Russia’s state RIA news agency said on Sunday it had calculated that the West stood to lose assets and investments worth at least $288 billion if it confiscated frozen Russian assets to help rebuild Ukraine and Moscow then retaliated.
After President Vladimir Putin sent forces into Ukraine in February 2022, the U.S. and its allies prohibited transactions with Russia’s central bank and finance ministry, blocking around $300 billion of sovereign Russian assets in the West.
U.S. and British officials have worked in recent months to jumpstart efforts to confiscate Russian assets immobilized in Belgium and other European cities in order to help reconstruction in Ukraine, parts of which lie in ruins.
They hope Group of Seven leaders will agree to issue a stronger statement of intent when they meet in late February, around the second anniversary of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, three sources told Reuters on Dec. 28.
Russia has accused Washington of trying to strong-arm countries in Europe, where most of the Russian assets are, into signing up to similar measures, and the Kremlin has said that Moscow has a list of U.S., European and other assets that would be confiscated if Western countries press ahead.
RIA cited data which it said showed that direct investment by the European Union, the G7 nations, Australia and Switzerland in the Russian economy at the end of 2022 totalled $288 billion.
It said EU nations held $223.3 billion of the assets, of which $98.3 billion was formally held by Cyprus, $50.1 billion by the Netherlands and $17.3 billion by Germany.
It said the top five European investors in the Russian economy also included France with assets and investments worth $16.6 billion and Italy with $12.9 billion.
Among the G7 countries, it named Britain as one of the largest investors, citing data at the end of 2021 which showed British assets in Russia were worth about $18.9 billion.
It said the United States had $9.6 billion worth of Russian assets at the end of 2022, Japan $4.6 billion and Canada $2.9 billion.
Switzerland and Norway, which RIA said usually signed up to anti-Russian measures, had $28.5 billion and $139 million respectively at the end of 2022, it said, while data showed Australia had $683 million invested at the end of last year.
Eve Ottenberg is a novelist and a journalist who has published articles in The New York Times, Vanity Fair, The Washington Post, The American Prospect, The Nation, CounterPunch and other publications.
Ukraine and the UK announced a security agreement Jan. 12, the first of its kind and one that Kyiv hopes puts it on a glide path into NATO.
British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak also increased military funding for Ukraine by 200 million pounds to 2.5 billion pounds in 2024-2025. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called the deal an “unprecedented security agreement.” This seeming hyperbole is accurate. It is the first bilateral security pact involving Ukraine forged since the Russian invasion in 2022.
However, he then slipped into speculation, tweeting “If the UK and other countries had provided such a level of guarantees after 1991, there would have been no Russian aggression at all.”
Maybe. If such pacts had accelerated Ukraine’s entrance into NATO, before Russia recovered from its 1990s collapse, the 2022 invasion might never have occurred. However, all evidence from 2008 onward is that Moscow implacably opposed Ukraine joining NATO. If the West had moved in the 1990s to extend security guarantees to Ukraine, it is equally likely that Russia would have intervened much earlier — and if Russia was much weaker in the 1990s, so too was Ukraine.
Elements of the new UK-Ukraine security pact, like intensified intelligence sharing, have already made Moscow suspicious that the West intends to end-run a possible NATO membership, that is, to supply Ukraine with actual NATO soldiers. Indeed, the pact’s announcement drew a swift response from Kremlin hard-liner Dmitry Medvedev — no stranger to hyperbole himself — accusing London of planning just that, and threatening a nuclear response.
So what does this bode for the war’s future? Nothing good. It is not that the UK on its own can guarantee anything to Ukraine, let alone sufficient military aid to maintain Ukraine’s defense. (The British army now has only around 150 main battle tanks and in 2022 Britain’s production of artillery shells for the entire year was less than the number expended by Ukraine in a three-day period at the height of the counteroffensive. Contracts inked in 2023 to ramp up will take an estimated two years to fulfill.)
Rather, this British move will create yet another impediment to the opening of peace talks, both by increasing Russian distrust and by strengthening opponents of talks elsewhere in Europe.
The Kremlin’s goal of keeping Ukraine out of NATO has been consistent since peace talks collapsed in spring of 2022, and this latest British assault can only serve to slow Russian willingness to end combat and talk. Indeed, there’s little evidence right now that Moscow intends to cease fighting; this new security deal only makes things worse. As Anatol Lieven of the Quincy Institute tells me in an email, “Although as far as London is concerned much of this agreement is just the usual British play-acting as a great power, it could have serious consequences in the real world.”
In short, it’s a provocation. The British announcement comes at an especially bad time, too, amid reports that the Biden administration wants to start moving toward a negotiated settlement to end the war. This security pact ensures that no such settlement will be forthcoming soon. Because if it sketches out the West’s general refusal to contemplate a neutral Ukraine, it’s hard to see Moscow backing off.
