The Bell, 4/14/23

Military service law is a major curb on freedoms

Putin’s regime last week took a big step towards total control over its citizens. Both houses of Russia’s parliament approved amendments to a law on military service and military registration, formally equating an electronic summons with traditional call-up papers. In addition, they accepted serious restrictions on constitutional rights, including restrictions on foreign travel, in a bid to stop people evading military service. The regime is becoming more and more naked in its aggression against its own citizens. We’ll take a look at why this is bad news, not only for ordinary Russians but also for the economy and the authorities.

What’s happening?

In the space of less than a week, both houses of Russia’s parliament rushed to approve a law that gives full legal force to an electronic call-up for military service and creates a digital database of those eligible for military service. On Friday evening, the law was signed by Vladimir Putin. This is directly linked to the Gosuslugi portal – used by millions to handle day-to-day interactions with the government – and will be under the control of military commissariats. By order of the Defense Ministry, the Ministry of Digital Development will create the database and almost every ministry will contribute data: from the Tax Service and the Interior Ministry to employers and educational institutions. People can be added to the register without ever physically attending an enlistment office. For example, in the year when a man turns 17, or after gaining Russian citizenship, he will automatically be added to the service register.

The law comes into force from the moment of its publication. Digital Development Minister Maksut Shadayev was quick to calm the situation, saying that the register would only be working “in full” during the fall conscription period. However, that does nothing to prevent the register working to a limited extent (whatever that means) right now. The new law does not only affect conscripts, but everyone eligible for military service. Now, anyone with “grounds” (such as women who have a military specialty or men over 27 years but who did not complete their military service) can be remotely enrolled. Russia is continuing its latent mobilization, so anybody on the list could be called for military service at any time.

How will Russians be called up?

Alongside the traditional call-up papers, conscripts can also be summoned electronically. Any electronic summons is considered served as soon as it appears in a personal account, regardless of whether or not it has been read. This does not merely mean a message in a Gosuslugi account, it could be any account or “information system” among the many that are being created alongside the new military register. As a result, the now-popular tactic of simply deleting a Gosuslugi account will not save anyone from the draft.

As soon as a summons is delivered, the subject is banned from leaving the country. Anyone who fails to report to an enlistment office without good reason within 20 days of the date of the call-up will be unable to take out a loan, register ownership of property or vehicles, or register as self-employed. Banks will be obliged to check the register before issuing loans.

After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the country experienced two big waves of emigration. The first came in March 2022 and the second was in September after mobilization was announced. One of the more memorable images of that time showed traffic jams backed up for several kilometers at a checkpoint on the Georgian border. The authorities have not announced an exact figure for those who have left the country permanently. The Bell’s minimum estimate is that more than 500,000 people have gone into exile. Despite assurances from the authorities that few people left, it’s clear this is painful for the Kremlin.

Why is the law needed, and how was it adopted?

The authorities adopted the new legislation in blitzkrieg fashion. On the eve of the draft, Rear Admiral Vladimir Tsimlyansky, head of the main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate of Russia’s Armed Forces, let slip that electronic call-ups would be issued. State media were then banned from reporting this statement, an official told The Bell. This was confirmed by an employee of a state media organization: “the ban came from the Kremlin.” On the same day, the Gosuslugi portal removed the option of deleting an existing account (later it was returned).

Immediately after the bill was adopted, the authorities issued a “manual” (seen by Meduza) to explain to journalists how to report the new law. Apparently it is to do with “eliminating shortcomings in the military registration system.” However, on national television, Duma committee chief Andrei Kartapolov let slip that the law was essential to “deploy mobilization.”

Clearly, the deputies are just a front. However, it is not known who is behind the new law. For the government, which is also responsible for demographics and the labor market, the news came as a surprise, two federal officials told The Bell.

“There were no meetings, there was no consideration of a possible third wave of emigration,” one of them said.

