By Kamal Shahin, New Lines Magazine, 5/26/25

Kamal Shahin is a Syrian journalist who worked for decades covering political and social issues

The Syrian army’s failure to repel a modest opposition attack on Aleppo in December, which ultimately culminated in the collapse of the regime of Bashar al-Assad, defies explanation. 

The opposition’s military strength and its use of drones were contributing factors, no doubt, but they were hardly enough. The Syrian army had previously reclaimed vast swaths of territory from rebel forces. By the summer of 2024, Assad’s government controlled two-thirds of the country. The sudden unraveling and the conventional explanations behind it belie what unfolded beneath the surface of the military event itself.

In a previous interview with New Lines, a high-ranking Syrian officer, who recounted the final days of the regime’s existence, disclosed a revealing detail that I decided to spend some time pursuing. A closer examination revealed it to be the key to understanding the regime’s collapse from a different angle, not merely as a logistical or battlefield failure, but as the result of a silent, invisible war. 

The snippet of information was this: A mobile application, distributed quietly among Syrian officers via a Telegram channel, had spread rapidly in their ranks. In truth, the app was a carefully planted trap, the opening salvo of a hidden cyberwar — perhaps one of the first of its kind against a modern army. Militias had weaponized smartphones, turning them into lethal instruments against a regular military force.

Beyond revealing the contours of a cyberattack against the Syrian army, this investigation seeks to understand the application itself, its technology and reach, and to uncover the nature of the information it siphoned from within military ranks. This, in turn, leads directly to the potential impact on Syria’s military operations.

The larger question remains: Who orchestrated the cyberattack, and to what end?

The answers may point to players within the conflict itself — factions of the Syrian opposition, regional or international intelligence services, or other, still unseen hands. In any case, the attack must be understood within its full political and military context.

In February 2020, a mobile phone left behind by a Syrian soldier inside a Russian-made Pantsir-S1 air defense vehicle helped to turn the entire system into a fireball. Israeli forces tracked the phone’s signal, pinpointed the battery’s location, and launched a swift airstrike that obliterated the system before it could be rearmed. The incident, revealed by Valery Slugin, the chief designer behind the Pantsir system, in an interview with the Russian news agency TASS, showed how a single mobile phone could trigger catastrophe, whether by design or by sheer ignorance. 

The consequences were devastating: critical equipment and personnel were lost at a moment when the army could least afford it. The soldier responsible — a survivor of the Israeli strike — may have been an informant or a recruited agent or, more likely, had no grasp of the damage he had caused. According to Slugin, all communication devices, such as phones or radios, should have been shut off during operations, and the battery location changed immediately after launching missiles to avoid detection. These are standard security protocols. Yet the Syrian crew’s failure to follow them turned an ordinary phone into a beacon, a live marker that guided the enemy’s strike straight to its target.

By the basic logic of military science, the Syrian authorities should have launched a full investigation after the Pantsir’s destruction — banning mobile phones within the ranks or devising countermeasures to stop them from becoming roving surveillance nodes. But that never happened. The Syrian army, this time and many times after, behaved with the same fatal irresponsibility — and paid for it dearly.

What was most striking after the events of Nov. 27, and the fall of Aleppo to the opposition, was how suddenly the Syrian army ceased to fight. Most units simply watched as opposition forces advanced, offering little more than sporadic resistance until the rebels reached the outskirts of Damascus on the morning of Dec. 8. In the rural areas of Idlib and Aleppo, opposition factions swept past dozens of positions belonging to brigades of the 25th and 30th Divisions, as well as narrow outposts in hilly terrain. They covered more than 40 miles in just 48 hours.

By then, the Syrian army was a shadow of its former self. After a decade of grinding warfare, marked by tens of thousands of casualties and irreparable material and moral losses, there was little strength left to rally. Years of conflict had left the forces battered not just by battlefield defeats, but by a more insidious collapse from within: The Syrian pound’s freefall, from 50 pounds to the dollar in 2011 to 15,000 in 2023, had turned soldiers’ and officers’ salaries into a cruel joke — barely $20 a month. Many no longer fought for “the country and the leader,” but simply to survive. Transportation costs had doubled; the salary of a high-ranking officer could no longer feed a family. One officer from the 47th Regiment recalled that they often received only half of their scheduled meals, made up of half-raw, unprepared food. In many units, a privileged few officers dined separately, which fueled bitter resentment among the rank and file.

Beyond the economic collapse, worsened in part by Western sanctions, Syria had, by 2018, sunk into a deep military and political stagnation. Fronts grew paralyzed. Morale sagged. Commanders reinvented themselves as smugglers of Captagon and fugitives. Meanwhile, the regime clung stubbornly to power, rejecting even the most pragmatic solutions, whether offered by yesterday’s enemies among Arab states, by Turkey or by the West.

The stagnation, and the suffocating sense of a future foreclosed, birthed a grotesque kind of entrepreneurship within the army. Officers and soldiers no longer focused on military duties; they scrambled for any opportunity that might sustain them. They traded anything and everything just to stay alive, without exaggeration.

Imagine an army where officers sold the remains of stale bread rations meant for their men. Where senior officers bought solar panels and rented out charging services to soldiers desperate to light their shelters or charge their phones. It seems those who thought to weaponize this moment knew exactly what they were looking at — and what they could exploit.

In the early summer of 2024, months before the opposition launched Operation Deterrence of Aggression, a mobile application began circulating among a group of Syrian army officers. It carried an innocuous name: STFD-686, a string of letters standing for Syria Trust for Development.

To Syrians, the Syria Trust for Development was a familiar institution: a humanitarian organization offering material aid and services, overseen by Asma al-Assad, Bashar’s wife. It had never ventured into the military sphere. None of the officers or sources we spoke to could explain how the app found its way into army hands. The likeliest explanations point to collusion by compromised officers — or a sophisticated deception.

What lent the app its credibility was that its name and information were publicly available. To heighten its aura of authenticity, and to control its spread, the app was distributed exclusively through a Telegram channel also bearing the name Syria Trust for Development, hosted on the platform but lacking any formal verification. The app, promoted as an initiative personally endorsed by the first lady, sidestepped scrutiny: If her name was attached, few questioned its legitimacy, or the financial promises it lured them with.

The STFD-686 app operated with disarming simplicity. It offered the promise of financial aid, requiring only that the victim fill out a few personal details. It asked innocent questions: “What kind of assistance are you expecting?” and “Tell us more about your financial situation.”

