WASHINGTON, Oct 12 (Reuters) – The United States must prepare for possible simultaneous wars with Russia and China by expanding its conventional forces, strengthening alliances and enhancing its nuclear weapons modernization program, a congressionally appointed bipartisan panel said on Thursday.
A senior official involved in the report declined to say if the panel’s intelligence briefings showed any Chinese and Russian nuclear weapons cooperation.
“We worry … there may be ultimate coordination between them in some way, which gets us to this two-war construct,” the official said on condition of anonymity.
The findings would upend current U.S. national security strategy calling for winning one conflict while deterring another and require huge defense spending increases with uncertain congressional support.
“We do recognize budget realities, but we also believe the nation must make these investments,” the Democratic chair, Madelyn Creedon, a former deputy head of the agency that oversees U.S. nuclear weapons, and the vice chair, Jon Kyl, a retired Republican senator, said in the report’s preface.
Addressing a briefing held to release the report, Kyl said the president and Congress must “take the case to the American people” that higher defense spending is a small price to pay “to hopefully preclude” a possible nuclear war involving the United States, China and Russia.
The report contrasts with U.S. President Joe Biden’s position that the current U.S. nuclear arsenal is sufficient to deter the combined forces of Russia and China.
The arsenal’s makeup “still exceeds what is necessary to hold a sufficient number of adversary targets at risk so as to deter enemy nuclear attack,” the Arms Control Association advocacy group said in response to the report.
“The United States and its allies must be ready to deter and defeat both adversaries simultaneously,” the Strategic Posture Commission said. “The U.S.-led international order and the values it upholds are at risk from the Chinese and Russian authoritarian regimes.”
Congress in 2022 created the panel of six Democrats and six Republicans to assess long-term threats to the United States and recommend changes in U.S. conventional and nuclear forces.
The panel accepted a Pentagon forecast that China’s rapid nuclear arsenal expansion likely will give it 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035, confronting the United States with a second major nuclear-armed rival for the first time.
The Chinese and Russian threats will become acute in the 2027-2035 timeframe so “decisions need to be made now in order for the nation to be prepared,” said the 145-page report.
The report said the 30-year U.S. nuclear arms modernization program, which began in 2010 and was estimated in 2017 to cost around $400 billion by 2046, must be fully funded to upgrade all warheads, delivery systems and infrastructure on schedule.
Other recommendations included deploying more tactical nuclear weapons in Asia and Europe, developing plans to deploy some or all reserve U.S. nuclear warheads, and production of more B-21 stealth bombers and new Columbia-class nuclear submarines beyond the numbers now planned.
The panel also called for boosting the “size, type, and posture” of U.S. and allied conventional forces. If such measures are not taken, the United States “will likely” have to increase its reliance on nuclear weapons, the report said.
By Courtney Kube, Carole E. Lee, and Kristen Welker, NBC News, 11/3/23
WASHINGTON — U.S. and European officials have begun quietly talking to the Ukrainian government about what possible peace negotiations with Russia might entail to end the war, according to one current senior U.S. official and one former senior U.S. official familiar with the discussions.
The conversations have included very broad outlines of what Ukraine might need to give up to reach a deal, the officials said. Some of the talks, which officials described as delicate, took place last month during a meeting of representatives from more than 50 nations supporting Ukraine, including NATO members, known as the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, the officials said.
The discussions are an acknowledgment of the dynamics militarily on the ground in Ukraine and politically in the U.S. and Europe, officials said.
They began amid concerns among U.S. and European officials that the war has reached a stalemate and about the ability to continue providing aid to Ukraine, officials said. Biden administration officials also are worried that Ukraine is running out of forces, while Russia has a seemingly endless supply, officials said. Ukraine is also struggling with recruiting and has recently seen public protests about some of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s open-ended conscription requirements.
And there is unease in the U.S. government with how much less public attention the war in Ukraine has garnered since the Israel-Hamas war began nearly a month ago, the officials said. Officials fear that shift could make securing additional aid for Kyiv more difficult.
Some U.S. military officials have privately begun using the term “stalemate” to describe the current battle in Ukraine, with some saying it may come down to which side can maintain a military force the longest. Neither side is making large strides on the battlefield, which some U.S. officials now describe as a war of inches. Officials also have privately said Ukraine likely only has until the end of the year or shortly thereafter before more urgent discussions about peace negotiations should begin. U.S. officials have shared their views on such a timeline with European allies, officials said.
“Any decisions about negotiations are up to Ukraine,” Adrienne Watson, spokesperson for the National Security Council, said in a statement. “We are focused on continuing to stand strongly in support of Ukraine as they defend their freedom and independence against Russian aggression.”
An administration official also noted that the U.S. has participated with Ukraine in discussions of its peace summit framework but said the White House “is not aware of any other conversations with Ukraine about negotiations at the moment.”
Questions about manpower
President Joe Biden has been intensely focused on Ukraine’s depleting military forces, according to two people familiar with the matter.
“Manpower is at the top of the administration’s concerns right now,” one said. The U.S. and its allies can provide Ukraine with weaponry, this person said, “but if they don’t have competent forces to use them it doesn’t do a lot of good”
Biden has requested that Congress authorize additional funding for Ukraine, but, so far, the effort has failed to progress because of resistance from some congressional Republicans. The White House has linked aid for Ukraine and Israel in its most recent request. That has support among some congressional Republicans, but other GOP lawmakers have said they’ll only vote for an Israel-only aid package.
Before the Israel-Hamas war began, White House officials publicly expressed confidence that additional Ukraine funding would pass Congress before the end of this year, while privately conceding concerns about how difficult that might be.
Biden had been reassuring U.S. allies that Congress will approve more aid for Ukraine and planned a major speech on the issue. Once Hamas terrorists attacked Israel on Oct. 7, the president’s focus shifted to the Middle East, and his Ukraine speech morphed into an Oval Office address about why the U.S. should financially support Ukraine and Israel.
Is Putin ready to negotiate?
The Biden administration does not have any indication that Russian President Vladimir Putin is ready to negotiate with Ukraine, two U.S. officials said. Western officials say Putin still believes he can “wait out the West,” or keep fighting until the U.S. and its allies lose domestic support for funding Ukraine or the struggle to supply Kyiv with weapons and ammunition becomes too costly, officials said.
Both Ukraine and Russia are struggling to keep up with military supplies. Russia has ramped up production of artillery rounds, and, over the next couple years may be able to produce 2 million shells per year, according to a Western official. But Russia fired an estimated 10 million rounds in Ukraine last year, the official said, so it will also have to rely on other countries.