Two sources close to the Kremlin told Meduza that Kremlin officials were unaware of the changes and played no role in drafting the legislation. Meduza’s sources are certain that the amendments came from the Defense Ministry. However, a federal official disputes this, insisting that it would be impossible to push through the bill without the Kremlin: “The military does not carry sufficient weight to push through a law that would have such a powerful impact on society and the economy while the country is in special operation mode,” he said. “Unless there have been some decisive changes in the structure of the regime.”

The economy and the labor market

Apart from an electronic summons, which is almost impossible to evade, the law makes it possible to sign up conscript soldiers for three year-contracts right away (previously, the maximum initial contract was just three months). At the same time, there are almost no limits on the nature of the contract during mobilization. This means that any conscript could theoretically be sent immediately “to the zone of the special military operation.” Thus the military can now ignore Putin’s public pledge that conscripts will not be sent to fight. There are plenty of examples of how the military forces conscripts to sign contracts (see here or here). Now, contract military service will become voluntarily-compulsory. In late March a source told Bloomberg that the Russian authorities wanted to avoid a second wave of mobilization, but also planned to recruit 400,000 contract soldiers for the war.

The law should not have a direct negative effect on the economy, but it will likely be destabilizing: increased anxiety among the population and the business community, coupled with rising uncertainty, discourages investment. Moreover, there is a risk of a third wave of emigration. For individuals and businesses, the key issue when planning is the likely duration of the conflict. Alexander Isakov of Bloomberg Economics said: “If the passage of the law is taken as a signal that [the conflict] will go on longer than expected, then we will see lower consumer confidence and a continued high level of savings.”

In 2022, 1.3 million people under the age of 35 left the workforce, according to official figures. Russians aged 25-29 were most likely to leave. Research attributes this to an aging demographic and emigration. The war in Ukraine is not mentioned, but it is a real factor that influences the labor market. The FSB estimates that Russia lost 110,000 people killed or injured in Ukraine, the New York Times writes with reference to leaked U.S. intelligence reports. Reuters, referring to another document from this leak, reported that the U.S. military estimates Russia’s losses from 189,500 to 223,000 men, of which up to 43,000 have been killed. In early April 2023, Mediazona and the BBC Russian Service, along with a team of volunteers, used open data to identify 19,688 Russian soldiers killed since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. As the wounded leave the workforce, there is nobody to replace them. There are few men left on the labor market (we wrote about this here) and in several regions women are being hired to fill roles traditionally performed by men.

More bans and restrictions

In parallel with “digital mobilization,” lawmakers have been considering the possibility of imposing a life sentence for treason. Since the start of the year, at least 17 Russian citizens have been arrested for treason (there were 20 such cases in the whole of last year). “This stems from the fact that Putin’s model of government is now in place forever and any betrayal of him – whatever that means in an arbitrary interpretation of their own law – is punishable by eternal imprisonment,” expert Andrei Kolesnikov wrote in a recent analysis.

In addition, it recently emerged that officials and employees of state companies and corporations face restrictions on leaving the country. Recent changes mean that all top officials – from ministers down to heads of department – can only travel abroad with the express permission of Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin.

And that permission is only given when there is a clear operational need, reported The Bell. Some officials have been obliged to hand over their passports. And there were media reports that, over the New Year holidays, both national and regional-level officials were banned from leaving Russia. The Federal Security Service (FSB) maintains a database of officials, governors and other state employees who must obtain special permission in order to leave the country. “An iron curtain for those associated with the state is… in place,” a senior Russian government official said at the time.

Why the world should care

When war broke out in Ukraine, the Kremlin did everything it could to prove that mass emigration from Russia was not something that troubled the authorities. However, the ever-widening restrictions (first security officers, then officials and now conscripts) on leaving the country tell a different story. It appears that the Kremlin cannot rule out a further deterioration in the situation, which might provoke another wave of emigration, but is still unwilling to close the borders. “The situation is something of an emergency, which has left the political regime writhing and convulsing. This could lead to transformations that it never even planned,” said political analyst Ekaterina Shulman.

Link here.

