War Diaries is a collection of writer and analyst Gilbert Doctorow’s regular essays on the Russia—Ukraine war covering the first two years of 2022—2023.  He has been a specialist on Russia for many years and readers of this blog will be familiar with him as I have cross-posted him plenty of times and reviewed other books by him. 

To summarize his background and expertise on Russia and the former Soviet Union, he was born and raised in the U.S., but his grandparents were Russian emigres.  His family background fostered a curiosity about Russia and he studied the country and its history at both Harvard and Columbia, including taking courses under the notorious Richard Pipes.  He then traveled through Western and Eastern Europe on a fellowship, and received another fellowship that enabled him to study for a year at the state archives in Leningrad and Moscow from 1971-72.  It was during this time that he met a young Russian writer who would become his wife. He earned his living doing consultancy work for U.S. companies with major industrial projects at the time in the Soviet Union.  Thus began a career that would span through the 1990’s working in management and consultancy positions for companies, mostly in the food processing, liquor and agribusiness industries, throughout Europe and Russia.  Through his work, he acquired a deep knowledge of the language and culture of Russia. Though his home base is in Brussels, he lives part-time in St. Petersburg and has provided regular updates over the years on what the Russian situation is like socially and economically in response to sanctions and varying degrees of war.  Some of those dispatches from 2022 and 2023 are included in his anthology.

The bulk, however, involve essays describing and analyzing the lead-up to and first two years of what is known in Russia as the “special military operation (SMO).”  In much of the western mainstream media it is referred to as “Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.” His essays also regularly provide a summary of what the domestic Russian media are saying – something that much of western media and punditry largely ignore, which is negligent if one’s purpose is to actually inform an audience or readership about Russia and its policies.

The book is over 700 pages long, so I have provided a review and thoughts on points throughout the essays that I found particularly interesting.*

Doctorow starts the book off with essays from one year prior to the SMO to provide context, with particular attention to how the Covid pandemic had already paved the way for the severance of economic and travel connections between Russia and the West. This is something that had become obscured to me over time and his mentioning it was an interesting reminder that the West was continuing its gradual mission since 2003 of finding a multitude of reasons to distance itself from and vilify Russia.

A recurring theme in Doctorow’s writing is the West’s refusal to understand, much less take seriously, Russia’s concerns and how its perceptions of relations directly inform what actions it will take:

“My overriding concern has been that the U.S. and foreign policy communities are ‘flying blind’ as they conduct their war on Russia since they do not take into account anything being said on the other side of the barricades. That can be fatal. We simply will not know how and why we are under missile attack should it come. Our leaders insist that Vladimir Putin’s actions are unknowable when nothing could be further from the truth.” (page xiv)

It would be difficult to disagree with Doctorow on this since Putin first clearly delineated Russia’s concerns with the West’s treatment of Russia and its legitimate interests in the very public forum of the Munich Security Conference in 2007. He has reiterated those points to varying degrees in subsequent speeches and interviews over the years as well as making concrete proposals to negotiate a more equitable security architecture in the Euro-Atlantic region at least twice since 2007 to avoid escalation. It was the West, led by Washington, that constantly dismissed Russia’s concerns and attempts at meaningful diplomacy.

Part of the answer to why Washington doesn’t seem able to display any strategic empathy and doesn’t know how to negotiate is provided by Doctorow himself in the following observation:

“U.S. policy is based on scenarios written by political scientists with the intellectual capacity and life experience of college sophomores; Victoria Nuland is an outstanding example.” (page 6)

Expounding on this theme later, he states:

“The problem in Washington is that no one on Capitol Hill or in the foreign policy community wants to acknowledge the obvious facts about Russia today. Everyone is happy with the version of a slovenly, chaotic Russia led by a merciless dictator, whose regime is fragile and just needs a little push, like Nicholas II’s autocracy, to tilt over and collapse. This is rubbish and if it remains the foundation of U.S. policy towards Russia under Biden then we can expect nothing much to happen to reduce the dangers of nuclear war or move towards calmer waters in international relations.” (page 25)

As I’ve written before, the people in Washington who serve as advisors and staff the executive branch are largely of poor quality.  They are pampered ideologues who are too arrogant to understand their own ignorance at worst (e.g. Michael McFaul) or career-climbing opportunists who know better than to stray much from the establishment narrative no matter how dangerously distorted it may be (e.g. Fiona Hill). In any event, Doctorow was very accurate in recognizing that the Biden administration’s attitude did not bode well.