The Biden administration has spent $43.9 billion on security assistance for Ukraine since Russia’s invasion in February 2022, according to the Pentagon. A U.S. official says the administration has about $5 billion left to send to Ukraine before money runs out. There would be no aid left for Ukraine if the administration hadn’t said it found a $6.2 billion accounting error from months of over-valuing equipment sent to Kyiv.
Public support slipping
Progress in Ukraine’s counteroffensive has been very slow, and hope that Ukraine will make significant advances, including reaching the coast near Russia’s frontlines, is fading. A lack of significant progress on the battlefield in Ukraine does not help with trying to reverse the downward trend in public support for sending more aid, officials said.
A Gallup poll released this week shows decreasing support for sending additional aid to Ukraine, with 41% of Americans saying the U.S. is doing too much to help Kyiv. That’s a significant change from just three months ago when 24% of Americans said they felt that way. The poll also found that 33% of Americans think the U.S. is doing the right amount for Ukraine, while 25% said the U.S. is not doing enough.
Public sentiment toward assisting Ukraine is also starting to soften in Europe.
As incentive for Zelenskyy to consider negotiations, NATO could offer Kyiv some security guarantees, even without Ukraine formally becoming part of the alliance, officials said. That way, officials said, the Ukrainians could be assured that Russia would be deterred from invading again.
In August national security adviser Jake Sullivan told reporters, “We do not assess that the conflict is a stalemate.” Instead, Sullivan said, Ukraine is taking territory on a “methodical, systematic basis.”
But a Western official acknowledged there has not been a lot of movement by either side in some time, and with the cold weather approaching it will be tough for either Ukraine or Russia to break that pattern. The official said it will not be impossible, but it will be difficult.
U.S. officials also assess that Russia will attempt to hit critical infrastructure in Ukraine again this winter, attempting to force some civilians to endure a frigid winter without heat or power.
Administration officials expect Ukraine to want more time to fight on the battlefield, particularly with new, heavier equipment, “but there’s a growing sense that it’s too late, and it’s time to do a deal,” the former senior administration official said. It is not certain that Ukraine would mount another spring offensive.
One senior administration official pushed back on any notion of the U.S. nudging Ukraine toward talks. The Ukrainians, the official said, “are on the clock in terms of weather, but they are not on the clock in terms of geopolitics.”
First of all, please accept my greetings on the occasion of your Birthday you have recently celebrated. How was it?
Vladimir Putin: Thank you very much. I celebrated it with my friends and family. It was fine.
Wang Guan: I must say that you are in a great shape. Do you manage to carve out time for physical exercises?
Vladimir Putin: Thanks God I do. I think that this is necessary, first and foremost, in order to be able to work hard. Exercises are not an objective in itself. But they provide a means to achieve really important goals, an opportunity to work hard in a way that would make it possible to achieve the necessary results.
Wang Guan: We have gone through some information materials and we have seen that somewhere in 2015 – 2017 you had hockey drills and learnt to play hockey. You actually did well and scored a lot.
Vladimir Putin: Yes, I started skating just ten years ago. Before that, I had not been able even to stand up on skates. But ten years ago I tried, then started to play, and I’m still at it. And I enjoy it. Team sports are always interesting and exciting; they grab your attention and allow you a break from the routine.
Wang Guan: So you mean that you learnt to skate and play hockey, all at once?
Vladimir Putin: Of course. It was just the same thing for me. I hope that sports cooperation with our Chinese friends will also actively evolve. Wushu is very popular in Russia. I hope it will grow even more so; and we would also like to show our Chinese friends our national martial arts, as we call them, such as sambo wrestling (unarmed self-defense). I will certainly discuss this issue with your President during my visit, suggest we cooperate on a mutual basis, and ask him to support initiatives of young people, athletes, in order to expand collaboration in sports.
Wang Guan: So, let’s start our interview.
Vladimir Putin: Please go ahead.
Wang Guan: Mr. President!
First of all, let me thank you for agreeing to give interview to the China Media Group. I know this is the first time you give interview to a Chinese TV channel over the past two years.
In March 2023, a joint Russian-Chinese statement was adopted, which stressed that relations between the two countries were at their strongest level ever.
Indeed, you said at the recent Valdai Discussion Club that Russian-Chinese cooperation was as an important stabilizing factor in global affairs. Could you please elaborate on your assessment of Russian-Chinese relations as well as their prospects for development?
Vladimir Putin: Relations between Russia and China – you know, I am telling you what immediately comes to my mind after you asked your question – have not been shaped to suite the current global environment; nor are they the result of a short-term political opportunism. Russian-Chinese relations have been shaped for twenty years in a careful, phased-out manner. At each step, the Russian and Chinese sides have both guided themselves by their own national interests as they understood them. While encouraging the other side to take the next step, both have always taken into account each other’s opinions and interests. We have always tried to reach a compromise, even on complicated issues inherited from the old days.
Our relations have always been driven by goodwill. It helped us solve the border delimitation issues that had remained outstanding for 40 years. Our shared desire to remove all possible obstacles to our joint progress in future was so huge that we managed to compromise in a mutually acceptable way. And then we began to develop economic cooperation, also gradually, filling the niches that were once owned by other countries in our relations, but were not as effective as our mutual cooperation in a particular area. For instance, in the area of energy that has a special place in our relations. Russia now ranks first among Chinese partners in the supply, for example, of energy to China in value terms.
China progressively became Russia’s first trade partner in terms of trade turnover, and Russia gradually rose to the sixth place among China’s trade and economic partners.
What would I note? We had different ratios for exports and imports at different times. For our part, we have tried to cover the needs of the Chinese economy, and our Chinese friends have never ignored our views as regards some imbalances, particularly in trade in manufactured goods. We have been gradually, step by step and year by year increasing and improving this trade balance. That is the way we are advancing in almost every area.
Not to mention the role that Russian-Chinese relations play in ensuring stability in the world. Relation between Russia and China are a fundamental factor.
All of this together leads us to believe that we are moving in the absolutely right direction and in the interests of both the Chinese and Russian peoples.
Wang Guan: Mr. President!
You have just mentioned trade and economic cooperation between Russia and China. Earlier, a goal was put forward to reach the target of 200 billion US dollars in trade turnover by 2024. In fact, in 2022, the two parties basically approached this target and we could feel many of the changes.
This time I came to Moscow and saw that the streets and stores, including online trading platforms, were increasingly filled with Chinese brands. At the same time, Russian gas is supplied to the homes of Chinese consumers and Russian meat and dairy products, for example, are becoming more and more common in Chinese stores.