The expected answer was clear: financial help. In return, users would supposedly receive monthly cash transfers of around 400,000 Syrian pounds — roughly $40 at the time — sent anonymously via local money transfer companies. Sending small sums across Syria, whether under real or fictitious names, required nothing more than a phone number, and the black market was teeming with intermediaries ready to facilitate such transfers.

On the surface, the app appeared to offer a special service for officers. Its first disguise was a humanitarian one: claiming to support the “heroes of the Syrian Arab Army” through a new initiative, while showcasing photos of real activities from the official Syria Trust for Development website.

The second mask was emotional, employing reverent language that praised the soldiers’ sacrifices: “They give their lives so that Syria may live with pride and dignity.” The third was nationalistic, and framed the app as a “patriotic initiative” designed to bolster loyalty, and this mask proved the most persuasive.

The fourth mask was visual: The app’s name, both in English and Arabic, mirrored the official organization exactly. Even the logo was an identical replica of Syria Trust’s emblem.

Once downloaded, the app opened a simple web interface embedded within the application, which redirected users to external websites that didn’t display in the app bar. The sites, syr1.store and syr1.online, mimicked the official domain of Syria Trust (syriatrust.sy). The use of “syr1,” an abbreviation of Syria, in the domain name seemed plausible enough, and few users paid much mind. In this case, no special attention was given to the URL; it was simply assumed to be trustworthy.

To access the questionnaire, users were asked to submit a series of seemingly innocent details: full name, wife’s name, number of children, place and date of birth. But the questions quickly escalated into riskier territory: the user’s phone number, military rank and exact service location down to the corps, division, brigade and battalion.

Determining officers’ ranks made it possible for the app’s operators to identify those in sensitive positions, such as battalion commanders and communications officers, while knowing their exact place of service allowed for the construction of live maps of force deployments. It gave the operators behind the app and the website the ability to chart both strongholds and gaps in the Syrian army’s defensive lines. The most crucial point was the combination of the two pieces of information: Disclosing that “officer X” was stationed at “location Y” was tantamount to handing the enemy the army’s entire operating manual, especially on fluid fronts like those in Idlib and Sweida.

According to an analysis by a Syrian software engineer, what the officers dismissed as a tedious questionnaire was, in reality, a data entry form for military algorithms, turning their phones into live printers that generated highly accurate battlefield maps. “The majority of officers often ignored security protocols,” the engineer said. “I doubt any of them realized that behind these innocent-looking forms, traps were laid for them with the innocence of a wolf.” He added that while the mechanism of espionage was technically old, it remained devastatingly effective, especially given the widespread ignorance of cyberwarfare within the Syrian army.

At the bottom of the application’s web page, another trap lay in wait: an embedded Facebook contact link. This time, the user’s social media credentials were siphoned directly to a remote server, quietly stealing access to personal accounts. If the victim somehow escaped the first snare, there was a good chance they would fall into the second. 

After harvesting basic information through embedded phishing links, the attack moved to its second stage: deploying SpyMax, one of the most popular Android surveillance tools. SpyMax is an advanced version of SpyNote, notorious on the black market, and typically distributed through malicious APK files (files designed to install mobile apps on Android phones), disguised on fake download portals that appear legitimate. Crucially, SpyMax does not require root access (the highest level of access to the phone’s operating system) to function, making it dangerously easy for attackers to compromise devices. While original versions of the software sell for around $500, hacked versions are also freely available. In this case, the spyware was planted via the same Telegram channel that distributed the fake Syria Trust app and installed on officers’ phones under the guise of a legitimate application.

SpyMax has all the functions of RAT (Remote Access Trojan) software, including keylogging to steal passwords and intercept text messages; data extraction of confidential files, photos and call logs; and access to the camera and microphone, allowing real-time surveillance of victims. 

Once connected, the victim can appear on an attacker’s dashboard, the live feed displaying everything from call logs to file transfers, depending on the functions selected.

The spyware targeted Android versions as old as Lollipop — an operating system launched in 2015 — meaning a broad range of both older and newer devices were vulnerable. An examination of the permissions granted to the app showed it had access to 15 sensitive functions, the most critical among them including tracking live locations and monitoring soldiers’ movements and military positions, eavesdropping on calls, recording conversations between commanders to uncover operational plans in advance, extracting documents like maps and sensitive files from officers’ phones and camera access allowing the person who launched the spyware to, potentially, remotely broadcast footage of military facilities.

Once the initial information was extracted, fake servers took over, routing data through anonymous cloud platforms to make tracing the source of the malware nearly impossible. The app was also signed with forged security certificates, much like a thief donning a fake police uniform to slip past security. The attack combined two deadly elements: psychological deception (phishing) and advanced cyberespionage (SpyMax). The evidence suggests the malware was operational and the infrastructure ready before June 2024, five months before the launch of the operation that led to the Assad regime’s collapse.

A review of the domains associated with Syr1.store revealed six linked domains, one of which was registered anonymously. Through SpyMax, whoever was behind the app extracted a devastating range of data from the officers’ phones, including their ranks and identities, whether they were responsible for sensitive posts and their geographical locations (possibly in real time). They would have access to troop concentrations, phone conversations, text messages, photos and maps on officers’ devices, and be able to monitor military facilities remotely. The phishing site itself collected myriad sensitive data from military personnel, including their full names, names of family members, ranks and service positions, dates and places of birth and Facebook login credentials if they used the social media contact form.

The potential uses are also myriad, and would have allowed the operators to pinpoint gaps in defensive lines, which were exploited in Aleppo, as well as locating weapons depots and communication hubs, and assessing the real size and strength of deployed troops. It would have allowed those with access to the information to launch surprise attacks on exposed sites, potentially cutting off supplies to isolated military units, issue contradictory orders to troops and sow confusion among military cadres, in addition to blackmailing the officers. 

It’s at least clear that the Assad regime’s enemies benefited from the app in some way — although exactly how is difficult to confirm, and it is difficult to surmise who was behind it. For example, one of the domains linked to the hackers appears to be hosted in the United States, which had ties to the armed opposition, but the location of the server could have been masked as a misdirection. Israeli airstrikes in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the regime destroyed almost the entire conventional military capacity of Syria, and one Syrian army officer, who served in the air defense units of Tartous Governorate, told New Lines that the application had been active at his site. That meant that Syrian officers had already, through their own carelessness, uploaded the blueprints of Syria’s defensive fronts to a cloud server — accessible to anyone who knew where to look.