Indeed, on Jan. 15, came news of the “Moldova Highway” between Ukraine and Romania. According to reports this highway will greatly speed the time needed to transfer U.S. weapons and equipment to Ukraine.
In addition to the security agreement funds, this pact promises “swift and sustained” help for Kyiv, if Moscow attacks again. It also advocates Ukraine’s future NATO membership, provides “comprehensive assistance to Ukraine for the protection and the restoration of its territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders,” including the maritime zone, rebuilding the economy, protecting citizens, preventing and deterring Russian military escalation, and support for Ukraine’s European integration, according to the agreement’s text.
Key elements are intelligence sharing, military and medical training, cyber security, and defense industrial cooperation. The UK’s commitment to provide thousands of military drones, “the largest ever,” according to Sunak’s office, doubtless also did little to advance peace negotiations.
In the context of President Joe Biden’s remarks two weeks ago about a “U.S.-Russia direct war” — and his earlier claim to congressional Republicans that if they failed to fund Ukraine, American and Russian soldiers would fight each other, in other words, World War III would erupt with all its dreadful nuclear implications — one might well conclude that Washington plans to follow London along the escalatory route.
“The stakes of this fight extend far beyond Ukraine,” Biden recently said, “and affect the security of both NATO and Europe.” That is an open question. There is little evidence that Moscow intends to invade other neighbors, though fears are often whipped up by the media and carelessly chattering politicians, only impeding the necessary shift toward diplomacy.
However, given the failure of Ukraine’s counteroffensive, and Russia’s slow, steady forward movement all along the line of contact, the U.S. has indicated an interest in talks in recent months. This is the wiser of the two courses currently, albeit schizophrenically, being signaled from inside the Beltway. Ukraine is running out of manpower, and European military cupboards are bare, since almost everything was shipped to Ukraine and destroyed by Russia, while Moscow’s wartime industrial base has expanded. Meanwhile, NATO is out of ammo. Talks now would likely secure a better deal for Ukraine than they would in six months or a year.
“It is now obvious to all that the Ukrainian summer counteroffensive failed. Meanwhile, as Russian military supplies have been ramping up, Ukrainian supplies have been dwindling,” notes Nicolai Petro, University of Rhode Island professor of comparative and international politics, in an interview. “This inevitably sets the stage for a potential Russian counteroffensive.”
But recognizing that requires a depth of Western realism for which there is so far little evidence. If Russia is the victor – and that is the path events currently follow – the Kremlin will dictate the terms. And Moscow has long made clear that it must talk with Washington, not just Kyiv. Time to salvage any aspect of this fiasco for the West is running out. New aggressive security pacts just make it run out faster.
Mark Curtis is the editor of Declassified UK, and the author of five books and many articles on UK foreign policy.
UK will provide “equipment across land, air and sea” in any future Russian attack
British arms firms have sent £437m worth of equipment to Ukraine since Russia’s invasion
A new agreement signed by Rishi Sunak and Ukrainian President Volodymr Zelensky on 12 January provides UK “security commitments” to Ukraine in the event of “new aggression” by Moscow.
It states: “In the event of future Russian armed attack against Ukraine, at the request of either of the Participants, the Participants will consult within 24 hours to determine measures needed to counter or deter the aggression”.
It then says the UK “undertakes” to “provide Ukraine with swift and sustained security assistance, modern military equipment across all domains as necessary.”
Strikingly, the text also encourages Ukraine to “provide effective military assistance” to Britain in the event of an attack on the UK – similar to Nato’s mutual defence pledge – although it does not make this a formal commitment for Kyiv.
Zelensky used the words “security guarantees” or “guarantees” when describing the agreement at a press conference in Kyiv following its signing.
Sunak has tended to use the phrase “security assurances”. The text does not refer to “guarantees” but to “security commitments”.
Assurances
Some commentators say such “commitments” are toothless and do not provide a hard defence guarantee. They compare them to the 1994 Budapest Memorandum when Ukraine agreed to give up its Soviet nuclear arsenal in exchange for “security assurances” which never materialised.
Neither has the agreement yet been ratified by either country’s parliament, meaning its legal position is uncertain.
Perhaps most importantly, the accord does not explicitly commit Britain to despatching military forces to Ukraine by providing boots on the ground. However, a risk is that it could embroil the UK in any future war with Russia.
Describing the agreement in parliament, Sunak stated that “if Russia ever invades Ukraine again, we will provide swift and sustained assistance, including modern equipment across land, air and sea. Together with our allies, the UK will be there from the first moment until the last.”
