Russia Matters, 10/20/25

1. Russian President Vladimir Putin demanded Ukraine hand over full control of the eastern Donetsk region as a condition for ending the war, during a 2-hour call with his U.S. counterpart Donald Trump on Oct. 16,according to two senior officials cited by Michael Birnbaum of the Washington Post.¹ Birnbaum also reported that Putin indicated willingness to abandon claims on portions of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia in exchange for Donetsk, a small concession compared to earlier demands, which some White House officials viewed as progress. Trump did not publicly comment on Putin’s demand, but in a high-tension meeting with Volodymyr Zelensky on Oct. 17, the U.S. leader urged his Ukrainian counterpart to accept Putin’s terms, reportedly warning him that Putin had vowed to “destroy” Ukraine if Zelensky did not agree to his terms, according to Christopher Miller, Max Seddon, Henry Foy, and Amy Mackinnon of the Financial Times. At one point Trump—who was “cursing all the time” tossed aside maps of the front line Zelensky—who refuses to yield more territory without fight—brought to the meeting. Asked after the meeting whether was concerned that Putin was stringing him along, Trump said he was not concerned, according to AP and WP’s Birnbaum. “I’ve been played all my life by the best of them, and I came out really well,” he said, adding it was “all right” if it took a little time. “But I think that I’m pretty good at this stuff,” he added. Trump’s acknowledgement of being played indicates that he has clearly arrived at a more realistic assessment of Putin who had repeatedly heaped praise on Trump and Trump’s views.
2. If Trump’s recent repeated claims that he is considering supplying Tomahawk cruise missiles to Zelenskyy were meant to reignite Putin’s interest in substantive discussions of a Russian-Ukrainian peace deal, then he can congratulate himself. The Russian leader not only scrambled to talk to his U.S. counterpart one day before the latter was to host Zelenskyy on Oct. 17, but he also agreed to a U.S.-Russian summit to be hosted by Viktor Orban in two weeks. As for Zelenskyy’s hopes to convince Trump to permit supplies of these U.S.-made long-range cruise missiles during their meeting, they appeared to be all but dead in the water even before the bilateral. Trump appeared noncommittal about providing Tomahawks on Oct. 16, according to the Kyiv Independent. Trump then reaffirmed his recent cooling toward the idea of supplying these cruise missiles to Kyiv when hosting Zelenskyy on Oct. 17. “Tomahawks are very dangerous weapons,” Trump said. “Hopefully, we will be able to end the war without thinking about Tomahawks,” he said, according to FT. Meanwhile, George Beebeof Responsible Statecraft has warned that supplying Tomahawks to Ukraine risks repeating failed pressure tactics and ignores Russia’s fundamental security concerns, making compromise less likely. In contrast, The Wall Street Journal editorial board argues that sending Tomahawks would deter Russian aggression and show American resolve. Marc Thiessen of the Washington Post also supports sending Tomahawks to impose crushing costs on Russia, asserting it would push Putin to negotiate and that fears of escalation are overblown. Meanwhile, Sam Skove in Foreign Policy contends that Ukraine’s most pressing battlefield need is more drones, not long-range Tomahawk missiles.
3. In his latest essay Thomas Graham explains why, in his view, containment is inadequate to the current Russian challenge. The structural conditions that underpinned containment’s success no longer exist: the world is no longer bipolar, Russia no longer lies at the center of U.S. policy, and the U.S. model is no longer obviously superior to the alternatives, Graham explains. Graham argues that the United States should seek to harness Russian power and ambition to U.S. purpose rather than to defeat Russia. To attain these goals, Graham proposes a policy of “competitive coexistence,” grounded in “five principles,” including that the U.S. “must accept Russia as it is,” “accept that Russia has legitimate national interests,” “recognize that Russian weakness can prove as dangerous as Russian strength,” “harness Russian power and ambition… to American purposes,” and “engage third parties… where Russia and the United States are not the dominant powers.”
4. The deployment of Russian nuclear weapons to Belarus demonstrates both change and continuity in Russian thinking on escalation management, Gabriela Iveliz Rosa-Hernandez, Decker Eveleth, and Paul Schwartz argue in their CNA report. They find that joint military exercises, force deployments, and readiness demonstrations, which have been carried out as part of this deployment, are consistent with Russia’s pre-2022 war doctrine. At the same time, the authors highlight a key departure: placing nuclear weapons in Belarus marks a “marked departure” from Russia’s pre-war posture as it had long opposed NATO nuclear sharing, and now treats “attacks on Belarus [as] attacks on Russia itself. “They argue this forward deployment “alters the balance in Eastern Europe”—giving Russia “very little reaction time if [these weapons] are launched preemptively,” and increasing the likelihood of escalatory responses and NSNW demonstrations in future crises. Rosa-Hernandez, Eveleth, and Schwartz conclude that “Russia is embracing new forms of escalation management not seen since the Cold War,” and that “US and NATO strategists… should immediately take the implications… into consideration” and closely monitor evolving Russian doctrine.
5. A Polish judge ordered the release of Volodymyr Zhuravlev, a 45-year-old Ukrainian accused of involvement in the Sept. 2022 Nord Stream sabotage, arguing that Ukraine was justified to order the sabotage the pipeline, Karolina Jeznach and Bojan Pancevski reported in Wall Street Journal. Judge Dariusz Lubowski ruled that the evidence presented by German authorities was insufficient. He said the attack on the pipeline was a legitimate operation considering that it was undertaken in wartime as Ukraine sought to defend itself against Russia. “The act of blowing up [the Nord Stream pipeline] is an act of sabotage, but not during the times of war and if it is the property of an aggressor,” Judge Lubowski said, according to WSJ. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk did not disagree with the judge on whether the destruction of Nord Stream 2 was justified. Tusk was quoted by WSJ as saying that “The problem with North Stream 2 is not that it was blown up. The problem is that it was built.” German prosecutors maintain the attack was criminal, alleging Zhuravlev, a deep-sea diver, helped plant explosives. A German investigator called the ruling “shameful.” Another suspect’s extradition from Italy was delayed after procedural errors.

