By Ray McGovern, Consortium News, 11/11/24

A former and future U.S. president talked with Vladimir Putin on Thursday! At least that is what The Washington Post reported today. 

In a highly detailed account, the Post wrote: 

“During the call, which Trump took from his resort in Florida, he advised the Russian president not to escalate the war in Ukraine and reminded him of Washington’s sizable military presence in Europe, said a person familiar with the call, who, like others interviewed for this story, spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive matter.

The two men discussed the goal of peace on the European continent and Trump expressed an interest in follow-up conversations to discuss ‘the resolution of Ukraine’s war soon,’ one of the people said.”

Except on Monday, Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s spokesman, denied it ever happened.

As a follow-up, the Post was forced to report:

“Peskov called the story ‘completely untrue’ … ‘This is the most obvious example of the quality of the information that is now published, sometimes even in fairly respected publications. This is completely untrue. This is pure fiction, this is simply false information,’ he told the Russian news agency Interfax.”

Someone is lying here. The Post said it had five unnamed sources confirming the call and providing extensive detail of what was supposedly discussed.  Trump has said nothing so far about whether such a call took place. But on Monday he posted a short Fox video on his Truth Social account showing the world leaders he has spoken to so far and Putin is not among them. Volodymyr Zelenksy of Ukraine is.

https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/113465350193329113

A Long- Time Coming

It has been two and a half years since a conversation between U.S. and Russian presidents.

That last conversation was held on Feb. 12, 2022. It ended badly – the readout showing there was no room for compromise, no room for a “deal” to stave off war in Ukraine.

The U.S. would not reverse its stance on inviting Ukraine into NATO; and went back on an earlier undertaking not to put offensive missiles in Ukraine. The Russians saw their core national security interests at stake, just as the U.S. had core interests in preventing Cuba from installing offensive missiles in 1962.

According to the Russian readout, Putin made clear that Joe Biden “did not really address non-expansion of NATO, or non-deployment of strike weapons systems on Ukrainian territory.” Twelve days later, the Russians launched what they call their Special Military Operation.

The Biden administration knew this would happen. None other than NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg let that cat out of the bag (no doubt inadvertently) in a speech to the EU Parliament on Sept. 7, 2023:

“Putin’s precondition for not invading Ukraine was: No Ukraine in NATO. We rejected that. So he went to war to prevent more NATO.”

Context: Reading the Readout

The Kremlin placed the readout of the Feb. 12, 2022 summit-call squarely in the context of a key Putin-Biden telephone conversation nine weeks earlier on Dec. 7, 2021. That virtual summit had been arranged abruptly, at Putin’s urgent request.

And so it came to pass that Biden was at home on holiday in Delaware – without his minders. As things turned out, he apparently reasoned that agreeing not to put offensive missiles in Ukraine made sense, given the threat Putin saw in that (and the fact that the US already had such emplacements in Romania and Poland).

The Russian readout from that Dec. 30, 2021 telephone call stated: “Joseph Biden emphasized that Washington had no intention of deploying offensive strike missiles in Ukraine.” [Emphasis added.]

Biden administration officials, with the full cooperation of Establishment media, were able to obfuscate and suppress this key undertaking made by Biden when he was ‘home alone’, so to speak.

There was virtually no public reporting or comment. The only exception was former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, John Herbst, an ardent Ukraine fan, who quickly and quietly dismissed the readout as nothing new.

Dec. 7, 2021: U.S. President Joe Biden, on screen during video call with Russian President Vladimir Putin. (Kremlin.ru, CC BY 4.0, Wikimedia Commons)

Signs of Thaw 

A lot of water has flowed down the Dnieper River since February 2022. Much of it will be frozen thick on Jan. 20 when Donald Trump takes office. There are, however, already some tentative signs of a coming thaw in relations between the U.S. and Russia.

On Thursday, Putin publicly congratulated Trump on his victory, praising his “manly” response to the assassination attempt in Pennsylvania. On Sunday, Kremlin spokesman Peskov told an interviewer there were “positive” signs for improved relations under a Trump presidency.

“Trump talked during his campaign about how he sees everything through deals, that he can make a deal that will lead everyone to peace. At least he talks about peace, not about confrontation and the desire to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia,” Peskov said.

