Strana.UA, 12/31/25 (Translated by Geoffrey Roberts)

This entire year has been marked by US President Donald Trump’s efforts to end the war in Ukraine.

Outwardly, these efforts have been fruitless: the war continues, casualties and tensions mount, and the year ends amidst Kremlin announcements of a strike on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s residence and threats of a military response.

It would seem like a dead end.

In reality, Trump has succeeded in bringing the positions of the two sides closer together.

If we recall the situation at the beginning of the year, it was strikingly different from now.

Kyiv’s official doctrine was the “Zelensky peace formula.” It included war until the 1991 borders were reached, with demands for Russia to pay reparations.

Indeed, the cause of the infamous scandal in the Oval Office in late February 2025 was Zelensky’s refusal to stop the war along the front lines.

After the scandal, Trump stopped supplying weapons and intelligence to Ukraine, and Kyiv’s position changed dramatically. Zelensky agreed to a ceasefire along the current demarcation line.

Putin’s official doctrine, announced in June 2024, demanded the transfer to Russia of the entire territory of the four regions whose annexation Russia announced in 2022 (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia), along with much else. Hence, the Kremlin initially refused to agree a ceasefire along the front line, demanding a broader agreement, which was communicated to the Ukrainian delegation during talks in Istanbul. Kyiv predictably rejected these conditions.

This led to tensions in the Trump-Putin relationship. Trump threatened to impose tariffs on buyers of Russian oil and gas. However, after encountering resistance from India and China, he reversed his position and met with Putin in Alaska. Putin also softened his demands, retaining the condition of Ukrainian troop withdrawal from Donbas but removing it for the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. Moreover, according to the US President, Putin was accommodating regarding security guarantees for Ukraine. This laid the framework for Trump’s peace plan, which emerged in November 2025.

Zelensky disagreed with this plan and – with European support – attempted to radically revise it. However, following his meeting with Trump in Florida, he was unsuccessful. Washington continues to adhere to the “Alaskan position” on key issues, including the withdrawal of troops from the Donetsk region. Zelensky remains somewhat opposed, but is no longer as unequivocal as before.

In other words, in less than a year, Trump has narrowed the disagreements between Ukraine and Russia over the terms of the peace agreement to the issue of the 25% of the Donetsk region’s territory currently under the control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Another important contentious issue is security guarantees for Ukraine. As noted above, in Alaska, according to Trump, Putin agreed that such guarantees should be provided.

However, there is a difference between how Russia views security guarantees and how Ukraine and Europe view them. For Russia, the absence of foreign troops on Ukrainian territory is essential, as are guarantees that Ukraine will not join NATO. Kyiv and the Europeans insist that the door to Ukraine’s accession to the Alliance should not be closed de jure (although it is clear that it is still closed de facto). And, most importantly, they insist on the deployment of foreign troops. This is still considered a “red line” in the Kremlin.

Trump’s initial plan included a provision stating that Ukraine should not join NATO and that foreign troops would not be stationed in the country. Then, after a series of negotiations with Kyiv and the Europeans, media reports surfaced that the US had given the go-ahead for the deployment of foreign troops and, moreover, was prepared to shoot down Russian missiles and aircraft in the event of a new war, and – if Zelensky and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk are to be believed – to send its own troops to Ukraine.

It should be noted that the Americans have never officially confirmed this. However, it appears that security guarantees remain the “carrot” that Washington intends to offer Kyiv in exchange for ceding Donbas.

Theoretically, Trump could accommodate Zelensky’s requests, although, of course, this doesn’t mean the Americans will honour these guarantees in practice due to the risk of nuclear war with Russia.

Moscow, for its part, is currently making efforts to return Trump to his original peace plan, excluding the deployment of foreign troops. According to one theory, this is part of the meaning of the statements about the “attack on Putin’s residence.” The Kremlin is essentially telling Washington: “With the kind of guarantees Kyiv is asking for, they’re simply dragging you into a nuclear war with us.”

But, let us reiterate, there’s no evidence yet that Trump considers the deployment of European, let alone American, troops to Ukraine as security guarantees. Only Zelensky (which may be his wishes) and media outlets close to the Democrats, which have repeatedly published “inside information” that has subsequently been outright refuted (such as reports about Russia agreeing to a ceasefire for the sake of holding a referendum), have said so. There are other contentious issues in the peace plan. But if we can reach an agreement on territories and security guarantees, everything else will move much more quickly.

Of course, there’s no 100% certainty that an agreement will be reached.

The warring parties are very reluctant to compromise.

The Ukrainian authorities don’t consider their situation on the front lines, or in general, so catastrophic that they should cede territory. Yes, the Russians are advancing, but the front isn’t collapsing. Yes, there are problems with manpower in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, but thanks to drones, they’re holding their ground. Yes, Europe has provided less money than expected, but it’s still something. Yes, the energy situation is very difficult, but there’s no total blackout. At the same time, Kyiv constantly harbours hopes of a “quick collapse in Russia”- because of mounting economic and interethnic problems, as well as problems with conscription that would necessitate a new mobilisation.

However, the “collapse of Russia” – anticipated for several years now – may not happen in the coming year either. And if Ukraine experiences serious problems at the front and with its energy supply, then the peace terms will become much worse than they are now. And this is being discussed with increasing frequency.

Besides, Trump may pressure Kyiv to expedite the process before the congressional mid-term elections. So far, he hasn’t done so. But such a threat could also influence Kyiv’s decisions.

But all is not clear about Russia’s position. Even if Kyiv agrees to withdraw its troops from the Donetsk region and security guarantees can be agreed upon, won’t the Kremlin impose new conditions in order to prolong the war?