By Ian Proud, Responsible Statecraft, 10/8/25

Support for mainstream political parties in Europe is crumbling against a rising tide of nationalism as voters increasingly want their governments to prioritize domestic issues.

This might not be enough to end the war in Ukraine, which will cost Europe $50 billion it can ill afford in 2026. But we may be witnessing the beginning of the end of the uniparty in Europe.

On October 6, France lost a fourth prime minister in little over a year with the unexpected resignation of Sebastien Lecornu.

The country’s problem is not new. With national debt at 114% of GDP a succession of prime ministers have fallen at the altar of trying to impose deeply unpopular budgetary cuts. One way out, which at the moment seems unlikely, is for President Macron to resign before his term expires in 2027. But polls suggest that the National Rally of Marine le Pen would stand a good chance of winning should fresh presidential elections be held.

The National Rally has seen a stunning surge in popularity over the past year — garnering 31.5% of parliamentary votes in 2024 — by focussing on local economic concerns and tapping into dissatisfaction with traditional political parties.

And there’s the rub. This pro-war internationalism of the mainstream in Europe is crumbling in the face of rising nationalism, in which citizens want their governments to focus on domestic issues, not foreign adventurism. As it stands, France will need to double its yearly defense spending to €100 billion by 2030 if it is to stay on course to hit the 5% of GDP target. It simply doesn’t have the money and any government that tries to obtain it through taxes or cuts will fall.

We are seeing the same in Britain. Given burgeoning government debt, bond yields in the UK are now consistently the highest among G7 nations. Britain seems unlikely to face a debt crisis as some fear. But as in France, the nationalist Reform Party in Britain is turning the political tide. It is now surging ahead of the incumbent Labour Party in opinion polls, with 35% share of the vote, from the eight main parties.

Mid-term elections are seldom a reliable bell-weather of electoral success. And yet, when it came to office in July 2024, the Labour Party amassed a seemingly unassailable majority of 152 seats in Parliament. Just 15 months later, it now looks beatable.

There is an increasingly widespread view that Keir Starmer’s government is not performing well on the issues that matter, on the economy, the cost of living and immigration. Yet Labour continues to pump $6 billion each year into the war effort in Ukraine and has committed, gradually, to hit 5% of GDP in defense spending by 2035. The latter would increase government spending by $80 billion per year, money which manifestly the country cannot afford without increasing taxes or cutting services to ordinary people. This continued fiscal pressure will simply funnel more votes to the Reform Party, increasing the chance that it comes to power in 2029.