By Anatol Lieven, Foreign Policy, 4/11/23

Clear differences are emerging within the Ukrainian government as to whether Ukraine should make the reconquest of Crimea a nonnegotiable goal of its war effort or be prepared to trade at least provisional Russian control of the peninsula for Russian concessions elsewhere. This issue also has the potential to create a deep split between Kyiv and Western governments, which fear that Crimea and control of the strategically vital military base of Sevastopol might be the point on which Moscow would be willing to escalate toward nuclear war. The question is becoming more urgent as Ukraine prepares for an offensive that could potentially allow it to cut the land route between Russia and Crimea.

My own research in Ukraine last month suggests that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky would have very great domestic difficulty in supporting a cease-fire leaving Crimea in Russian hands. Not only would this face strong opposition from hard-line nationalists and the Ukrainian military, but the Ukrainian government has helped foster a general public mood that Crimea must be recovered at all costs.

In a departure from the previous government line, Andriy Sybiha, the deputy head of the presidential staff and a veteran Ukrainian diplomat, told the Financial Times last week: “If we succeed in achieving our strategic goals on the battlefield, and when we are on the administrative border of Crimea, we are ready to open a diplomatic page to discuss this issue … [though] this doesn’t mean that we exclude the way of liberation [of Crimea] by our army.”

In a recent interview rebroadcast by Radio Liberty, another advisor to Zelensky, former journalist and hard-line nationalist politician Mykhailo Podolyak, took a very different line from Sybiha, ruling out any compromise with Russia:

“Could there be talks about a diplomatic way out of Crimea? … Yes, of course, if [Moscow] starts withdrawing those troops today, then we can wait a day, two or three, while those troops leave together with the [Russian] inhabitants.”

Podolyak said that after Russia leaves all Ukrainian territory, negotiations should be about Russian compensation to Ukraine and punishment for war crimes, together with the creation of a 100-kilometer (62-mile) demilitarized zone on the Russian side of the border. He also raised another issue of crucial importance to the issue of Ukraine’s recovery of the territories controlled by Russia since 2014: that of the fate of their populations, much of which have historically identified with Russia. Referring to pro-Russian Crimeans as mankurts (roughly, “brain-dead slaves”), he said:

“We have to completely close everything related to the Russian cultural space there. We have to eradicate everything Russian. There should be only Ukrainian cultural space or global cultural space. We should not have a dialogue about whether a person has the right to use the Russian language or not. … There shouldn’t be this line: ‘Maybe these are our people, maybe we need to talk about something with them.’ I was constantly surprised by this concept of reintegration in 2014-2015 and [the argument that] let’s reintegrate the occupied territories with a smile. Gangsters live there, criminals live there, occupying armies and administrations live there, but let’s reintegrate them with a smile. … They should be expelled, and some should be imprisoned.”

This vision (which many in the world would likely see as tantamount to ethnic cleansing) was not shared by most of the Ukrainians with whom I spoke during three weeks in the country last month. A clear majority said Crimea should be returned to Ukraine—but with some (usually unspecified) measures for the peaceful reintegration of its population.

A substantial minority, however, said Ukraine should be prepared to give up Crimea in return for peace and the return of the territory taken by Russia since last February. The reasons they gave differed, but the three principal ones were that “otherwise this war will go on forever”; that Crimea (which was transferred from the Russian to the Ukrainian Soviet republics in 1954 by Soviet decree) “was never really part of Ukraine”; and that the pro-Russian population of Crimea would be a perpetual internal problem for Ukraine. According to an opinion survey conducted last July, 58 percent of the Ukrainians who responded said Crimea must return to Ukraine—a majority but not a huge one.

There was one striking difference between the two positions on Crimea and a negotiated peace with Russia. The people with whom I spoke who stated that the return of Crimea to Ukraine was essential and nonnegotiable mostly spoke on the record. Not one of the advocates of compromise was willing to do so.

As a former dissident from the Soviet days (and leading supporter of the 2004 Orange Revolution) told me:

“Certainly, a great many people do believe that we have to fight on indefinitely to reconquer Crimea, irrespective of losses; but at heart, most sensible people know that it is not possible. The problem is that it has become almost impossible to say this in public without losing your job and perhaps worse. You know that under the Soviet Union people were afraid to say what they thought. Well, I have to say that a similar situation exists in Ukraine today. This is due to the anger and hatred in the population caused by the Russian invasion but also to repression by the state. Anyone who advocates compromise with Russia is immediately publicly branded a traitor and targeted by the SBU [the Ukrainian security service], no matter if they have always supported Ukrainian freedom and independence.”