The “war party” in Moscow is constantly calling for the this They, like their Kyiv and Western counterparts, say that “time is on our side,” “the Ukrainian front is about to collapse, the power supply will shut down, we just need to step it up a bit,” “sanctions aren’t a threat to us,” and so on. However, they’ve been repeating these lines for the past year. But the Ukrainian front hasn’t collapsed yet. Yes, Russia has managed to create and maintain an advantage in manpower, and recently, in some areas, in drones. Moreover, it has adapted its tactics to the new battlefield conditions, infiltrating the “drone line” in small groups. This allows it to advance, albeit slowly and with heavy losses. And no one can say how long the army will be able to replenish itself solely with contract soldiers, without declaring mobilisation. The Russian economy has withstood sanctions by reorienting sales markets, tapping into its reserves, and also by Russian entrepreneurs returning money to Russia due to the risks they face abroad. But the reserves are not unlimited. Sanctions are hitting oil prices, increasing sales costs, and creating many other problems. Furthermore, interethnic and interreligious tensions are being systematically fuelled within the country (including by the same information and political network that previously promoted Prigozhin, preparing the ground for his rebellion).

Both Ukraine and Russia are walking on very thin ice, hoping the other side will fall through first, even though both sides could drown.

The main justification for the concept of “war to the bitter end” in Ukraine and Russia, as well as among certain forces in the West, is the thesis of the “existential” nature of the war. This definition derives from the Latin word “existentia,” meaning existence. Thus, an “existential war” is a war for existence, the outcome of which determines the life and death of a state and nation. In the event of defeat, the nation and state perish. To complement the thesis of the “existential” nature of war, it is common to repeat the phrase, “either they perish, or we perish.” This thesis posits the incompatibility of Ukraine and Russia’s existence as two neighbouring states.

However, such reasoning is an “existential trap” for both countries.

Regarding the current war, it is clear that one of the warring parties (or both) will only find itself facing a real existential threat in the event of a “war to the bitter end.” Then it could indeed end in the complete collapse of one of the adversaries, the loss of statehood, or the disintegration of the state (which many in Kyiv and Moscow wish for each other). But for the victor, the price could be so high that it would amount to defeat.

Will ending the war based on Trump’s current peace plans mean that Ukraine or Russia collapse into the abyss and lose their statehood? Of course not. On the contrary, it would mean saving both countries from this scenario. It would mean eliminating the existential threat (a threat to their very existence) that could threaten both countries if the war continues.

Incidentally, such an end to the war would not pose an existential threat to Putin or Zelensky personally. For Putin, ending the war along the front lines (let alone gaining control of the entire Donbas) would be a victory. Of course, questions may arise about the price of such a victory, but it’s unlikely anyone will dare to ask them out loud. And most Russians won’t even ask them, rejoicing that the war is finally over.

For Zelensky, withdrawing troops from Donbas won’t mean a clear political defeat if in return Ukraine receives security guarantees and EU membership.

Will the implementation of Trump’s peace plans mean a resumption of war after a certain period of time? Not necessarily. It will depend on whether both countries continue to see each other as existential adversaries that must be destroyed sooner or later, or whether they allow each other to live in peace.

It will also depend on Europe’s position. More precisely, the West as a whole. And the United States, of course. But primarily on Europe’s position.

There, too, the prevailing attitude is now to view the war in Ukraine as an “existential” (for Europe) conflict. A theory has become widespread that Europeans benefit from prolonging the war in Ukraine because if it ends, Putin will attack the EU. We have written many times about the extreme dubiousness of this theory.

But it directly influences the European position and is a factor contributing to the prolongation of the war (given the EU and UK’s influence on the Ukrainian authorities). This is also influenced by the domestic political struggle in the US itself, where the Democrats (allied with the current European elites) do not benefit from Trump’s success in achieving peace in Ukraine, as this could strengthen the Republicans’ hand in the Congressional elections at the end of next year.

However, prolonging the war in Ukraine carries real existential risks for Europe if it is drawn directly into the war – with a far from zero risk of it escalating into a nuclear war.

There could be many occasions for this. For example, Europeans support for Ukraine crossing the Kremlin’s “final red line,” perhaps by beginning the supply of long-range Taurus missiles or by blockading Russian ports and the “shadow fleet.” Or, if the situation on the front reaches a stalemate, the Russian “war party” will convince the Kremlin to “intimidate” Europe militarily, forcing it to abandon its aid to Kyiv. Or perhaps there are simply some incomprehensible situations, like the sudden appearance of drones over Europe this fall. Who launched them and for what purpose remains a mystery. But this immediately sparked calls in the West to retaliate against Russia. Such “anonymous” incidents aimed at provoking a war between Europeans (and even NATO as a whole) and Russia are certainly not ruled out in the future.

And this, we repeat, is a real existential threat for Europe, Ukraine, Russia, and indeed for all of humanity, given the risk of nuclear war.

And the only way to mitigate this risk is to stop the war in Ukraine.

By the New Year, this task had not been accomplished.

However, given the significant narrowing of the range of contentious issues, it cannot be ruled out that this could happen in the coming months.

This offers hope for peace, but also makes these months extremely dangerous. On the one hand, the “war parties” in all countries will make every effort to disrupt the agreements (media outlets close to them are already full of predictions that the war will not end next year). On the other hand, all sides will try to “raise the stakes” to persuade the other side to make concessions.

However, with willpower, a successful conclusion to the negotiations is possible. The main thing to remember is that the real existential threat to everyone is the continuation of the war, not its end on compromise terms.