Refreshingly, the author acknowledges that he was wrong in some of his analysis or predictions leading up to the SMO and in the early days of the fighting. For example, he (along with many others) predicted that the war would be relatively short. He admits that he did not initially take into consideration the following: 1) the US-led West’s view that this was a war to weaken Russia, using Ukraine as a proxy, and its willingness to increasingly escalate its provision of weapons and assistance to Ukraine that simply delays Ukraine’s inevitable defeat rather than facilitating victory, and 2) Russia’s approach to fighting the war has given consideration to the fact that Ukrainians are an historically fraternal people and therefore they wanted to forego a “shock and awe” style war of overwhelming destruction and mass civilian casualties. Ukraine does not look like Fallujah in 2003 or Gaza in 2025.

“Moscow wished to avoid civilian casualties in Ukraine to prevent revanchism after the fighting was over. This necessarily slowed the progress on the battlefield versus what we onlookers in the West expected. And when the acts of terror committed against Russian civilians put an end to Moscow’s indulgence for Ukrainians, the political calculations of the Kremlin to avoid casualties among its own troops that might kindle political disturbances within Russia nonetheless required avoidance of heroic mass offensives and storming of cities. This also slowed the Russian advance versus the forecast of outside observers.” (p. xv)

Regarding the actual invasion or start of the SMO, Doctorow says it was a response to the major increase in attacks by Kiev on the Donbas in the days prior and to prevent what Moscow believed to be a major imminent attack by Kiev on the rebel oblasts:

“The Russian invasion of Ukraine was timed to forestall what Moscow perceived to be an imminent and massive campaign by Kiev to storm the rebellious provinces of the Donbas. [A major uptick in attacks by Kiev on the Donbas was recorded by the OSCE in the days prior to the start of the SMO]. In that respect, defense of compatriots and of the Russian World was a motivating factor.  However, there was also a wholly different and less often publicly stated motivation at the level of strategic defense of the Russian Federation.

After all, Russia was deeply concerned over the advancing NATO presence in Ukraine during the time since 2014 when American and European advisors supervised the rebuilding of the Ukrainian armed forces and prepared the country for accession into NATO, an ambition that they had been promoting since 2008. Intelligence reports indicated that the British in particular were busy preparing to set up naval installations in one or another Ukrainian Black Sea port, and other NATO infrastructure was being introduced inland. The Russians expected the placement of US missiles in Ukraine, all of which would pose threats to Russian security with or without NATO membership.” (page xvii)

Doctorow also admits that he did not see the real significance at the time of the draft peace agreement of April 2022 scuttled by the West in the person of Boris Johnson who advised Ukrainian president Zelensky to keep the conflict going with the West insisting it would help Ukraine fight Russia for as long as it takes.  As those who have been following the war closely will know, the draft agreement would have left Ukraine with a much better deal than it will ever get now or in the future and hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian men would still be living their lives rather than moldering in the ground.  The terms provided that Ukraine could join the EU [whether the EU will ever actually accept them as a full member is another matter], and Kherson and Zaporozhe and the Donbas would be independent in exchange for Crimea being recognized as de facto Russian, Ukraine being formally neutral and foreign military personnel and installations being prohibited on Ukrainian territory.

With respect to the initial sanctions imposed by the West after the start of the SMO, Doctorow points out how these were an extension of previous punitive measures against Russia including the Magnitsky Act for alleged human rights violations and sanctions in response to the Crimea annexation (or reintegration depending on your point of view).  Russia’s response in the form of import substitution and strengthening economic ties with the non-West had been developing and has continued to keep Russia’s economy going, rendering western predictions of a dramatic economic collapse foolhardy.