As in most recent wars, this public atmosphere is greatly reinforced by state control of television, which since the suppression of allegedly pro-Russian channels has become almost absolute as far as news and analysis are concerned. Voices on television now speak overwhelmingly in support of the government line (or perhaps, the previous government line) that the return of Crimea and the eastern Donbas is nonnegotiable. This is backed up by pressure on the print media. As a journalist in the city of Dnipro told me, “The biggest problem is the atmosphere of censorship. Nobody gives a direct order, but everyone knows that if you write certain things, you will have bad problems, from your employers and the security services. So discussion now takes place only within very narrow limits.”

As Ukrainian analyst Volodymyr Ishchenko has stated, the result is a “spiral of silence” in which views held by many in private are wholly absent in public.

Whether the planned Ukrainian offensive succeeds and brings Ukrainian forces to the border of Crimea or fails and leads to an ongoing stalemate, Ukraine is likely to face increasing calls from Western governments for some form of provisional territorial compromise with Russia, coupled with the threat of a reduction of Western aid—and Sybiha’s statement suggests that some Ukrainian officials at least understand this very well.

But as in so many wars, state propaganda aimed at motivating the population to fight has helped create what one Ukrainian analyst called a “Frankenstein’s monster” for itself when it comes to compromise with Russia, a public mood that it helped create but now cannot control. Oleksiy Danilov, the secretary of the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council, has stated: “If Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky proposes peace talks between Kyiv and Moscow, he will commit political suicide”—which is no doubt why Zelensky himself has not yet said anything about Sybiha’s remarks. All the Ukrainian analysts with whom I spoke agreed that only intense public pressure from Washington could allow Zelensky to agree to a territorial compromise—even if Zelensky himself felt compelled to respond to the pressure in public with bitter protest.

By Shira Silkoff, The Jerusalem Post, 4/11/23

The Kyiv City Council may be set to name a street after a Nazi collaborator and SS official, the director of the Ukrainian Jewish Committee, Eduard Dolinsky has reported.

According to Dolinsky, a street in the Ukrainian capital will be renamed following a motion passed by the city council, and will bear the name of Volodymyr Kubiyovych, who during the Holocaust was heavily involved in the formation of the Waffen-SS Galizien, a Nazi military force made up of Ukrainian volunteers.

Speaking to The Jerusalem Post, Dolinsky explained that a historical expert commission within the Kyiv City Council had put forward several options for the renaming of what is currently Przhevalsky Street in Kyiv.

The names suggested by the historical commission were then put forward by the city council for a public vote on the Kyiv Digital app, where voting will remain open until April 16.

The option to rename the street after Volodymyr Kubiyovych has so far received a majority, with 31% of the vote, with the second and third highest options receiving just 18% and 10% respectively.

Once the public vote is closed, the Kyiv City Council will then vote to approve renaming the street after Kubiyovych.

Who was Volodymyr Kubiyovych?

Prior to the start of the Holocaust, Kubiyovych was a strong supporter of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-M) and in April 1941, he requested the creation of an autonomous state within Ukraine in which Poles and Jews would not be allowed to live.

Later in the war, in 1943, Kubiyovych took on a key role in the formation of the Waffen-SS Galizien and publicly announced his willingness to take up arms and fight for the Nazi cause.

After the Red Army approached Poland in 1944, Kubiyovych fled to Germany, and then France after the Nazi surrender. In France, he served as the editor-in-chief of the Encyclopedia of Ukrainian Studies, the largest academic project taken on by Ukrainian expats during the Cold War.

The Encyclopedia of Ukrainian Studies was reflective of Kubiyovych’s nationalistic views and was intended to preserve Ukraine’s heritage under Soviet rule.