What is our assessment of the prospects for trade and economic ties between the two countries?
Vladimir Putin: Our economic relations diversify from year to year.
Indeed, as I have said, we have an extensive scope of cooperation in the field of, say, energy, and it is very diverse. This is not only the supply of oil and gas. In the field of oil, a pipeline is operating steadily, and pumping volumes are increasing.
The same goes for the Power of Siberia gas pipeline. Now we have good prospects, we have already signed an agreement on the Far Eastern route, and one more route, the Power of Siberia 2 that goes through Mongolia, is being worked out.
The amount of coal and electricity supplied is increasing and we continue to build nuclear units. And not only to build units at two plants, but we are working on a fast neutron reactor, which will provide us with an entirely new way of building relations in this high-tech energy sector as it creates conditions for a closes cycle and, in fact, there will be virtually no waste.
We do have a very good prospect in other industries. These are automobile construction, shipbuilding, aircraft construction, and electronics. I have mentioned automobile construction. Look, just yesterday I talked to some people who could well be called car enthusiasts with a great and long experience. And in all sincerity, not knowing that we were going to have an interview today, my interlocutors told me: you know, Chinese cars are settling in our market not simply because others are becoming fewer, this is not the only reason. The quality is improving. The quality of Chinese cars is getting better, so our consumers, particularly in terms of quality/price ratio, are happily turning towards products of Chinese manufacturers.
You have mentioned agriculture. Yes, our cooperation is expanding here as well. There are certain issues related to the supply of meat products and so on, but the work is continuing. We are aware of the Chinese consumers’ interest not only in agricultural products, but also in the supply of some products that the People’s Republic of China itself needs to produce there agricultural products on its own territory.
We are working on and we are developing a significant number of industries, and this number has been constantly growing, especially recently, because of our cooperation on high-tech.
Wang Guan: We are confident that we will reach the $200 billion target this year, what do you think?
Vladimir Putin: I have no doubts, or, let us be more cautious, I am almost certain. In the previous period, we had 32 per cent growth in trade, which is a very good one. There is every reason to believe that we will reach $200 billion mark by the end of the year.
Wang Guan: Mr. President, with regard to the Belt and Road Initiative, I would now like to talk about energy. We are cooperating in areas such as renewable energy, combating climate change and the UN climate agenda.
What do you think is the impact of our cooperation in these areas for the whole world, for mankind?
Vladimir Putin: You know, when we talk about the UN Sustainable Development Goals, there is more than one, two or three of them, I believe there are 17 actually. The struggle for the environment and the fight against climate change both are very important areas, but they are not the only ones.
One should not forget, for example, the fight against poverty. How can you say to people in African countries: you will get no oil, you will get no petroleum products, you will have to rely on renewable energy sources exclusively – on wind and solar energy, for example, and so on. Those are largely out of reach for developing countries. So, people are going to starve or what? So there should be a balance; all decisions should be balanced.
In this context, when we talk about President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative – I believe, it was some ten years ago when he formulated the idea – I think it was very timely and is developing well, because the focal point of this idea is an attempt to unite the capabilities of many countries to achieve common development goals.
Today, in one way or another, President Xi Jinping’s ideas have involved you know, how many? Some 147 countries, two-thirds of the world’s population. So I think this is already a success, this is a good, correct and technologically organized initiative that is developing.
Yes, we see that some people consider it an attempt by the People’s Republic of China to put someone under its thumb, but we see otherwise, we just see desire for cooperation. Our own ideas on the development of the Eurasian Economic Union, for example, on the construction of a Greater Eurasia, fully coincide with the Chinese ideas proposed within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative.
Look, our countries, the Eurasian Economic Union, have received $24 billion in investments as a result of our cooperation. What is wrong with that? At the same time, each country chooses for itself, within the framework of bilateral or multilateral formats, what is favourable or unfavourable for it, no one imposes anything. But it stimulates and creates conditions for development.
The same applies to the development of logistics and infrastructure facilities. We have recently built two bridges over the Amur River with China. I think this is good for people –it increases the number of them communicating with each other, and it is good for business because it allows us to increase trade.
So we welcome this initiative by President Xi Jinping, we are working together, we are ready and we will continue to work together.
Wang Guan: Mr. President, you also said that aligning the EAEU and the Belt and Road is a very important project, the so-called integration of integrations. You are to take part in the Belt and Road Summit. What do you expect from it?
Vladimir Putin: I think we will think of something…I have already said that the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union have already secured $24 billion in investments by working together on the Belt and Road Initiative. But this volume is growing because the number of mutually beneficial projects is increasing. They are not only beneficial to the countries that receive some loans under this initiative. They are also beneficial to the People’s Republic of China, because it also receives products from the implementation of these projects and gets conditions for better and greater development. All this is done on the basis of mutual benefit.
We have joint projects. Perhaps it is too early to dwell upon it, but I am sure that contracts will be signed; new contacts will be established between economic actors; heads of governments, various ministries and departments cooperating directly will meet. I am not going through all of it now. I have familiarised myself with the Russian government’s proposals in various areas. They are running over several tightly printed pages, and each project may represent something we will work on for more than a year, perhaps a decade. Thus I have the best expectations, including from contacts with my colleagues.
Wang Guan: We have also seen that the international community has different opinions about the Belt and Road Initiative. What do you think are the benefits of the Belt and Road Initiative, which in 10 years has gone from being a kind of initiative to a realistic, implemented project that brings benefits to all mankind?
Vladimir Putin: You know, it seems to me that the main advantage of the concept of cooperation proposed by the Chinese side is that nobody imposes anything on anybody in the framework of this work. Everything is done within the framework of finding not only acceptable solutions, but such projects and such ways of achieving a common goal that are acceptable to all. This is what makes China today, under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, unique in building relations with others: no one imposes anything on anyone; no one forces anything on anyone, but only gives them opportunity. And, as I said, if there are difficulties, compromises are sought and always found. In my view, this is what distinguishes the Belt and Road Initiative proposed by the Chinese President from many others that countries with a heavy colonial legacy are trying to implement in the world.
Wang Guan: Our bilateral relations also involve many interests and joint projects, including in the humanitarian sphere and sports. To cite but one example, according to the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation, the number of Russian students taking the Unified State Examination in Chinese has doubled. More recently, Russian literature and music have undoubtedly influenced several Chinese generations.
We have also been following the young Russian skaters – Trusova, Valieva, Shcherbakova – with bated breath. They have a large fan community in the Chinese internet segment, and Chinese internet users even call them fairies who have no equal but each other.
