All posts by natyliesb

Big Serge: Russo-Ukrainian War: Leak Biopsy

By Big Serge, Substack, 4/10/23

Author’s Note: I had been intending to publish an article on Soviet operational art this week, but the emergence of the leaks diverted my attention and led to this article instead. We’ll return to military history shortly.

Another winter has ended, and spring has again arisen on the war in Ukraine. Amid the thaw and attendant mud, Russian forces – including the indominable Wagner Group – have pushed the Ukrainian grouping in Bakhmut to the brink, with the AFU now clinging its last defensive toehold in the city. Bakhmut has become the largest battle of the 21st century, and is now entering its climactic phase.

Nevertheless, battlefield developments have been upstaged to some extent by the apparent leak of classified US military intelligence documents which provide a sweeping view into the inner workings of the Pentagon’s war.

I am not entirely clear on Substack’s content policies as it relates to such documents. It is certainly too late for the US Government to contain the leak, as the images have by this point been shared, screenshotted, and downloaded countless times, but that does not preclude an attempt to limit its circulation via a whac-a-mole campaign of content deletion. In any case, desiring neither to violate US law nor run afoul of Substack’s content rules, prudence dictates that I ought not embed the images directly in this post, but they are not hard to find – the “Rus Fleet” Telegram channel has them up at the moment, for example. Use your own discretion.

While I will not be posting the leaked documents either here or on twitter, I would like to talk about them. If they are indeed authentic (and it appears that they are), they offer important insight into force generation and combat power in Ukraine – and perhaps even more importantly, into the intelligence framework that the Pentagon is working with. None of the items adduced paint a particularly rosy picture for either the AFU or its benefactors on the Atlantic seaboard.

A Brief History of the Leaks

Let’s briefly indulge in an overview of the leaked documents as such before we think about their contents. They take the form of photographs of physical pieces of paper from an American intelligence briefing. This implies that the particular nature of the breach is a leak (personnel with legitimate access to the documents illegally disseminating them to the public) rather than a hack (someone gaining illegitimate access through intrusion of one form or another). The pages have visible creases on them, and a hunting magazine can be seen on a table in the background. Many of the pages are marked for sharing with NATO allies, but some stipulate US eyes only.

The general impression is that an American folded the briefing documents up, put them in his/her/their/xer/xem/plur pocket (the American military is a Diverse and Inclusive institution, and the leaker could have any, all, or no gender), took the pages home and photographed them. It was almost certainly not a Russian asset – if the documents had been acquired by Russian intelligence, they would have kept it internal.

Now, the obvious question is whether the documents are real. There’s probably at least some rational basis to suspect a misinformation operation. All militaries engage in a range of intermingling intelligence (seeing what the enemy is doing), counterintelligence (hiding what you are doing), and misinformation (lying about what you are doing). Perhaps, one may muse, these documents were not leaked at all, but indelibly planted on the internet to mislead.

I was originally rather agnostic about the documents’ authenticity, but I have come to the view that they are genuine (let’s rate it a 90% likelihood of authenticity and a 10% likelihood of forgery or misinformation). My reasons are essentially as follows:

-The timeline of events suggests an authentic leak. While the documents only started to circulate widely in the last week or so, they were actually first posted to the internet (as best as I can tell) on March 1st – but nobody noticed, apparently. The documents didn’t attract mass attention until a pro-Russian telegram channel found them and reposted them after badly photoshopping the casualty estimates to show much lower Russian losses. Ironically, it was these falsified edits that sparked mass interest in the documents. To me, this suggests that the documents are not part of some sort of Pentagon misinformation campaign, because they essentially sat idle in the remote corners of a Minecraft Discord server for an entire month. If American intelligence wanted to circulate fake documents, one suspects they would have actually circulated them, rather than dropping them in an obscure corner of the information space and leaving them to languish.

-The documents have perfect internal consistency. The full leak includes dozens and dozens of pages which are totally consistent down to the level of delivery dates, inventory listings, and arcane unit identification. This goes even above and beyond the perfect use of acronyms and military symbiology. Creating these documents would be a colossal undertaking and would require both precise subject matter expertise and a mammoth amount of cross-referencing to prevent contradictions – unless, of course, the documents are genuine, in which case the material would be consistent because it is real.

-The documents are relatively low on actionable intelligence. They contain no planning details of Ukraine’s coming offensive operations and only hazy outlines of Ukrainian force dispositions. A ruse intended to deceive the Russians would be expected to contain highly actionable (but false) intelligence.

-Finally, both the government and the media are proceeding as if the documents and the associated security breach are real, and they are attempting to both limit the spread of the documents online and track down the source of the leak.

All of this to me suggests that these documents offer a genuine look into the Pentagon’s handling of the war. We can retain some measure of caution and doubt, but let us proceed on the presumption of their authenticity and think on what we can learn from them.

Ukrainian Force Generation

The most significant implication of the documents is simple: Ukraine’s combat power is significantly degraded, and in particular their mechanized units and artillery forces are in very rough shape.

The relevant material here in particular is a page entitled “US Allied & Partner UAF Combat Power Build”, which details the force generation, training, and equipment tranches that will create the mechanized package which Ukraine will use in its spring offensive. The plan calls for a force of twelve nominal brigades, nine of which will be equipped by NATO and three internally generated by the Ukrainians. The leak does not offer insight into the three Ukrainian brigades, but the intended complement of the nine NATO brigades is meticulously listed).

All told, the combat power build calls for these brigades to field a total of 253 tanks, 381 Infantry Fighting Vehicles, 480 Armored Personnel Carriers, and 147 artillery pieces. This implies that these will be brigades in name only, and will in fact be far understrength. Parceling these systems out across nine brigades will give an average strength of a mere 28 tanks per brigade, along with some 95 IFVs/APCs and 16 artillery tubes. Compare this to a US Army Armored Brigade Combat Team, which would have almost 90 tanks and almost 200 IFVs/APCs. An American Stryker Brigade (a lighter, rapidly deployable formation) would have about 300 Strykers – the Ukrainian 82nd Brigade is listed to receive only 90.