But the compromised data could have also been helpful to the opposition, which carried out attacks such as a clandestine operation targeting the military joint operations room in Aleppo, which this magazine previously reported on, leading up to the broader campaign that unseated Assad. 

And perhaps this is what makes this spyware unique: While other spyware operations have largely targeted individuals, like the use of the application Pegasus to spy on activists in the Middle East, this particular campaign seems to have been focused on compromising an entire military institution through a primitive but devastating phishing attack. 

It is difficult to determine exactly how many phones were compromised in the attack, but the number is likely in the thousands. A story published on the same Telegram channel in mid-July noted that 1,500 money transfers had been sent that month, with other posts referencing additional rounds of money distribution. None of those who received money through the app agreed to speak with me, citing security concerns.

Compromised military command may also help explain some of the stranger episodes that surrounded the regime’s collapse, in addition to the rapid military success of the opposition’s campaign.

One example is the exchange of fire that erupted on Dec. 6, 2024, between forces loyal to two senior Syrian commanders — Maj. Gen. Saleh al-Abdullah and Maj. Gen. Suhail al-Hassan — in the Hama region’s Sibahi Square. At the time, at least 30,000 Syrian army fighters had gathered in the area. According to witnesses, al-Abdullah issued orders for a southern withdrawal, while al-Hassan commanded his forces to advance north and engage opposition units. The conflicting commands led to a firefight between the two factions that raged for more than two hours. This clash can also be explained by the likelihood that each commander had received contradictory orders, either due to direct infiltration of the command structure or because external actors were using compromised channels to issue false instructions. It remains unclear how much of the command might have been compromised.

In an interview with Syria TV following the fall of the Assad regime, Ahmad al-Sharaa, Syria’s interim leader, revealed additional details about Operation Deterrence of Aggression, the name given to the campaign that ousted the former dictator. He stated that planning for the operation had spanned five years and that the Syrian regime had known about it, but failed to stop it. This, he emphasized, is a matter of certainty.

How did he know? 

It is unlikely that any one thread that can be traced in the dramatic fall of the Syrian regime was responsible for unraveling the entirety of the system, and the story of the days leading up to the final campaign may never be fully uncovered. But the Syrian Trojan horse may point to one significant part of that story.

By Phar Kim Beng and Luthfy Hamzah, Asia Times, 5/19/25

It may seem paradoxical that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is now deepening its engagement with Russia after publicly reaffirming its commitment to “sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity” in a communique soon after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. 

Yet ASEAN’s diplomatic posture should be viewed not through the lens of moral idealism but rather strategic realism. For ASEAN and this year’s chair, Malaysia, engagement is not endorsement.

Rather, it is a highly conscious effort to anchor Russia within an evolving regional framework that prizes dialogue over confrontation and sustains a long-standing tradition of hedging and strategic autonomy amid major power rivalries.

Last week’s meeting between Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow—expected to be followed by Putin’s attendance at the East Asia Summit (EAS) in Kuala Lumpur in October 2025—marks a critical moment.

ASEAN was never meant to be a sanctions-driven alliance, nor an adjudicator of great power misconduct. It is a convening architecture—ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)—that emphasizes inclusion, consensus and continuous dialogue.

It was designed precisely to accommodate rivals, outliers and even belligerents on the assumption that talking is always better than total disengagement. Thus, engaging Russia through ASEAN channels is not a contradiction—it is the essence of ASEAN diplomacy.

Welcoming Moscow to the EAS in Kuala Lumpur is a diplomatic bet that Russia may still be seeking avenues of cooperation over confrontation. It is also a message to the world that ASEAN does not subscribe to bloc politics or enforced isolation as a pathway to peace.

Avoiding a Bipolar Trap

Malaysia and ASEAN envision an Indo-Pacific that is diverse, multipolar and strategically balanced—not one held hostage by zero-sum US-China dynamics. ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) is a clear expression of this intent.

Russia’s involvement, alongside India, Japan, South Korea and Australia, ensures that no single hegemon dominates the regional agenda. This multiplicity is ASEAN’s insurance policy and safeguard against being subsumed by external rivalries.

For this reason, a constructive Russian role in East Asia is not only acceptable—it is essential. It helps ASEAN retain policy flexibility and geopolitical space, allowing it to maneuver without choosing sides in an increasingly polarized world.

Even amid sanctions and international condemnation, Russia remains a relevant economic actor. It is a major exporter of energy, fertilizer and arms. Russian Sukhoi Su-30 fighter jets remain in active service in Malaysia’s air force. Countries such as Vietnam and Indonesia still maintain defense ties with Moscow, recognizing both cost-effectiveness and strategic diversification.

Severing these links in the name of moral absolutism may satisfy some, but it could erode national security and economic resilience across Southeast Asia. For ASEAN, continued technical cooperation with Russia is not about blind dependence—it is about avoiding overreliance on any one country or bloc, especially in defense and energy security.

Russia’s activities in Central Asia, the Arctic and along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) may seem remote, but they matter for ASEAN’s long-term connectivity agenda.

The convergence of Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) signals an emerging transcontinental corridor that could reshape Asia-Europe trade flows, complementing ASEAN’s regional integration ambitions.

Engagement, therefore, offers ASEAN influence—however subtle—over the trajectory of Russian involvement in Eurasian and Arctic dynamics. By including Russia in multilateral dialogues, ASEAN helps steer that engagement toward peaceful integration rather than exclusionary blocs.

Defining Russian test

Putin’s potential visit to Malaysia in October 2025—potentially his first ever—will be closely watched far and wide, including in Washington. Putin’s visit would be more than protocol; it would be a test of whether Russia can conduct diplomacy on ASEAN’s terms, i.e. inclusive, peaceful and future-oriented.

Will Russia remain trapped in historical resentments and revisionist impulses? Or will it see the summit as a moment to reset its engagement with Asia? The ball, diplomatically speaking, is in Moscow’s court.

Malaysia, as the pivotal summit’s host, has an opportunity to send a clear signal. Prime Minister Anwar’s stated personal commitment to justice, multilateralism and civilizational dialogue gives him standing to engage Putin—not as an apologist, but as a moral and strategic interlocutor.

