I can add this to the long wish list of items that people claim may be a “serious threat” to the Kremlin. – Natylie

The Bell Weekly, 9/12/22

This week’s fighting saw Ukraine’s armed forces inflict a major defeat on Russia, almost completely liberating the Kharkiv region. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian officials offered any significant information about the course of the offensive and, unsurprisingly, the gap was filled by bloggers and Telegram channels. Russian pro-war bloggers, who have become a leading source of objective information about the fighting, were not slow to criticize the Kremlin and the Defense Ministry to their audience of millions. We explain how this part of the media functions, and who is worth reading.

What’s going on?

The Ukrainian military’s sudden offensive in the Kharkiv region turned into Russia’s worst defeat in six months of war. In just four days, Ukrainian troops broke through the Russian lines and forced the Defense Ministry to withdraw forces from the entire region. Russia controlled a third of the district from the start of hostilities.

Ukraine’s Sept. 6-10 offensive was not just a major military reversal: for Moscow, it became a PR disaster. Up until Sept. 10, the Defense Ministry and official propaganda were absolutely silent about the battle in the Kharkiv region, even though it was obvious to anyone following the war through open-source information that Russian forces had big problems.

It wasn’t until Saturday afternoon that the ministry announced a “regrouping” of Russian forces from Kharkiv to the unrecognized Donetsk People’s Republic, in what it called an “increase of efforts in the Donetsk direction.” Leading Russian officials demonstratively ignored the military reversal. At the time, President Vladimir Putin was opening Europe’s largest observation wheel in Moscow, followed by a fireworks display to mark the city’s birthday. 

The behavior of both the Kremlin and the Defense Ministry is the latest disappointment for patriots and Russian nationalists, who have offered scathing criticism on some of the leading pro-war Telegram channels. Within the “fog of war,” patriotic Russian channels – many of which are run by people on the front lines or who have good sources in the Russian forces and are often unconcerned about military censorship – are almost the principal sources of information about the true state of affairs at the front.

Since February, these pro-war channels have emerged from the margins to form one of the most popular segments of Russian social media. The average audience for each of these channels is around 500-700,000. While they are all supportive of the war and “our guys,” they also often criticize the Defense Ministry and the Kremlin, accusing them of indecisiveness. They frequently call for an all-out war, full mobilization and even the use of tactical nuclear weapons. They do not simply regurgitate the Kremlin’s narrative. On Saturday, while propaganda channels were broadcasting pathetic accounts of how “Russian units are purposefully regrouping” and “the enemy is driving himself into a trap,” Russia’s “ultra-patriots” openly admitted defeat and offered objective reports of Ukrainian successes (accompanied, of course, by curses against Ukraine’s forces).

The growing popularity of nationalist channels cannot fail to alarm the Kremlin. Even before the Kharkiv offensive, renowned journalist Ekaterina Vinokurova cited a source in the presidential administration complaining of irritation with these so-called “angry patriots.” This was not limited to longtime Kremlin critics like Igor Strelkov (Girkin), but extended to “playful loyalists” such as the writer Zakhar Prilepin. “The main complaint about the ultra-patriots is their attempts to dictate their agenda and their view of the special operation to the Kremlin,” Vinokurova’s source said. The same source added that those ultra-patriots who enjoy direct influence are getting advice from above to scale back the pathos and the amount of reporting.

Which patriotic channels are worth following?

Ultra-patriotic, pro-war Telegram channels fall into several groups, each of which has its own distinctive nature. 

Anonymous channels: The best-known anonymous pro-war channel is Rybar (“The Fisherman”) with 770,000 followers. It is not known who is behind the channel, nor who funds it, but it regularly publishes criticism of the Defense Ministry and the Kremlin. Frequent updates and high-quality content make it clear that Rybar can call upon a large, capable team. This channel produces the most professionally created, quality campaign maps. During Ukraine’s offensive on Kharkiv it had the fastest and most objective information about the fighting.

• Reverse Side of the Medal (151,000 followers). This channel is connected with Wagner Group and thus has excellent sources at the front. On Aug. 30, Reverse Side of the Medal warned that Ukraine was readying an offensive in the Kharkiv region for which the Russian army was unprepared.
• Another channel linked to Russian private military companies, Grey Zone has 309,000 followers.