Tempering expectations, Putin responded cautiously to a question at the Valdai conference in Sochi on Nov. 7. Asked what he expects from a second Trump administration, Putin replied, “I don’t know what will happen now. I have no idea.”

On Ukraine, nothing good will happen until Biden/Blinken/Sullivan can admit that what they have been saying for a year and a half is not true. Putin has not “already lost.” It is just the opposite. And his terms are correspondingly tough. On that basis, and only on that basis, will he be prepared “to deal.”

US ‘Exceptionalism’

Biden was fond of quoting former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s oft-stated belief that the U.S. was not only “exceptional” but also “indispensable.” It seems Biden and his acolytes, particularly Secretary of State Antony Blinken, may actually believe that.

What most observers have long since forgotten is that Putin called out Barack Obama on that very issue – precisely at a time when there was hope for increasing mutual trust. Putin placed a revealing op-ed about all this in The New York Times on Sept. 12, 2013.

In short, Putin persuaded Syria to let its chemical weapons be destroyed under U.N. inspection, and thus pulled Obama’s chestnuts out of the fire when Obama agreed.

Obama later admitted that all of his advisers insisted he had to wage war on Syria because of a chemical attack near Damascus during the civil war there. It was a false-flag attack, and he sensed that. Obama was reluctant to start yet another overt war – this one on Syria. He told a lot of this story to Jeffrey Goldberg of The Atlantic.

Syria’s chemical weapons were destroyed and war was avoided. And not only that. The possibilities had increased perceptively for growing trust, only to be dashed when Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and friends mounted a coup d’etat in Kyiv just six months later.

Here’s the last paragraph of the NYT op-ed by Putin on Sept 12, 2013. As we shall see, there are clear echoes of this in Putin’s talk on Friday at Valdai, 11 years later:

“My working and personal relationship with President Obama is marked by growing trust. I appreciate this. I carefully studied his address to the nation on Tuesday. And I would rather disagree with a case he made on American exceptionalism, stating that the United States’ policy is ‘what makes America different. It’s what makes us exceptional.’ It is extremely dangerous to encourage people to see themselves as exceptional, whatever the motivation. There are big countries and small countries, rich and poor, those with long democratic traditions and those still finding their way to democracy. Their policies differ, too. We are all different, but when we ask for the Lord’s blessings, we must not forget that God created us equal.”

The Valdai Message 

Putin addressing the Valdai Club on Friday. (President of Russia)

Is there a chance for resuscitation of this “growing trust” from 11 years ago? In his Valdai presentation Friday, Putin made abundantly clear what the new international situation — the new balance of power – will now require, especially as a very large part of the world is already in BRICS and arrayed against a lily white, Western minority.

Putin’s words on Friday are as interesting now as his New York Times op-ed was 11 years ago:

“The Western-centric world has embraced certain clichés and stereotypes concerning the global hierarchy. There is supposedly a developed world, progressive society and some universal civilization that everyone should strive to join – while at the other end, there are backward, uncivilized nations, barbarians. Their job is to listen unquestioningly to what they are told from the outside, and to act on the instructions issued by those who are allegedly superior to them in this civilizational hierarchy.

It is clear that this concept works for a crude colonial approach, for the exploitation of the global majority. The problem is that this essentially racist ideology has taken root in the minds of many, creating a serious mental obstacle to general harmonious growth. [Emphasis added.]

The modern world tolerates neither arrogance nor wanton disregard for others being different. To build normal relationships, above all, one needs to listen to the other party and try to understand their logic and cultural background, rather than expecting them to think and act the way you think they should based on your beliefs about them. Otherwise, communication turns into an exchange of clichés and flinging labels, and politics devolves into a conversation of the deaf.”

It is possible to hope that, on Ukraine at least, U.S.-Russian talks can quickly move beyond cliches and labels, to stop the killing. Mutual trust is also possible, but it will take some time to rebuild it.

Perhaps it helps to recall that it almost happened just 13 years ago.

By Simon Saradzhyan, Russia Matters, 10/17/24

A majority of Russians would support ending hostilities and launching peace negotiations, according to the results of a September 2024 poll by Russia’s Levada Center1 on Russians’ views on the war against Ukraine. However, when asked if Russia should make concessions in such negotiations, a vast majority answered in the negative. Moreover, when asked to evaluate the conditions of a hypothetical peace deal, vast majorities of respondents rejected returning territories to Kyiv, as well as Ukraine’s membership in NATO. In addition, when Levada divided its respondents into two groups, a majority in one of the groups said they would not support an end to the military conflict if it meant returning annexed territories, even if Vladimir Putin himself made such a decision. This obviously doesn’t bode well for those in the West seeking support for brokering a peace deal that would defer territorial issues in exchange for Kyiv’s membership in the Alliance.