In an era defined by economic fragmentation and great power antagonism, ASEAN’s outreach to Russia is not a betrayal of values—it is a reclaiming of diplomacy’s purpose. To isolate a nuclear power is to risk escalation; to engage it is to seek transformation.

Russia, under the right conditions, could evolve from a source of disruptive conflict to a contributor to regional stability. The 2025 East Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur will be its opportunity to show that such a transformation is possible.

ASEAN, and especially Malaysia, are offering the table. The question now is: will Russia take the seat and rise to the occasion?

By Matt Taibbi, Substack, 7/10/25

Last evening, former CIA director John Brennan made his first public comments since news broke that the FBI under Kash Patel has opened a criminal investigation into his conduct in the Trump-Russia investigation. He was interviewed on MSNBC, where he is a paid contributor. The one piece of salient information host and former Bush administration spokesperson Nicolle Wallace didn’t leave out is that Brennan is a “Senior national security and intelligence analyst right here at MSNBC.”

This was after Wallace interviewed former Hillary Clinton lawyer Marc Elias, who in 2016 was the point man responsible for hiring the “research” firm Fusion-GPS, which in turn hired former British spy Christopher Steele to compile reports on Donald Trump. Elias in other words paid the firm that shopped bogus reports to virtually every news agency in America, along with the FBI and politicians like John McCain, in an effort to kick-start a political investigation of a political rival.

What did Elias have to say about investigations into Brennan and Comey? Abandoning all self-respect, humorously hoping no one would remember his entire political raison d’être has been leveraging iffy information into legal trouble for antagonists, he said, “Like honestly, I’m just imploring the media, do NOT report” the news of the investigations. Priceless:

The amusing Elias video means people like the former Clinton lawyer are worried that not only conservatives, but friendly audiences at places like MSNBC might begin exploring what actually happened in 2016-2019. If those audiences put even minimal effort into learning the basics of these cases, it’s possible mainstream public opinion will finally turn — not on Trump, but on the concocted Trump-Russia mania of those years, which deserves a place in history next to or even above the WMD scandal as the biggest intelligence fiasco of our time.

The Wallace interview with Brennan was similarly comic. A summary of the segment is included for those who believe he’s innocent. This article isn’t paywalled, so Racket readers can circulate it to anyone who they feel may still be holdouts on Trump-Russia island. If that describes you, the MSNBC segment below is a small, jewel-like example of how you’ve been lied to by media and by officials like Brennan:

https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/rt3mt4mURts?rel=0&autoplay=0&showinfo=0&enablejsapi=0

Note that Wallace early on says “exactly what conduct is being investigated is not clear.” That’s not strictly true. It’s been reported in multiple places (including here) that the FBI is looking at perjury and conspiracy charges. Wallace does say investigations are in connection with Brennan’s handling of a January 6th, 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment, but she doesn’t tell you why this is important.

Nor does the New York Times, whose headline read, “Administration Takes Steps to Target 2 Officials Who Investigated Trump,” as if the gravestone modifiers for Comey or Brennan might be, THEY INVESTIGATED TRUMP. The Times, like Elias, is going with a “misuse, abuse, [and] authoritarian takeover” theme, insisting these investigations signal only that “Trump’s appointees intend to follow through on his campaign to exact retribution against his perceived enemies.” The Washington Post used the same construction, highlighting Trump’s campaign-trail promise to “exact retribution against many of his political enemies.”

It’s probably true Trump is anxious for payback — he denounced Comey and Brennan as “very dishonest people” in the wake of the investigation news and suggested there may be a “price to pay” — but that doesn’t mean these goofs have no real exposure. Mainstream press audiences just haven’t been told what both men did, and specifically how both benefited from an illegal leak of material from their January 2017 Intelligence Assessment, material that was both bogus and classified.

In early 2017, it wasn’t inevitable that President-Elect Donald Trump was going to face years of exhaustive Russia investigations. Contrary to popular legend, as of January 6th, 2017, neither the FBI nor the CIA had developed intelligence supporting a conclusion that Vladimir Putin “aspired” to interfere with our presidential election specifically to help Trump. In fact, there was evidence in the opposite direction, suggesting Russia and Putin were less than thrilled by the prospect of a White House run by the “unreliable” Trump, and may have seen Clinton as “manageable and reflecting continuity.” However, the Democratic Party by the end of 2016 already committed publicly to the idea that Putin aided Trump’s win. On December 16, 2016, for instsance, Hillary Clinton blamed her loss on Putin’s “personal grudge” against her.

There was no reason government officials had to co-sign this conclusion in the Intelligence Assessment Barack Obama commissioned, but they did. To get there, they had to use material from Steele, who had already been dismissed as a source by the FBI on November 1st, 2016, after he leaked reports for a Mother Jones story by David Corn.

Without Steele material, there would have been no pre-inauguration report saying “Putin and the Russian Government aspired to help President-elect Trump’s election chances when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton.” In order to keep that storyline, the FBI had to take seriously Steele’s assertions about the existence of a “well-developed conspiracy of cooperation” between him and Russia. With Trump about to enter the White House and FBI investigations into Carter Page, Michael Flynn, and Trump stalling, this “Assessment” was the whole ballgame, the last chance to keep Trump-Russia going. Two actions were crucial: the controversial internal decision to include the Steele stuff, and the near-immediate leak of the report’s classified contents to the public before Trump was sworn in.

Here’s how first Wallace, then Brennan handled this:

1. Nicolle Wallace (at 2:22 above):“But the report or the Note doesn’t dispute the conclusion of the intelligence community. And that conclusion is that Russia interfered.”This is a silly mischaracterization of John Ratcliffe’s “Note,” which didn’t even look at the question of whether or not Russia “interfered.” Ratcliffe and the CIA instead “focused particular attention on the ICA’s most debated judgment— that Russian President Vladimir Putin ‘aspired’ to help then-candidate Donald Trump win the election.” Ratcliffe did “dispute” that conclusion, repeatedly.The CIA chief said that “placing a reference to the [Steele] material” as a “supporting bullet for the judgment that Putin ‘aspired’ to help Trump… elevated unsubstantiated claims to the status of credible supporting evidence.”He also noted the CIA and FBI should not have said they had “high” confidence in the notion that Russia aspired to help Trump, given that multiple quality sources are required for “high” confidence, and they didn’t have those. As reported last year, the ICA authors — like the authors of the original WMD report — also suppressed “credibly sourced reporting” that “suggested Putin was more ambivalent about which candidate won the election.”
2. Nicolle Wallace (at 4:34 above).“In fact, a report authored in part by Donald Trump’s current secretary of state and current national security advisor, then-Acting Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Marco Rubio, actually did look into the process of how the intelligence community came to this conclusion that Russia interfered in the 2016 election. And that report… says this: “Every witness interviewed by the committee stated that he or she saw no attempt, no attempt to pressure or politicize the findings.”Wallace is describing a five-part Senate Intelligence Committee Report on the 2016 election. She’s right that it’s odd Marco Rubio took part in a report concluding Russia engaged in an “extensive” campaign to meddle for Trump. What Wallace didn’t mention is that the Senate relied on different evidence than the CIA/FBI’s 2017 Assessment to come to the same conclusion, a transparent indictment of the 2017 report.If Brennan and Comey got it right in 2017, why was a second report with all-new evidence necessary? The Senate report was a repair job, designed to replace Comey and Brennan’s car-wreck of a 2017 paper with a Senate product whose chief assertions — particularly around former Paul Manafort aide Konstantin Kilimnik, whose tie to Trump they said posed a “grave” intelligence threat — were not even reviewable, since lines like “Konstantin Kilimnik is a Russian intelligence officer” were not backed by visible evidence.
3. John Brennan (at 10:27)“But you’re supposed to be interviewing the people involved in this to try to get a better understanding of the context for a lot of the actions that were taken.”Brennan’s unintentionally hilarious complaint is that John Ratcliffe didn’t bother interviewing him for the 8-page note released last week.This is the same Brennan who included an explosive “annex” of classified material from ex-spy Christopher Steele that upended American politics for years without interviewing Steele, his “Primary Sub-Source” Igor Danchenko of the Brookings Institute, or any of the Russian sources who ostensibly provided the pillars of Steele’s reports: tales of Trump “employing a number of prostitutes to perform a ‘golden showers’ (urination) show,” the “well-developed conspiracy” between Trump and Russia, and the notion that “Russian authorities had been cultivating and supporting… Donald Trump, for at least five years.”When Justice Department Inspector General Michael Horowitz put out his review of these issues in 2019, he pointed out that nobody interviewed Steele’s “Primary Sub-Source” until January of 2017, i.e. after the Assessment was released. When the FBI finally did talk to Steele’s sources, they disavowed almost every key point of Steele’s: the prostitute romps (“rumor and speculation,” the sub-source said), the “well-developed conspiracy” (there was “nothing bad” in communications between the Kremlin and Trump, per the source), and the notion that Trump and Page had been offered “the brokerage of up to a 19 percent (privatized) stake in Rosneft” in exchange for lifting sanctions (the sub-source “never stated that [Rosneft] had offered a brokerage interest”). Beyond that, no American official during this entire process ever picked up the phone to call key players/suspects like Julian Assange or Konstantin Kilimnik. It’s rich for Brennan complain no one interviewed him.
4. John Brennan (10:40).“That’s why we went to extraordinary lengths to protect the sensitive intelligence that really undergirded the assessment that was extensively footnoted in the assessment. But also, as I said, to protect individuals involved, including Donald Trump. To make sure that none of this intelligence that could have been seen as inflammatory and as something that was, you know, very damning, would get out. And so that’s why we wanted to make sure it was done in a very appropriate and meticulous and diligent manner…”In a wounded tone, Brennan notes that he and James Comey went to extraordinary lengths to “protect the sensitive intelligence that really undergirded the assessessment” and “also… to protect individuals involved, including Donald Trump.”The timeline on this: Brennan, Comey, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, and NSA chief Michael Rogers decided to present a 2-page summary of the classified Steele material to Trump on January 6th, 2017. It was decided Comey would tell Trump the bad news that “Russians allegedly had tapes of him and prostitutes” at the Ritz-Carlton in 2013.“I said media like CNN had them and were looking for a news hook,” Comey explained. “I said it was important not to give them an excuse to say the FBI has the material or [redacted] and that we were keeping it very close-hold.”Four of the nation’s most senior intelligence chiefs gave a briefing of classified information to the President-Elect of the United States on January 6th, 2017. One might expect that experienced intelligence officials handling classified information might be able to keep a lid on for at least a week.No luck. The whole story was on every front page and every TV station within four days. Here’s the CNN headline from January 10:The lede of the CNN piece contained details only someone with advanced knowledge of the meeting would know. “Classified documents presented last week,” the four CNN writers said, included “allegations that Russian operatives claim to have compromising personal and financial information about Mr. Trump” and that “there was a continuing exchange of information during the campaign between Trump surrogates and intermediaries for the Russian government.” Material was presented in “a two-page synopsis that was appended to a report on Russian interference in the 2016 election,” and “came, in part, from memos compiled by a former British intelligence operative.”That’s what Brennan means by going to “extraordinary lengths” to protect information. The CNN story in one swoop outed classified intelligence, blew its source (all of Washington knew which “former British intelligence operative” CNN meant, which is why Buzzfeed could publish Steele’s dossier within hours) and betrayed the target, Trump. That’s a rare trifecta of incompetence. A coked-up Tourette’s patient would have done a better job guarding information. Are there really people left who believe these people?

Populist Talk, Populist Message, Substack, 5/29/25

History of early US Russia relations

The Revolutionary War –1775-1783—Catherine the Great significantly affected the outcome of the American Revolution through her diplomacy. Catherine’s diplomacy helped the US gain independence. Catherine, though her foreign advisor, Nikita Ivanovich Panin, remained officially neutral during the war. Russia refused to assist Great Britain militarily and insisted on peace talks that linked a resolution of the American Revolution with the settlement of separate European conflicts. Catherine’s insistence on diplomacy, at least indirectly, helped the Americans win the Revolution and gain independence.

The Civil War–1861-1865–Russia supported the Union during the Civil War believing that a unified US could act as a counter force to Europe–especially Great Britian. In 1863, the Russian Navy‘s Baltic and Pacific fleets wintered in the American ports of New York and San Francisco, discouraging outside interference and preventing sudden attacks on Union port cities. To Tsar Alexander II, the main reason to support the Union was clear and it was that they were fighting on the side of emancipation and freedom. Tsar Alexander II was the Tsar that abolished serfdom in the Russian Empire and he believed that Lincoln shared his similar beliefs and championed the side of emancipation. This was one of the main reasons why the Russian Empire continued its support of the Union throughout the American Civil War.

