Trump’s security guarantees: key to a Ukraine settlement?
By Stephen Bryen, Asia Times, 8/18/25
Are we in for something like a repeat of Woodrow Wilson’s failure to achieve Senate backing for the Treaty of Versailles?
US President Donald Trump has offered Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky security guarantees that Trump describes as “like Article V” of the NATO Treaty. Zelensky has apparently signed onto the Trump offer and potentially has agreed that some “territorial swaps” will be needed to make a deal with Russia.
Trump has reported to his European interlocutors who came to the White House to back up Zelensky. He told them more or less the same thing, according to reports, and told German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who pushed for an immediate ceasefire, that a ceasefire ahead of a deal was off the table.
We don’t know what security guarantees mean or how they would be implemented. The Russians will be asking a lot of questions about the idea, if they have not already done so. Trump said he would be calling Russian President Vladimir Putin as soon as today, [August] 18, 2025, where it is already after midnight as this is written.
Here are the likely questions about security guarantees.
(1) Will the US send troops to Ukraine (as the European so-called “coalition of the willing” wants to do) or will the assurances to Kyiv be political in nature?
(2) Will the US set up any kind of infrastructure in Ukraine as part of the assurances to Ukraine?
(3) While Trump has ruled out any NATO membership for Ukraine, will the Europeans, or some of then, be part of the Trump guarantee?
(4) Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which is the effective collective security provision of the Treaty, requires consensus of all NATO members. Is Trump thinking of a quasi-NATO-like arrangement that also will require consensus for activation? One should note that not all European countries plan to support any troop presence in Ukraine even for security assurances. Specifically, Germany, Italy and Poland have said “no” to proposals from the UK and France.
(5) NATO is a treaty organization that was formally approved by its members, meaning the Treaty was signed and ratified by each country’s legislative authority. If Trump’s security guarantees are not under a treaty format, the deal might not be supported by a future President. If Trump wants to sign a treaty with Ukraine, he will need to convince Congress it is in the US national interest. This may not be as easy as it would seem because many will start to question exactly what would oblige the US to take military action if there is a violation of the final deal on Ukraine. It is obvious these are tricky waters, and the Trump administration will have to skip a lot of rope to sell the idea of an actual guarantee that involves the US military in a war with Russia, which is, as I am sure some have noticed, a nuclear-armed power.
In the United States a treaty, for ratification, needs a two thirds vote in the US Senate. There may well be enough isolationists in Congress to block ratification, if Trump goes for a treaty. Down the road, one is reminded of Woodrow Wilson’s failure to achieve Senate backing for the Treaty of Versailles.
There are more recent examples of treaties that ran into trouble. These include the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Convention on Elimination of All Forces of Discrimination Against Women and the Law of the Sea Convention.
(6) The Russians have demanded a smaller Ukrainian military and a neutral Ukraine. Will this demand be honored in any way?
(7) We don’t yet have any idea on the territories Ukraine will yield, or the actual borders (since the Russians do not control all of Donbas). This will be a tough negotiation, and Putin will be under heavy pressure from his army, which, for the most part, is gaining ground in Donbas and elsewhere.
Trump faces an uphill battle selling US guarantees for Ukraine, notwithstanding whether they require US boots on the ground and if others will join the US, such as the UK and France. In one sense, with a smaller group, the Russians will regard the future risk as greater than the NATO risk because the UK and French are aggressively promoting their participation in armed conflict against Russia. A so-called coalition of some-willing looks like a non-starter for Russia.
All of this means that what looks like a success at the White House may devolve into another casualty of the Ukraine war. The offer of guarantees may fail under scrutiny, either by Russia or by the US Congress.
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Doubts Grow on Ukraine Security Package as Russia Demands a Role (Excerpt)
By Natalia Drozdiak, Bloomberg, 8/21/25
Efforts to establish security guarantees for Ukraine as part of a US-led push to end Russia’s war are running into difficulties almost immediately.
US, Ukrainian and European officials have started hashing out proposals for a post-war plan to protect Ukraine, after White House officials said Russian President Vladimir Putin was open to “Article 5-style” security guarantees for Kyiv, a reference to NATO’s collective defense commitment.