Russians Not Ready for Meaningful Compromise

Like all but one of Levada’s previous polls on Ukraine since October 2022, the September 2024 poll shows that the percentage of respondents favoring an end to Russia’s so-called special military operation and launching peace negotiations (54%) is greater than that of those who support continuing the operation (38%). However, when asked whether Russia should make concessions to Ukraine to end the military operation and sign a peace agreement, the share of those who answered “definitely or probably yes” was 20% in September 2024. In contrast, 70% were opposed, after fluctuating in the range of 70%–73% last year.

Levada has also asked its respondents to weigh in on specific conditions that a peace accord would contain. It has found that 94% of respondents considered an exchange of POWs to be acceptable or preferable as of September 2024, and 78% of respondents considered immediate ceasefire to be acceptable or preferable. However, only 21% of these respondents found returning the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions to Ukraine to be acceptable or preferable, while 69% found such a return unacceptable. Additionally, 75% found returning the Luhansk and Donetsk regions to Ukraine unacceptable. Finally, the share of those who found Ukraine’s membership in NATO as acceptable or preferable was 15% in September 2024, while 73% found it unacceptable under any circumstances.

Russians Won’t Agree To Return Land Even if Putin Decides to Do So

As part of the September 2024 survey, the Levada Center once again repeated the following experiment. With the help of a random number generator, the respondents participating in the survey were divided into two equal groups, each of which was asked a question in one of two formulations. In Group 1, the respondents were asked if they would support or not support the president’s decision to immediately end the military conflict, without any conditions to support or not to support the president’s decision to immediately end the military conflict (without any conditions). In Group 2, the respondents were asked whether they would support Putin’s decision to end the conflict, but on the condition of returning territories to Ukraine. Some 73% in Group 1 in September 2024 said they would support Putin’s decision to end the conflict with Ukraine (in April 2024 it was 71%), while 19% said they would oppose it (20% in April 2024). In Group 2, 30% said in September they would support Putin’s decision to end the military conflict with Ukraine and return the annexed territories, while 60% said they would oppose such a combination.

Majority of Russians Believe Their Army is Succeeding in Ukraine

Perhaps, one reason why majorities of Russians reject concessions to Ukraine is that many of them believe the Russian armed forces are succeeding in Ukraine (60% in September 2024). In comparison, the share of those who believe that the campaign has been going somewhat unsuccessfully or extremely unsuccessfully totaled 23% in September 2024. This belief in the success of the Russian army may also explain why a significant majority of Russians continue to personally support its actions in Ukraine (76% in September 2024). As for what shaped that belief itself, one should keep in mind that, according to Levada, majority of Russians (60%) continue to learn ‘news’ from Russian TV channels, which are mostly owned by the authorities or their loyalists. These channels toe the Kremlin’s line in portraying Russia’s war against Ukraine as a success. For instance, they trumpet Russian advances while declining to mention how far away the troops are from fulfilling Putin’s orders on capturing the Donbas. That the Kremlin refuses to admit number of casualties on the Russian side (which Western and independent Russian sources estimate at 200,000–600,000) to the Russian public also influence the latter’s assessment of whether their army is successful in Ukraine.

Yet, Russians See More Harm Than Good in War

At the same time, even in spite of suppression of facts on the ground in Ukraine, Levada’s recent polls still show that the share of those who believe Russia’s war in Ukraine has generated more harm than good does not only exceed the share of those who believe the reverse, but their number has also increased. The share of those who believe the conflict has caused net damage went from 41% in May 2023 to 47% in Sept. 2024 (damage-seers). In the same period, the share of those who believe the conflict has generated a net benefit decreased from 38% to 28% (benefit-seers).