The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1991— The communist takeover of Russia was opposed by the US and by most Russians. The philosophy of Communism was not indigenous to Russia, and Christian Russians were not aligned with the Bolsheviks. Communism extracted an enormous toll on Russia where an estimated 61 million Russians died from the various efforts to create a communist society. The USSR was peacefully dissolved on December 26, 1991. This marked the first time in history that an empire surrendered its empire without firing a shot. It also marked the end of communism.

The continuation of US militarism. The capture of Russia by communism, along with the occupation of Eastern Europe by the USSR after WW2, gave rise not only to the Cold War, but to many of the current tensions as well. The US did not disarm after World War 2 instead; the Cold War began, and US militarism was born. The old Cold War ended in 1991, but a new cold war began sometime after 2001 as the US, NATO and the CIA became more involved in Ukraine, but especially after the US backed coup in Ukraine in 2014. Meanwhile, US militarism continued even after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991.

Russia is no longer a communist country. Russia is a mixed economy that is primarily capitalist in orientation. The Russian people suffered during the long and brutal transition from communism to capitalism that took place during the 1990’s. At least 7 million Russians died, but this disgraceful period is beyond the scope of this essay. For those interested, please see The Harvard Boys Do Russia. Since 2000 Russia has regained her footing economically and, on a purchasing power parity basis, is the 4^th largest economy in the world.

The second World War–The US and the then USSR were allies. The German defeat, and the destruction of the German Army by the USSR, in Operation Barbarossa, essentially won the war. Over 27 million Russians died in World War 2 including almost 9 million military personnel. Today, the entire west refuses to acknowledge Russia’s sacrifice and Russia is not even invited to attend memorials to this horrid war. Increasingly, historical references discount or eliminate the contribution of the USSR to the Nazi defeat.

Two of the largest military campaigns in history were fought on Russian soil. In both cases, the invaders were defeated, and the capital of the invading country was captured

Napolean invades Russia—In 1812 Napolean sent his “Grande Armee” of 651,000 men and arms to invade Russia. The idea was to force Russia to comply with Napolean’s demand of a continental blockade of the United Kingdom.. That army perished in Russia along with hundreds of thousands of Russia civilians. In 1814 a coalition, including Russia, defeated Napolean in the Battle of Paris, conquering Paris, and forcing Napolean to abdicate.

Hitler invades Russia–On June 22, 1941, Hitler sent the flower of the German military to conquer the Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa. For this campaign, the Germans allotted almost 150 divisions of about three million men. This included, 19 panzer divisions, about 3,000 tanks, 7,000 artillery pieces, and 2,500 aircraft. It was the largest and most powerful invasion force in human history. The Germans’ strength was further increased by more than 30 divisions of Finnish and Romanian troops. This entire force was destroyed, crippling German’s war fighting power. The Soviet Army marched across Eastern Europe and from April 16-May 2, 1945 fought the Battle of Berlin in revenge for the suffering of the Soviet people. The city fell to the Soviets, and the Soviet flag was raised above the Reichstag.

What is the value of Russia’s resources?

Russia’s natural resources are estimated to be worth a staggering $75 trillion. Russia’s vast wealth is composed of a wide array of commodities, including crude oil, natural gas, coal, and rare earth metals. Russia also leads in developing the Artic and has vast timber and freshwater resources. This positions Russia as a major global player in the energy and resources sector. The scale of Russia’s resources impacts both the global energy markets and geopolitical dynamics. These resources are also unencumbered as Russia has very little debt. These facts also make Russia a target by highly leveraged economies searching for resources and assets.

The USSR (Russia) was promised that NATO would not expand eastward one inch

The promise of US Secretary of State James Baker that NATO would expand “not one inch eastward” has been documented by declassified U.S., Soviet, German, British and French documents posted by the National Security Archive at George Washington University (http://nsarchive.gwu.edu).

The documents reinforce former CIA Director Robert Gates’s criticism of “pressing ahead with expansion of NATO eastward [in the 1990s], when Gorbachev and others were led to believe that wouldn’t happen.” President George H.W. Bush had assured Gorbachev during the Malta summit in December 1989 that the U.S. would not take advantage of the revolutions in Eastern Europe to harm Soviet interests.

Despite these promises NATO expanded. This is the history of NATO expansion: in 1999 NATO was expanded into The Czech Republic (formerly Czechoslovakia), Hungary, and Poland. 2004 saw the largest increase in NATO members since the Alliance’s foundation. Perhaps even more notable, though, is that republics of the former Soviet Union were now joining (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). Bulgaria (formerly of the Warsaw Pact) Estonia Latvia Lithuania Romania (formerly of the Warsaw Pact) Slovakia Slovenia (successor to Yugoslavia) In 2009, NATO’s foothold in East Europe grew firmer: with the addition of Albania (formerly of the Warsaw Pact), and Croatia (successor to Yugoslavia). The additions to NATO in 2017 and 2020 are successor states to Yugoslavia: Montenegro (in 2017) North Macedonia (in 2020). NATO was now at Russia’s doorstep, all that remained was Ukraine and Georgia and NATO would border Russia, including the areas that had been used in the past by European countries to invade Russia.

NATO and the US begins to conduct “exercises” with Ukraine along Russia’s border

Larry Johnson did a series on NATO exercises conducted, with Ukraine, along the Russian border. Many of these exercises mimicked a decapitation strike against Russia. They include: Understanding Military Exercises; The Road to War in Ukraine — The History of NATO and US Military Exercises With Ukraine — Part 1; The Road to War in Ukraine — The History of NATO and US Military Exercises With Ukraine — Part 2; The Road to War in Ukraine — The History of NATO and US Military Exercises With Ukraine — Part 3 Here’s Larry Johnson:

“The ten-year period — 2011 -2021 — marked a dramatic surge in the size of the Ukrainian military. Although the number of active-duty soldiers stabilized at 200,000 starting in 2018, the Ukrainian reserves grew by a factor of 10. These reserves were made possible by Ukraine’s annual military training with NATO and USEUCOM forces. The stage was set for going to war with Russia.”

The US/NATO knew that attempting to expand NATO to Ukraine would force Russia to intervene

A very strong case can be made that the US began the process of creating conditions for war with Russia as far back as 2008. Senior US government officials knew that the threat of adding Ukraine to NATO would be seen as a serious “military threat” by Russia, a threat that would crosse Moscow’s security “redlines” and could force it to intervene.