In combat power terms, therefore, these new brigades are going to be far understrength. Their tank strength, far from being full brigade level, amounts to less than an American armored battalion.

Another key aspect of the force build document is the training schedules. This document dates from the beginning of March, at which point five of the nine brigades were listed at “Training 0% Complete”. Only one of the brigades was more than halfway trained, rated at 60% complete. Despite this, six out of nine were scheduled to be ready by the end of March and the remainders by the end of April. This can only be achieved with significantly truncated training times, and these are detailed in the document. Leopard tank training, for example, is listed at only six weeks. Just for context, American tankers can pencil in 22 weeks of training for the Abrams.

The overall picture, therefore, is rather foreboding for Ukraine. The leaked documents do not give us insight into the three brigades that Ukraine is expected to generate with their indigenous assets, but the nine NATO trained and equipped brigades are slated to be significantly understrength and manned by personnel who are receiving a hugely accelerated training course. These brigades will almost certainly need to be deployed in groupings to be capable of the requisite combat tasks.

An ancillary but important note at this point is the fact that, as best we can tell from these documents, Ukraine’s prewar tank park is almost completely gone. Ukraine went to war with about 800 of its workhorse T-64, but the NATO combat power build notes only 43 now on hand. There are others, of course, that are currently being operated by Ukrainian frontline units, but the build plan indicates that Ukraine has virtually none in reserve to equip this vital attack package, on which all their hopes will depend.

Meanwhile, a separate element of the leak paints a similarly dismal picture of Ukraine’s ranged fires. Buried on a page marked “NOFORN” – which means No Foreign Nationals, even allies, are supposed to see it, is a logistics table showing 155mm shell deliveries and expenditures. This bit is rather shocking.

We have known for quite some time that Ukraine is facing a critical shell shortage, but the leaked documents reveal just how acute this issue is. Ukraine’s usage rate is very low right now – the report claims only 1,104 shells had been expended in the previous 24 hours – compare this to the 20,000 or so shells that the Russian army is firing on a daily basis. Even more alarming for Ukraine is the note that they have only 9,788 shells on hand.

Even with a low burn rate that leaves the AFU massively outgunned, they have enough on hand to sustain combat for a little over a week, and they rely on a trickle of deliveries from the USA to keep these stocks stable. The report noted a shipment of 1,840 shells departing in the next 24 hours. Batches of this size are obviously insufficient for Ukraine to build up its stocks, and can only serve to backstop and replenish daily expenditure. There is no possibility of America quickly ramping up the size of these deliveries, because a mere 14,000 shells are produced per month. US officials hope to get this number up to 20,000 this year, but this is still below Ukraine’s current burn rate.

The implication is pretty straightforward. Ukraine is on a shell ration that leaves it unable to offer more than token fire, and it will likely have to live with this shell ration for the duration of the war.

The overall picture of Ukrainian combat power is atrocious. Their overall combat effectiveness faces a hard ceiling due to systemic shell shortages, and the mechanized package slated for the spring offensive is going to be far less potent than advertised. Those nine NATO-created brigades will have the striking power equivalent of (if we are being generous) perhaps four genuine full strength brigades, augmented by three internally generated Ukrainian brigades of dubious quality. Ukraine’s hopes for a glorious assault on the Russian land bridge to Crimea will rest on, at most, 400 tanks and perhaps 30,000 men.

Should this force dash itself to pieces against the well prepared Russian forces in the south, an important question would present itself. If this was the best force that NATO could generate for Ukraine, what will the second team look like? Will there even be another force? This understrength and undertrained mechanized package may be Ukraine’s last serious roll of the iron dice.

The American Analytic Framework

While the leaked documents certainly do not paint an encouraging picture of Ukraine’s force generation, they also offer a similarly shocking glimpse into the state of American military intelligence.

One of the things that immediately jumps out when one looks at the operational reports (the pages showing detailed situation maps) is that the Pentagon apparently has far more information on Russian dispositions than on Ukrainians units. Russian units are strongly accounted for – their locations are precisely marked, unit designations are identified, there are assessments as to which Russian units are combat capable or not, and there are very specific estimates of Russian frontline strength (IE, 23,250 men on the Zaporizhzhia axis and 15,650 men on the Kherson axis).

In contrast, Ukrainian units are not given combat capability designations, their locations are more generally indicated, and there are huge ranges on the assessed manpower (10,000 to 20,000 men on the Donetsk axis – an enormous margin of error!) This, incidentally, is another reason why I think the documents are genuine. If the intent was to put forth disinformation to confuse or deceive the Russians, one would expect actionable (but fake) intelligence about Ukrainian deployments – yet there is no such thing here. Ukrainian strengths and dispositions are presented vaguely and inconclusively, so the only thing the Russian army might extrapolate from this report is that the Americans don’t really know what’s going on with Ukrainian forces.

Indeed, this is the inescapable conclusion. The Pentagon does not seem to have a strong sense of Ukrainian unit strength, location, or activities. They also list their assessed Ukrainian KIA at a mere 16k-17.5k. This is an absurdly low number – where could they have gotten it? In fact, it is a direct copy-paste of the casualty numbers reported publicly by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

The fact that the Pentagon does not seem to have any independently generated intelligence about the Ukrainian army is shocking. They seem to have be relying on Ukrainian propaganda numbers and publicly available deployments data, like the open source Deployment Map. For the record, this is not a knock on the Deployment Map site – I use this resource frequently and find it very useful. The point, of course, is that the Pentagon, with its nearly unlimited resources, does not seem to have any unique insight or intelligence streams of its own in this regard. They gesture vaguely at the map and mutter, “there’s probably a brigade or two in this area, maybe 8,000 men. Or 4,000. We don’t really know.” In fact, all of their axis strength assessments for Ukraine have a 100% margin of error (that is, the upper limit of the range is double the lower limit).