When asked an open question to specify what exactly they meant when they said that the special military operation has caused more harm than good, some 52% of damage-seers pointed to the death toll, victims and suffering caused by the operation. Military losses, specifically the deaths of soldiers, were highlighted by 21% of damage-seers. Economic concerns were also notable, with 18% citing the worsening economic situation and increased expenses as a significant harm. Some 13% of damage-seers viewed the operation as leading to widespread destruction, devastation and violence typically associated with war. Deterioration of international relations and isolation is a concern for 7% of the damage-seers. In contrast, when asked an open question to specify what exactly they meant when they said that the special military operation has generated more benefits than harm, 26% of the benefit-seers pointed to the “return of territories, new territories and larger population.” Closely following this were 24% of the benefit-seers who believe that the operation has succeeded in the “protection of the people of Donbass, Russians and Russian-speaking individuals.” Additionally, 16% of the benefit-seers feel that the operation has strengthened Russia’s global position. Some 11% of these respondents said that the operation “stopped NATO expansion, removed Western threats.” Some 10% of the benefit-seers highlighted that the operation “has strengthened the economy and production.”

It should also be noted that the share of Russians who follow the situation in Ukraine has not changed significantly this fall. The share of those who are following it very closely or fairly closely went from 53% in August 2024 to 54% in September 2024.

Conclusion

The latest polling by the Levada Center reveals a complex and somewhat contradictory stance among the Russian public regarding the war in Ukraine. While a majority favor ending hostilities and pursuing peace negotiations, this sentiment is undercut by a strong unwillingness to make concessions on key issues, such as returning annexed territories, or accepting Ukraine’s membership in NATO. Such a stand leaves little room for meaningful compromise in the near future, especially given that recent polls show that majority of Ukrainians are also unwilling to compromise on key issues (polls held this summer show that 55% of Ukrainians are opposed to making any territorial concessions while 59% reject the demand that Ukraine’s neutrality is codified). The Levada polling also highlights a lingering belief in the success of Russian military efforts, which also likely fuels resistance to compromise even though an increasing share of Russians believe the war has caused more harm than good. As noted above, a number of factors may be influencing this belief; including reliance of the public on pro-Kremlin TV channels for news and suppression of information on casualties. One also should not forget that Russia’s slide towards a hard authoritarianism has led to criminalization of freedom of speech on issues related to the war, among other things. This cannot help influencing what a Russian living in Russia says when a stranger introduces himself as a pollster and says she and her colleagues want to ask him or her such questions about the war, which has become one of the central organizing principles of Putin’s rule.

The author would like to thank RM editor Ivan Arreguín-Toft for reminding him of some of the significant constraints faced by pollsters and respondents in Russia. The author also thanks RM student associate Chris Conway and managing editor Angelina Flood for contributing to retrieving and structuring polling data for this blog post.

Footnotes:

The Levada Center remains the most respected of Russia’s independent pollsters in spite of increasing constraints on such activities in authoritarian Russia.

By Kyle Anzalone, Libertarian Institute, 10/21/24

The Ukrainian prosecutor’s office has opened 51,000 cases of desertion through the first nine months of 2024. The number of soldiers abandoning their posts is likely to double last year’s total. 

The Times of London reported data from the Ukrainian government showing that “51,000 criminal cases were initiated for desertion and abandonment of a military unit between January and September of this year.” El Pais previously noted that 45,000 Ukrainians were being prosecuted for desertion from the start of the year through August. Al-Jazeera says the number is at least 30,000 desertions. 

At the start of the year, Kiev was estimated to have between 500,000 and 800,000 active-duty soldiers and an additional 300,000 reservists. The Ukrainians have also sustained casualties fighting to defend from Russian advances and amid Kiev’s Kursk invasion. 

Kiev has struggled to fill its ranks with fresh soldiers, leading Ukraine to drop its conscription age from 27 to 25. As Kiev is still facing manpower shortages, American politicians are pushing Ukraine to drop draft age to 18. Ukraine has also resorted to allowing prisoners to leave jail if they join the military 

One Ukrainian who deserted told the Times that prison was a better option than the military because “at least in prison, you know when you will be able to leave.” 

The number of Ukrainians that Kiev is prosecuting for desertion has significantly increased throughout the war. In 2022, the number was 9,000, and it had more than doubled to 24,000 last year.