The Kremlin hasn’t confirmed publicly that Putin made such a commitment at his summit with US President Donald Trump in Alaska last week. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said Wednesday that Russia should have a say in security arrangements for Ukraine, which could also involve China. Hours later, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy ruled out Beijing as a potential guarantor of peace.
Lavrov reiterated the demand on Thursday, saying Moscow had supported a Ukrainian proposal at negotiations in Istanbul shortly after the 2022 invasion began that would have involved the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, the US, Russia, China, the UK and France, in security guarantees.
Russia supports guarantees based “on the principle of collective security, on the principles of indivisible security,” Lavrov said. “Anything else, anything unilateral is, of course, an absolutely hopeless undertaking.”
Several senior European officials and diplomats, speaking on condition of anonymity, said they viewed Lavrov’s comments as an attempt to stall the process, and expressed doubt that Putin is willing to make a deal. Trump is pressing for Putin and Zelenskiy to meet for direct talks as the next stage of US efforts to reach an end to the war that’s in its fourth year.
Zelenskiy and a delegation of European leaders rushed to the White House on Monday for talks with Trump after the US president rolled out the red carpet for Putin at their summit and appeared to swing toward Russia’s positions on the war. He abandoned demands for Putin to agree to a ceasefire ahead of negotiations and said Ukraine would have to concede territories to Russia as part of a settlement.
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US will play minimum role in Ukraine’s security guarantees – Politico
By Ben Aris, Intellinews, 8/21/25
The Pentagon’s top policy official Elbridge Colby says the US will play a minimal role in any Ukraine security guarantees, Politico reported on August 21.
US President Donald Trump has shifted position in the last month, promising to contribute to the security guarantees being worked out by Ukraine’s European allies ahead of a meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and Russian President Vladimir Putin, but has also made it clear that the US role will be limited.
Trump has revealed few details of what the US role will be but has said Washington will not contribute troops to any peacekeeping force Europe appears to be planning. Colby comments add some clarity and underscore the fact that the lion’s share of the security arrangements will fall to Europe.
There also seems to be some dissent amongst EU leaders on what the best sort of security guarantee would be. While the UK and France are tending towards reviving the idea of sending peacekeepers, Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has been a lone voice arguing for a true “Nato Article 5-like” guarantee where EU members sign genuine security guarantees and commit to sending troops to Ukraine within 24 hours if Russia were to re-invade Ukraine, Bloomberg reports. The plan does not include Ukraine’s membership in Nato, but does tally with the bilateral security deals that Zelenskiy was hoping for as part of the 2022 Istanbul peace deal.
Meloni first brought up the idea of “Nato-lite” Article 5-like protections for Kyiv in March 2025, but has not been backed by other Nato members. She brought the idea up again in public comments during the White House summit on August 18.
The Article 5-like proposal is one of many options currently being weighed by European leaders ahead of a mooted meeting between Putin and Zelenskiy that also includes peacekeepers, more sanctions, increased weapons supplies, security agreements, long-term economic aid, and land swaps.
Peacekeepers
A decision to send peacekeepers to Ukraine is controversial. The Kremlin has said repeatedly that it will not accept any Nato-backed troops on Ukrainian soil.
The idea of peacekeepers was first floated by French President Emmanuel Macron earlier this year and backed by the UK, two of the leading members of the coalition of the willing. Germany, however, the third leading member of the coalition, has made it clear that it will not participate. Bloomberg previously reported that about ten European countries are willing to commit troops to Ukraine.
The Kremlin has dismissed the peacekeeping security proposals. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said on August 20 that Russia should be one of the countries that provides Ukraine security guarantees.
“As for reports that the UK, France, and Germany want to develop collective security guarantees, we support making these guarantees truly reliable,” Lavrov said on August 20 and repeated earlier calls that any deal should be based on the terms agreed in Istanbul in 2022.
“Our delegation then agreed to work out security guarantees involving all permanent members of the UN Security Council — Russia, China, the US, France, and the UK,” he said. “Germany and Turkey were mentioned, as well as others that may be interested in joining this group.”
Zelenskiy has demanded that Russia provide Ukraine with “ironclad” security guarantees and Putin signalled during the Alaska summit on August 15 that he was agreeable to the idea.