Kubiyovych’s airbrushed legacy

Today, the encyclopedia exists online, both in its native language and in English and is still frequently updated with articles focusing on Ukrainian heritage and culture.

The Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine avoids mentioning Kubiyovych’s Nazi past, instead focusing on his work pre and post-World War Two, saying only that: “During the Second World War he headed the Ukrainian Central Committee (UCC) in Cracow and in 1943 took part in organizing the Division Galizien.”

Kubiyovych died in Paris in 1985, and to this day is recognized by many as a prominent and important Ukrainian scholar, and his works continue to be widely circulated, despite his Nazi past.

Should a road in Kyiv indeed be named after him, it will not be the first time that Ukraine has chosen to honor Kubiyovych. In 2000, a pre-stamped envelope was issued by the Ukrainian postal service in honor of the 100th anniversary of his birth, and in the Ukrainian city of Lviv, a plaque honoring the Nazi official still stands to this day.

By Ivan Timofeev, RT, 4/5/23

Ivan Timofeev is the Valdai Club Programme Director & one of Russia’s leading foreign policy experts.

Long before relations between Russia and the West spiralled into a comprehensive political crisis, officials and experts here were enthusiastically voicing ideas about developing ties with the rest of the world. At the administrative level, such a course began to take shape as early as the 1990s, starting from the views of former Foreign Minister Evgeny Primakov. Subsequently, it also received practical development within the framework of a multi-vector foreign policy.

The gradual growth of contradictions with the West accelerated the formation of ‘pivot to the East’ ideas, although their implementation was slow. It was limited by objective infrastructural and economic conditions, as well as the absence of a direct and painful incentive for such a ‘turn’. However, the current crisis in relations between Russia and the West, for all its appearances, is irreversible, and has driven an increase in the number and quality of ties with countries which are outside the control of the US. The ‘sanctions tsunami’ and the impasse in relations with the West have become a very sharp stimulus for long overdue changes. At the same time, a number of difficulties and obstacles await us on our way to the ‘world majority’. Moscow must assess them realistically and objectively, and we must avoid the illusion that the pivot itself will solve all our problems. We have hard and painstaking work ahead, for decades to come.

The development of Russia’s relations with the non-Western world is likely to take into account several interrelated tasks. The first is the formation of centres of power which are relatively independent from the United States and its allies, with a high degree of political agency. These do not have to be consolidated into a single political project. There may be some contradictions between them. However, their independence in making fundamental decisions in the areas of security and development is the essential feature that unites them. Russia itself is unlikely to be able to cement and consolidate them alone. However, it exemplifies the very possibility of challenging the political West on fundamental issues. Not everyone is ready to follow the same path, but the very fact of its presence is an event which has a global dimension.

While avoiding imposing ideological conditions, Russia has nevertheless managed to create a significant precedent. That is why the suppression of the ‘Russian rebellion’ is a matter of principle for the West. The victory of Moscow – in any form – will mean the consolidation of the precedent, which means that the fight against the West will become uncompromising. The stakes are extremely high.

The second task is to create reliable opportunities for modernisation through interaction with the non-Western world. Here, success is far from guaranteed. The ‘world majority’ is closely embedded in Western-centric globalisation, although the existing system has its own problems.

One of the most obvious is the West’s growing use of its central position in global networks as a political tool. Politicisation is taking place on a broad front, from global finance and supply chains, to the media and universities. So far, the system is outwardly stable, but the number of dissatisfied voices is growing. If Russia manages to build a workable economic model that is not fundamentally connected to Western financial institutions or supply chains, the precedent will be very serious. Previously, such precedents have been associated with countries that are called ‘rogue states’. Despite the costs for them and their citizens, countries such as North Korea and Iran have managed to maintain their agency and build functional economic models. These are distorted by sanctions and restrictions. However, they still exist and develop. The emergence of such an alternative in a large and well-resourced power will significantly change the current state of affairs. In addition, China, as a major player, is very cautiously following the same path. While maintaining beneficial global ties and not forcing a confrontation with the US, Beijing is gradually building an economic system that is resistant to the external contour. Russia’s course is beneficial there because the Chinese get a partner in building their own economic system, protected from the influence of competitors and rivals. At the same time, Beijing is hardly interested in revolutionary breakthroughs that would make it lose control of the situation.