Do you think that humanitarian and sports cooperation is of great value for our friendship?
Vladimir Putin: Indeed it is. Sports cooperation as part of humanitarian cooperation is very important because it establishes direct people-to-people contact. It is no surprise that our athletes have fans in China, because they are true stars. We also follow the success of Chinese athletes with great respect, always looking at how the work is organized.
Wang Guan: Are there any athletes or sports that you follow with special interest?
Vladimir Putin: Certainly, we know about Chinese athletes. We know about gymnasts, for example, and other sports. It is important that China has brought the work in high-performance sports to a good professional level.
No doubt, it is equally important to establish contacts at other, more modest levels. I refer to cooperation in PE, contacts between the regions, competitions between universities, and between Chinese provinces and constituent entities of the Russian Federation.
I think we should think of it as well. I suppose it would be very interesting. In fact, as far as I know, this is what is being done within the interregional cooperation. My colleagues are also paying the necessary attention to this. I am sure that it will go on this way, continue in this vein.
You know what is important? That our sports cooperation is devoid of any political or economic conjuncture.
Unfortunately, modern international sport is more and more immersed in commerce. We have nothing of this sort in our sports relations and I hope we never will.
Wang Guan: Mr. President, you once said that if you had not practiced judo, your life might have taken a completely different path. Why do you say so?
Vladimir Putin: Everyone knows and it’s not a secret that I come from a simple working-class family, and in the past I had a lot of time to spend in the yard. I don’t know how my life would have turned out if I hadn’t taken an interest in sports. It doesn’t really matter what kind of sports I did, it’s important that I paid a lot of attention to it. And immediately there appeared priorities to assert myself not in the yard, not in some, let’s say, not very disciplined youth environment, but to assert myself on sports grounds, in my case, on tatami. Immediately certain views on relations with other people appeared: on how to build these relations, how to treat partners with respect, how to avoid anything that could somehow undermine relations between people, and so on. Sport is educative, and this is very important.
Therefore, the development of our cooperation in this field is extremely important, and in today’s world, where there are so many threats that come from the Internet, from the illegal spread of drugs, and so on, sports activities for young people are an extremely important thing in the formation of character and correct, strong life attitude.
Wang Guan: Mr. President, recently at the Valdai Discussion Club, you mentioned fair multipolarity, that there is a need for it. You also mentioned such a phenomenon as hegemonism in the field of morality and ethics, in the value system. You also said that rule-based order is a manifestation of colonial thinking. Why do you think so?
Vladimir Putin: You have just said “rule-based order”. Have you ever seen those rules? No, you haven’t, because no one has agreed on them with anyone. So how can one talk about order based on rules that no one has ever seen? In terms of common sense, it’s nonsense. But it is beneficial to those who promote this approach. Because if no one has seen the rules, it only means that those who talk about them are making them up themselves from time to time to their own advantage. That is the colonial approach.
Because colonial countries have always believed that they are first-rated people. After all, they have always talked about bringing enlightenment to their colonies, that they are civilized people who bring the benefits of civilization to other nations, whom they consider second-rate people. No surprise today’s political elite, say, in the United States, talks about its exceptionalism. This is the extension of this colonial mindset, meaning that when they consider themselves exceptional in the United States, it means that other people, all the people in fact, are just some second-rate people. How else could one understand it? Those are mere vestiges of colonial thinking, nothing else.
Our approach is quite different. We proceed from the fact that all people are equal, all people have the same rights; the rights and freedoms of one country and one nation end where the rights and freedoms of another person of an entire state appear. This is the way in which a multipolar world should be evolving gradually. This is exactly what we are striving for, and this is the basis of our interaction with China on the international stage.
Wang Guan: BRICS has recently expanded from five to 11 countries. What historical process do you think the BRICS expansion reflects? In addition, Russia will take presidency of BRICS in 2024. In your opinion, what role will Russia play in BRICS in the future and during its presidency?
Vladimir Putin: First of all, I want to say that the expansion itself was quite uneasy. It was a challenging, I would even say difficult dialogue. But largely due to the efforts of our Chairperson, the President of the Republic of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa (I want to emphasize his role once again), we managed to come to this consensus and to reach an agreement.
What is at the core of the expansion process? This process is based on objective reality. The multipolar world is creating by itself, as a matter of fact. We can speed up this process or someone can try to slow it down and maybe even achieve some kind of reduction in the pace of building a multipolar world. Anyway, its creation is inevitable. It is happening on its own because of the growing potential of many countries, including, not least, the growing potential of the People’s Republic of China. India is growing in Asia, Indonesia is also growing, many other nations in Latin America like Brazil, and Russia is getting back on its feet and gaining strength. Our countries do have their problems, and what countries don’t? There are always problems of some kind. But it’s not about that, it’s about growing our potential, and this growth is evident, including in the economic sphere.
As for BRICS, at the time of the Johannesburg summit, the ratio of the G7 and BRICS economies was already in favour of BRICS in terms of purchasing power parity.
After six members had joined BRICS, this ratio shifted even more in favour of the BRICS countries. Once again, this is a manifestation of the objective process of forming a multipolar world.
This means that all those who have joined BRICS support the idea and concept of forming a multipolar world. No one wants to play second fiddle to some sovereign, everyone wants equal rights. And when they join BRICS, they see that we can achieve this goal by joining efforts within the framework of expansion and strengthening of such a format.
Wang Guan: Mr. President, you are very familiar with history. In fact, you are the one who makes history. There is an opinion, you know, that some models of interstate relations, such as realism, have not helped at all to solve the problems that humanity faces in terms of development.
In your opinion, how important are Mr. Xi Jinping’s ideas about building a community of common destiny for mankind, as well as his initiatives in the field of global development, global security, global civilization initiative, and what values do they represent at such a historic crossroads?
Vladimir Putin: Thank you for bringing this up. As far as I understand, these ideas were first formulated in general terms in about 2013 during President Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow, where he spoke at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations and brought this up for the first time.
Of course, this is a global approach to human history. For sure, everything is interconnected. And today, with the formation of a multipolar world, these ideas have become even more relevant. He spoke about it in 2013, and today these ideas are actually being realized. This is extremely important.
Once again, I want to go back to the start: we all, and Mr. Xi Jinping in particular, are not guided by opportunistic considerations of the current moment; we try to assess the situation in a comprehensive manner and look into the future. You see, he spoke here about the formation of a global world and the interconnection between the destinies of all countries on the planet in 2013, and then he launched the Belt and Road Initiative. This is the practical realization of what he talked about in theory.