One can only conclude that the tail is wagging the dog. The Ukrainians are able to extract material, training, and cash from the west, but there is little accountability or honest information flow in return. There were hints of this earlier in the war – that Ukraine is a sort of black box which sucks in resources but does not communicate honestly in return; American officials have complained (and Ukrainian leaders have confirmed) that Kiev simply does not tell DC all that much. Apparently this remains an issue well over a year into the conflict. One particularly alarming footnote in the leaked documents states:

“We have low confidence in Russian (RUS) And Ukrainian (UKR) attrition rates and inventories because of information gaps, OPSEC and IO efforts, and potential bias in UKR information sharing.”

Good grief.

One other issue is the Pentagon’s estimate of Russian vehicle losses. It seems that here too they are copy-pasting external estimates. In this case, they appear to be using the “documented” vehicle losses from the Oryx project. Oryx is… interesting. In theory, they are tabulating visually documented equipment losses, which sounds very scientific and hard to dispute. Furthermore, the sheer mass of pictures they have accumulated is something of a verification deterrent – nobody really wants to sort through thousands of pictures and keep score.

However, Oryx has been audited and found wanting. There are a variety of issues that cause them to overcount Russian losses, in some cases drastically. These include double counting (multiple pictures of the same vehicle), wrongly identifying Ukrainian vehicles as Russian losses, counting as lost vehicles that have no apparent damage, accepting images that have obviously been photoshopped, and so on. In one particularly egregious case, a picture of a Ukrainian Msta howitzer had its crew photoshopped out and was marked as destroyed Russian artillery piece. I mean, look at this:

According to Oryx this is a destroyed Russian howitzer, and not a very badly photoshopped Ukrainian gun. Please ignore the conspicuous shadow.

The issue is essentially that Oryx gathers data passively, by having people on social media send them pictures, which they then look at and mark as verified losses. Social media, however, has a pro-Ukrainian bias which leads to a flood of allegedly destroyed Russian vehicles coming in, and Oryx seems to have a weak filter that uncritically verifies almost all of these claims. As a result, Russian losses are drastically overcounted, and Ukrainian losses are undercounted.

Okay, so what? Let Oryx run their little counting project, no harm done – right? Apparently not. The Pentagon’s leaked documents claim 6,000 assessed vehicle losses as of March 1, which lines up with Oryx’s claims (now up to 6,486 destroyed vehicles as of April 10). This is a strong data point confirming suspicions that the American Defense Department is increasingly outsourcing intelligence to OSINT (Open Source Intelligence). It is fairly clear at this point that there is an incestuous amplification between OSINT and the American defense and political establishment. When Oryx counts absurd photoshop hack jobs as destroyed Russian hardware, this becomes a meaningful data point feeding the Pentagon’s battlefield assessments.

It would seem that, much like in the case of Ukrainian force generation and losses, the Pentagon simply does not have any sort of robust or meaningful insight of its own. There would seem to be no independent intelligence streams at work here – only a mindless regurgitation of Ukrainian MOD propaganda numbers and dubious open source projects like Oryx. The American military increasingly seems to be a hollowed out simulacrum of its past glories, decaying behind a façade of shiny machines and bloated budgets – a trillion dollar technobureaucratic jobs program coasting on the residual patriotic fumes of red state American boys.

It has long been apparent that the Kiev regime has no real plan, no firm path to victory, and only a tenuous and unfriendly relationship with reality. Far more terrifying is the thought that the Pentagon is much the same.

Air Defense at the Brink

One last major revelation from the leak is the greatly degraded state of Ukrainian air defense. Very simply, Ukraine is quickly running out of munitions, especially for its critical S-300 and BUK systems, and it can only endure two or three more wave strikes before breaking completely.

Air defense systems can be complicated to talk about for people who aren’t familiar with the nomenclature. This is because there are a large number of different systems required for a modern air defense, which must be “layered” with different systems that intercept targets at various altitudes, phases of flight, and trajectories. The conversation can quickly become even more muddled because the launch systems have both a Russian designation and a NATO designation, and their munitions have different designations still – just for example, the air defense system which the Russians call the S-300 is designated the SA-10 by NATO, and it fires a variety of different interceptor missiles which have their own names, like the 9M83. Multiply this by the many different types of air defense systems currently in use in Ukraine, and you can see how it can easily decay into a morass of acronyms and serial numbers.

In any case, the key thing to understand about air defense systems is the layering aspect – if one node in the layer fails, not only does one lose full spectrum coverage, but the burn rate on the remaining systems increases because they are now bearing an undue load. Ukraine is now almost completely out of interceptors for the S-300 and BUK systems, which comprise almost all of its medium to long range defense. At the current burn rate, they are projected to run out by the first week of May and have had to make hard choices about where and what to defend. There is no prospect of acquiring more interceptors for these systems because they are manufactured in Russia.

To backstop these capabilities, NATO has been rushing its own systems to Ukraine and providing crash course training. What is notable, however, is that NATO is opting to send Ukraine new systems. Germany, for example, sent Ukraine four brand new IRIS-T systems in October. This was a cutting edge weapon in its first run out of the factory. The downside, of course, is that because it is new, there are no deep stockpiles of munitions from past production runs to call on – therefore, surprise surprise, the leaked Pentagon documents claim that Ukraine is already out of IRIS-T interceptors.

The leak furthermore revealed that Ukraine will be outfitted with two newer NATO systems – the American-made Patriot PAC-3 and the Aster 30-SAMP/T (I apologize for this horridly long designation, but I didn’t name the blasted thing) which is a joint Italian-French creation.

