Russia Matters, 2/2/24

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy summoned Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (ZSU) Valerii Zaluzhnyi on Jan. 29 to tell the general he was being fired. At the meeting, Zaluzhnyi was offered the post of secretary of the national security council, but he turned it down, according to The Economist.[1] Two days after the meeting, the general, still in command of ZSU, published an essay with CNN, in which he said that bureaucracy is holding back Ukraine’s defense industry and “a new philosophy of training and warfare” is needed in 2024. By doing so, he “doubled down on a confrontation with Zelenskyy over military leadership,” according to Bloomberg. Zelenskyy and Zaluzhnyi have recently sparred on whether to mobilize an additional 500,000, with the president arguing that his government lacks the money to sustain such a mobilization. Zelenskyy has also been reportedly discontent with both the insufficient progress of ZSU’s counteroffensive last year and Zaluzhnyi’s acknowledgement of stalemate on the battlefield. In addition, some members of Zelenskyy’s staff have reportedly become weary of Zaluzhnyi’s growing popularity as he has become the most trusted figure in Ukraine. The removal of Zaluzhnyi, which was yet to be formalized as of Feb. 2, but which Kyiv has already informed Washington about, would cause an uproar within both Ukraine’s civil society and ZSU’s rank-and-file, according to FT. Nevertheless, two generals are being mentioned as contenders to replace Zaluzhnyi, commander of the ground forces Oleksandr Syrsky and military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov, according to the Economist and WP.

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According to an article by Seymour Hersh dated 2/1/24, one of the main reasons Zelensky wants to fire Zaluzhny is because the general has been conducting secret talks with western military and intelligence officials about a path toward a negotiated end to the war, which Zelensky opposes:

Zelensky’s desire to fire his commanding general is the result, some Americans believe, of his knowledge that Zaluzhny had continued to participate—whether directly or through aides is not known—in secret talks since last fall with American and other Western officials on how best to achieve a ceasefire and negotiate an end to the war with Russia. It was those talks that led Zaluzhny to declare to the Economist that the war was stalemated. Zelensky has talked of mobilizing 500,000 more soldiers, via another draft, and to try again this spring to launch another counteroffensive against the Russians. Ukraine, of course, would need renewed funding from the Biden administration to do so. It is not clear that Republicans in Congress are prepared to finance another counteroffensive, but there is little doubt that the Biden administration would lobby hard for the funds. (On Thursday, the EU approved funding for Ukraine in excess of 50 billion euros.)

All of this comes at a time when there has been renewed interest among some in the American military and intelligence community in finding a way to both support significant reform in the Ukrainian government and support Zaluzhny’s efforts for far-reaching talks with Russia about a settlement in the war. A few hints of the details were provided last week to the Washington Post in a story headlined “In Ukraine, U.S. dials back plans to take turf.” The article left open the possibility of Ukraine undertaking future military action against Russia. The Post reported that the key elements are support for Ukraine’s battered industrial and export base and funding for the political reforms required for full integration into Western Europe.

According to Hersh’s sources, various western officials, including current CIA director William Burns, have communicated to Zelensky in recent months that continued western support is dependent upon four things: implementing serious reforms to address corruption, a meaningful audit of all government funding, serious investment in building up Ukrainian infrastructure and economy, and defense of the country.

The current plan evolved among experts in the intelligence and military bureaucracy without input from the White House, the State Department, or the National Security Council. “It stems from the American and Ukraine general staffs and it is putting investments” from private industry, the official said, “and not solely government funding and grants as the ticket out.

In a December 1, 2023 article, Hersh claimed that, according to his sources, Zaluzhny had also been conducting secret talks with Russian Chief of General Staff of the armed forces Valery Gerasimov:

The ingredient that triggered the private talks is a shared understanding that Putin would not object to a settlement that fixed borders according to where the troops were in place when the peace talks ended. Russia would be left with unchallenged control of Crimea and, pending an election to be held under martial law in March, with essential control of the four provinces, or oblasts, that Russia annexed last year: Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and the still embattled Kherson. In return—in a concession not foreseen—Russia, that is, Putin himself, would not object to Ukraine joining NATO.