It will be interesting to read Volume II when it comes out. I’m sure it will provide interesting commentary on what will no doubt be a continuing refusal on the part of the US-led West, due to its incompetence and hubris, to deal with reality when it comes to Russia.

*Doctorow’s books are always hefty and therefore tend to look a bit intimidating. Potential readers can peruse the Foreword, Introduction, and Table of Contents so they can pick and choose what will be most interesting and valuable to them.

Russia Matters, 11/14/25

1. Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies (known by their acronyms NABU and SAPO) announced on Nov. 10 that they had uncovered a $100 million kickback and money laundering scheme at the Energoatom state-owned nuclear energy company.¹ The 15-month inquiry, which has been codenamed “Midas,”² focuses on allegations of illegal payments by Energoatom contractors—typically 10–15% of contract value—to retain business.³ Suspects reportedly include Minister of Justice Herman Halushchenko, Energy Minister Svitlana Hrynchuk and Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s onetime business partner, Timur Mindich.⁴ Mindich—who is suspected of having allegedly run the kickback scheme—fled Ukraine as investigators closed in, while the two ministers resigned. With arrests already underway (prosecutors named seven suspects, with five detained), Zelenskyy—who was elected president in April 2019 on a promise to root out the pervasive graft,⁵ but who then came under strong fire at home and in the West in summer 2025 for attempting to defangthe two anti-corruption agencies—called for arrests, promised a reset at Energoatom and sanctions on those involved. The scandal has fueled public outrage at home—particularly amid the ongoing blackouts caused by Russian attacks—and has increased pressure on Zelenskyy’s government to deliver lasting accountability.⁶
   1. European leaders issued warnings to Ukraine this week, saying that continued military and financial support depends on Kyiv taking decisive action against corruption. European Commission spokesman Guillaume Mercier called on Ukraine to protect its anti-corruption bodies and ensure clean handling of international financial support. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz told Zelenskyy that Europe expects Ukraine to advance anti-corruption reforms, while German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul stressed that Western aid hinges on stronger anti-corruption measures. Dutch Finance Minister Eelco Heinen also emphasized that EU aid packages are conditional on Ukraine’s fight against graft. Italy’s Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini warned that more aid could prolong the war and worsen corruption. Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó called for a freeze on EU funds to Ukraine, while Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban declared that “the golden illusion of Ukraine is falling apart.” Asked if the disclosures have shaken EU confidence, Lithuanian Finance Minister Kristupas Vaitiekunas responded in blunt terms: “Maybe, but what other options do we have?” according to The Washington Post.
2. In the period of Oct. 14–Nov. 11, 2025, Russian forces gained 165 square miles of Ukrainian territory, an increase over the 154 square miles these forces gained during the previous four-week period, according to the Nov. 12, 2025, issue of RM’s Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. This week, Russian forces have been advancing into the eastern towns of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, which they are “very likely” to seize, according to ISW. Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT reportedly announced on Nov. 12 that Russia’s gain of 15 square miles (40 square kilometers), made in the preceding 24 hours, was the largest daily territorial gain by the Russian troops since the start of the year. DeepState also reported that Russian forces captured the following settlements in southeastern and eastern Ukraine on Nov. 7–14: Novoe, Novouspenivske, Rivnopillia, Uspenivka, Katerynivka, Novomykolaivka, Yablukove and, most recently, Stepova Novoselivka. Since Jan. 1, 2025, average Russian monthly gains have been 170 square miles, according to the RM card.
   1. Russia launched 98 ballistic missiles into Ukraine in October, a record since observations began in May 2023, with only 17 intercepted by Ukraine, according to the card.
3. Ukrainian prosecutors estimate that 290,000 cases have been opened for desertion or absence without leave since the start of the war, highlighting the severe manpower crisis facing Ukrainian forces, according to The New York Times. In October alone, nearly 20,000 such cases were recorded—the highest monthly figure this year—as Russian troops exploit gaps along thinly held lines in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, where just four to seven infantrymen defend each kilometer of the 1,000 kilometer frontline, according to Financial Times. “The result [of desertions] is that the [Ukrainian] land forces are not expanding but are actually declining in numbers,’’ Konrad Muzyka, director of Rochan Consulting, told FT.
4. A German federal police investigation has concluded that an elite Ukrainian military unit, directed by Gen. Valeriy Zaluzhniy, was responsible for the September 2022 Nord Stream pipeline bombings, aiming to disrupt Russian energy revenues and Moscow’s ties with Germany, The Wall Street Journal reported. Investigators relied on surveillance photos and boat rental records, issuing European arrest warrants for three Ukrainian soldiers and four divers.⁷ The findings have triggered diplomatic friction: Poland has refused to extradite one suspect, hailing him as a hero, while Italy is considering a similar extradition request, according to WSJ. The case has intensified political divisions within Germany—where the far-right has capitalized on public anger over energy prices—and across Europe, straining unity and stirring debates about continued aid to Kyiv. [As regular readers of this blog know, this narrative of who and how the Nordstream pipeline bombing was carried out is not very credible. Apparently, German authorities must decide on a narrative that doesn’t admit their own cravenness in allowing self-righteous allies to destroy their infrastructure and economy. – Natylie]
5. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that the Russia-China Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation remains fully relevant and that the approaching expiration date of July 16, 2026, will not go unnoticed by either side, according to Kommersant. Lavrov indicated that Moscow and Beijing are working on extending or updating the treaty as its term nears completion, according to Kommersant. It will be interesting to see if there will be new definitions of the Russian-Chinese relationship if the signatories update the treaty rather than extend it.*