EU leaders have flip flopped on the idea of peacekeepers, but it appeared the plan was abandoned in March, deemed to be unworkable thanks to Russia’s objections. Now the idea appears to have been revived in lieu of giving Ukraine true security guarantees.
UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer said on August 20 that the UK was willing to send up to 30,000 soldiers to Ukraine as part of the peacekeeper force.
Europe in the driving seat
Colby’s comments came in response to questions from European military leaders in a meeting of the Joint Chiefs chair Gen. Dan Caine on August 20. Defence chiefs from the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Finland pushed the US side to disclose what it would provide in troops and air defences to help Ukraine maintain a peace deal with Russia should an agreement be reached, according to a European official cited by Politico.
“There’s the dawning reality that this will be Europe making this happen on the ground,” a Nato diplomat who was briefed on the talks told Politico. “The US is not fully committed to anything.”
Trump on Monday said he was ready to send US troops to Ukraine. But he backtracked next day, suggesting instead that he was open to providing air support for European troops there.
“I don’t know where that leaves us,” a European official told Politico. “Pretty much back to where we were in the spring with the coalition of the willing.”
Trump has tried to withdraw from supporting Ukraine since taking office. He has cancelled all monetary and military support at least twice since taking office but has been pressured into resuming some level of support by the Ukraine supporters in his entourage.
But what support remains, will be minimal. US Secretary for Defence Pete Hegseth announced in July that the Pentagon had stopped all support for Ukraine, although the White House walked the total halt back a week later. As bne IntelliNews reported, Europe has taken on almost the entire burden of supporting Ukraine since the start of the year.
EU officials are sceptical of Colby, who was the force behind Hegseth’s decision to stop supplying Ukraine, arguing that US stockpiles of weapons had fallen to only 25% of what Pentagon’s strategic planning targets demanded for the US’ own defensive needs. Coby has long lobbied for European allies to do more to defend the continent against Russia.
A poll from The Economist/YouGov found that US citizens are deeply divided on the question of US support for Ukraine. A third (32%) of Americans favour increasing military aid, and a fifth (21%) favour maintaining the current amount. Just over half (54%) of those polled said that Europe should be involved in the talks with Russia while just under half (46%) think the US should also be involved.
The poll also found that the results show that 42% would blame Putin for the failure of the talks, while only one in ten would blame Zelenskiy. An additional 11% would blame President Donald Trump, and 17% would blame all of the leaders equally.
The poll also shows strong opposition to Ukrainian territorial concessions: 68% of Americans said Russia should get “none of it,” although the same poll found that 38% of Americans believe Russia will ultimately control “some of” Ukraine’s territory and 30% of Americans believe Russia is more likely to win the conflict, while only 15% believe Ukraine is more likely to win.
Zelenskiy reports that Ukraine now produces between 40% and 50% of all the weapons it needs, but the progress has been largely in the simpler weapons raising the question: can Ukraine go it alone? For now, Kyiv remains entirely dependent on the West for the sophisticated and long-range offensive and defensive items like Patriot, HIMARS and ATACMS missile systems.
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Can Putin Legally Stop The Conflict Without First Controlling All The Disputed Territory?
By Andrew Korybko, Substack, 8/19/25
The Constitutional Court would likely have to rule on this hypothetical scenario due to 2020’s constitutional amendment prohibiting the cession of Russian territory except in certain cases.
RT’s report on Steve Witkoff’s claim that Russia has made “some concessions” on territorial issues, which signal a “significant” shift towards “moderation”, prompted talk about whether Putin can legally stop the special operation without first controlling all the disputed territory that Moscow claims as its own. He himself demanded in June 2024 that the Ukrainian Armed Forces “must be withdrawn from the entire territory of these regions within their administrative borders at the time of their being part of Ukraine.”
Moreover, the agreements under which Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporozhye, and Kherson joined Russia all describe their administrative boundaries as those that existed “on the day of [their] formation”, thus suggesting that the entirety of their regions are indeed legally considered by Russia to be its own. Putin also famously declared during the signing of those treaties in late September 2022 that “the people living [there] have become our citizens, forever” and that “Russia will not betray [their choice to join it]”.
