now the Russians quickly identify starting locations. Our drone teams rely on speed and accuracy, as staying at the starting location for a long time is mortally dangerous. We also hunt Russian UAV crews, but we are inferior to the RF in terms of firepower. We very carefully inspect downed Russian UAVs. Among them are fewer and fewer civilian Chinese “Mavics”, and more and more new models that are not assembled on the spot. These drones are clearly factory-made. And although the insides of the drones – the boards – are still mainly Chinese, the housings, the load-bearing of the planes, are Russian”.

It is noteworthy that Ukrainian military are claiming the Russians have begun to use massive drone attacks more often. In addition, the Russian army has managed to increase the range of its electronic warfare.

Tactics for using “Shaheds” are also changing, said aid officer N, serving in the Ukrainian Air Defence Forces:

“Now their UAVs attack in swarms. Before the attack, ten to fifteen “Shaheds” make several circles distant from the target – at great distance and at an altitude of up to 4000 metres – outside the zone of destruction of our air defence. Then the “Shaheds” attack the targets, diving from a great height. At the same time, they are clearly controlled remotely, which indicates the UAVs are equipped with electronic warfare-protected communication systems. Because of these new tactics, the effectiveness of our air defence in eliminating enemy UAVs is sharply reduced”.

Yesterday, a military publication reported that Russia is increasingly using autonomous kamikaze drones, which can now strike at a distance of up to 100 km, whereas until recently they could only strike at 30 km.

RT, 6/12/25

Israel announced a “preemptive” strike in Iran on Friday and declared a state of emergency in anticipation of possible retaliation.

Multiple loud explosions were reported in Tehran, along with missile interceptions.

The IDF said it targeted both military and nuclear sites. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that a nuclear enrichment facility in Natanz was among the targets.

News organizations reported last month that Israel had discussed potential strikes on Iranian nuclear sites with the United States.

The attack comes after five rounds of U.S.-Iranian talks on Iran’s nuclear program failed to produce a breakthrough. The sixth round of negotiations is scheduled for Sunday in Oman.

• 13 June 202502:00 GMT Iranian news agency Tasnim has reported that the commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Major General Hossein Salami has been killed in an Israeli strike. According to unconfirmed reports, other victims include Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces Gholam Ali Rashid.
• 01:49 GMT Iranian state media have reported civilian casualties in the capital.
• 1:43 GMT Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the IDF has struck the nuclear enrichment facility in Natanz.He added that the strikes, dubbed Operation Rising Lion, will “continue for as many days as it takes to remove the threat” from Iran.
• 01:22 GMT US Secretary of State Marco Rubio released a statement saying that the United States is not involved in Israel’s “unilateral action against Iran.”
• 01:16 GMT Dozens of aircraft participated in the “opening strike,” hitting “dozens of military targets, including nuclear sites in various regions of Iran,” the IDF said.
• 01:08 GMT The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said they had “begun preemptive and precise strikes targeting the Iranian nuclear program in order to prevent the Iranian regime’s ability to build a nuclear bomb in the immediate timeframe.”“Over the past few months, intelligence has shown that Iran is closer than ever to obtaining a nuclear weapon,” IDF spokesman Effie Defrin said.
• 01:00 GMT Videos from the scene show destruction in residential areas. Unconfirmed reports on Iran-linked Telegram channels claimed that the apartment complexes housed members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
• 00:52 GMT Unverified reports on social media show thick clouds of smoke billowing over Tehran. Iranian media have confirmed that loud explosions and air raid sirens were heard in the capital.

YouTube link here.

By Ben Aris, Substack, 5/23/25

The money the West grants to support Ukraine’s economy and military campaign gets a lot of attention. So far the West has sent a total of $133bn to Ukraine over the last three years, according to the Ministry of Finance (MinFin) and continues to get a bit less than $40bn a year, although MinFin is anticipating that to more than halve in the next two years. From a fiscal point of view, Bankova needs the war to stop in the next year or so as it will become increasingly difficult to finance.

However, there are two other big and important funding questions that get almost no attention. The first is how is the reconstruction going to be financed? The second is that the EU is about to reimpose duties on Ukraine’s exports to Europe in June and that will swell a $20bn trade deficit that is already growing in the first quarter of this year. Ukraine’s corn and metal exports – two of the biggest revenue earners – are already becoming uncompetitive with rivals. How will that be funded?