It occurs to me that being consist and moving towards common goals while realizing the essence of what is going on is what distinguishes President Xi Jinping and the PRC’s policy.
Wang Guan: Mr. President, you have seen Xi Jinping 40 times. What kind of person, what kind of leader do you think Mr. Xi Jinping is? Could you share with us any stories you have in common?
Vladimir Putin: The thing is that President Xi Jinping calls me his friend, and I call him my friend, too. We have a saying here: tell me who your friend is and I’ll tell you who you are. So if I praise President Xi Jinping now, I would feel uncomfortable, as if I was praising myself. So I will try to be objective. He undoubtedly is one of the recognized world leaders.
It is good that you recalled his speech at MGIMO in 2013 and I connected it with the Belt and Road Initiative. I will repeat it for the third time, but it is very important: he is a leader who does not make momentary decisions on the basis of some current situation, but he assesses the situation, analyzes it and looks into the future. This is very important. This is exactly what distinguishes a world leader from people whom we call “timeservers” who are there for a brief moment just to show off on the international stage, and then they are gone.
Of course, President Xi Jinping is absolutely different. He is attentive to detail, cool-headed, business-minded and a reliable partner – that is what I wanted to underline. If we agree on something, we can be sure that both sides will keep their end of the bargain.
As for our meetings, yes, we have had plenty, which is good. You have probably counted, I do not remember how many exactly – maybe about 40 meetings. Once – I do not remember the year, I think it was at an APEC meeting, probably in Indonesia, – I had my birthday and we celebrated it together. Later, an event in Dushanbe coincided with his birthday, and we celebrated it in the course of our joint work.
We had a great trip during President Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia, when we went to St. Petersburg and visited the cruiser Aurora, took a boat ride down the Neva River and had a very lengthy, in-depth, absolutely neutral and friendly discussion about bilateral relations and the world situation. It was a most friendly atmosphere, where we spoke to our hearts content, went through all the issues, all the problems, discussed everything. It was very substantive, very calm and amiable, an ambiance that makes you feel at home. As you know, he most recently visited us in March. It was also a very good, business-like visit, of great significance for the future development of our relations. I hope that, with the next meeting planned in China, we will uphold this tradition.
Wang Guan: As regards the Ukrainian issue: Mr. President, what is your opinion on the prospects of a peaceful settlement of the Ukrainian crisis? When will peace prevail?
You have also mentioned the Chinese document outlining a political solution for the Ukrainian crisis settlement. What do you think about it?
Vladimir Putin: We are thankful to our Chinese friends for trying to think about ways to end this crisis. However, I would like to remind you that hostilities in Ukraine did not start with our special military operation, but way before – in 2014, when the Western countries, after having volunteered as guarantors of the agreements between President Yanukovich and the opposition, forgot about those guarantees in a matter of days and – worse still – supported a coup d’état. United States Administration officials even acknowledged spending big money on it – five billion, they said, if memory serves me, – and now we have what was bound to happen.
I am not going to dwell on whether it was a revolution or whether it was a colour revolution, but it was anyway a coup d’état. Yes, it had to do with mistakes made by the then leadership, but those mistakes needed to be remedied through democratic procedures, rather than by means of militants in the streets. But Western countries chose otherwise – to support a coup d’état. And then, essentially by proxy of the Kiev regime, they started hostilities in the south-east of Ukraine, in Donbass, and continued those hostilities for eight years, killing women and children. The West paid no attention to that or pretended not to notice.
Even when agreements were signed in Minsk, Belarus, known as the Minsk Agreements, Russia did everything to follow this path towards settling the conflict. They did not let us do that, either.
Moreover, Ukraine’s leaders ultimately said that they simply did not like those Minsk Agreements and they were not going to fulfil them.
This was aggravated by the United States’ attempts to drag Ukraine into NATO, which led to the escalation of the conflict.
Let me remind you that, when Ukraine gained independence – or proclaimed its independence – it was the Declaration of Independence that served as the fundamental document laying the basis for Ukrainian independence. The main principle enshrined in this Declaration of Independence was that Ukraine is a neutral state.
Yet in 2008, for no good reason – there was no crisis in sight – they announced that they would welcome Ukraine in NATO. Why? Still no one understands. And thus, year by year, they would heighten the tensions. Then, finally, the 2014 crisis hit, the hostilities broke out. This took the escalation to a new level. Therefore, the start of the special military operation was not the start of a war, but an attempt to end it.
As for what needs to be done and how it needs to be done in order to end the conflict by peaceful means: we have never been against this. Moreover, we reached an agreement in Istanbul confirming that we were ready for this, provided that – I emphasize – the legitimate security interests of Russia are respected. The Ukrainian side put forward very strict demands in terms of security, and we almost accepted them. However, as soon as we pulled our troops back from the Ukrainian capital, Kiev, the Ukrainian side committed all the arrangements to flames. Those same arrangements that were initialled on paper by the heads of the negotiating parties – not the package itself, but the memorandum on those arrangements. They announced that they would seek to defeat Russia and secure a victory on the battlefield, to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia. They launched an active military operation, the so-called counter-offensive. It has continued since 4 June. No results achieved so far, only massive losses. The losses are simply huge, at a ratio of one to eight.
Of course, we know the proposals of our Chinese friends. We highly value those proposals. I think they are absolutely realistic and could lay the foundation for peace arrangements. But, unfortunately, the opposing side does not want to enter into any negotiations. In fact, the President of Ukraine has even issued a decree prohibiting everyone – including himself – to conduct any negotiations with us. How can we conduct negotiations if they are not willing to and even issued a regulation prohibiting such negotiations?
So if the Ukrainian side is willing to, I guess the first thing to do is to revoke the decree and express the readiness for the negotiations. We are ready, including on the basis of the proposals by our Chinese friends.
Wang Guan: Mr. President, China has always articulated its interest in building shared, common and indivisible security. Is there any chance to reconcile the positions on the Ukrainian issue?
Vladimir Putin: Yes, we have always said that, too. We said that security of one group of states cannot be built at the expense of security of other states. Security needs to be the same for everyone.
In this context, it is extremely important for us that Ukraine stays outside any blocs. We were told as far back as 1991 – by the then US Administration – that NATO would not expand further east. Since then, there have been five waves of NATO expansion, and every time we expressed our concerns. Every time we were told: yes, we promised you not to expand NATO eastwards, but those were verbal promises – is there any paper with our signature on it? No paper? Good-bye.