At the annual NATO summit back in 2008, the George W. Bush administration publicly called for adding Russia’s neighbors Ukraine and Georgia to the military alliance. NATO’s secretary-general declared that the two countries would eventually become members. But privately, US diplomats knew that this move would be seen as an existential threat by Moscow and could provoke Russian military intervention in Ukraine.

Former US Ambassador to Russia William J. Burns, who later became CIA director, admitted in a classified 2008 embassy cable that NATO expansion to Ukraine crosses Moscow’s security “redlines” and “could potentially split the country in two, leading to violence or even, some claim, civil war, which would force Russia to decide whether to intervene.”

President Putin discussed these and other issues in an address he gave at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007. It was a clear statement of Russian foreign policy including the need for multilateralism. Although the speech was mostly ignored in the West, some have compared it to the speech given by President John F. Kennedy at American University in June of 1963. Both were appeals for diplomacy rather than war.

Russia tries to avert war with the Minsk Agreements

In 2014, after the Maidan coup, a civil war broke out between Kiev and several eastern Ukrainian republics. This is a complex story but to simplify–in 2014 and 2015 agreements were entered into in Minsk, ie the Minsk agreements—aimed at restoring peace in the region by ending the separatist war. France and Germany were to oversee the agreements. Both Hollande and Angela Merkel have both admitted that the Minsk Agreements were designed to buy time for an arms buildup for Ukraine. Ukrainian government forces and pro-Russian separatists had been fighting in the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine since 2014 in a conflict that Kyiv says has claimed some 15,000 lives.

Russia proposes a new security treaty in December 2021

Despite the risk of war, Western leaders continued to insist that Ukraine would join the US-led military alliance. In December of 2021, Russia submitted a proposal for a new mutual security guarantees to the United States. At this very time, NATO was conducting another exercise in the Black Sea. The proposal was immediately dismissed by NATO and the US.

The US and NATO had apparently forgotten the words of President John F. Kennedy: “while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy—or of a collective death-wish for the world.”

On February 18, 2022, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov voiced alarm on Friday over a sharp increase in shelling in eastern Ukraine and accused the OSCE special monitoring mission of glossing over what he said were Ukrainian violations of the peace process.

February 22, 2022, Russia intervenes in Ukraine

Who provoked who? We have all heard the mantra that Russia’s intervention in Ukraine was “unprovoked”, but there is a great deal of evidence to the contrary. Ukraine built significant fortifications in the Donbass and had been shelling civilian areas for several weeks. There were also fears that Ukraine was preparing a military campaign against the pro-Russian population of the Donbass. Russia argued that intervention was necessary to prevent the Donbass from being overrun. The fortifications are so extensive that Russia is still clearing these areas.

Sanctions on Russia. The US and the EU implemented extensive sanctions on Russiaincluding excluding Russia from the SWIFT clearing system and seizing over $300 billion in Russian assets. The belief was that the sanctions would crash the Russian economy and lead to the overthrow of President Putin. This did not happen. The Russian economy adapted and continued to grow.

The US has run this war. On March 25, 2025 the New York Times printed an enormous story titled: The Partnership: The Secret History of the War in Ukraine. The US has provided the weapons and financial support to Ukraine, but the US and NATO assistance went much further. The Times story revealed a secret operation in Wiesbaden, Germany where US and NATO forces formed a partnership with Ukraine “…of intelligence, strategy, planning and technology that would become the secret weapon.” In this operation “…American and Ukrainian officers planned Ukraine’s counter offenses. A vast American intelligence-collection effort both guided big-picture battle strategy and funneled precise targeting information down to Ukrainian soldiers in the field.”

In other words, the US and NATO were directly involved in killing Russian soldiers and Russia knew this was happening. This operation was supported by a finding signed by President Biden.

Conclusion– The US and Russia have a long very positive history going all the way back to the founding of our nation. We were allies in World War 2 even though Russia was in the grip of communism at that time. Russia is no longer a communist country. Why are we essentially at war with Russia today? The only possible reason is that Russia insists on being a sovereign nation and on using her resources to benefit her people rather than transnational financiers. Under the Wolfowitz Doctrine from 1992, the US is to act to prevent a rival power from arising in the EU, Asia or the former territory of the Soviet Union. Unless this doctrine is set aside it implies that the US will go to war with Russia and China–wars the US is unprepared to fight. This fact is demonstrated in these articles by Lt Col (Retd) Alex Vershinin: The Return of Industrial Warfare (Jun 17 2022) The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine – RUSI May 2024 Battlefield Conditions Impacting Ukraine Peace Negotiations – Russia Matters, Apr 18 2025 republished by Responsible Statecraft: Ukraine’s battlefield position is deteriorating fast May 5 2025.

Certain people within the US and NATO acted to force Russia to intervene in Ukraine. The people of Ukraine have been used as a proxy so the US and NATO could safely confront Russia. Since February 2022 the Russian Federation has basically been at war with the United States and NATO. Russia has carefully conducted this war as a war of attrition designed to exhaust the US and NATO and force a new security architecture–and as the above essays discuss, this is a war Russia is winning. Russia has adapted to all the weapons provided Ukraine and continues to expand and improve her military technology, and her weapons. Military recruitment is strong in Russia and her people are united and quite angry at the insults, and the lies. Isn’t it time we made peace?

As Otto von Bismark noted–Russia is slow to saddle up but fast to ride. Russia is now riding very fast.

In the face of powerful interests, can President Donald Trump be the president of peace? Trump ran on the promise to be a “peace president”, specifically promising to end the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, stating in his inaugural address that he wanted to be known as “a peacemaker and unifier.”

Significant elements within the national security state are opposed to peace–not only in Russia, but in Iran and Gaza as well. Senator Lindsey Graham has split with the president and claims to have 81 Senators prepared to support more sanctions on Russia. The President has business before the Senate and needs their support.

There is also opposition to peace with Iran. AIPAC and Israel want the US to go to war with Iran and are demanding zero enrichment and a complete dismantling of nuclear energy. Iran says there will be no deal if this is the demand. Like with Russia, a US war with Iran is beyond current US military capabilities.