Nevertheless, Putin could still hypothetically “moderate” this demand. Article 67.2.1 of the Russian Constitution, which entered into force after 2020’s constitutional referendum, stipulates that “Actions (except delimitation, demarcation, and re-demarcation of the state border of the Russian Federation with adjacent states) aimed at alienating part of the territory of the Russian Federation, as well as calls for such actions, are not permitted.” “Moderation” could thus hypothetically be an “exception”.
To be absolutely clear, no call is being made within this analysis for Russia to “cede” any territory that it considers to be its own, nor have any Russian officials lent any credence whatsoever to Witkoff’s claim. That said, if Putin concludes for whatever reason that Russia’s national interests are now best served by “moderating” its territorial claims after all that happened since September 2022’s referenda, then any proposed “re-demarcation of the state border” would likely require the Constitutional Court’s approval.
He’s a lawyer by training so it would make sense for him to proactively ask them to rule on the legality of this hypothetical solution to the Ukrainian Conflict. Even if he instead hypothetically proposes retaining his country’s territorial claims but freezing the military phase of the conflict and only advancing those claims through political means, he’d still likely seek their judgement too. They’re the final authority on constitutional issues and these scenarios require their expertise per their connection to Article 67.2.1.
If they hypothetically rule in his favor, the question would then arise about the fate of those living in the Ukrainian-controlled parts of those regions who Putin said “have become our citizens, forever.” They might rule that those who didn’t take part in the referenda, such as the residents of Zaporozhye city, aren’t Russian citizens. Those that did but then fell under Ukrainian control, such as the residents of Kherson city, might be deemed citizens who could move to Russia if Ukraine lets them as part of a deal.
To remind the reader, no Russian officials at the time of this analysis’ publication have lent any credence whatsoever to Witkoff’s claim that Russia made “some concessions” on territorial issues, so it remains solely a hypothetical scenario for now. Even so, Putin might hypothetically conclude that such “moderation” is the best way to advance Russia’s national interests in the current context (such as part of a grand compromise), in which case the Constitutional Court would likely have to rule on its legality.
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Declassified notes from Putin’s first presidential summit show parallels with Alaska meeting last week
National Security Archive, 8/21/25
Washington, D.C., August 21, 2025 – Newly declassified notes from Vladimir Putin’s first presidential summit with an American leader reveal some of the constants in the Russian leader’s approach: flattery, banter about sports, appearing to agree while saying nyet, and history lectures, according to documents obtained through a Freedom of Information lawsuit and published today by the National Security Archive.
The notes written by Strobe Talbott show Putin in his most cooperative and pro-Western period, hoping for full integration of Russia into the European security system and even NATO. Putin emphasizes cooperation on every point, strategic and economic, even when he intends to disagree. Putin is still inexperienced, yet confident and in full command of his brief, freely moving from subject to subject and trying to impress the American president.
The declassified notes published today include extensive color commentary about Putin’s style, psychological assessments of Putin and his rhetorical flourishes, dramatic quotes from Putin about preferring force to negotiations (“giving them what they deserved”), descriptions of Russian motivations and red lines—all the product of close first-hand observation by Strobe Talbott, then deputy secretary of state and fluent in Russian, during the June 2000 summit between Putin and President Bill Clinton at the Kremlin. Talbott was the U.S. notetaker during the three “one-on-ones” (actually 3-on-3 including translators and notetakers) at the 2000 summit, as he had been for most of Clinton’s previous meetings with Yeltsin.
The publication today also includes the formal memorandum of conversation for one of the two plenary sessions during the summit, declassified by the Clinton Presidential Library as the result of a Mandatory Review request by the National Security Archive. Detailed in this memcon is an extraordinary back-and-forth between Putin and Clinton about the possibility of Russia actually joining NATO, a prospect about which Putin says, “I am pleased.”
While the parallels between last week’s Alaska summit and the Moscow summit 25 years ago are not exact, many of the same issues resonate today, although similar detailed notes are unlikely ever to appear from the meeting last week between Putin and President Trump. Putin’s aggressive approach to the Chechen war back then and his endorsement of force over negotiation no doubt rhymes with his current stance on Ukraine, since he was the invader and could stop the war tomorrow if he wanted. The other major subject of the Putin-Clinton conversations—missile defense—remains a front-burner issue today, with President Trump’s newfound interest in building a “Golden Dome” over the U.S.
Read documents here.