While Germany does not face as severe a debt crunch as either Britain or France, it is deindustrializing in the face of high energy prices accelerated by the war in Ukraine and decisions to cut off Russian energy supplies. There, the nationalist Alternative für Deutschland is also on the rise and some fear it could compete for victory at the next Federal election in 2029.

In Czechia, the populist Andrej Babis is trying to form a coalition having won parliamentary elections with 35% of the vote. Among other things, he has vowed to scrap the Czech ammunition initiative which has supplied Ukraine with 3.5 million artillery shells since 2022 and criticized the previous centrist government for giving “Czech mothers nothing and Ukrainians everything.” That country appears to be shifting gradually towards the position of Slovakia and Hungary that want to bring the war in Ukraine to an end.

All across Europe, the mainstream appears to be falling out of favor. Part of the reason for that is a sense that all the traditional parties form a so-called uniparty in which the needs of big business and internationalism come before the needs of ordinary people. Liberals deride this notion, yet the concept appears to be gaining traction with ordinary people who increasingly want their governments to tackle issues that matter to them and to their children.

It is precisely this wave of disenfranchisement that swept Donald Trump to power in 2016 and 2024.

This shifting political arithmetic in Europe will ultimately seal the fate of the war in Ukraine, although not necessarily in the short term.

With no signs that the major powers in Europe want to get behind a negotiated end to the war, Ukraine is already signalling that it will need an additional $49 billion in Western financial support in 2026 to balance the books. With, at best, a fraction of that coming from the United States under President Trump, that leaves Europe largely on the hook for a cost that European governments can ill afford, either economically or politically.

That will weigh ever heavily on the shoulders of the mainstream across the continent who try to justify the cost of an unwinnable war to increasingly sceptical voters. France will not likely be in a position to double its financial contributions to Ukraine at a time it is trying to force through €44 billion in spending cuts. Britain is unlikely to increase its funding having already been forced to backtrack on attempts to cut welfare benefits over the past year. Where will the money come from?

The European Commission has so far been unable to extend a $140 billion credit facility to Ukraine backed by frozen Russian assets in Belgium that would allow that country in theory to continue fighting through 2027. Belgium, which houses Euroclear where the monies are held, has long opposed this move and the French, already in strife politically, are also sceptical.

Nevertheless, if Macron clings to power, and with Starmer and German Chancellor Frederich Merz relatively safe in their roles for at least another three years, it’s likely the major European powers will continue to back a continuance of war, despite its unaffordable cost, and will search for ways to make the finances work. This will have continued heartbreaking consequences for Ukraine itself.

But, it also seems obvious that the traditional parties in France, Germany and Britain will bear a painful political cost. Macron and Merz both recently decried the assault on European democracy, with the German chancellor claiming “our liberal way of life is under attack, from both outside and within.”

But that is not the point. Democracy functions specifically to evict governments who aren’t delivering what their voters want. What we are starting to witness in Europe today is a natural and inevitable shift from internationalism to nationalism. Europe is simply coming to the party a few years after the United States.

Reuters, 10/8/25

MOSCOW, Oct 8 (Reuters) – Russia will shoot down Tomahawk cruise missiles and bomb their launch sites if the United States decides to supply them to Ukraine and find a way to retaliate against Washington that hurts, a senior Russian lawmaker said on Wednesday.

U.S. President Donald Trump said on Monday he would want to know what Ukraine planned to do with Tomahawks before agreeing to provide them because he did not want to escalate the war between Russia and Ukraine. He said, however, that he had “sort of made a decision” on the matter.

“Our response will be tough, ambiguous, measured, and asymmetrical. We will find ways to hurt those who cause us trouble,” Andrei Kartapolov, head of the Russian parliament’s defence committee, told the state RIA news agency.

Kartapolov, a former deputy defence minister, said he did not think Tomahawks would change anything on the battlefield even if they were supplied to Ukraine as he said they could only be given in small numbers – in tens rather than hundreds.

“We know these missiles very well, how they fly, how to shoot them down; we worked with them in Syria, so there is nothing new. The only problems will be for those who supply them and those who use them; that’s where the problems will be,” he said.