A term has been circulating on the internet–TACO, short for Trump Always Chickens Out. The term, coined by the Financial Times columnist Robert Armstrong, has been used to describe how markets tumble when the President issues threats, usually over tariffs, then rebounds when Trump gives way. This phenomena, lucrative for traders in the know, is the subject of a story in today’s New York Times. Asked about the term President Trump lashed out at the reporter: “I chicken out? I’ve never heard that,” he said. “Don’t ever say what you said,” he told the reporter. “That’s a nasty question. To me, that’s the nastiest question.”

President Putin recounts that he has dealt with 3 US Presidents, none of whom were able to carry out the promises they made. His conclusion? The president may change but US policy stays the same. Will this be the case with this president on the question of peace with Russia, Iran and Gaza?

At this moment in history–our lives may depend on the answer.

By Jeff Childers, Substack, 6/3/25

Jeff Childers is a lawyer and conservative writer based in Florida.

We are learning much more about why the Epstein disclosures might be taking so long. Yesterday, the Federalist ran an intriguing story headlined, “DOJ Officials Didn’t Know Database Let FBI Bury Russiagate Docs.” Oh, FBI.

According to the story, the FBI stores its evidence in a central document management system called Sentinel. It’s how anyone finds anything. For example, when special counsel John Durham searched for documents related to Russiagate, he used the Sentinel system. It is the only way to access the FBI’s stored evidence.

But the FBI’s permanent bureaucrats knew something that the political appointees didn’t. Sentinel has several layers of classification. These designations are used to protect classified information, conceal witness identity, and maintain operational security during investigations.

What John Durham and nearly everyone else at the Department of Justice didn’t know was that the FBI had built a top-secret, master-level code into the Sentinel system called “Prohibited Access.” Unlike “Restricted Access,” which shows that documents exist (but are locked down), Prohibited Access entirely hides their existence.

In other words, it returns false negatives in internal FBI searches— agents querying relevant terms would see nothing at all and think there is nothing. The only way to find a “Prohibited Access” document is to know exactly what you’re looking for and run a special search while logged into the specific case where the documents were saved.

According to Federalist sources, no one from Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s office ever mentioned to Durham that documents relevant to the investigation into surveillance of the Trump campaign were concealed by the “Prohibited Access” designation, even though FBI officials knew the DOJ was investigating the origins and handling of the Crossfire Hurricane case.

Now it becomes easier to understand why Peter Strzok and James Comer were so annoyingly arrogant during their Congressional testimony. They knew a secret. They knew that John Durham would never see the most problematic documents.

(Sounds like a job for DOGE’s engineers. Or maybe it already has been.)

If evidence was willfully concealed using database tools designed to frustrate discovery, it might be criminal. Options include obstruction of justice, fraud on the court, Brady violations (failure to disclose exculpatory evidence), or even civil rights offenses if this was part of a politically motivated prosecution strategy.

There is conceivable justification for some kind of Prohibited Access. One can imagine the need for total secrecy in some key cases, like if the FBI were investigating an FBI agent, or a Chinese spy. But those favorable arguments are blown out of the water by the singular fact that the DOJ didn’t know about it and the FBI didn’t tell them— even during an active investigation.

In a late-breaking story published this morning while I was writing this up, the Federalist reported that the U.S. Attorney tasked with investigating the Biden-Burisma connection confirmed he was not told by FBI about the Prohibited Access codes. He ran keyword searches in the Sentinel system for “Burisma,” “Zlochevsky,” and other related terms, and got nothing.

The FBI had its own secret invisibility code without any oversight. In other words, the Sentinel system has a built-in auto-redact switch designed to bypass the people in charge, effectively making FBI a rogue agency.

But “Prohibited Access” is now exposed as a key deep-state tool, perhaps one of the most insidious and darkly elegant weapons in the administrative arsenal. It appears legitimate. After all, it doesn’t destroy documents, leak emails, or fabricate evidence. It simply hides reality. Silently, permanently, without fingerprints.

It’s plausible deniability: “But you never asked for Prohibited Access documents.”

CONGRESS: “Why weren’t these turned over?”

FBI: “Your request didn’t include ‘buried under digital cement.’”

This story reanimates Donald Rumsfeld’s folksy term, “unknown unknowns.” The Federalist said not even FBI agents were aware of the Prohibited Access code. So only a cabal of trusted insiders knew, and it appears they weren’t inclined to share, even with their Constitutional bosses.

🔥 This is a scandal on par with the worst cases of intelligence abuse in American history.

In 1975, in Watergate’s wake, the Church Commission investigated CIA abuses. Congressional investigators uncovered a series of top-secret internal CIA memos hidden from anyone outside the Agency, even the President. The secret memos described decades of unconstitutional and criminal abuse. They pictured a CIA that was completely off the chain, describing domestic surveillance of journalists and dissidents, illegal wiretaps and mail opening, assassination plots against foreign leaders (like Fidel Castro, Patrice Lumumba, and Rafael Trujillo), drug testing on unwitting Americans (e.g., MK-Ultra), collaboration with the mafia (Castro assassination attempts), and infiltration of domestic political groups.

Inside the Agency, these protected memos were called the CIA’s “Family Jewels,” too dangerous to disclose to outsiders, too damning to destroy. (In other words, they were preserved as blackmail insurance against former CIA members, rogue presidents, or a recalcitrant Congress.)

In 1975, as the Family Jewels sparkled in the daylight, committee chair Frank Church prophetically observed, “If this government ever became a tyranny… the technological capacity that the intelligence community has given the government could enable it to impose total tyranny, and there would be no way to fight back.”

Indeed. The Family Jewels disclosures led to the only major reform of the intelligence agencies in history. From that scandal, we got Congressional oversight committees, the FISA court, and an executive order prohibiting assassinations. The debacle also led inexorably to the minting of the now-familiar term, “deep state.”

🔥 Like CIA’s “Family Jewels,” “Prohibited Access” is no longer a secret and has gone mainstream, even if corporate media is stubbornly ignoring the scandal. If the documents are anywhere in the database, they can be found. Who knows what could be there? Presumably (hopefully) it contains a lot of things that should be protected, like the aforementioned counterintelligence operations.

But how about other politically sensitive issues? How about the Epstein documents? Covid origins? January 6th? Hunter’s laptop?

If the Federalist’s article is to be at all believed, Kash Patel’s team is just now finding out about this. It could amount to nothing, or a few minor reforms. Or this story could ignite a nuclear-grade accelerant for Trump’s broader strategic disclosure doctrine.