The accord is a further step towards Nato membership for Ukraine. It increases UK military cooperation with Kyiv intending “to deepen Ukraine’s interoperability with Nato”, “accelerate Ukraine’s transition to Nato equipment and standards” and develop “a pathway to a future in Nato”.
The accord has arisen from Nato’s summit in Lithuania last July in which G7 states pledged to make a series of bilateral security agreements with Ukraine.
More arms
But the agreement goes beyond security commitments, and Britain’s arms exporters will likely be major beneficiaries.
In a section on “defence industry cooperation”, the text says the UK will work with arms companies and Ukraine to “identify opportunities for closer defence industrial partnerships and collaboration including for mutual commercial benefit”.
Britain “will encourage its defence industry to work with Ukraine” on “manufacturing of UK defence products” in the country.
The Ukraine war has been a boon for UK arms firms. Since Russia’s invasion in February 2022, they have exported £437m worth of military equipment to Ukraine – over 12 times more than they sold in the previous ten years.
Both Babcock and BAE, the UK’s largest arms exporter, have recently set up offices in Ukraine, positioning themselves to secure new deals.
BAE’s agreement with Ukraine will “ramp up the company’s support to Ukraine’s armed forces” and enable BAE “to work alongside” them “to… support its future force structure”.
Disinformation
A section in the text on “information security” notes that Britain will also help Ukraine counter Russian propaganda “globally” – or “support each other’s efforts to tell the truth well”, as the document quaintly puts it.
The two countries will work together “offering the world a truthful alternative to the Russian Federation’s disinformation campaigns” which will involve “closer collaboration of communications output”.
Britain’s Foreign Office is already spending millions on private “counter-disinformation” groups which tend to support UK government policy positions, such as over Ukraine.
Declassifiedfound before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that the British government ploughed at least £82.7m of public money into media projects in countries bordering or near Russia in the four years to 2021.
The UK government’s funding of the “counter-disinformation” industry looks more like an information operation in itself rather than a neutral effort to combat fake news.
Private sector
A further commitment is ensuring Ukraine promotes pro-Western economic policies through reforms and postwar reconstruction.
“Before this terrible war, Ukraine’s economy was becoming a huge investment opportunity,” then foreign minister Leo Docherty said at the Ukraine Recovery Conference hosted in London last June.
That conference urged “international businesses” to invest in Ukraine in its “ambitious reform agenda”, including “reducing the size of the government”, “privatization”, “deregulation” and “investment freedom”.
The new agreement reinforces these goals. Ukraine will have “a strong private sector-led economy… that is integrated into global markets”, the text states. This involves Kyiv fully implementing IMF reforms, promoting measures “to increase investor confidence” and “unlock private investment”.
In this, the UK will “support” activities in economic sectors such as energy, infrastructure and tech.
On Feb. 8, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy replaced Valerii Zaluzhnyi with Oleksandr Syrskyi as the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (ZSU). Zelenskyy outlined problems in the military that Syrskyi will need to address, including disparity between the overall number of military servicemen and the number of servicemen participating in actual combat. Zelenskyy also called for “a different approach to mobilization and recruitment,” two issues over which he has had disagreements with Syrskyi’s predecessor. In the first comments on priorities since his appointment, Syrskyi himself vowed to improve the rotation of troops at the frontlines and to focus on the “introduction of new technical solutions and the scaling of successful experience,” including drones, according Bloomberg. Syrskyi—who is seen as a close ally of Zelenskyy and is considered more accessible by some U.S. commanders than Zaluzhnyi was—has been credited with the successful defense of Kyiv in Spring 2022 and recapturing territory in the east and south in Fall 2022. However, his reputation among the Ukrainian servicemen is far from stellar, with some describing him as a “butcher” for his willingness to sacrifice soldiers during the defense of Bakhmut in 2022-2023.
In the past month, Russian forces have captured 64 square miles of Ukrainian territory, while Ukrainian forces have re-gained 0 square miles, according to the Feb. 6, 2024, issue of the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. This week, Russians have penetrated the eastern Ukrainian city of Avdiivka from the north and south in a development acknowledged by Ukrainian OSINT project DeepState. The Russians are also closing in around Kupyansk, a town in the Kharkiv region that Ukrainian forces retook in 2022, according to WSJ. Russian forces plan to retake more territory in that eastern region, having amassed more than 40,000 troops and hundreds of tanks and armored vehicles near Kupyansk for that purpose, according to NYT.