You see, it is very difficult to engage in a dialogue with people like that. I have already cited the example of the Iranian nuclear programme. The negotiations on the Iranian nuclear programme were very, very lengthy. An agreement was reached, a compromise found, and documents signed. Then came a new Administration and threw everything in the trash, as if those arrangements never existed. How can we agree on anything if every new Administration starts from scratch – begin each time from the centre of the playing field?
The same goes for any issue, any topic, including the one we are discussing. That is why one of the key points is to ensure equal security for everyone, and Russia is entitled to that, just as any other state. If we believe that NATO poses threats to us through Ukraine, we want our concerns to be heard.
Wang Guan: Thank you very much for the interview. Thank you.
Vladimir Putin: It was a pleasure for me to do this for Chinese viewers, listeners. I would like to thank you from the bottom of my heart and extend my best wishes to the citizens of our friendly neighbour, the People’s Republic of China.
On November 18, 2021, Putin held a meeting with Russian diplomats. Facing renewed vows that Ukraine would enter NATO and continued concerns that NATO’s “military potential and infrastructure [would be] in the vicinity of Russian borders,” Putin turned to his minister of foreign affairs, Sergey Lavrov, and said, “it is imperative to push for serious, long-term guarantees that safeguard Russia’s security . . ..”
One month later, Russia presented the US and NATO with a proposal on those mutual security guarantees. A month after that, the US rejected Russia’s central demand that NATO keep its promise and not expand into Ukraine.
The US had rejected what NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg would later call Putin’s “pre-condition for not invad[ing] Ukraine.” Lavrov remarked that “our Western colleagues are not prepared to take up our major proposals, primarily those on NATO’s eastward non-expansion.” But what seemed to really surprise the veteran diplomat was not that the US insisted on its “open-door policy” on Ukraine joining NATO, but that it closed the door on diplomacy: “Neither the United States, nor the North Atlantic Alliance proposed an alternative to this key provision.”
Lavrov has been Russia’s foreign minister, under Putin and Medvedev, since 2004. He is very respected and, retired US ambassador Chas Freeman told me, has a reputation amongst diplomats as being “very competent and professional.” Lavrov’s statements are important insights into Russian policy. Freeman says, Lavrov is “meticulously loyal and completely trustworthy in the eyes of his president.”
In recent weeks, Lavrov has made a number of statements that glance at what could have been in Ukraine and hint at what might provide a path out. Those statement refer to three of Ukraine’s key goals: peace, territorial integrity and sovereignty.
Istanbul: Could Have Had Peace
In the first months of the war, before most of the death, devastation and escalation, there were several opportunities for a possible peace. The most promising were the Turkish mediated talks that were held in Istanbul in March and early April 2022.
Those talks resulted in a tentative agreement. Recently, Putin has revealed just how tantalizingly close those talks came, revealing for the first time that the agreement had been initialled by both sides. On September 23, at a press conference following the UN General Assembly High-Level week, Lavrov confirmed that crucial point: “we did hold talks in March and April 2022. We agreed on certain things; everything was already initialled.”
Lavrov also confirmed the second crucial point. There could have been peace if not for the roadblock of the political West. Putin has claimed that Ukraine abandoned the talks at the insistence of the US and UK. Well placed Turkish officials, including Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu and deputy chairman of Erdogan’s ruling party Numan Kurtulmus, have verified Putin’s account, saying the US put an end to the agreement because they “want[ed] the war to continue.” At his press conference, Lavrov backed Putin, using the same language as the Turkish officials. Lavrov says that two days after the agreement was initialled, the talks abruptly ended “because, I think, someone in London or Washington did not want this war to end.” Days later, during a September 28 interview, Lavrov was less speculative. He said that “in April 2022 . . . Ukraine proposed ceasing hostilities and settling the crisis based on providing reciprocal, reliable security guarantees.” He then clearly said, “But this proposal was recalled at the insistence of Washington and London.”
By April 2022, there is the tantalizing possibility that the war could have ended. At his September 23 press conference, Lavrov confirmed that the agreement had been initialled and, both then and five days later, suggested that the agreement was sabotaged because Washington and London did not want the war to end.
Minsk: Could Have Had Territorial Integrity
The Istanbul agreement was not the first agreement to be made and then not implemented. A key reason cited by Russia for launching the invasion of Ukraine is the prevention of NATO expansion into Ukraine; into “the immediate vicinity of areas of strategic importance to our security,” in Lavrov’s words; and right up to Russia’s borders. But another reason cited by Russia is the protection of the language, culture, rights, property and lives of the ethnic Russians in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine after the coup of 2014.
The protection of those rights could have been achieved, Lavrov said in his press conference at the UN General Assembly, “a year later with the signing of the Minsk Agreements.” Those agreements, if implemented, would have guaranteed Ukraine the territorial integrity – with the exception of Crimea – that they now, understandably, seek. “Had they implemented the Minsk agreements,” Lavrov said, “Ukraine’s territorial integrity would have been guaranteed, because this is what the agreements were all about.” The Minsk agreements promised to satisfy Kiev by keeping the Donbas in Ukraine and satisfy the Donbas by keeping it there with autonomy. “Territorial integrity would have been restored through the granting of special status to Donbass,” Lavrov told the press.
Ukraine’s territorial integrity could have been guaranteed through the Minsk agreements. But they were never implemented. The agreements were brokered by Germany and France, agreed to by Ukraine and Russia, and accepted by the US and UN. But the US failed Ukraine by not providing it the support it needed, and Germany and France disappointed by not applying the necessary pressure on Kiev. But revelations in 2022 proved it to be much worse than that.
Germany and France didn’t disappoint by not pressuring Ukraine to implement the agreement. They never intended Ukraine to implement the agreement. That the agreement was a deceptive soporific designed to lull Russia into a ceasefire with the promise of a peaceful settlement while actually buying Ukraine the time it needed to build up an armed forces capable of achieving a military solution has now been confirmed by everyone of Putin’s partners in the negotiations, including then Ukrainian President Pyotr Poroshenko, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President François Hollande.
In his September 28 interview, Lavrov referenced the deception and placed the blame on Europe and Ukraine for the failure of the Minsk agreement: “They have confessed after all that no one – Germany, France, let alone Ukraine – intended to implement the Minsk agreements. In 2022, this was stated in plain language by former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Former French President Francois Hollande, and former Ukrainian President Petr Poroshenko. They said the agreements were needed to gain time to replenish the Ukrainian regime’s military arsenals against the Russian Federation.” But for that Western deception, “Ukraine’s territorial integrity would have been guaranteed.” Instead, “President Vladimir Putin’s co-authors with regard to the Minsk agreements openly admitted that they had deceived him . . . and this is why they are to blame for destroying Ukraine’s territorial integrity, which they are so solicitous about today.”