Though Hersh has an excellent reputation as an investigative reporter, his understanding of Russian politics and society seems to be rather shallow and he seems to have an overreliance on mainstream media sources and his own insider government sources in forming his view of Russia and its leadership. I think this may make him vulnerable at times to unwittingly publishing what amounts to information warfare from western insiders. While it’s possible there have been talks between Zaluzhny and Gerasimov to get a feel for how a negotiated settlement could be worked out, I don’t find it credible that Putin would allow Ukraine to join NATO even if Crimea and the four oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia were agreed to be part of Russia. NATO membership – de facto or de jure – was a repeatedly stated red line over the course of many years and It’s the main reason Putin felt the need to conduct the “special military operation.” Even if Putin were foolish enough to think a smaller Ukraine would be less of a long-term threat on behalf of NATO shenanigans, I don’t think it would fly politically among Russians, especially among Russian families who have lost loved ones in the fighting. My sense is that most Russians don’t care about taking any more territory but It would be tough to spin Ukraine ultimately joining NATO as a Russian victory worthy of the sacrifice, especially when Russia has gained the upper hand.

By Ted Galen Carpenter, Antiwar.com, 1/10/24

There are multiple indications that members of the foreign policy establishment are increasingly worried that the American people are growing weary of Washington’s strategic overextension and the excessive costs in treasure and blood that role imposes.  Elites show their nervousness through desperate attempts to preserve the policy status quo.  One recent example was the effort in Congress to limit the president’s powers and options regarding NATO.

In December 2023, hawks finally achieved their goal when both the Senate and House approved a provision attached to the National Defense Authorization Act that would bar a president from withdrawing the U.S. from NATO without the approval of two-thirds of the Senate or separate legislation passed by both houses of Congress. Washington Post analyst Meagan Vasquez notes that “the bipartisan attempt to add checks and balances highlights the lengths Congress is willing to go to protect the U.S.-NATO relationship amid ongoing Russian aggression and after years of criticism of the military alliance during Trump’s presidential tenure.”

Yet even the Brookings Institution’s Michael E. O’Hanlon, a prominent establishment foreign policy figure, concedes that Congress is entering uncharted and controversial territory.  He points out “that there is precedent for presidents withdrawing unilaterally from treaties without consulting Congress. A chief executive conceivably could push back on efforts to restrict that [authority] particularly if the treaty addresses the United States’ defense posture abroad.  A “future president might challenge such an effort and invoke the president’s authorities as commander in chief under Article 2 of the Constitution.”

O’Hanlon is probably correct.  Indeed, a congressional-presidential collision is likely to take place even if critics of promiscuous military interventions do not attempt to end U.S. membership in NATO.  Members of the “NATO forever” crowd will react badly even if a president committed to a more restrained foreign policy merely attempts to reduce the U.S. military footprint in Europe.  Such a move would indicate a long overdue willingness on the part of an administration to move beyond burden sharing toward burden shifting with respect to transatlantic security policy.

Even a partial withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe would signal to the European members of NATO that going forward they would need to accept primary responsibility for their own defense and the continent’s security.  NATO partisans would regard such a policy change as undermining continued U.S. dominance of the trans-Atlantic security relationship.  That faction in Congress would almost certainly move to thwart a reformist administration.

U.S. hardliners already have demonstrated a determination to prevent any president from implementing a less interventionist policy elsewhere in the world.  In October 2019, congressional hawks led by neo-conservative Rep. Liz Cheney (R-WY) secured a resolution condemning President Donald Trump for even considering a partial withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria.  Fears that Trump might remove U.S. forces from Europe during a second term have become widespread in Washington.  Indeed, those worries on the part of America’s stodgy foreign policy elite were a major reason why Congress passed the new bi-partisan measure to prohibit the president from unilaterally exiting NATO.

It is notable that Congress has afforded presidents a great deal of latitude both with respect to the general handling of foreign policy and specifically in the use of U.S. forces on the world scene.  Yet that restraint seems to apply only when a president is willing to continue Washington’s interventionist foreign policy.  When merely a theoretical possibility of a less belligerent policy emerges, congressional hawks are prepared to severely restrict the president’s role as commander-and-chief of the military.

The controversy over whether the president has the authority to withdraw U.S. membership in NATO reflects a broader problem with U.S. foreign policy.  The core feature of Washington’s long-standing insistence on U.S. global primacy is a NATO under permanent U.S. dominance. That determination has been evident for decades.  Even when the Soviet Union disintegrated, there was vehement opposition from members of the foreign policy blob to dissolving an alliance whose overriding purpose was to counter Soviet power in Europe.  Clearly, that mission was no longer needed since the Soviet Union no longer existed.

Instead of accepting and adjusting to that existential change, the blob’s reaction was to find alternative missions for their sacred, but now obsolete, alliance.  Suggested new missions even included promoting student exchanges and coordinating environmental policies, measures for which a military alliance is not needed.  Worse, NATO enthusiasts sought to expand the alliance into Eastern Europe, thereby threatening non-Communist Russia’s security zone.  Such provocative actions eventually poisoned the West’s relations with Moscow.  The war in Ukraine and the resulting NATO-Russia confrontation is the alarming result.