Here’s the issue. The US Department of Defense only purchases 230 PAC-3 interceptors per year, and the new procurement schedule does not ramp this number up at all. The Aster system is just now coming online, and Italy and France have contracted to have 700 missiles delivered in the coming years.

What all of this means is fairly straightforward: the Pentagon’s plan to shore up Ukrainian air defense will force NATO to dip into its own stocks very soon, and we will see the artillery situation repeated with air defense interceptors. There simply is no surplus or large scale production to tap into to supply Ukraine; they can only be propped up by directly eating away NATO’s own stocks. All of this occurs at the same time the Russian Air Force is becoming more and more assertive, using new glide bomb conversion kits to deliver colossal FAB bombs from safe distances.

Conclusion: Asleep at the Wheel

At first glance, the worst thing about this remarkable leak is the fact that it happened. This is a bewildering and embarrassing breach; an American citizen seems to have simply walked out with highly classified documents, which were then permitted to sit on a Minecraft Discord server for a month without anyone being the wiser. One must wonder how, and perhaps even more importantly why someone would do this.

Yet the leak as an act of subterfuge or treason is less significant than what the documents show. They show a conspicuous lack of alertness or long-range planning on the part of the Pentagon. American leadership seemingly has to contend with Ukraine as a black hole which sucks in money and munitions and gives nothing back; there is no strong sense of Ukrainian frontline strength, losses, or planning, and the Pentagon seems to lack any sort of independent intelligence streams.

Meanwhile, the material situation in Ukraine is degrading rapidly. Their artillery arm is running on fumes, with a miniscule shell ration and no reserve stocks to speak of, fed by a trickle of deliveries from the USA. Air defense is similarly worn thin, and the plan to repair this crucial umbrella threatens to quickly become vampiric and drain NATO interceptor stocks. The entire strategic logic of Ukraine has reversed. Rather than becoming a cheap way to drain the Russian military, NATO finds itself drawing down its own stocks to prop up the hemorrhaging Ukrainian state, with no clear endgame in sight. The proxy has become a parasite.

There does not seem to be any long term plan to sustain Ukraine’s war. The Pentagon’s procurement plans do not indicate any real intent to ramp up production of key systems. For FY2024, they have ordered a modest 5,016 GMLRS – the missiles launched by the famous HIMARS system. Ukraine has already fired nearly 10,000 GMLRS, making this yet another system where Ukrainian expenditures vastly exceed supply.

To salvage the situation, Kiev must place its hopes on one desperate dice roll with a mechanized attack package comprised of half-strength brigades wielding a disparate inventory of different vehicles and systems. This Frankenstein’s monster of armies – sewn together with a bevy of different tanks, IFVs, APCs, and artillery systems drawn from all corners of the NATO alliance, will likely be asked to smash through the heavily fortified and robustly manned Russian lines in the south, where it will be pulverized and become only so much more mulch for the Pontic Steppe.

Russia Revises its Foreign Policy Concept

Kremlin website, 3/31/23

The President held, via videoconference, a briefing session with permanent members of the Security Council to discuss the updated version of the Russian Federation Foreign Policy Concept and other current issues.

Taking part in the meeting were Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matviyenko, State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev, Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office Anton Vaino, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, Director of the Federal Security Service Alexander Bortnikov, Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service Sergei Naryshkin, and Special Presidential Representative for Environmental Protection, Ecology and Transport Sergei Ivanov.

President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Good afternoon, colleagues.

We will begin our meeting today with a discussion on the Concept of the Russian Federation Foreign Policy.

Radical changes in international affairs have forced us to seriously revise our main documents on strategic planning, including the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, which sets out the principles, tasks and priorities of our diplomacy.

The Foreign Ministry, working together with the Presidential Executive Office, the Security Council Staff, the Government and many ministries and departments, has completed a large-scale and meticulous job to update and adjust the concept to modern geopolitical realities.

Today I have signed an Executive Order approving the updated Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation.

I would like Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to report on its key provisions.

Mr Lavrov, go ahead, please.

Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov: Thank you.

Mr President, colleagues,

Mr President, as you said, this is a strategic planning document drafted by our Ministry in conjunction with other federal executive bodies. It builds on foreign policy provisions that are included in the National Security Strategy approved by you in 2021.

The concept shows a high degree of continuity with the previous version of 2016 in terms of the fundamental principles underlying our foreign policy, primarily its independence and focus on creating favourable external conditions for Russia’s progressive development, ensuring its security and improving the well-being of our citizens.

Mr President, you said earlier that the logic of the document reflects the changing geopolitical reality, in fact, revolutionary advances in the international sphere which have received a sizable boost with the start of the special military operation.

In particular, the unprecedented level of international tension over the past decade is a fact of life. The existential nature of threats to our country’s security and development that are being created by unfriendly states has been recognised. The document designates the United States as the main originator and vehicle of the anti-Russian policy. Overall, the policy of the West that is aimed at the all-out degrading of Russia is described as a new type of hybrid war.

A description of the key long-term international development trends is provided, including the crisis of economic globalisation, which until recently was following the American rules.

The fact that the global economy is undergoing a major structural overhaul on its way to a new technological basis is among the factors. The redistribution of growth potential in favour of new centres of growth is leading to the creation of a multipolar world order, which is the key trend in current international relations.

In the Concept, we presented our vision of the principles of a more balanced and fairer world order, such as polycentricity, sovereign equality of countries, ensuring their right to choose development models and upholding the cultural and civilisational diversity of the world. Assistance in establishing a multipolar world order is defined as a framework task for all areas of foreign policy.

It emphasises the need to ensure the rule of law in international relations and declares that the progressive development of international law must consider the realities of today’s world. In the face of acute external threats, our readiness to observe the principle of indivisible security is reaffirmed, but only in relation to those countries and their associations that show reciprocity in this matter.