Constitutional Commitments: Could Have Had Sovereignty
At his September 23 press conference, Lavrov was asked if Russia recognizes the sovereignty of Ukraine. Lavrov answered that Russia “recognized the sovereignty of Ukraine back in 1991, on the basis of the Declaration of Independence, which Ukraine adopted when it withdrew from the Soviet Union.” He then clearly pointed out that “one of the main points for [Russia] in the declaration was that Ukraine would be a non-bloc, non-alliance country; it would not join any military alliances.”
The Russian recognition of Ukrainian sovereignty was contingent, in part, on Ukrainian neutrality. That neutrality was enshrined in Article IX of the 1990 Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine, “External and Internal Security,” that says that Ukraine “solemnly declares its intention of becoming a permanently neutral state that does not participate in military blocs. . ..” That promise was later enshrined in Ukraine’s constitution, which committed Ukraine to neutrality and prohibited it from joining any military alliance: that included NATO. However, the neutrality upon which Russian recognition of Ukrainian sovereignty had been, in part, contingent was removed in 2019 when Ukraine amended the constitution, with neither vote nor referendum, to include a mandate for all future governments to seek as a goal membership in NATO.
After reminding the reporter that that rescinded promise was “one of the main points for Russia,” Lavrov then went on to add the key line that “In that version, on those conditions, we support Ukraine’s territorial integrity.”
Lavrov seemed to be explaining both that Ukraine’s commitment to walking through the open NATO door was part of what dissolved the commitment to Ukrainian sovereignty and motivated Russia to cross its borders and that a return to the commitment not to walk through that door would achieve, in exchange, a return to Russian “support [for] Ukraine’s territorial integrity.”
In his two recent talks to the press in September, Lavrov hinted at what could have been in Ukraine. Peace was possible before the war started if Ukraine had promised not to join NATO as their Declaration of State Sovereignty and their constitution before the 2019 amendment committed it to and if Ukraine had implemented the Minsk agreements. Peace was possible after the war started if Washington and London had not pulled Ukraine back from the initialed Istanbul agreement. Lavrov’s recent comments hint not only at Russia’s perspective on the causes of the war but at Russia’s perspective on the way out.
Ted Snider is a regular columnist on US foreign policy and history at Antiwar.com and The Libertarian Institute. He is also a frequent contributor to Responsible Statecraft and The American Conservative as well as other outlets.
There is a growing danger that Ukraine’s now imminent rout on the battlefield at the hands of a far better-trained and better-equipped Russian force will lead to a period not unlike the Ruin that occurred in the latter half of the 17th century on Ukrainian territory and temporarily split Cossackdom into two several entities divided between Poland and Russia. The great Ruin involved a series of wars conducted by foreign powers — most notably Poland and Russia, but also the Ottoman Empire and Crimean Tatar Khanate — and internecine fighting and social unrest, which decimated a good part of Cossack territories, including many of those now being destroyed by NATO-Russia Ukrainian war.
With the failure of Ukraine’s counter-offensive, high attrition and increasingly low morale among its fighting forces, declining political and military support from the West, the coming onset of winter and a possible, massive Russian offensive, the stage is being set for potential catastrophe. An all too possible path to a new Ruin could now be open and take the following course: the Ukrainian army’s collapse, a subsequent coup in Kiev, resulting in civil war, chaos and, as I have written before, the possible formation of Ukrainian guerrilla resistance forces fighting Moscow’s occupation.
COLLAPSE OF THE UKRAINIAN ARMY
The failure of Ukraine’s counteroffensive has major implications for the further course of the war, in particular the health and internal stability of Ukraine’s military establishment. First and foremost, the counteroffensive has brought the Ukrainian army perhaps as many as 70,000 casualties, nearly exhausted the army’s reserves, depleted its short- and medium-range artillery capabilities, led to the destruction of perhaps more than 5,000 pieces of military equipment. There is growing discontent in the middle-officer ranks and among the rank-and-file as a result of bad strategic and tactical operation of the counteroffensive, which led to throwing small wave after small wave along the same difficult, often heavily mined terrain without air cover and artillery suppression against far superior force in order to take and re-take small patches of territory and insignificant, depopulated, and almost completely destroyed villages.
Psychologically, Ukrainian soldiers are demoralized because of the high casualties and insignificant gains they brought on the background of the leadership’s claims that Western military equipment and training would lead to a successful counteroffensive as demoralized Russian forces would be routed and retreat as they did in Kharkiv and Kherson last year. Ukrainian society has been treated to this spectacle, exposure of wide-scale corruption in civilian and even military leadership circles, brutal forced recruitment tactics contrasted against the privileged party life abroad enjoyed by government officials, oligarch, and these elites’ sons and daughters. If the army comes from society and a demoralized army meets an outraged society, the will of both the army and society to keep up the fight cannot but be shaken.
These trends wll be made even more powerful, as the war leads to greater militarization of society. One manifestation of such a development that will intensify politicization in the military is the recruitment of military personnel, including officers, by political parties. Reports suggest that Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelenskiy is preparing to jettison his now exceedingly corrupt and thus unpopular ‘Servants of the People’ Party and form a new one which will be based largely on those who served in the military (https://t.me/rezident_ua/19475). Other Ukrainian parties are likely to follow this example, further militarizing society and politicizing the army.
As the position of Ukraine’s army deteriorates along the 600-mile front, the likelihood of a military insurrection and/or popular revolt becomes quite high.
KIEV COUP
Wars tend to politicize militaries, and there can be nothing worse for civil-military relations in any country than a mix of the collapse or even just the failure of a military campaign run by a civilian leadership along with a failing but increasingly politicized military. As the civilian leadership continues to flail in the running of the war, with Zelenskiy’s less than competent leadership and his alienation of allies, the issue of its replacement by a military leadership or a new civilian one brought to power by the military cannot but appear on the agenda. Chief of the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Gen. Valeriy Zalyuzhnyi was opposed to the timing of this summer’s failed counteroffensive but was careful to publicly point the finger only at Ukraine’s Western allies for pushing the counteroffensive without providing Ukraine’s army the necessary weapons for artillery and air support for carrying out. But there should be no doubt that he also blames the civilian leadership for succumbing to such pressure, overpromising the results of such a hasty and poorly thought out offensive, and perhaps even for Zelenskiy’s failure to resist the West’s pressure to continue the war rather than conclude the March 2022 Istanbul talks for an agreement that would have avoided the disaster now hanging over Kiev. There can also be little doubt that many other military officers as well as rank-and-file soldiers fell the same way.