The most recent World Bank estimate of the cost of the damage to the economy was $524bn, of which $178bn is physical damage – housing, transport, energy, commerce and industry, and education sectors, including 13% of Ukraine’s entire housing stock needing repairs or rebuilding, some 2.5mn households.

Private sector investment

Where is money going to come from? The common plan is that the “private sector” will provide it but having talked to a lot of fund managers that know Eastern Europe, they all say they won’t commit anything until the risk of a second Russian attack falls away. Don’t bank on seeing funds like Blackrock or private equity houses moving in for years.

Some direct investors might move a little faster. The FMCGs (fast moving consumer goods) companies are in it for the long haul and so usually willing to invest as soon as physically possible as for them it’s all about grabbing as much market share as they possibly can as soon as they can and then hunkering down until the market eventually booms. They have decades long time horizons, which is why some beer and fag companies like Carlsberg and Phillip Morris have already made investments into factories in Ukraine. I also discovered in the early 1990s in Russia that luxury luggage companies like Samsonite get into emerging markets very early for much the same reason: people tend to buy only one set of posh luggage in their lifetimes.

But even this foreign direct investment (FDI) will be minimal and won’t touch a lot of things that need investment most. FDI has been on its back since the war started, falling 97% y/y to a mere $121mn in 2022, before bouncing back to $4.8bn in 2023 (which is still peanuts for the $200bn Ukrainian economy) and is expected to have received about $4.3bn in 2024. (The final number is not out yet.) At this rate it will take Ukraine 125 years to raise the money to rebuild its economy.

The biggest source of investment capital in the meantime is going to be development banks like the EBRD and the IFC that are going to carry the bulk of the load. Also quango development banks like the European Investment Bank (EIB), which is a proxy tool for EU-back investment aid to Ukraine, are already playing an important role. The EU is now sending Ukraine about $1bn a month, as part of the G7 $50bn loan to Ukraine, approved on June 13 at a G7 summit in Italy, backed by Russia’s frozen assets.

If you add up all the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) pledges then there is some $75bn due over the next decade, which is still not enough but can at least make a real dent in the physical damage repairs.

However, during conversations at the recent EBRD annual meeting in London it was pointed out to me that most of the extreme damage – cities wiped off the face of the earth – is in eastern Ukraine and still under Russian occupation. It is Russian President Vladimir Putin who will have to pay for that repair work, not Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy.

Now it becomes more interesting. The experts I talked to estimate that some $300bn worth of damage has been done in the occupied territories, leaving Bankova to deal with the remaining $200bn worth of destruction, which isn’t as bad anyway.

If you use the same proportions of overall damage to physical damage that the World Bank does then the bill for physical repairs in the parts of Ukraine under government control comes to a much more manageable $68bn – in other words the MDBs can fund all of those repairs and as part of the “build back better” programme I’m sure we will hear a lot about when a ceasefire comes and these programmes get under way. Indeed, people like the EBRD are already doing the preparatory work for the obvious things, starting with emergency residential construction and small scale local generators to power things like hospitals and villages.

The key issue is if enough money can be invested to start a virtuous circle of: investment that primes a local economy, leads to jobs and rising incomes, to consumption, to profits, and closes the circle with increasing investment. How much pump priming money is needed to start the wheel turning? That is an open question.

Ironically, the problem of rebuilding the occupied territories has led to a little noticed comment by the Kremlin saying that it is not entirely against signing over the frozen $300bn of CBR money to the West, however, only if “part of that money is used to rebuild the occupied territories.” Clear the Kremlin realises that hanging on to the four regions it annexed in particular is going to come with a massive reconstruction bill, as well as subsequent subsidies in the peace, if it hangs on to them. Gifting Ukraine the $300bn, but with a commitment to investing in Donbas, is one of the practical ways for the Kremlin to claw back at least some of this money, as surely at this point Putin never expects to see that money again even if there is a ceasefire.

Trade deficit

The West has sent a lot of money to Ukraine, but actually the EU is making a $20bn a year profit from trade with Ukraine. It exports more to Ukraine than it imports and those exports to Ukraine are going up.

One of the most useful funding policies the EU put in place in 2022 was to suspend the incredibly restrictive duties and miniscule duty-free quotas it granted to Ukraine as part of the pre-war Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA). For example, Ukraine is a big producer of honey, which is also made in the EU, but the duty free export of honey quota for honey was so small that it was used up every year before the end of January.