The approach to work at the UN focuses on increasing the effectiveness of this organisation and reaffirming its fundamental goals and the principles of its Charter, which the West is trying to undermine with its practical actions.

Important innovations are envisaged in the conditions for the use of force in self-defence as part of unconditional adherence to the relevant requirements of Article 51 of the UN Charter.

The Concept provides for the possibility of taking symmetrical and asymmetrical measures in response to unfriendly actions against Russia.

There is a paragraph on the use of the Armed Forces to repel or prevent an armed attack on Russia and its allies. Thus, we unequivocally declare that we will defend the right of the Russian people to existence and free development.

The Concept elaborates on provisions that affect the protection of Russian traditional spiritual and moral values, and the building of cooperation based on a single spiritual and moral compass, common to all world religions.

It absolutely rejects neocolonial practices and any kind of hegemonism.

The unconditional priorities include ensuring the rights of our people and organisations abroad, providing support to compatriots, countering Russophobia, strengthening the position of the Russian language in the world, fighting for historical truth, protecting our culture, depoliticising sports, and establishing new forms of sports cooperation.

The regional section of the Concept places an emphasis on Russia’s strategic interests in the context of deepening Eurasian integration based on the Union State of Russia and Belarus, the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, the CIS, the formation of a greater Eurasian partnership, and the further strengthening of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS.

The policy on unlocking the potential of strategic partnership with our great neighbours – the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of India, the countries of the Islamic world, as well as countries of ASEAN, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean – has been enshrined as a vital resource.

The commitment to a peaceful solution to all issues that may arise in the Arctic region has been confirmed.

The Concept provisions state that unfriendly states’ anti-Russian moves will be consistently and, if need be, firmly stopped.

The idea that we are not isolating ourselves from the Anglo-Saxon countries and continental Europe and do not have hostile intentions towards them has been clearly conveyed. However, they must realise that pragmatic interaction with Russia is possible only if they realise the futility of a confrontational policy and refuse to pursue this kind of policy in their practical actions. It will be up to us to decide to what extent the West is ready to follow these recommendations.

Overall, Mr President, we have a difficult job ahead of us to implement our foreign policy in fundamentally new circumstances. We will spare no diplomatic effort to accomplish what we set out to achieve in close coordination with other agencies and will report to you regularly on progress based on the Executive Order that you signed on possible additional steps in individual areas.

Thank you.

Vladimir Putin: Thank you.

I think the above Concept serves as a robust doctrinal basis for further activities in the international arena.

In practical terms, I would like to ask our colleagues who engage in implementing the single foreign policy to pay special attention to expanding ties with our constructively-minded partners and to creating the conditions for unfriendly states to abandon their hostile policies towards our country.

Importantly, our long-term planning should include the entire array of factors and trends in international relations, enhance Russia’s sovereignty and increase our country’s role in addressing global issues and shaping a fairer multipolar world order.

Without a doubt, the Foreign Ministry should, in a collaborative effort with other agencies, play a coordinating role in implementing the Concept.

In closing, I would like to thank everyone who was directly involved in drafting the Concept. What we got in the end is a balanced document that will underlie our practical actions in the medium and longer term.

Thank you very much.

Let’s move on to the next issue.

The Grayzone: Inside a Russian youth camp condemned by the ICC

Link here.

“In this Grayzone exclusive, reporter Jeremy Loffredo visits the Donbas Express, a musical instruction camp for youth from the war torn regions of Donetsk and Lugansk, and reveals the reality of a program described by State Department-funded researchers who inspired the ICC arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin as a “re-education” camp.”

By Jeremy Loffredo and Max Blumenthal, The Grayzone, 3/31/23

  • The International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin, accusing him of the “unlawful deportation” of Ukrainian children to a network of camps inside Russia. The warrant was based on a report by the Yale HRL center, which is funded by the US State Department.
  • US journalist Jeremy Loffredo visited one of Russian government-sponsored camps in question. At The Donbas Express, located just outside of Moscow, Loffredo met youth from war-torn regions who were flourishing thanks to free music instruction, and grateful to be in a secure environment. This article features his exclusive video report.
  • A Grayzone review of the Yale HRL report found the paper’s content contradicted many claims contained in the ICC warrant. It also undercut incendiary statements its director, Nathaniel Raymond, issued during media appearances.
  • In an interview with Loffredo, Yale HRL’s Raymond further contradicted allegations he made in a CNN interview about a massive “hostage situation” underway in Russia, acknowledging that most of the camps he researched were “teddy bear”-like cultural programs. He also disclosed his collaboration with US intelligence.

Read the full article here.

Amanda Yee: Six war mongering think tanks and the military contractors that fund them

crop man counting dollar banknotes
Photo by Karolina Grabowska on Pexels.com

By Amanda Yee, Liberation News, 3/7/23

From producing reports and analysis for U.S. policy-makers, to enlisting representatives to write op-eds in corporate media, to providing talking heads for corporate media to interview and give quotes, think tanks play a fundamental role in shaping both U.S. foreign policy and public perception around that foreign policy. Leaders at top think tanks like the Atlantic Council and Hudson Institute have even been called upon to set focus priorities for the House Intelligence Committee. However, one look at the funding sources of the most influential think tanks reveals whose interests they really serve: that of the U.S. military and its defense contractors.

This ecosystem of overlapping networks of government institutions, think tanks, and defense contractors is where U.S. foreign policy is derived, and a revolving door exists among these three sectors. For example, before Biden-appointed head of the Pentagon Lloyd Austin took his current position, he sat on the Board of Directors at Raytheon. Before Austin’s appointment, current defense policy advisor Michèle Flournoy was also in the running for the position. Flournoy sat on the board of Booz Allen Hamilton, another major Pentagon defense contractor. These same defense contractors also work together with think tanks like the Center for Strategic and International Studies to organize conferences attended by national security officials. On top of all this, since the end of the Cold War, intelligence analysis by the CIA and NSA has increasingly been contracted out to these same defense companies like BAE Systems and Lockheed Martin, among others — a major conflict of interest. In other words, these corporations are in the position to produce intelligence reports which raise the alarm on U.S. “enemy” nations so they can sell more military equipment!