YouTube link here.

By Thomas Graham, The National Interest, 10/26/25

President Donald Trump’s proposed meeting with Russian president Vladimir Putin in Budapest may never take place, and a final settlement of the Russia-Ukraine war may lie far in the future. Yet, it is not premature to consider how such a settlement should be framed to advance US interests in European security and in relations with Russia. Broadly speaking, two strategic approaches are available: containment, the preferred option of much of the foreign-policy establishment, and competitive coexistence. The choice between them depends on how the United States assesses Russia.

As during the Cold War, containment treats Russia as an implacable adversary with intolerable geopolitical ambitions in Europe and beyond. Echoing George Kennan’s logic, it assumes that thwarting Russian expansionist ambitions will eventually erode the foundations of the regime and yield a new Russia, a country more in tune with Western values and a potential partner for the United States. 

A strategy of competitive coexistence, by contrast, begins from the assumption that Russia is a permanent rival whose domestic system and strategic mindset the West cannot change through pressure or inducement. It sees the task of US foreign policy not as defeating or transforming Russia but rather as managing competition responsibly to prevent direct military confrontation, which could prove catastrophic for both sides.

Containment and competitive coexistence share the goal of preserving Ukraine’s sovereignty and preventing further Russian aggression against its neighbors. Where they diverge is in their understanding of how to address the two central issues of this conflict: security guarantees for Ukraine and the disposition of disputed territory.

Containment: Moral Clarity and Strategic Rigidity

Applied to the current war, containment would take a principled stand in support of Ukraine’s right to seek NATO membership, even if that prospect remains remote for the time being. It would place no limits on Ukraine’s security cooperation with NATO or individual allies. It would reject any restrictions on Kyiv’s military capabilities beyond its voluntary commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons. Any Russian objections would be dismissed out of hand.

Containment would also insist on Ukraine’s territorial integrity within its internationally recognized 1991 borders, refusing to accept any political settlement that legitimized Russian gains since 2014. De facto Russian control of occupied territories might be tolerated as a temporary reality. Still, the United States would support Ukraine diplomatically, politically, and economically in efforts to recover them over time.

Containment thus satisfies the moral and legal imperatives of defending sovereignty and resisting aggression. Yet it carries costs. By denying Russia any face-saving exit or security assurances, containment risks prolonging the war. It could entrench a new Cold War dynamic, destabilize Europe, and impose devastating long-term costs on Ukraine, the very nation it seeks to protect.