War correspondents: Accredited Russian journalists working in the combat zone. They all share an ultra-patriotic ideology, but face differing levels of military censorship depending on where they are based.

• Kotsnews. The Telegram channel of Alexander Kots, war correspondent for Russia’s leading tabloid Komsomolskaya Pravda. Like all other journalists, he is subject to censorship and is under indirect Kremlin control. He is the most active and objective of the war correspondents.
• Rossiya TV war correspondents Alexander Sladkov (871,000 followers) and Evgeny Poddubny (693,000). As reporters for the leading state TV channel, they have access to places on the front line that are out of reach for others, so they often publish exclusive footage. Their Telegram channels occasionally deviate from the official perspective on events.
• WarGonzo (1.08 million). Run by Semyon Pegov, a former war correspondent for the tabloid Life. The author is not the most reliable or objective analyst, but he has a knack for getting to places that other journalists can’t. For example, Pegov was the only journalist to get to Izyum when it was surrounded by Ukrainian forces on Sept. 10.

Bloggers connected with the Defense Ministry: Military bloggers without any official media accreditation, typically traveling with Russian forces and broadcasting a position close to the Ministry’s official line. They are often more outspoken than officials.

• Colonel Cassad (Boris Rozhin, 744,000 followers). Rozhin was one of the best-known Russian military bloggers even before the war. Believed to have a direct link with the Defense Ministry, his reports closely follow the official line but contain far more detail than official sources.
• Older than Edda (528,000). War blogger German Kulikovsky, little known outside of Telegram, has accompanied Russian forces in the Kharkiv region throughout the war. In the days leading up to the war, he was one of only a few bloggers who announced the “special operation” in advance.

Igor Strelkov and soldiers from the Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics (DNR and LNR): Igor Strelkov (Girkin) is a retired FSB colonel who actually started the war in Donbas: in 2014, with Russian help, he organized volunteer detachments that took Donetsk.For the soldiers of the breakaway republics, Strelkov is considered a great authority. He responded to the early days of the “special operation” with great enthusiasm, but returned to his searing criticism of the “indecisive” Kremlin and Defense Ministry after Russia’s first military setbacks. Strelkov publishes military reports derived from his sources in the breakaway republics and he often exaggerates the problems within the Russian army.

• Andrei Morozov (Murz), 11,700 followers. This channel isn’t hugely popular, but it is very interesting. The author is a notorious Moscow nationalist who has been serving in the LNR army since 2014. He knowledgeably writes about the combat zones in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions and on Russian forces’ supplies and equipment.
• Vladimir Grubnik (PriZrak Novorossii), 155,200 followers. An officer in the DNR’s army and organizer of one of the biggest volunteer funds in support of the breakaway republic. He writes about fighting in the Donetsk region.
• Alexander Khodakovsky, 400,000 followers. The current commander of the Vostok battalion, one of the most famous regiments in the DNR’s army. Compared with the other two, his channel is under closer control from Moscow.

Why the world should care

Russia’s pro-war nationalist bloggers are one of the main sources of information about the fighting in Ukraine (especially if you can filter out their bias). However, they are also one of the biggest media threats to the Kremlin. If Russia sustains more losses in Ukraine, these bloggers are likely to fuel even more right-wing resentment toward Moscow.

Gilbert Doctorow, Blog, 9/9/22

The UK and Commonwealth may be mourning the passing of Queen Elizabeth II yesterday. I am in mourning as well, but for a very different reason: the gathering of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group in the Ramstein air base in Germany yesterday reshuffled the deck on Western military and financial assistance to Ukraine, raising contributions to the ongoing holy crusade against Russia from still more nations and adding new, still more advanced precision strike weapons to the mix of deliveries to Kiev. It was an open summons to the Kremlin to escalate in turn, as were the test firing the same day of a new intercontinental rocket, the Minuteman III, from Vandenberg air base in California and the unannounced visit to Kiev yesterday of not only Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who was featured in Western media accounts, but also other top officials of the Biden administration. The most notorious member of this delegation was surely Blinken’s deputy, Victoria Nuland, who had stage managed the February 2014 coup that put in power in Kiev the Russia-hating regime that Zelensky now heads.