And of course these are the same defense companies that donate hundreds of thousands of dollars each year to think tanks. Given all this, is it any wonder the U.S. government is simultaneously flooding billions of dollars of weaponry into an unwinnable proxy war in Ukraine while escalating a Cold War into a potential military confrontation with China?

The funding to these policy institutes steers the U.S. foreign policy agenda. To give you a scope of how these contributions determine national security priorities, listed below are six of some of the most influential foreign policy think tanks, along with how much in contributions they’ve received from “defense” companies in the last year.

All funding information for these policy institutes was gathered from the most recent annual report that was available online. Also note that this list is compiled from those that make this information publicly available — many think tanks, such as the hawkish American Enterprise Institute, do not release donation sources publicly.

1 – Center for Strategic and International Studies

According to their 2020 annual report

$500,000+: Northrop Grumman Corporation

$200,000-$499,999: General Atomics (energy and defense corporation that manufactures Predator drones for the CIA), Lockheed Martin, SAIC (provides information technology services to U.S. military)

$100,000-$199,999: Bechtel, Boeing, Cummins (provides engines and generators for military equipment), General Dynamics, Hitachi (provides defense technology), Hanwha Group (South Korean aerospace and defense company), Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc. (largest military shipbuilding company in the United States), Mitsubishi Corporation, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (provides intelligence and information technology services to U.S. military), Qualcomm, Inc. (semiconductor company that produces microchips for the U.S. military), Raytheon, Samsung (provides security technology to the U.S. military), SK Group (defense technology company)

$65,000-$99,999: Hyundai Motor (produces weapons systems), Oracle

$35,000-$64,999: BAE Systems

2 – Center for a New American Security

From fiscal year 2021-2022

$500,000+: Northrop Grumman Corporation

$250,000-$499,999: Lockheed Martin

$100,000-$249,000: Huntington Ingalls Industries, Neal Blue (Chairman and CEO of General Atomics), Qualcomm, Inc., Raytheon, Boeing

$50,000-$99,000: BAE Systems, Booz Allen Hamilton, Intel Corporation (provides aerospace and defense technology), Elbit Systems of America (aerospace and defense company), General Dynamics, Palantir Technologies

3 – Hudson Institute

According to their 2021 annual report

$100,000+: General Atomics, Linden Blue (co-owner and Vice Chairman of General Atomics), Neal Blue, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman

$50,000-$99,000: BAE Systems, Boeing, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries

4 – Atlantic Council

According to their 2021 annual report

$250,000-$499,000: Airbus, Neal Blue, SAAB (provides defense equipment)

$100,000-$249,000: Lockheed Martin, Raytheon

$50,000-$99,000: SAIC

5 – International Institute for Strategic Studies

Based in London. From fiscal year 2021-2022

£100,000+: Airbus, BAE Systems, Boeing, General Atomics, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Rolls Royce (provides military airplane engines)

£25,000-£99,999: Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems, Northrop Grumman Corporation

6 – Australian Strategic Policy Institute

Note: ASPI has been one of the primary purveyors of the “Uyghur genocide” narrative

From their 2021-2022 annual report

$186,800: Thales Australia (aerospace and defense corporation)

$100,181: Boeing Australia

$75,927: Lockheed Martin

$20,000: Omni Executive (aerospace and defense corporation)

$27,272: SAAB Australia

Gilbert Doctorow: Journalist Pavel Zarubin’s interview with Vladimir Putin, 25 March 2023

By Gilbert Doctorow, Blog, 3/26/23

I normally pay very little attention to Russian television journalist Pavel Zarubin, who is best known as the co-host of a Sunday evening program called Moscow, Kremlin, Putin, which is broadcast in between two of the best known weekend shows on Rossiya 1, News of the Week with chief of all news programming Dmitry Kiselyov and Evening with Vladimir Solovyov, a political talk show that in the past I have often cited as an indicator of views held by Kremlin elites.

In general, my attention span for the two lead programs has suffered greatly in recent weeks. Kiselyov has extended his program to over two hours. It is simply too long and unfocused. Moreover, the war coverage, particularly the coverage of the material damage and injuries caused by Ukrainian artillery and rocket strikes on Donetsk city and nearby settlements, is painful to watch and very repetitive week after week. No one in the West cares at all about these Ukrainian inflicted atrocities, while for the Russian audience this raises embarrassing questions as to why, after more than a year of war, the Russian Army has been unable to destroy the Ukrainian positions within firing range of the capital of the Donetsk Republic.

 As for Solovyov, he has become insufferable because of the way he bullies some of the very respectable experts who are his panelists. I think in particular of his hectoring one dean of international affairs at Moscow State University, an expert on the USA, whom he interrupts and loudly contradicts, not letting him finish a sentence. Meanwhile, Solovyov is very deferential to others of his guests, most notably RT editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan and Mosfilm general manager Karen Shakhnazarov. Solovyov is perpetuating the worst traditions of Russian talk shows, which were always a blood sport, though in the past it was foreign guests, from Ukraine or Poland or the USA, who took the fist on their chins. Solovyov should be taken off the air and his place should be ceded to the hosts of Sixty Minutes, who are more informative and more civilized. Many of the panelists on both shows are the same; indeed being a television panelist is probably a major source of income for these experts and would explain why they agree to suffer indignities on air.