Competitive Coexistence: Managing Rivalry to Avoid Ruin

A strategy of competitive coexistence, by contrast, would urge Ukraine to adopt a posture of armed neutrality as a way to secure its sovereignty while addressing Russia’s security concerns. Kyiv would forswear NATO membership and agree not to host foreign forces, while still developing its defense-industrial base—with Western investment and technology—to build the weapons needed for self-defense. It would limit Ukraine’s military capabilities, but only as part of a reciprocal arrangement imposing comparable restrictions on Russian forces within a defined zone along Ukraine’s border with Russia and Belarus.

On territorial questions, competitive coexistence would accept de facto Russian control over seized Ukrainian territory without recognizing it de jure. Rather than pursuing the restoration of the 1991 borders, it would instead favor a resolution grounded in the principle of local self-determination, allowing populations in disputed areas to decide their political affiliation through an agreed, internationally supervised democratic process. The outcome would not legitimize conquest but would instead reinforce a fundamental political right. 

This strategy is pragmatic rather than principled. It recognizes that Ukraine’s security ultimately depends not on Western moral commitment but on a stable balance of power. It would enable Ukraine to survive, rebuild, and integrate with Europe without becoming a permanent flashpoint for confrontation between nuclear powers.

Pragmatism for a Multipolar World

Containment remains appealing because it expresses moral conviction and the confidence of a superpower that stands astride the global stage, as the United States did in the immediate post-Cold War years. But the world in which the United States could dictate outcomes has long since passed. A policy of competitive coexistence offers a more realistic framework for managing enduring competition with Russia in a multipolar system; the United States cannot dominate, as it faces a rival it cannot vanquish.

Competitive coexistence does not appease aggressors, as its critics claim, nor does it reward aggression. It contains it through balance, restraint, and diplomacy. It sees compromise—even with unsavory rivals—as an element of statecraft in an open-ended contest in which setbacks can be redressed and advantages accumulated over time. It seeks not decisive victory but durable stability, a peace of imperfect justice but one achievable in practice.

In the end, the United States must choose between a policy of moral clarity and one that works. Competitive coexistence, for all its ambiguities and imperfections, offers the surer path to a Europe at peace and a global order that advances US interests and values, if not as fully or as rapidly as some would hope.

By Mike Fredenburg, Responsible Statecraft, 10/27/25

The West likes to inflate the cost of Russian weapons as a way to suggest Moscow is in a financial bind and manipulate the narrative of a looming Ukraine victory — while also masking real inefficiencies in the U.S. defense industry.

By assuming Russian weapons have input costs similar to U.S. systems or conflating export prices with Russia’s internal costs, Western estimates produce misleading figures. These inflated costs bolster the narrative that the strain on Moscow is tremendous, while downplaying the increasing challenges for Ukraine and NATO to effectively counter Russia’s relatively inexpensive missiles and drones.

Moreover, these estimates obscure a stark reality: due to difficulties in expanding production of prohibitively costly Western missiles, combined with low real-world missile interception rates, even if the U.S. and Europe sent all their air defense missiles to Ukraine, they would fall far short of being able to stop most Russian missile and drone attacks.

Overstated costs, underestimated resilience

Western media and think tanks have consistently framed Russian missile expenditures to imply unsustainability. For example, Forbes Ukraine estimated Russia spent $7.5 billion on missiles in the war’s first two months — 8.7 percent of Russia’s 2022 defense budget. A Newsweek article, citing Forbes Ukraine, reported that an August 19, 2024 attack on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure cost Moscow $1.3 billion. In the same article, the Institute for the Study of War stated that Russia “is likely unable to sustain such large-scale missile and drone strikes with regularity.” Yet, Russia’s sustained high-tempo operations over the past six months cannot help but cast doubt on this assessment.

Many of the articles emphasizing the high cost of Russia’s massive missile and drone strikes rely on missile cost estimates from an October 2022 Forbes Ukraine article estimating some key Russian missile costs including the Kh-101 at $13 million, the Kalibr at $6.5 million, the Iskander at $3 million, the P-800 Oniks at $1.25 million, the Kh-22 at $1 million, and the Tochka-U at $0.3 million.