From the other side of Ukraine’s political spectrum on this issue, the ultra-nationalists and neo-fascists who comprise the vanguard of the ‘war party’ in Kiev form a good part of the Ukrainian army, though surely many have perished in the fighting over the past 19 months. This element has less commitment to the rule of law, and many of the so inclined have long asserted that the Miadan revolt was just the first phase of Ukraine’s ‘national revolution’, which needs to be completed by the final neofascist takeover. On this background, the risk of a palace and/or military coup runs high. Forces such as Right Sector, Azov, the Ukrainian Volunteer Corps, and a host of smaller ultranationalist and neofascist parties and organizations, with access to arms could return to Kiev and seize power in tandem with some moderate military officers. After all, these elements have been a source of political violence, mass disturbances, and protests of neofascist intimidation for a decade or more. Indeed, they played the lead role in transforming the peaceful Maidan demonstrations, motivated by European aspirations and distaste for corruption, into a violent false flag terrorist attack that targeted protesters and police, sparking the outrage that led to fall of President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014. There is no reason why they cannot convert a new cycle of upheaval, even chaos into a new overthrow of the political leadership.
A military coup or military-backed coup could also come about as a result of the disintegration and isolation of one or more large Ukrainian military contingent, which manages to set up a separate or even separatist enclave, for example in western Ukraine or parts thereof, under the patronage and leadership of a local politician, oligarch and/or military commander establishing himself as warlord. In this way and others political schism could spark internecine warfare and civil war.
CIVIL WAR
Any successful coup in Kiev or separatist entity could generate an opposition, sparking civil war. Along with the breakup of the army or simply given the ubiquity of weapons in Ukraine, such a rejection of the coup leadership by one or more forces would almost certainly lead to internecine violence. Ukrainian culture is touted by many in the West as essentially a Western one, characterized by values of freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. This is inaccurate. Ukrainian political culture is equally dominated by an anarchic democracy, which can confound republicanism and the rule of law. The various neofascist, ultranationalist, moderate nationalist, national democratic, and liberal democratic elements in Ukrainian culture and society have not been successful in forging a political and cultural consensus over the course of thirty post-Soviet years. Although the separation of the pro-Russian and Soviet nostalgic east and Crimea eliminated one of the points around which conflict swirled in Ukrainian state and society, the others noted above remain and are incompatible with each other. To be sure, the war consolidated Ukrainian society in the first year of the war, as the rise of Zelenskiy’s catastrophic approval ratings at the time demonstrated. However, the ‘bump’ from the shock of the war’s onset has largely dissipated, and defeat at the front is likely to return Zelenskiy’s ratings to their pre-war low. Zelenskiy’s new face and fresh energy temporarily consolidated Ukrainian society and dampened its schismatic, conflictive, and anarchic cultural elements. Now, however, deep divisions, high political tensions, internecine violence, and the threat of civil war are being revived. The threat of civil war raises the specter of chaos and quagmire.
THE POTENTIAL OF A UKRAINIAN QUAGMIRE FOR RUSSIA
There is real potential for any internecine conflict or civil war to devolve into political and social chaos and state breakdown or failure. In a failing or failed war-torn, even civil war-torn Ukraine, we could see one or more remnants of the army, one or more guérilla or partisan armies carrying out combat, sabotage, and terrorist attacks against any Russian occupying force. The farther west Russian forces move and attempt to occupy and annex territories, the likelihood of the emergence of an underground partisan army in the tradition of the Ukrainian Partisan Army of World War II and post-World War II anti-Soviet resistance grows. Even in the Russia-annexed southern regions of Kherson and Zaporozhe — where there is considerable, though likely not majority pro-Russian sentiment – pro-Russian administrations have been plagued by assassinations of their officials and other cases of support for Kiev. Underground resistance to Russian rule also likely would emerge in Mikolaev and Odessa in the south, Kharkov, Sumy, and Chernigov in the north, as well as in central, not to mention in very anti-Russian western Ukraine.
Depending on how the war plays out, Russia may be forced to send forces into one or more of these areas, crossing the Dnepr around Kiev and moving further west would guarantee the Russians a difficult occupation. If Ukrainian armed factions are roaming and fighting, growing millions of refugees and general chaos, the Russians could find themselves in a situation like that which faced the US and NATO forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, contending with a long, drawn out armed guerrilla insurgency, underground terrorism, and nation-building.
But it is not just Russia that will feel the repercussions of such developments. Belarus, Moldova, and Europe’s NATO and EU states will see an even greater influx of Ukrainian refugees. Poland will simply be inundated, and with great mutual antagonism lying just below the surface of Polish-Ukrainian relations, there would be potential for Ukrainian political violence in Poland.
CONCLUSION
The above is no longer an unlikely scenario; several of its elements are beginning to shift over into the likely category. For Russia, a quagmire would lengthen and raise the costs of Russia’s involvement in Ukraine. Moscow cannot let a new anti-Russian regime to emerge in Kiev or allow chaos and state collapse to persist on its border. Russia could end up facing a second Afghanistan, with all the domestic political risks such a development would be fraught. Imagine a scenario in which Moscow has been saddled with Ukrainian conflict, chaos, and state-building for 5-10 years and Putin’s health begins to wane or fails. Not a preferred scenario, you would agree.
Obviously, a Russian quagmire in Ukraine will offer opportunities for the West to continue attempting to exact costs on Russia for its actions in Ukraine. Washington, Brussels, London and Warsaw could supply and fund anti-Russian partisan and terrorist activity. A recent U.S. strategic plan for the future of Ukraine being discussed in the wake of Kiev’s failed, ill-conceived counteroffensive already proposes creation of a “national level resistance plan,” that, according to Politico, “could allude to ordinary Ukrainians fighting back if Russia gains more territory” and about which “(t)he State Department official would not clarify that point” (www.politico.com/news/2023/10/02/biden-admin-ukraine-strategy-corruption-00119237). It cannot be excluded that in tiring of Zelenskiy’s less than competent, increasingly erratic, and unpopular leadership the West may back a coup plot against him. After all, Washington for its part has a long track record of doing so. In any civil war scenario, the West likely would attempt to ensure that pro-Western, anti-Russian Ukrainians came to power, arming and funding one or another group as has now become the tradition. Most disturbingly of all, a scenario of social chaos and state failure will heighten the fog of war and politics to a peak of uncertainty in which the risk of miscalculation by Russia and/or the West becomes even greater than it is now. This risks the spread of the Ruin scenario beyond Ukraine’s borders to the detriment of Russia, the West, and perhaps all the rest of us.