As for Zarubin, I have systematically skipped his programs because he regularly plays the clown, telling the audience with a smirk that he will take us all behind the closed doors of the Kremlin to see how the President does his job. It is patently obvious that the substantive content of what goes on in the Kremlin is kept under seven seals and that Zarubin will present only useless tidbits, such as how Putin knots his tie or enjoys his breakfast. These crumbs from the table can only serve a personality cult, which I thought Putin had better judgment to discourage.

Be that as it may, today Rossiya 1 has broadcast a self-standing twenty-six minute interview that Zarubin conducted with Putin yesterday. Lo and behold, we see that this journalist can perform as a real professional when it suits him and his paymaster. His questions to Putin are important and obviously were reviewed with Vladimir Vladimirovich before they went before cameras because the answers have been meticulously prepared.

https://smotrim.ru/video/2586445

There is much here that our political and military leaders in the West would do well to study.

In what follows, I will first provide an abbreviated transcript of the interview in which I summarize the essence of the questions and answers. The translation is, of course, my own.

Second, I will point to one mainstream newspaper and a couple of television broadcasters who have presented to their audiences a commentary on an item of particular interest in this interview.

Finally, I will offer my own analysis of what is especially newsworthy in the interview.

                                                                      *****

Question: The West keeps saying it is supplying weapons to Kiev in response to what they call Russian aggression and to prepare Ukraine for a counter-attack. What is your evaluation of the military supplies being sent to Ukraine by Europe and NATO: the tanks, the one million artillery shells; and what about their plans to send fighter jets? Does this pose a real threat to Russia?

A: Of course, these present a threat to Russia. But let’s look in detail. One million shells for Ukraine. Is that a lot or little? Of course, it is a lot. But, in the leading NATO country, in the USA, according to the data we have, they have monthly production of 14,000-15,000 artillery shells. Meanwhile the Armed Forces of Ukraine are using up to 5,000 shells every 24 hours. Next year, in the USA they plan to produce 42,000 per month; and in 2025, 75,000. Still, in this year it is 15,000. As for us, the military industry of Russia produces much more. I don’t want to comment on the intentions of the Western suppliers. But here in Russia the military industry is expanding at a very fast rate, much faster than the West expected. So in the period during which the West supplies to Ukraine 1 million shells, we will produce more than three times as many. The Western supplies are an attempt to draw out the conflict. They are planning to send to Kiev 460 tanks, but here too the same story as with artillery shells. Russia will in this time produce 1,600 new and modernized tanks. The total number of tanks which Russia has will be more than 3 times what the Ukrainian army will have. I don’t talk about planes, because there the difference is several orders of magnitude. The result of the new shipments of arms to Kiev will only be to prolong the fighting, which is what they want, but as for outcomes they just exacerbate the tragedy.

Q : Guns or butter?

A: In the USA and in some NATO countries this will be the choice they face, but here in Russia we have budgeted to cover all of our preexisting infrastructure development, civilian residential construction, healthcare, education – we are not cutting back on anything. We have organized our economy so that there is no excessive militarization.

Q: the Ministry of Defense has announced they will supply to Kiev artillery shells with depleted uranium. Then in your meeting with Xi you said that in response Russia is considering sending tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus. Then the British insisted there is no danger in the depleted uranium munitions, they leave no radioactive traces.

A: That is not the case at all. These artillery shells are, of course, not weapons of mass destruction. But they do create radioactive dust and in this connection they belong to the category of most dangerous weapons. Experts agree that after use of these weapons in Yugoslavia, in Iraq the incidence of cancer in the civilian population rose many times over. And if we look at the use of these in Ukraine, where the residents are supposedly considered to be their own, they will nonetheless be exposed to these agents, and that will have an impact on the soil in the areas where they are used. So these weapons are very dangerous not only for combatants but also for the environment and for ordinary people living in these territories. Russia has the means to respond to this. We have literally hundreds of thousands of such artillery shells. Up to now, we have not used them.

As regards my talks with Alexander Grigor’evich Lukashenko, the decision to send tactical nuclear weapons there was prompted by the announcement from Britain on depleted uranium artillery shells. But without any reference to this latest development, he has long requested that we provide to Belarus tactical nuclear weapons. There is nothing unusual about this. The USA has done precisely the same for decades, supplying such weapons to its allies, NATO members: Turkey, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy and Greece. And so we decided to do exactly the same, without violating in any way our obligations under the Non-ProliferationTreaty. We have helped the Belarus colleagues to reequip their jets to carry these tactical weapons. We have given over to Belarus our very effective missiles Iskander, which can also be a delivery vehicle. On 3 April we will start training the flight crews. And on 1 July we will complete the construction of a special storage base for these weapons.

Q: In your meeting with Chinese President Xi you announced that Russia will be trading in Yuan not only with China but with other countries. In the West, this was seen as an attack on the global status of the dollar. Are you doing that?

A: No. It is not true that we are attacking the dollar. We would use the dollar, but they do not let us have them. So we have to settle accounts in a currency that is acceptable to our business partners, and the Yuan is one such acceptable currency, all the more so as it is used by the IMF. They [the USA] themselves sawed away the branch on which they were sitting. By restricting the use of dollars on the basis of momentary considerations of a political nature, they have done harm to themselves. The fact that they froze our gold and currency reserves: the whole world was watching and thought about this, about just how reliable their American partner is. And they all came to the same conclusion: America is not reliable. And so we are pleased to agree with our commercial partners to trade in Yuan. The oil exporting countries in the Middle East also have said they want to settle accounts in Yuan. So we will gradually extend this, extend the use of all currencies that are reliable. Yes, we understand the present-day advantages of the dollar. There are limitations on all the currencies we use today, not only the Yuan. But all countries are interested in strengthening their national currency and all countries will move in this direction. So, without a doubt, this was a great mistake on the part of the American authorities.

Q: On the first day, we in the press pool were waiting outside the Kremlin for you and Xi to come out. It grew dark and only at 9 pm you emerged, after more than 4 hours together. What did you talk about for so long on that first day?