Kartapolov was also cited as saying that Moscow had so far seen no signs that Ukraine was preparing launch sites for Tomahawks, something he said Kyiv would not be able to hide if it got such missiles. If and when that happened, he said Russia would use drones and missiles to destroy any launchers.

Separately, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov urged Washington to assess the situation around the potential supply of Tomahawks “soberly”. He said any such decision would be a serious escalatory step that would bring about a “qualitative” change in the situation.

***

Russia Doesn’t Fear American Tomahawk Missiles in Ukraine. Here’s Why.

By Brandon J. Weichert, The National Interest, 10/8/25

It is almost a year to the day when then-candidate Donald Trump told rapt audiences around the country that he would get a resolution to the end of the Ukraine War “on Day One.” At other times throughout the contentious 2024 presidential election cycle, Trump would huff that the Ukraine War would have never happened had he been president in February 2022, when the Russians invaded Ukraine. 

And in just one year’s time, since being sworn in, Trump has gone from belittling Ukraine’s military position in the ongoing war with Russia—famously claiming to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy that he “[didn’t] have the cards” to continuing the war—to claiming instead that Ukraine could reclaim all its lost territory. In fact, Trump made a series of bizarre pronouncements that represent a seemingly significant reversal in his longtime commitment to peace with Russia over the Ukraine War. 

Trump as an Agent of Chaos

In a series of diplomatic punches, Trump announced in short order that he was authorizing US targeting intelligence to be used to assist Ukraine in targeting sensitive Russian energy sites within Russia. After that, in the wake of what appeared to be a series of Russian incursions into NATO airspace, Trump decreed that European members of NATO should shoot down the next Russian warplane that dared to infringe upon their airspace.

Rounding out Trump’s apparent change of heart, the 47th president intimated that he might send America’s vaunted Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine so that those weapons can be used to more effectively attack targets within Russia.

It is doubtful that Trump is truly interested in expanding the already expansive (and expensive) Ukraine War beyond what it has already been expanded to. In fact, some experts, even those who support increasing American military aid to Ukraine, have acknowledged to Reuters that the chances of Trump actually sending Tomahawks to Ukraine are slim. There are a variety of reasons for this, partly because, despite whatever Trump might say publicly, there is little appetite on his end to abandon his previous stance about bringing peace to Ukraine and resetting relations with Russia.

Trump Wants to Force Putin to the Table—but Probably Can’t

There is some evidence that even suggests all these rhetorical flourishes from Trump are being made out of understandable frustration over the glacial pace at which peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia have proceeded. Realizing that Zelenskyy is inflexible, and that, so long as Russia continues winning the war, Vladimir Putin is disinterested in real negotiations, Trump is seeking to acquire leverage. 

A man who fancies himself as the dealmaker-in-chief, who (ostensibly) wrote The Art of the Deal, and who made gobs of money in the cutthroat world of Manhattan real estate, Trump is keenly aware of the importance of leverage. Right now, he doesn’t have it—and he wants it. And Trump certainly doesn’t want to send more equipment and money to the black hole that is Ukraine. But he thinks that by threatening to do so, in a clear reversal of his previous stance, it will nudge Putin into a more conciliatory position.

But it will not. Putin, a strategist by professional and academic training, has a much better understanding of the conditions on the ground than do his Western rivals. Indeed, the more Trump blusters with no significant way to back it up, the less inclined the Kremlin will be to fear each subsequent threat. And the emptiest threat that Trump has made thus far as part of his quest for greater leverage over Russia is the insinuation that he would hand over America’s Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine. 

Why Tomahawk Missiles Are Not Going to Ukraine

Any military analyst, either in Washington or Kyiv or Moscow, knows how ridiculous this statement is. 

For starters, Ukraine simply lacks the launch systems needed for these weapons. Tomahawks are primarily launched from warships and submarines belonging to the US Navy. They are also fired from US Air Force B-52 Stratofortress bombers—none of which Ukraine possesses, or could even easily integrate into their smorgasbord of modern NATO and repurposed Soviet-era equipment.