 The Russians may be compelled to take the bait due to the course of military action on the ground. As now becomes clear, they have just suffered some losses in very heavy ground and artillery fighting these past few days around Kharkov. The Ukrainian gains were facilitated by the advanced weaponry recently arrived from NATO countries, by the targeting data they are receiving from the U.S. and from off-stage tactical direction from NATO officers. By ‘take the bait,’ I mean the Russians may escalate to all out war on Ukraine. This question figured prominently in yesterday’s major news and political talk show programs of Russian state television. I will go into these matters in some detail below.

Regrettably, all of the foregoing also obliges me to revisit the critique I published a couple of weeks ago on the latest essay in Foreign Affairs magazine by John Mearsheimer. His overarching message on the dangers of our stumbling into a nuclear war is better substantiated by the latest developments, even though I believe that Mearsheimer failed to identify the several successive steps that lie ahead before we find ourselves in such a war. Mearsheimer oversimplified Russian options to deal with setbacks on the ground. This also will be a central issue in my narrative below. 

Finally, in this essay I will direct attention to the second dimension of the ongoing confrontation between Russia and the entire Collective West: the economic war being waged on the Russian Federation via sanctions, which now far outnumber those directed against any other country on earth. This war, as I will argue, is going well for the Russians. More importantly for us all, it is the sole area in which the peoples of Europe may have a say in putting an end to the mad policies being pursued by their national governments under the direct pressure of Washington.

                                                               *****

Over the past ten days, we have witnessed the start of the Ukrainian counter-offensive which was preceded by so much anticipation in Western media. A reversal of Russian fortunes in the war was predicted, leading to the stalemate or outright defeat for Russia which Mearsheimer and some other analysts in the US foreign policy community feared would trigger a nuclear response from the Kremlin.

In fact, the Ukrainian counter-offensive got off to a very bad start. It opened in the south, in the Kherson region. Kherson, which is predominantly Russian-speaking, was the first major Ukrainian city to fall to the Russians and it has strategic importance for ensuring Russian domination of the Black Sea littoral. However, first results of the Ukrainian attacks there were disastrous for the Ukrainian armed forces. It soon was obvious that they had deployed new recruits who had little or no military experience. The infantry attacked across open terrain where they were easily destroyed in vast numbers by the Russian defenders of Kherson. I have heard the figure of 5,000 Ukrainian casualties in the Kherson counter offensive.  Obviously the Russians were jubilant, though there were reports of some Ukrainian reservists being withdrawn from the field of action for redeployment elsewhere.

What followed was something the Russians evidently did not expect, namely a well prepared and implemented assault on their positions around the northeastern city of Kharkov, Ukraine’s second largest city. Kharkov was briefly surrounded by Russian forces at the start of the war, but was left in relative peace as the Russians refocused their strategy on taking the Donbas and avoiding major urban warfare except in one place, Mariupol. Exactly what the Russian game plan has been was recently explained in a remarkable paper published by a certain ‘Marinus’ in the Marine Corps Gazette. See https://www.imetatronink.com/2022/08/a-former-us-marine-corps-officers.html

A couple of days ago I picked up the following amidst the chatter of panelists on Evening with Vladimir Solovyov: “yes, we made some mistakes, but it is inevitable in a war that mistakes are made.” As from the latest news on the apparent loss of Balakliya and surrounding villages on the outskirts of Kharkov, we can see that the Ukrainian tactics were precisely those which Russia had been using so effectively against them from day one of the ‘special military operation,’ namely a feint in one war zone followed by all-out attack on a very different region. Of course, the ‘feint’ around Kherson, if that is what it was, entailed the cynical sacrifice of thousands of young and not so young Ukrainian foot soldiers. But the resultant distraction prevented the Russians from bringing up sufficient manpower to successfully defend their positions around Kharkov, which include the strategically important city of Izyum.

Izyum is close to the Russian-Ukrainian border southeast of Kharkov and is a major logistical base for munitions and weaponry that are sent onward to support the Donbas operation. The latest information on the Russian side appears to be that the Russians have now dispatched large numbers of reservists to this area to hold their positions. They also speak of intense artillery duels. We may well assume that both sides have experienced heavy loss of life. As yet, the outcome is unforeseeable. Meanwhile, Russian war correspondents on the ground in Donetsk insist that the Russian advance towards Slavyansk, in the center of the former Donetsk oblast, is continuing without pause, which suggests that the strikes on their munitions stores claimed by the Ukrainians have not been totally effective. If Slavyansk is taken in the coming few weeks, then Russia will quickly assume control of the entire territory of the Donbas.