Russia Matters, 11/8/24

1. Donald Trump’s promise to end the war in Ukraine by his inauguration now puts the president elect in a position of having to choose between competing proposals from advisers united by a common thread—a sharp break from President Joe Biden’s approach of letting Kyiv dictate when peace talks should begin while arming Kyiv “as long as it takes,” according to WSJ. Instead, these proposals uniformly recommend freezing the war in place and forcing Ukraine to suspend its quest to join NATO for at least 20 years, this newspaper reported. One of these proposals is attributed to Mike Pompeo and is likely to push for a settlement that doesn’t appear to give a major win to Moscow, according to WSJ. In contrast, Richard Grenell’s proposal gives priority to Trump’s desire to end the war as swiftly as possible, even if it means forcing Kyiv into significant concessions. Throughout his campaign for the White House, Trump had bashed Biden’s handling of Ukraine, complaining that Kyiv “fleeced the U.S. by obtaining weapons worth billions of dollars free of charge,” and describing Zelenskyy as the “greatest salesman,” according to WSJ. Trump has also touted that he had a plan to resolve the conflict quickly, but noted “I can’t give you those plans because if I give you those plans, I’m not going to be able to use them.”
   1. The only way to achieve a swift end to Ukraine’s war against the Russian invasion would be to force his country into a defeat, according to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who had a phone conversation with Trump after the latter’s victory. The phone call included two surprises: Elon Musk was also on the line, and Zelenskyy was somewhat reassured by what he heard from Trump, two sources with knowledge of the call told Axios.
   2. After a significant wait, Russian President Vladimir Putin congratulated Trump on his victory in the U.S. presidential election, stating he’s ready to hold discussions with the president elect on stabilizing U.S.-Russian relations, including the issues of Ukraine and strategic stability. “It seems to me, it deserves attention what was said about the desire to restore relations with Russia, to help end the Ukrainian crisis,” Putin said in his first comments on Trump’s re-election, which he made in the course of the third hour of his remarks at the Valdai conference on Nov. 7. In earlier comments, Trump said he is planning to speak to Putin.  
   3. Russian stock investors expressed cautious optimism over Trump’s victory. The Moscow Exchange Index rose by 3.6% Nov. 6 on news of Trump’s victory, with Russian energy giants Gazprom and Novatek among the best performers, both rising nearly 5% shortly after opening, according to Istories and FT. Meanwhile, JPMorgan’s Emerging Europe, Middle East and Africa Securities jumped 18.3%, its biggest daily rise in over two years, according to FT.[1] “All the talk this morning is about how to trade Russia and whether sanctions will be thrown off,” one portfolio manager told FT the morning after the Nov. 5 elections.
2. At a summit this week, European Union leaders debated whether they can keep the Ukrainian war effort going if Trump decides to shut off support from the U.S., according to Bloomberg. While some EU leaders argued that the European Commission should be coming up with proposals on how the bloc will respond if U.S. aid is shut off, others were skeptical, according to this news agency. “Some EU leaders say that in such a case, the EU should take on full financial responsibility for Ukraine. I see this as impossible, and Slovakia will not agree to it,” Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico said. In spite of this disagreement, Zelenskyy, who attended the two-day summit in Budapest, urged European leaders to supply Kyiv with more weapons rather than pushing for negotiations with Moscow, according to Meduza. 
3. “I have previously stated that we have reached red lines. The West’s calls to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia, a nation with the largest arsenal of nuclear weapons, reveal the reckless adventurism of certain Western politicians,” Putin told the annual conference of Russia’s Valdai Club. “Such blind faith in their own impunity and exceptionalism could lead to a global catastrophe,” he warned. When asked by a Pakistani general to share his vision for maintaining strategic stability after New START expires, Putin claimed that Russia “never refused to continue the dialogue in the field of strategic stability,” but the U.S. cannot hope for a dialogue in that field with Russia while seeking to inflict a strategic defeat upon it.” He then added, “Let’s see how the new future [U.S.] administration will formulate its proposals, if there are any at all.”
4. This week multiplereportsemerged that North Korean troops had engaged their Ukrainian counterparts, fighting on the Kremlin’s side in Russia’s Kursk region, likely starting on Nov. 4. Russian and North Korean leaders continued to refuse to explicitly acknowledge the presence of a DPRK contingent in western Russia, in spite of these reports, accompanied by photos of purportedly wounded North Korean soldiers (who are reportedly paid $2,000 per month for participating in combat in Russia). However, the very fact that Vladimir Putin found time for a reportedly unscheduled meeting with North Korea’s visiting foreign minister, Choe Son-hui, while Russia’s Senate unanimously voted to ratify a mutual defense treaty with the DPRK, reaffirms how important the Hermit Kingdom’s support has become for the Kremlin in its aggression against Ukraine.
5. In the past month (Sept. 30–Oct. 31, 2024), Russian forces have gained 206 square miles of Ukrainian territory, and in the first week of November, an additional 75 square miles, while Ukrainian forces have re-gained zero square miles, according to RM staff’s Nov. 8 estimate based on data provided for that period by the Institute for the Study of War.