Could Ukraine adapt the Tomahawk for ground use? Probably, given enough time and effort; the Ukrainians have already jury-rigged other weapons for alternative roles. But adapting ground-based systems (like the existing Aegis Ashore in Poland) would likely require extensive modifications, training, and direct US personnel involvement. That would not only take far too long, and cost Ukraine in resources. There is also the danger that it would be viewed by Moscow as a serious escalation—which would in turn prompt a severe and direct response against NATO. Paradoxically, such a strike is ultimately what Zelenskyy, and many in Brussels, are hoping for, in order to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and force Trump to more fully commit US forces to Ukraine’s fight.

On the topic of escalation, the missiles rely on US-controlled targeting data and GPS—meaning Ukraine couldn’t use them without Pentagon approval. What is the Kremlin to make of that?

Then there’s the all-important matter of logistics. The United States has a very finite stockpile of Tomahawks, which have been prioritized for potential conflicts in the Middle East and Venezuela—both of which are expected to go kinetic in the near future. Depleting this limited supply for an open-ended and expansive commitment in Ukraine would weaken US readiness. 

Since production on these missiles ramps up slowly—with hundreds made per year, at best—there is simply no realistic way the Americans could ever make enough Tomahawk cruise missiles to both support their own national strategic needs as well as the never-ending demand from Ukraine.

Moscow has emphatically stated that they view the Tomahawks to Ukraine as a “red line,” warning that they would equate it to direct US involvement—potentially leading to significant upward movement on the “escalation ladder,” moving the world one rung closer to nuclear Armageddon. Of course, Russia has drawn other “red lines” before, and did little when they were crossed. But there is no good reason for Trump to push his luck.

Trump Probably Won’t Follow Through on the Tomahawk Threat

In any case, Trump’s history of behavior in these situations shows a pattern of bold statements for leverage without any significant follow-through. This is why his political opponents in the Democratic Party have nicknamed him “TACO” (Trump Always Chickens Out); the idea goes that when the cards are down, Trump’s actions rarely live up to his boasts.

While that moniker is mostly unfair, the fact remains that, whether in the trade war against China—which Trump is scrambling to get out of at all costs—or his previous threats in the first term against North Korea, Trump has no real desire for war. Putin understands this reality. Trump would be better served simply saying nothing and scaling back US support for Ukraine—so that he can focus on securing the Western Hemisphere and completing the Golden Dome national missile defense shield.

By Andrew Napolitano, Consortium News, 10/9/25

Andrew P. Napolitano, a former judge of the Superior Court of New Jersey, was the senior judicial analyst at Fox News Channel and hosts the podcast Judging Freedom. Judge Napolitano has written seven books on the U.S. Constitution. The most recent is Suicide Pact: The Radical Expansion of Presidential Powers and the Lethal Threat to American Liberty. To learn more about Judge Andrew Napolitano, visit here. 

During the past six weeks, President Donald Trump has ordered U.S. troops to attack and destroy four speed boats in the Caribbean Sea, 1,500 miles from the United States. The president revealed that the attacks were conducted without warning, were intended not to stop but to kill all persons on the boats, and succeeded in their missions.

Trump has claimed that his victims are “narco-terrorists” who were planning to deliver illegal drugs to willing American buyers. He apparently believes that because these folks are presumably foreigners, they have no rights that he must honor and he may freely kill them. As far as we know, none of these nameless, faceless persons was charged or convicted of any federal crime. We don’t know if any were Americans. But we do know that all were just extrajudicially executed.

Can the president legally do this? In a word: NO. Here is the backstory.

Limiting Federal Powers

The U.S. Constitution was ratified to establish federal powers and to limit them.
Congress is established to write the laws and to declare war. The president is established to enforce the laws that Congress has written and to be commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Restraints are imposed on both. Congress may only enact legislation in the 16 discrete areas of governance articulated in the Constitution — and it may only legislate subject to all persons’ natural rights identified and articulated in the Bill of Rights.

The president may only enforce the laws that Congress has written — he cannot craft his own. And he may employ the military only in defense of a real imminent military-style attack or to fight wars that Congress has declared.

The Constitution prohibits the president from fighting undeclared wars, and federal law prohibits him from employing the military for law enforcement purposes.