In last night’s talk show program, host Vladimir Solovyov said that this latest push in the Ukrainian counter-offensive was timed to coincide with the gathering at the Ramstein air base, Germany of top officials from NATO and other allies under the direction of the visiting U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. If the Ukrainian efforts were failing in the field, then the cry would go up: we must provide them with more weapons and training. And if the Ukrainian efforts in the counter-offensive were succeeding, those in attendance at Ramstein would hear exactly the same appeal to aid Kiev.

Though Evening with Solovyov, on air from about 23.00 Moscow time, offered viewers some few minutes of video recordings from the opening of the Ramstein gathering, far more complete coverage was provided to Russian audiences a few hours earlier by the afternoon news show Sixty Minutes. Here, nearly half an hour on air was given over to lengthy excerpts from CNN and other U.S. and European mainstream television reporting about Ramstein. Host Yevgeni Popov read the Russian translation of the various Western news bulletins. His presentation clearly sought to dramatize the threat and to set off alarm bells.

For his part, Vladimir Solovyov went beyond presentation of the threat posed by the United States and its allies to analysis of Russia’s possible response. He spoke at length, and we may assume that what he was saying had the direct approval of the Kremlin, because his guests, who are further removed from Power than he is, were, for the most part, allowed only to talk blather, such as the critique by one panelist of a recent pro-Ukraine, anti-Russia article in The New York Review of Books by Yale professor Timothy Snyder, who counts for nothing in the big strategic issues Russia faces today.

So, what did Solovyov have to say? First, that Ramstein marked a new stage in the war, because of the more threatening nature of the weapons systems announced for delivery, such as missiles with accuracy of 1 to 2 meters when fired from distances of 20 or 30 kilometers thanks to their GPS-guided flight, in contrast to the laser-guided missiles delivered to Ukraine up till now. In the same category, there are weapons designed to destroy the Russians’ radar systems used for directing artillery fire. Second, that Ramstein marked the further expansion of the coalition or holy crusade waging war on Russia. Third, that in effect this is no longer a proxy war but a real direct war with NATO and should be prosecuted with appropriate mustering of all resources at home and abroad.

Said Solovyov, Russia should throw off constraints and destroy the Ukrainian dual use infrastructure which makes it possible to move Western weapons across the country to the front. The railway system, the bridges, the electricity generating stations all should become fair targets. Moreover, Kiev should no longer be spared missile strikes and destruction of the ministries and presidential apparatus responsible for prosecution of the war. I note that these ideas were aired on the Solovyov program more than a month ago but then disappeared from view while the Russians were making great gains on the ground. The latest setbacks and the new risks associated with the Western policies set out at Ramstein bring them to the surface again.

Solovyov also argued that Russia should now use in Ukraine its own most advanced weapons that have similar characteristics to what NATO is delivering to the other side. As a sub-point, Russia should consider neutralizing in one way or another the GPS guidance for U.S. weapons. Of course, if this means destroying or blinding the respective U.S. satellites, that would mean crossing a well-known U.S. red line or casus belli.

Next, in the new circumstances, Russia should abandon its go-it-alone policy and actively seek out complementary weapons systems from previously untouchable countries, such as Iran and North Korea. Procurements from both have till now been minimal. On this issue, a couple of panelists with military expertise were allowed to explain that both these countries have sophisticated and proven weapons that could greatly assist Russia’s war effort. Iran has unbeatable drones which carry hefty explosive charges and have proven their worth in operations that are unmentionable on public television. And North Korea has very effective tanks and highly portable field artillery which are both fully compatible with Russian military practice, because the designs were based on Chinese weapons, which in turn were copies of Russia’s own. These weapons also have shown their worth in the hands of unnamed purchasers in the Middle East. Moreover, North Korea has a vast store of munitions fully compatible with Russian artillery. It was also mentioned in passing that insofar as Kiev has mobilized in the field many Western mercenaries and covert NATO officers, Russia should also recruit from abroad, as for example, whole brigades from North Korea available for hire.