The third task is to ensure security vis-à-vis the West. The conflict has drastically undermined Russia’s security. On our Western borders, we are dealing with a powerful, technologically advanced and consolidated bloc. Its military strength will grow and it will be positioned to oppose Moscow. The military situation in Ukraine will determine the further dynamics of threats. The prospect of an open military clash between Russia and NATO is becoming quite real. Preventing such a scenario has already become a key military-political priority, in which the military rather than the diplomatic factors play the leading role. The prerequisites for a peaceful solution to the conflict are not yet visible. If we assume a peace agreement or a ceasefire will eventually happen, then the problem of the stability of such a deal will arise. Our disastrous experience with Minsk-2 has shown that it can become a cover for the next phase of the conflict, as some Western European leaders have directly confirmed. The countries of the Euro-Atlantic region will remain a direct military-political threat.

Does this situation mean the severing of all ties with the West and a painless restructuring? No. Russia’s links with its Western neighbours have been accumulating for centuries. Even such a powerful crisis like today’s cannot cut them overnight. Within the West itself, there is both an ideological and a purely material stratification. Behind the facade of general political slogans lies an extremely heterogeneous political and mental space. It bizarrely combines postmodernism and ultra-liberalism with conservatism and traditionalism. Moreover, the latter does not determine the proximity of positions to Russia. For example, Poland is one of the most conservative countries in Europe. However, conservatism in itself does not create the political prerequisites for rapprochement with Russia.

It is impossible to count on the proximity of cultures, values, and mentality as a prerequisite for political rapprochement. On the other hand, the very existence of such connections will continue to provide Russia and various Western countries with similar coordinates and human ties, no matter how distant political relations may be. To remain human even in the face of confrontation, to maintain cultural, humanitarian, and, ultimately, family ties amid hostility, hatred, and political confrontation, is a much more difficult, but nonetheless very important task.

In our relations with the ‘world majority’, there is no similar cultural commonality. However, this does not prevent the establishment of pragmatic relations. Does it mean that the cultural distance will remain significant forever? No. It will be necessary to build up our cultural competencies in working with a wide variety of non-Western countries. The civilisational diversity is amazing here. Russia has unique schools of Sinology, Arabic studies, Indology, and many other areas. Unfortunately, though, these institutional advantages are extremely limited when it comes to meeting the tasks of a full-fledged turn to the East. It is normal for us to speak European languages, we have absorbed European literature, and we more or less understand a person of European culture, with all the diversity of the West. At the same time, we know very little about the literature, culture, and mentalities of countries which remain friendly. For a complete turnaround, we will need dozens of schools like the Institute of Asian and African Countries at Lomonosov Moscow State University, not to mention language teachers. Without such competencies, working in the depths of Chinese, Indian, and many other societies will be extremely difficult, if not impossible.

At the same time, we will have to take into account the fact that the countries of the world majority which are friendly to us have their own national interests. They are unlikely to sacrifice them simply for the sake of friendship with Russia. Every time, we will face a set of requirements and requests that will, ultimately, not be beneficial to Moscow. Many non-Western countries maintain close relations with the West. A considerable number of them still benefit from Western-centric globalisation, even if this gain is inertial in some cases. Moreover, many use a modernising process according to the Western model, preserving their cultural identity, and if possible, political sovereignty, but do not hesitate to use Western standards in the fields of economics, production, management, education, science, technology, etc.

When establishing and maintaining ties with friendly countries, Russia may well find itself in a situation in which certain Western models will again come to Russia through the East, just as the ideas of Aristotle came to medieval Europe through Arab intellectuals. It will be difficult for Russia to make a choice between the West and the non-West, simply because such a choice is impossible in practice. Rather, Russia will have to engage with a variety of cultures and ways of life.        

We may have to listen more than we talk and learn more than teach. What lies ahead is a time of patience, endurance, and sometimes humility, in the face of hardship, without which it will be difficult to survive a new historical epoch.