The Fifth Amendment — in tandem with the 14th, which restrains the states — assures that no person’s life, liberty or property may be taken without due process of law. Because the drafters of the amendment used the word “person” instead of “citizen,” the courts have ruled consistently that this due process requirement is applicable to all human beings.

Basically, wherever the government goes, it is subject to constitutional restraints.

Tribunal Trial

Traditionally, due process means a trial. In the case of a civilian, it means a jury trial, with the full panoply of attendant protections required by the Constitution.
In the case of enemy combatants, it means a fair neutral tribunal.

The tribunal requirement came about in an odd and terrifying way. In 1942, four Nazi troops arrived via submarine at Amagansett Beach, New York, and exchanged their uniforms for civilian garb. At nearly the same time, four other Nazi troops arrived via submarine at Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida, and also donned civilian clothing. All eight set about their assigned task of destroying American munitions factories and infrastructure. After one of them went to the F.B.I., all eight were arrested.

At trial, all eight were convicted of attempted sabotage behind enemy lines — a war crime. The Supreme Court quickly returned to Washington from its summer vacation and unanimously upheld the convictions. By the time the court issued its formal opinion, six of the eight had been executed. The two Americans were sentenced to life in prison. Their sentences were commuted five years later by President Harry Truman.

On July 1, 1942, a special military commission conducts the trial of eight Nazi saboteurs in a courtroom at the Department of Justice building in Washington. (U.S. Army Signal Corps/U.S. Library of Congress’s Prints and Photographs division/Wikimedia Commons/Public Domain)

The linchpin to all this was President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s decision to appoint counsel and have a trial. The Supreme Court made it clear that even unlawful enemy combatants — those out of uniform and not on a recognized battlefield — are entitled to due process; and, but for the trial afforded to the Nazi saboteurs, it would not have permitted their executions.

This jurisprudence was essentially followed in three Supreme Court cases involving foreign persons whom the George W. Bush administration had arrested and characterized as enemy combatants detained at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

In wartime, U.S. troops can lawfully kill enemy troops that are engaged in violence against them. But, pursuant to these Supreme Court cases, the United Nations Charter — a treaty that the U.S. wrote — as well the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights — another treaty that the U.S. wrote — if combatants are not engaged in violence, they may not be harmed, but only arrested.

All this presumes that Congress has in fact declared war on the country or group from which the combatants come. That hasn’t happened since Dec. 8, 1941.

Now, back to Trump ordering the military to kill foreigners in the Caribbean.
International law provides for stopping ships engaged in violence in international waters. It also provides for stopping and searching ships — with probable cause for the search — in U.S. territorial waters.

But no law permits, and the prevailing judicial jurisprudence deriving from the Constitution and federal statutes absolutely prohibits, the summary murders of folks not engaged in violence — on the high seas or anywhere else.

The U.S. attorney general has reluctantly revealed the existence of a legal memorandum purporting to justify Trump’s orders and the military’s killings — but she insisted the memorandum is classified. That is a non sequitur.

A legal memorandum can only be based on public laws enacted by Congress and interpreted by the courts. There are no secret laws, and there can be no classified rationale for killing the legally innocent.

If the memorandum purports to permit the president to declare non-violent enemy combatants on a whim and kill them, it is in defiance of 80 years of consistent jurisprudence, and its drafters and executors have engaged in serious criminality.

Where will these extrajudicial killings go next — to Chicago?

Published by permission of the author.

COPYRIGHT 2025 ANDREW P. NAPOLITANO

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The views expressed are solely those of the author and may or may not reflect those of Consortium News.

TASS, 10/16/25

MOSCOW, October 16. /TASS/. Russia delivered a massive strike by precision weapons, including Kinzhal hypersonic missiles on gas energy sites of Ukraine’s military-industrial complex in response to Kiev’s attacks on Russian civilian facilities, Russia’s Defense Ministry reported on Thursday.

“In response to Ukraine’s terrorist attacks on civilian facilities on Russian territory, the Russian Armed Forces delivered a massive overnight strike by ground-based, airborne and seaborne long-range precision weapons, including Kinzhal air-launched hypersonic ballistic missiles and attack unmanned aerial vehicles on gas infrastructure sites of Ukrainian military-industrial enterprises. The goal of the strike was achieved. All the designated targets were hit,” the ministry said in a statement.