If any of these ideas put out by Solovyov last night are indeed implemented by the Kremlin, then the present confrontation in and over Ukraine will truly become globalized, and we have the outlines of what may be called World War III. However, I note that the use of nuclear weapons, tactical or otherwise, does not figure at all in the set of options that official Moscow discusses in relation to the challenges it faces in its Ukraine operation. Such a possibility would arise only if the NATO forces being sent to the EU’s ‘front line states’ grew in number by several times those presently assigned and appeared to be preparing to invade Russia.

Continue reading here.

By Oliver Boyd-Barrett, Substack, 9/11/22

Mercouris, on Sunday September 11, reports Russian MOD announced redeployment of troops from Kharkiv area to Donbass, claiming a successful “deception operation,” without giving further details, and also claiming that Ukraine had lost 2,000 men in Kharkiv area operations, and a total loss of 4000 men since September 6 both in Kherson and Kharkiv.

He notes there is no doubt that the withdrawal from Izium and other cities in the area has been effective, fast and with minimum losses. A video circulating of crushed Russian tanks and the like, supposedly from Izium, is a fake. Mercouris is inclined to believe the Russian estimate of Ukrainian losses, but does not make clear why, especially as he argues that there has been very little fighting, but he does claim the Ukrainian forces have faced artillery barrages without the security of the own air cover. Otherwise, I don’t see why, in Kharkiv area, there should have been high Ukrainian losses if Russia was retreating fast (but this could have been accompanied to the tune of simultaneous artillery attack.

He talks of the Russian description of the withdrawal as a “success,” which Russia had been planning for quite some time. He notes there were constant attacks on Russian flanks, especially in Balakliya area. He appears to argue that Russia was ready to withdraw from Izium, that Izium’s significance was greatly exaggerated, etc. – but all this seems far too convenient and optimistic a rationalization from the Russian perspective, which understates what is at the very least a significant PR failure.

The Ostol (correct spelling later) river is now the Russian defense line in Western Ukraine. Mercouris notes there was likely a long-standing debate in the Russian leadership whether or not to do this thing; at some point, probably a couple of weeks ago, Moscow reached a consensus decision to withdraw. A withdrawal of this scale, to be carried out effectively, needs forward planning . Perhaps, but once again, this is an interpretation and explanation that is all too kind towards Russia.

The Donetsk militia, given their shortage of support and equipment, may have been pressing for this withdrawl for some time. There surely is concern for the welfare of the people left in this area, mostly pro-Russian even as Russians have been thinning their forces in the area for quite some time. For the first time we saw recently that Russian regular troops were taking part in the regular fighting in the Donbass, specifically in Marinka, and it is a reasonable guess that these troops came from Izium.

Mercouris cites extensive intelligence cooperation between the US and Ukraine. Very possibly the Ukrainians launched the offensive because they knew that the opposition was thin, and that they could send out flying columns to occupy villages at lightening speed in the knowledge that Russian forces had already been drawn down. Had their been large numbers of Russian forces, the Ukrainian offensive would have failed.

Total Ukrainian force was 15,000.

Mercouris does not agree that the Russian withdrawal can be a “success.” He recalls seeing video images of Russian reinforcements rushing to the defense of Izium. This was probably the “deception operation,” to which the Russia MOD referred, intended to deter Ukrainians from pressing their advantage.

Lots of other people were deceived by this operation including Mercouris himself. He now suspects that reports of Russian troop movements around the Donetesk ring road were probably filmed on the Moscow ring road as part of the deception operation. The Russian people, Telegram bloggers etc., etc., were also deceived into thinking the Russian army would stand and fight for Izium. The deceived are now very angry, given the large loss of territory and of weapons, without even a battle – territory which Russia had had to fight hard for earlier in the war.

If a proper evacuation of civilians had been organized civilians would be feeling less betrayed. Russia had been saying that its forces would stand and fight but then withdrew quickly.