On Feb. 8, the Democratic-controlled Senate cleared a critical hurdle toward passing a $95 billion national security-focused bill aimed at fortifying Ukraine, Israel and other allies. Most of the proposal’s funding—about $60 billion—is intended to help Ukraine as it fights off Russia’s invasion. The vote was 67-32, clearing the 60-vote bar needed to advance most legislation in the chamber, according to WSJ. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D) has said that he would allow an amendment process, which is something Republican senators said they intend to engage in, suggesting to trim funds that pay public servants in Kyiv, according to WSJ. Of the $60 billion intended for Ukraine, nearly $8 billion is intended to provide direct budget support for Ukraine. The largest portion, $19.9 billion, would replenish inventory levels of Defense Department weaponry that were emptied to help Ukraine’s military, according to WSJ. However, even if the bill ultimately clears the Senate, it faces an even tougher road in the Republican-controlled House, according to WSJ. House Speaker Mike Johnson (R) has declined to say whether he would bring the Senate-passed national-security package onto the floor, but Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R) has already threatened to try to oust Johnson as speaker if he advances more money for Ukraine, according to WSJ.
If Congress doesn’t approve new funding for Ukraine, U.S. equipment won’t suddenly stop, but slowly expire, according to NYT. ”Ukraine could effectively hold for some part of this year” without more American military aid, Michael Kofman, an expert on the Russian military, told NYT. Western officials and experts predict it would be at least a couple months before the lack of renewed aid has a widespread impact, according to NYT. By next month, Ukraine could struggle to conduct local counterattacks, and by early summer, its military might have difficulty rebuffing Russian assaults, the officials and analysts said to this newspaper.
The year is 2028, and a new and highly infectious coronavirus has struck the sailors of the U.S. Pacific Fleet stationed in the South China Sea. As the world grapples with this emerging pandemic, confusion runs rampant among officials at the CIA, CDC, and DOD, who bicker over the most effective response strategies.
Meanwhile, China, seemingly immune to the novel virus, seizes the opportunity to launch a full-scale assault on Taiwan, capitalizing on the global chaos.
While the World Health Organization praises China’s successful social distancing measures, little do they know that the Chinese government had covertly vaccinated its military and essential workers under the guise of a standard COVID-19 booster campaign.
This scenario, initially conceived by Pentagon researchers, may sound like science fiction, but military strategists believe that a “coronavirus bioweapon” may lurk on the horizon. This possibility is one of several outlined in a new report sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The report “Plagues, Cyborgs, and Supersoldiers: The Human Domain of War Research” delves into how CRISPR gene-editing technology, mRNA vaccines, brain networking, and other technological advancements could unleash new forms of military conflict.
Released earlier this month and reported here for the first time, this provocative report, conducted within the Acquisition and Technology Policy Program of the RAND National Security Research Division, offers futuristic scenarios that military planners should consider.
“We see a complex, high-threat landscape emerging where future wars are fought with humans controlling hyper-sophisticated machines with their thoughts” and “synthetically generated, genomically targeted plagues” that cripple the American military-industrial base,” the report warns.
In another intriguing scenario, seemingly inspired by the decline of Sen. Dianne Feinstein, and this time set in a more distant future, the report suggests that elderly congressional leaders, desperate to retain power, secretly install state-of-the-art Brain-Computer Interface devices. These devices, commonly used among wealthy senior citizens in the scenario, initially help the senators regain mobility and speech after years of clear cognitive decline. However, when the brain implants malfunction, causing erratic and belligerent behavior, foreign allies begin to distance themselves from the U.S., damaging national security.
The report further highlights the potential hacking vulnerabilities associated with BCI implants, which, while promising for patients with neuromuscular impairments, could be exploited to inject fear, confusion, or anger.
Additionally, the authors caution against the possibility of government employees replacing their natural eye lenses with artificial ones containing tiny cameras connected to micro-storage devices. The small cameras could collect classified intelligence and leak it to foreign adversaries.
However, not all aspects of the report focus on vulnerabilities. In a section discussing human genomic editing, the researchers explore the potential for creating “supersoldiers” through genetic modifications that enhance physical and psychological capabilities. Despite their vulnerabilities, BCI devices could also serve as a means for commanders to communicate swiftly with their forces during military operations.
The report extensively analyzes the technological capabilities of both China and the U.S. in biotechnology and brain technology, highlighting the differences in focus and status between the two nations. It highlights previous reporting on Chinese research into “ethnic-specific genetic weapons” and “purported brain-control weaponry.”
Nevertheless, the report ventures into cultural observations, emphasizing that the U.S. values openness, diversity, and democratic principles. In the face of a more contagious and deadly pandemic, China’s ethnically homogenous and compliant population could give it an advantage in deploying vaccines swiftly. At the same time, authoritarian states might similarly brutally suppress “anti-vaccine populists” and enforce compliance. The report claims this could hinder the U.S. due to its more relaxed regulatory environment that values individual liberties, where such crackdowns and forced vaccinations are more difficult to deploy…
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