Kiev loses 1,670 troops along engagement line in past day – latest figures

The Ukrainian army lost roughly 1,670 troops in battles with Russian forces in all the frontline areas over the past 24 hours, according to the latest data on the special military operation in Ukraine released by Russia’s Defense Ministry.

The latest figures show that the Ukrainian army lost roughly 235 troops and an armored combat vehicle in the responsibility area of Russia’s Battlegroup North, over 230 troops and three armored combat vehicles in the responsibility area of the Battlegroup West and about 215 troops and two armored combat vehicles in the responsibility area of the Battlegroup South.

During the last 24-hour period, the Ukrainian army also lost over 540 troops and an armored personnel carrier in the responsibility area of Russia’s Battlegroup Center, roughly 375 troops and eight armored combat vehicles in the responsibility area of the Battlegroup East and about 75 troops and three jamming stations in the responsibility area of the Battlegroup Dnepr, the latest figures show.

Russia’s Battlegroup North inflicts 235 casualties on Ukrainian army in past day

Russia’s Battlegroup North inflicted roughly 235 casualties on Ukrainian troops and destroyed an enemy armored combat vehicle in its areas of responsibility over the past day, the ministry reported.

“Battlegroup North units improved their tactical position and inflicted losses on formations of a mechanized brigade, an air assault brigade, an assault regiment of the Ukrainian army and a territorial defense brigade in areas near the settlements of Varachino, Kondratovka, Pavlovka and Sadki in the Sumy Region,” the ministry said.

In the Kharkov direction, Battlegroup North units inflicted losses on formations of a mechanized brigade and a motorized infantry brigade of the Ukrainian army in areas near the settlements of Vilcha and Volchansk in the Kharkov Region, the ministry said.

The Ukrainian army lost an estimated 235 personnel, an armored combat vehicle, 17 motor vehicles and three 155mm self-propelled artillery guns in those frontline areas over the past 24 hours, it specified.

In addition, Russian forces destroyed an electronic warfare station and four materiel depots of the Ukrainian army, it said.

Russia’s Battlegroup West inflicts over 230 casualties on Ukrainian army in past day

Russia’s Battlegroup West inflicted more than 230 casualties on Ukrainian troops and destroyed three enemy armored combat vehicles in its area of responsibility over the past day, the ministry reported.

“Battlegroup West units gained better lines and positions and inflicted losses on manpower and equipment of two mechanized brigades, an assault brigade of the Ukrainian army and a territorial defense brigade in areas near the settlements Kupyansk, Kurilovka, Petrovka and Sadovoye in the Kharkov Region, Drobyshevo, Krasny Liman and Novosyolovka in the Donetsk People’s Republic,” the ministry said.

The Ukrainian army lost more than 230 personnel, three armored combat vehicles, including a US-made HMMWV armored vehicle and a British-made Snatch armored vehicle, 24 motor vehicles and three artillery guns, among them two NATO weapons in that frontline area over the past 24 hours, it specified.

In addition, Russian forces destroyed a Grad multiple rocket launcher, 10 electronic warfare stations and nine ammunition depots of the Ukrainian army, it said.

Russia’s Battlegroup South inflicts 215 casualties on Ukrainian army in past day

Russia’s Battlegroup South inflicted roughly 215 casualties on Ukrainian troops and destroyed two enemy armored combat vehicles in its area of responsibility over the past day, the ministry reported.

“Battlegroup South units improved their forward positions and inflicted losses on formations of four mechanized brigades, an air assault brigade of the Ukrainian army, a marine infantry brigade and a territorial defense brigade in areas near the settlements of Artyoma, Berestok, Dronovka, Zvanovka, Ivanopolye, Konstantinovka, Pleshcheyevka, Seversk and Stepanovka in the Donetsk People’s Republic,” the ministry said.

The Ukrainian army lost an estimated 215 personnel, two armored combat vehicles, including a US-made MaxxPro armored vehicle and 10 motor vehicles in that frontline area over the past 24 hours, it specified.

In addition, Russian forces destroyed an ammunition depot and two materiel depots of the Ukrainian army, it said.