The American people need to firmly rebuff the ongoing effort to make the current U.S. posture toward NATO permanent.  A smart foreign policy must be agile and willing to adjust to important changes in the international system.  The place to begin such badly needed policy reform is by rejecting the out-of-touch foreign policy establishment’s escalating campaign to freeze NATO in place.

Ted Galen Carpenter, Senior Fellow at the Randolph Bourne Institute, is the author of 13 books and more than 1,200 articles on international affairs. Dr. Carpenter held various senior policy positions during a 37-year career at the Cato institute. His latest book is Unreliable Watchdog: The News Media and U.S. Foreign Policy (2022).

By Andrew Korybko, Substack, 1/15/24

Former Ukrainian MP Andrey Derkach dropped a bunch of bombshells about Biden’s corrupt dealings in Ukraine in a recent interview with Italian-American journalist Simona Mangiante. The takeaways can be read here, but they basically boil down to bribes and money laundering, among other crimes. While they might boost the Republicans’ impeachment efforts in the House where the opposition has a slim majority, their lack of a two-thirds majority in the Senate means that he won’t be removed from office.

Even so, these new allegations can still have an important impact on events, one that might be much more significant than his superficial impeachment by the House. Proceedings at that level have become politicized as proven by the Democrats’ witch hunt against Trump, which isn’t to say that the Republicans are carrying out their own against Biden, but just to emphasize that impeachment by the House has no tangible significance. At most, it’ll strengthen both parties’ efforts to get out the vote in November.

Where the actual importance of these latest allegations lies is in the larger context of the Ukrainian Conflict, which began to wind down late last year following the failure of Kiev’s counteroffensive and the consequent dwindling of Western aid. The Republicans already made their agreement on any more such deals contingent on robust border security reforms, but they might now also include the additional condition of a comprehensive joint investigation with Ukraine into Derkach’s bombshells about Biden.

If the opposition makes such a proposal, then there’s no way that the Democrats would agree, thus capsizing the possibility of any compromise on this issue until next year after November’s elections, which could shake up the congressional dynamics and potentially lead to Biden’s ouster as well. Furthermore, Zelensky’s regime can’t be counted on to assist any theoretical joint investigation in good faith since leading figures are also implicated in this corruption per Derkach’s revelations.

That particular point adds a curious twist to this scandal since it suggests that they might also be able to blackmail the Biden Administration, which provides a new layer of understanding to why the incumbent and his team have been so gung-ho about perpetuating NATO’s proxy war on Russia through Ukraine. Zelensky knows that any outcome short of the maximalist victory that he fantasizes about would kill his political career so he has self-interested reasons in wanting to turn this into a so-called “forever war”.

The US’ objective national interests aren’t served by depleting even more of its stockpiles and therefore reducing its ability to flexibly respond to foreign crises as they arise, or rather might even be provoked by America or its partners, hence why it’s become popular to talk about freezing the conflict. Former NATO Supreme Commander Admiral James Stavridis’ Korean-like “land-for-peace” armistice proposal last year could be a starting point but only if the West agrees to Russia’s security guarantee requests in Ukraine.

They’ve been reluctant to do so, however, hence why no progress has been made on this. One reason behind the US’ recalcitrance might not just be that it’s concerned about “losing face” upon reaching a pragmatic series of mutual compromises with Russia, but that Zelensky is blackmailing the Biden Administration that he’ll spill the beans if they dare to pursue this policy. Given his prior “godlike” status in the Western media, any corroboration of Derkach’s claims might be widely believed by Westerners.

They know that Zelensky isn’t a so-called “Russian agent” and have convinced themselves that he’s a “democratic freedom fighter” so it would be very damning to the incumbent Democrats’ reputation if he engaged in a “limited hangout” by sharing some relevant information. He of course wouldn’t implicate himself or his most loyal allies, but he could take down a couple less politically reliable officials in that event (perhaps as part of a purge) while possibly dooming Biden’s re-election and flipping the Senate.

Republican control of the White House and Congress coupled with what many regard as the right-leaning Supreme Court could lead to the Democrats’ worst nightmare of their opponents reversing most of Biden’s policies. Meanwhile, Zelensky’s worst nightmare is that Biden bows to the popular sentiment among Americans to scale back their country’s participation in this proxy war and coerce him to resume peace talks with Russia, so each can therefore keep the other in check through this mutual blackmail.