While some of the Forbes UA cost estimates seem reasonable, most of them seem to arrive at costs suspiciously close to what U.S. taxpayers would pay for a comparable missile. Finding such costs not credible, Defense Express Ukraine made a good faith effort to come up with more realistic missile cost estimates, including the Kh-101 at $1.2 million; the Kalibr, approximately $1 million; the Iskander R-500, $1 million; the Iskander 9M723 ballistic, $2 million; and the replacement for the legendary SS-N-22 “Sunburn, supersonic anti-ship cruise missile,” approximately $3 million.

While Defense UA does not give an estimate for the Kinzhal (Kh-47M2) hypersonic missile, given that it is essentially an air-launched variant of the Iskander 9M723, the cost should be similar, about $2 million.

Still to be fair, the Russian military budget’s lack of transparency means that in most cases one has to guesstimate. However, with input costs for weapons production and development being much lower than those for the United States, one would expect Russian missiles to be less expensive than the production of U.S. or Western European ones. Russian defense manufacturing labor costs average $1,200 per worker per month, compared to at least $4,000 for U.S. workers. Materials like steel, titanium, and composites are also less expensive in Russia. Russia’s defense industry prioritizes mass production and efficiency, unlike the U.S defense industry, where profitability and shareholder returns are of greater importance.

When it comes to weapon systems development, Russia typically adopts an evolutionary approach, incrementally improving existing systems, while the U.S. is far more likely to pursue revolutionary designs incorporating unproven technologies, inflating costs.

For example, Russia’s battle-tested Kh-47M2 Kinzhal hypersonic missile builds on proven platforms, while the United States has yet to field a hypersonic missile due to projects like the U.S. AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) program, which began in 2018. It took a much riskier approach and is now over budget, behind schedule, and in danger of being canceled after over $1 billion invested.

But even if it is not totally canceled and is eventually fielded, the ARRW, at $15 million to $18 million each, will be many times more expensive per missile than the Kinzhal, will have a similar range, and does not pack the same punch. Yes, its unpowered glide vehicle will be more maneuverable than the Kinzhal, but using that maneuverability can significantly impact its terminal impact velocity and range.

Another example is the American PAC-3 MSE Patriot interceptor and Russia’s S-400 9M96E2 interceptor. Both are highly agile short-range missiles with similar ranges of about 100 km and both use active radar to track and hit their targets. Both have interception speeds of about Mach 5. Yet the PAC 3 MSE missile costs $4 million-$6 million and the estimated cost of the 9M96E2 missile is between $500,000 and $1 million.

But how do they perform? An October 2, 2025 Financial Times article gives a big hint, reporting that the Patriot interceptor rate stood at 37% in August, was slashed in the month of September to just 6%. Of course it is standard operating procedure to overstate interception rates. But even if you buy the initial 37%, it was taking five interceptors to reach a 90 percent chance of intercepting one Kinzhal. At 6%, that goes up to 38 Patriot interceptors needed.

According to Military Watch magazine and other publications, on May 16, 2023, a Patriot System system/radar and at least one of its launchers were destroyed by a Kinzhal hypersonic missile despite launching 32 Patriot interceptors in an effort to protect itself. Unsurprisingly, this particular report has been contested, but given the long history of governments and vendors grossly overestimating air defense effectiveness, lack of transparency/veracity on actual Ukrainian losses, and the incredible interception rates regularly reported by Ukraine Air Force, the report cannot be dismissed out of hand.

We don’t have much objective information on the 9M96E2’s performance, but Russia also has a history of hyping the performance of its S-400 air defense systems. Still, even if the 9M96E2 is as ineffective as the Patriot interceptors, it costs a whole lot less.

By overstating Russian missile costs, Western analysts exaggerate Russia’s financial strain, while providing cover for exorbitant missile prices being charged by Western defense contractors. This distortion obscures the reality that Russia’s cost-effective missile production provides a big advantage in sustainability, while high Western missile costs, combined with U.S. difficulties in rapidly expanding missile production, is a huge disadvantage in any kind of sustained conflict, and could be a fatal disadvantage in going up against a peer competitor that can throw thousands of missiles at our ships and even attack U.S. based military facilities.