A: First we had a working supper. Then I invited Xi to come to my rooms in the Kremlin. Recently I have been spending time and spending nights in this Kremlin apartment. So we moved there and sitting next to the fireplace, we drank tea and talked about everything without being in a rush. We talked about the situation in world affairs, in their most varied aspects. The Chinese Chairman devoted a good deal of attention to the positive elements in the Chinese peace plan for Ukraine. By the way, it was at this time that we learned about the EU plans to send one million artillery shells to Ukraine. And the next day, as we were standing before the press we learned about the British plan to send depleted uranium shells to Kiev. It is as if this was done especially to interrupt our agreement. And so we see on one side the aggressive intentions of the West and on the other the peaceful resolution promoted by China. During these four hours we discussed Russian-Chinese relations in all aspects, above all in the economic sphere. China and Russia can complement one another. For China this is first of all with respect to hydrocarbons. China needs a reliable supplier and we can assure that. Since import from the dollar zone is closed to us, we don’t have any particular need for dollars.

We spoke a lot about economic cooperation and with the Chinese we will combine our efforts in technological areas, where each of us has well developed competitiveness in world markets.

The Chairman of the PRC is a very interesting talking partner. He is deeply immersed in international affairs, in the economy, in his own country and others including ours. He was well prepared. It is interesting to talk to him. I think we each got a lot of satisfaction out of this.

Q: Denmark has found an unidentified object near one of the gas pipelines and invited Gazprom to take part in investigation. Are we certain there will be a real investigation of the destruction of Nord Stream?

A: It will be difficult, very difficult to conduct a real investigation, though in the end what happened will be known. However, an American journalist who has become quite well known now in the world conducted an investigation and came to the conclusion that the explosion of the Nord Stream pipelines was organized by American intelligence agencies. I completely agree with such conclusions.

What has just happened with respect to Denmark:  Gazprom found that 30 km from where the explosions took place, at a connection point of pipes, another vulnerable location, there is an unidentified object. This was photographed by our people who suppose it is an antenna for initiating an explosion. We informed the Danish authorities and asked to investigate this object together with other international experts in the supposition that maybe some more explosives are in the area which for some reason were not detonated. We were told that our participation was not necessary. Then we eventually got a diplomatic note from them that they studied the object, that it is not explosive. They could have added that “it is no longer explosive.” But at any rate there will not be further explosions.

They have invited the Nord Stream consortium to come and see, but not invited Russian specialists. However, there would not be any benefit for us now to be present.  To be sure, our intention was not to find material to expose anyone but to ensure that there will be no further explosions.

Q: There have been massive demonstrations in France over the raising of the pension age. How do you view this considering that we also raised the pension age in Russia?

A: Firstly that is their internal affair in France. But of course we understand that many countries carry out reforms of this nature. It is hard to think of a country in our modern day world where this is not done given that life expectancy is rising everywhere and the number of pensioners is growing.

But there is a big difference between what we did in Russia and how they have proceeded in France. Firstly, we retained the five-year difference in the pension age of women and men. In France there is no such distinction. Second, we set a long time period for the transition – 10 years. This significantly relieves the burden on citizens. And finally, most importantly, we preserved all the privileges of taking retirement early. But in France, as far as I know, they did not do this. They liquidated all such privileges. Citizens of France saw this as excessively tough and unjust, because various forms of labor require different approaches to the question of going on pension.

                                                              *****

Out of all the material in the interview, one item was picked up by the world press: Putin’s announcement of the transfer of tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus. On Euronews and BBC, we heard from retired NATO generals that this would give the Russians no practical advantages and would not affect the West’s readiness to respond to nuclear threats. By contrast, The Financial Times published a lengthy article that contained a lot of material which an objective reader could use to understand why the transfer was decided precisely now, though in its presentation by FT muddled cause and effect, as is very common in the propaganda texts that pass for journalism these days. We read the following:

The Russian president’s comments [on the placement of nuclear weapons in Belarus] came only days after he signed a joint statement with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in which Moscow and Beijing declared: ‘All nuclear powers must not deploy nuclear weapons beyond their national territories and must remove all nuclear weapons they have deployed beyond their borders.’

The FT is presenting this decision as a violation of Putin’s high sounding principles. They intentionally overlook the logic that Putin is preparing the way for eventual pull-back of these weapons by all parties in some future negotiations with the U.S. That is to say, Putin has just bought his own poker chips.

We saw from the interview that Zarubin considered the decision on Belarus as Russia’s asymmetric response to the announcement by the UK Defense Ministry about sending depleted uranium artillery shells to Kiev. Putin seemed to concur on that explanation.

However, we need not take every word from Putin at face value. Stationing the weapons in Belarus puts them just at the border with Lithuania, with Poland, whereas the American nuclear weapons are stationed several hundred kilometers to the West. This puts Lithuania and Poland under immediate nuclear threat because of decisions taken by the USA together with Germany, Belgium and The Netherlands. This could open up fissures in the Alliance.

And quite separately, on the News of the Week program this evening one analyst explained that Russia’s response to the British use of special depleted uranium shells would be to use their own wolframite filled shells, which have armor-piercing functionality similar to depleted uranium but are not radioactive. If indeed, the British will be providing the depleted uranium shells only for use in the fourteen Challenger 2 tanks they are sending to Ukraine, then the decision on weapons to Belarus would seem to be disproportionate.

Otherwise, the interview is particularly interesting for Putin’s remarks on the use of Yuan for trade with third countries, which can promote a mighty shift against the dollar in the Collective South.

I have included Putin’s comments on the flaws of the pension reform in France that have contributed to the rage of so many French demonstrators and may yet bring down the Fifth Republic. It is curious to see this kind of substantive analysis coming from Moscow when we read not a word about it in our Belgian or UK newspapers.