One conclusion is that Russia simply did not deploy sufficient forces, even though it does indeed have these resources. Some of the troops who took part in the Vostock exercises may have been sent there from Ukraine. And while Mercouris himself doesn’t believe this, he understands why such claims are being made and are believed. The real problem is not that there were not enough Russian troops. The problem lies in the nature of the special military operation itself. Back in February it was meant to provide support for the Donbass militia, supplemented by Chechnyan forces and the Wagner group. Up until recently, commentators have presumed that Russian regular forces were central to the operations in Donbass, but this is incorrect, as it understates the role of these other forces. The lack of information as to who is fighting on the Russian side obscures the role of the Donbass militia. Khordokovky points out that these are divided between tough, regular forces trained up to the professional level, and the reservists. The militia themselves do not have vast numbers of forces they can call on. Ultimately, there is a shortage of infantry because the Donbass militia have been given a disproportionate role. They do their job very well even if they are insufficient against a Ukrainian offensive.

How much time does Putin have? Adam Touse (?), a supporter of Ukraine, notes that Ukraine is losing $7 billion a month and will collapse economically very soon. It is printing money . On the brink of winter, with contracting economy and broken supply lines, hyper-inflation is a real danger now. A collapse could work to Russia’s advantage. But for so long as Russia depends on the militia it risks a crippling weakness of strategy. Ukrainians are now concentrating forces at Uglada where Russian forces are much stronger and a Russian withdrawal is not an option. Mercouris thinks Russians will parry this. We may expect to see more regular Russian troops in time for the scheduled elections.

[So, one conclusion from the foregoing is that Russian propaganda has been exposed and that this will severely hurt its credibility. In particular, Russia’s reputation for giving high priority to the welfare of pro-Russian civilians in the Donbass has been undermined. Another conclusion is that Russia, like Ukraine, has focused far too much on the PR war, feigning strength at the Vostock exercises, preening along with Chinese and Indian participants, while foolishly leaving allied militia forces to fend for themselves against overwhelming force in the real war.

All this is very damaging, and Russia will now be under pressure – dangerous pressure, that can elicit ill-considered action – to reverse its positions on the battlefield. Another conclusion, for now, is that the confidence which the Military Summary Channel, Mercouris, Berlect and many others have invested, over at least two months, in the Russian assaults on the Ukrainian Izium-Kramtorsk defense line has been badly misplaced, and they allowed insufficient account of who, exactly, was doing the actual fighting.

And a final conclusion is that Putin has been trying to achieve a relatively humanitarian victory, within the norms of warfare, and within the contours of a “special military operation,” when many will argue that battlefield success may have required, may require, outright war. There will of course be many disturbing implications of any such conclusion – OBB]

Link here.

By John Hudson, Washington Post, 9/7/22

SOUTHERN UKRAINE — In dimly lit hospital rooms in southern Ukraine, soldiers with severed limbs, shrapnel wounds, mangled hands and shattered joints recounted the lopsided disadvantages their units faced in the early days of a new offensive to expel Russian forces from the strategic city of Kherson.

The soldiers said they lacked the artillery needed to dislodge Russia’s entrenched forces and described a yawning technology gap with their better-equipped adversaries. The interviews provided some of the first direct accounts of a push to retake captured territory that is so sensitive, Ukrainian military commanders have barred reporters from visiting the front lines.

“They used everything on us,” said Denys, a 33-year-old Ukrainian soldier whose unit fell back from a Russian-held village after a lengthy barrage of cluster bombs, phosphorous munitions and mortars. “Who can survive an attack for five hours like that?” he said.

Denys and eight other Ukrainian soldiers from seven different units provided rare descriptions of the Kherson counteroffensive in the south, the most ambitious military operation by Kyiv since the expulsion of Russian forces at the perimeter of the capital in the spring. As in the battle for Kyiv, Ukraine’s success is hardly assured and the soldiers’ accounts signaled that a long fight, and many more casualties, lie ahead.

“We lost five people for every one they did,” said Ihor, a 30-year-old platoon commander who injured his back when the tank he was riding in crashed into a ditch.

Ihor had no military experience before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24. He made a living selling animal feed to pig and cow farms. His replacement as platoon commander also has no previous military experience, he said.

The soldiers were interviewed on gurneys and in wheelchairs as they recovered from injuries sustained in the offensive. Some spoke on the condition of anonymity to avoid disciplinary action. Others, like Denys and Ihor, agreed to reveal only their first names. But most spoke plainly about the disadvantages they faced.

Continue reading here.