Russia’s Battlegroup Center inflicts over 540 casualties on Ukrainian army in past day

Russia’s Battlegroup Center inflicted more than 540 casualties on Ukrainian troops and destroyed an enemy armored personnel carrier in its area of responsibility over the past day, the ministry reported.

“Battlegroup Center units gained better lines and positions and inflicted losses on manpower and equipment of a heavy mechanized brigade, five mechanized brigades, an airmobile brigade, a jaeger brigade, an assault brigade, two air assault brigades, two assault regiments of the Ukrainian army and a territorial defense brigade in areas near the settlements of Dimitrov, Kotlino, Krasnoarmeysk, Novoaleksandrovka, Rodinskoye and Udachnoye in the Donetsk People’s Republic,” the ministry said.

The Ukrainian army lost more than 540 personnel, an armored personnel carrier, three motor vehicles and a field artillery gun in that frontline area over the past 24 hours, it specified.

Russia’s Battlegroup East inflicts 375 casualties on Ukrainian army in past day

Russia’s Battlegroup East inflicted roughly 375 casualties on Ukrainian troops and destroyed eight enemy armored combat vehicles in its area of responsibility over the past day, the ministry reported.

“Battlegroup East units kept advancing deep into the enemy’s defenses and inflicted losses on formations of a mechanized brigade, two assault regiments of the Ukrainian army and two territorial defense brigades in areas near the settlements of Alekseyevka and Privolye in the Dnepropetrovsk Region, Krasnogorskoye, Poltavka and Chervonoye in the Zaporozhye Region,” the ministry said.

The Ukrainian army lost an estimated 375 personnel, eight armored combat vehicles, 15 motor vehicles, seven artillery guns, including a US-made 155mm Paladin self-propelled artillery system, a Croatian-made RAK-SA-12 multiple rocket launcher and an electronic warfare station in that frontline area over the past 24 hours, it specified.

Russia’s Battlegroup Dnepr destroys 75 Ukrainian troops in past day

Russia’s Battlegroup Dnepr destroyed roughly 75 Ukrainian troops and three enemy jamming stations in its area of responsibility over the past day, the ministry reported.

“Battlegroup Dnepr units inflicted losses on manpower and equipment of a mechanized brigade, three coastal defense brigades of the Ukrainian army and three territorial defense brigades in areas near the settlements of Belogorye and Novoandreyevka in the Zaporozhye Region, Dneprovskoye, Olgovka and Shlyakhovoye in the Kherson Region,” the ministry said.

“As many as 75 Ukrainian army personnel, seven motor vehicles, three electronic warfare stations and two ammunition depots were destroyed,” the ministry said.

Russian troops destroy US-made Patriot missile launcher in Ukraine operation over past day

Russian troops destroyed an engagement control station, a launcher and a radar of the US-made Patriot anti-aircraft missile system over the past day, the ministry reported.

“Operational/tactical aircraft, attack unmanned aerial vehicles, missile troops and artillery of the Russian groups of forces destroyed an AN/MPQ-65 radar, an engagement control station and a launcher of the US-made Patriot surface-to-air missile system and struck energy sites of Ukrainian military-industrial enterprises, and also temporary deployment areas of Ukrainian armed formations and foreign mercenaries in 146 locations,” the ministry said.

Russian air defenses destroy 278 Ukrainian UAVs, six smart bombs over past day

Russian air defense forces destroyed 278 Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and six smart bombs over the past 24 hours, the ministry reported.

“Air defense capabilities shot down six guided aerial bombs, a rocket of the US-made HIMARS multiple launch rocket system and 278 fixed-wing unmanned aerial vehicles,” the ministry said.

Russian Black Sea Fleet destroys six Ukrainian naval drones in Black Sea

Russia’s Black Sea Fleet destroyed six Ukrainian naval drones in the Black Sea, the ministry reported.

“The Black Sea Fleet forces destroyed six Ukrainian unmanned boats in the Black Sea waters,” the ministry said.

Overall, the Russian Armed Forces have destroyed 667 Ukrainian warplanes, 283 helicopters, 90,559 unmanned aerial vehicles, 633 surface-to-air missile systems, 25,533 tanks and other armored combat vehicles, 1,602 multiple rocket launchers, 30,505 field artillery guns and mortars and 44,089 special military motor vehicles since the start of the special military operation, the ministry reported.