Opening the borders to Ukrainian products allowed Kyiv to earn money from trade to supplement the Western loans and grants. And that caused problems. Last year cheap Ukrainian corn wrecked the Polish grain market causing prices to collapse in this key sector and on June 5 the EU is due to reimpose the limits and duties on 30 Ukrainian products – mostly in the agricultural sector. These won’t be dropped again until Ukraine becomes a member of the EU, in at least ten years time.

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who is chairman of the Council of Europe until July, was explicit about this dual view of Ukraine saying that he supports Ukraine politically in its struggle with Russia, but not at the expense of Polish farmers, a core election constituency. There is a double standard here: the EU is willing to support Ukraine but only as long as it doesn’t bring it into a potential military confrontation with Russia and as long as it doesn’t negatively impact member states’ agricultural sectors.

In the meantime, officials in Kyiv are desperately looking for new markets and have done deals in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Zelenskiy even asked US President Donald Trump for a free trade deal, but instead has got the basic 10% tariffs everyone else got.

How big a problem this will be going forward is hard to say. When Ukraine broke off trade relations with Russia in 2014, which used to buy half of its exports, it actually proved very good at finding new markets for its goods, pretty quickly. Given we now live under Trump’s transactional multipolar world model it should be able to do the same thing again and the Global South is also open for business and increasingly active. But in the short-term, funding the trade deficit will be a headache that the EU is about to make a lot worse.

YouTube video link here. Video posted on 6/10/25.

By Andrew Korybko, Substack, 6/9/25

The Russian Ministry of Defense announced on Sunday that their forces had entered Ukraine’s Dnipropetrovsk Region, which Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov confirmed is part of Putin’s buffer zone plan. This was foreseen as early as late August once the Battle of Pokrovsk began but has been achieved even without capturing that strategic fortress town. Russian forces simply went around it after breaking through the southern Donbass front. This development puts Ukraine in a dilemma.

It’ll now have to simultaneously fortify the Dnipropetrovsk front together with the southern Kharkov and northern Zaporozhye ones in case Russia uses its new position to launch offensives into any of those three. This could put serious strain on the Ukrainian Armed Forces as they’re already struggling to prevent a major breakthrough in Sumy Region from Kursk. Coupled with depleting manpower and questions about continued US military-intelligence aid, this might be enough to collapse the frontlines.

To be sure, that scenario has been bandied about many times over the past more than 1,200 days, but it nowadays appears tantalizingly closer than ever. Observers also shouldn’t forget that Putin told Trump that he’ll respond to Ukraine’s strategic drone strikes earlier this month, which could combine with the abovementioned two factors to achieve this long-desired breakthrough. Of course, it might just be a symbolic demonstration of force, but it could also be something more significant as well.

Ukraine’s best chances of preventing this are for the US to either get Russia to agree to freeze the frontlines or to go on another offensive. The first possibility could be advanced by the carrot-and-stick approach of proposing a better resource-centric strategic partnership than has already been offered in exchange on pain of imposing crippling secondary sanctions on its energy clients (specifically China and India with likely waivers for the EU) and/or doubling down on military-intelligence aid if it still refuses.

As for the second, the 120,000 troops that Ukraine has assembled along the Belarusian border according to President Alexander Lukashenko last summer could either cross that frontier and/or one of Russia’s internationally recognized frontiers. Objectively speaking, however, both possibilities only stand a slim chance of success: Russia has made it clear that it must achieve more of its goals in the conflict before agreeing to any ceasefire while its success in pushing Ukraine out of Kursk bodes ill for other invasions.

The likelihood of Ukraine cutting its losses by agreeing to more of Russia’s demands for peace is nil. Therefore, it might inevitably opt, whether in lieu of the aforesaid scenarios or in parallel with one or both of them, to intensify its “unconventional operations” against Russia. This refers to assassinations, strategic drone strikes, and terrorism. All that will do, however, is provoke more (probably outsized) conventional retaliation from Russia and thus painfully delay Ukraine’s seemingly inevitable defeat.

With an eye towards the endgame, it appears as though an inflection point is about to be reached or already has been in the sense of irreversibly shifting the military-strategic dynamics in Russia’s favor. It’s very difficult to imagine how Ukraine can extricate itself from this dilemma. All signs point to this being impossible, though the conflict has already surprised observers on both sides before, so it can’t be ruled out. Nevertheless, it’s a far-fetched scenario, and it’s more likely that Ukraine’s official defeat is nigh.