The legitimacy of both the Biden Administration and Zelensky’s regime is therefore dependent on each of them staying silent about their corruption scheme, but one or the other could at least in theory reveal some details about this if they begin to distrust the other or want to get rid of them. For instance, the Biden Administration could leak some information about Zelensky’s corruption to pro-Democrat media to pressure him into resuming peace talks or to pave the way for a “government of national unity”.

That proposal was pushed by a member of the influential Atlantic Council think tank last month in an article for Politico and could credibly be interpreted as a signal that the Biden Administration is beginning to get fed up with Zelensky. As for the Ukrainian leader, it was already explained that he might be the first to leak certain details about this scheme if he feels that the Democrats’ support for this proxy war is faltering, which could be one of his “nuclear options” in that case alongside a major false flag.

Circling back to Derkach’s latest corruption allegations, their impact in terms of the Ukrainian Conflict is much more important than the possibility of them aiding the Republicans’ efforts to impeach Biden in the House since they can’t remove him due to a dearth of support in the Senate. The Republicans could make support for more Ukrainian aid conditional on a joint investigation into these claims and/or the Biden Administration or the Zelensky regime could leak evidence if the other doesn’t do their bidding.

Link here.

January 31, 2024 – The United Nations’ top court on Wednesday mostly rejected Ukraine’s claims that Russia was financing “terrorism” in eastern Ukraine, saying only that Moscow had failed to investigate alleged breaches. Fernande Van Tets, FRANCE 24’s correspondent in the Netherlands, reports from The Hague on why this ruling is such a victory for Russia.

By Ben Aris, Intellinews, 1/14/24

Russia is preparing for a potential massive legal battle with the West to thwart any attempt by the US or Europe to seize the Central Bank of Russia’s (CBR) frozen $300bn of frozen assets and give them to Ukraine, Bloomberg reported on January 12.

Officials in Moscow have been analysing the prospects of asset seizures, after the White House started pressuring its European partners in December to start the process of seizing the assets as a way of continuing to fund Ukraine’s fight against Russia.

Western financial and military aid has become snarled in internal wrangling and some $110bn of funding for Ukraine has been tied up as a result at a time when Ukraine is running out of money and ammunition.

On January 11, the US said it had sent its last military aid package and its funds for Ukraine are now exhausted. At the same time, several bills have been presented to give the US government the legal authority to seize the CBR’s money. However, the US only has some $5bn in frozen Russian assets whereas the bulk, some $210bn, is in Europe.

Western governments have the ability to freeze the money, but thanks to Western property rights technically the money remains the property of the Russian government. The only way Western can seize the money under current rules is if the West declares war on Russia.

The Bank of Russia is preparing to take the West to court should any of its assets be seized. The CBR is on the verge of finalising agreements with international law firms to safeguard the country’s interests in the event of a court confrontation, Bloomberg reported.

The Russian authorities have sought expert opinions on relevant foreign legislation and examined precedents in other countries like Iran and North Korea to bolster their position. Central Bank reserves have never been seized before and are generally regarded as sacrosanct; however, the international agreements governing their status are vague and incomplete.

The White House seems increasingly keen on seizing the assets as it has to contend with a mushrooming number of military clashes. It has been trying to coordinate this move with its G7 allies, but Europe remains reluctant, afraid of the damage it could do to Europe’s financial system and the euro.

When questioned about potential Western actions, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov emphasised that Russia would challenge such measures in court and warned of possible retaliation. Peskov said: “This will entail very serious judicial and legal costs for those who make such decisions,” highlighting the Kremlin’s readiness to contest any seizure in a court case that could go on for decades.

The legal route has long been considered by top Russian officials, with central bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina expressing preparedness to challenge the freeze in July. In a December interview, she criticised it as a violation of basic reserve security principles.

Officials engaged in discussions believe that pursuing the case in courts would thwart any transfer of funds to Ukraine, even if Russia doesn’t regain control of the money. They argue that the West faces slim chances in court and lacks legitimate grounds for seizure based on post-freeze legislation.

Russia’s state-backed Roscongress Foundation recently released a report on the prospects of taking up the case in court, which suggested that the “real risks” of seizing Russian central bank reserves remain low. It found that attempts to seize the assets would rely on the domestic laws of states imposing sanctions on Russia, providing grounds for legal challenges that could go on for decades.

One question that would need to be resolved is which court could hear such a case, as there is no pre-eminent global court of appeal in a case like this. And if fought at sovereign level, the existence of mutual investment guarantee treaties will also play a crucial role.

Russia’s potential legal avenues include appealing to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, the US District Court for the Southern District of New York and the EU’s Court of Justice in Luxembourg, according to Sergey Glandin, a Moscow-based partner specialising in compliance and sanctions law, Bloomberg reports.