By Konstantin Remchukov, RT, 10/17/24

By Konstantin Remchukov, editor-in-chief of Nezavisimaya Gazeta. A former MP, he is regarded as a leading thinker in Russia.

1. Putin makes all fundamental decisions personally, on the basis of his own ability, expertise, and sense of historical responsibility. A vivid example of this was the president’s speech at the Russian Foreign Ministry on June 14, in which he outlined the key provisions of Russia’s foreign policy priorities and his vision for the formation of a new international order. Most participants in the meeting expected the head of state to speak for no more than half an hour. In practice, Putin spoke for almost 80 minutes on theses he had written out himself, which he later explained to journalists.

2. The task of ensuring the security of the country and protecting Russians and Russian speakers in Ukraine, which Putin has been facing since 2014, has become the main existential factor of his rule. He will not hand over power to anyone before the final, internationally guaranteed settlement of this issue.

He cannot give up control until there is a final, globally recognized solution. Anything short of this would mean handing his successor a messy bunch of unresolved problems. Today, no one in Putin’s entourage is better at solving problems than the president. He knows this and is firmly convinced of it.

3. Putin will not resign. At the beginning of September, a schoolgirl in Tuva asked the president: “How would you spend your days if you were an ordinary man, i.e. not the president?” Putin replied succinctly and clearly: “It’s hard for me to imagine that now.” This is his most important message of recent times – both for Russians and outsiders. Putin is saying that in your own future planning, proceed from the basis that I will be in the Kremlin. In this way, the president has delivered a reality check to the many Western politicians and indeed Russian opposition activists who have been dreaming and deluding themselves, claiming that “if there is Putin, there is a problem; if there is no Putin, there is no problem.” The fact is, the president is here to stay.

4. It is now clear that after more than two years of a nuclear threat hanging over us all, the world is ready for real negotiations on this issue. However, there are doubts about whether talks will be successful. The most serious Western politician – and someone who actually understands the consequences of nuclear war – is US President Joe Biden. Sadly, he will be gone in a few months.  Neither Kamala Harris nor former President Donald Trump has the foreign policy credentials to even grasp the importance of this issue and the dangers involved.

5. The past years and months of the Ukraine conflict, the brutal sanctions, and the radical transformation of the driving forces of the Russian economy have clearly demonstrated that it is time for our own domestic public and political consciousness to decisively abandon the notion, once sown by the Polish/American thinker Zbigniew Brzezinski, that Russia’s greatness rests on its unity with Ukraine. If the country is torn out of Moscow’s sphere of influence, Russia’s status as a great power will come to an end, he warned.

But that was then, and this is now. Today it is obvious that Russia’s place in the world is guaranteed regardless of the degree of proximity to any country or group of countries. Liberation from speculative constructs in the minds of influential ideologues is a powerful factor in normalizing the development process and assessing fundamental risks and opportunities. Russia can be a great and important power regardless of the degree of integration with other states. The greatness of a country is measured by the level of well-being and opportunities of its citizens, by achievements in health care, education, science, and technology.

6. Talking about the Russian economy, we should keep in mind one simple detail: the federal budget submitted to the State Duma (parliament) is based on an oil price of $60 per barrel. According to forecasts, the average annual oil price in 2025 will be $69 per barrel. This is a very high level of conservatism, realism, and sober calculation on the part of the Mikhail Mishustin government. The Russian economy is expected to remain manageable and the pace of development will be sufficient to meet the challenges we face. The obvious structural and technological difficulties will not be decisive in 2025. At this level of industrial development, a balanced budget and currency stability are crucial.

7. Today’s fighting makes it clear that the main goal of Russian troops on the ground is to reach the administrative borders of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions. When listing his objectives, Putin increasingly uses the following words: the liberation of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, and Novorossiya. It can be assumed that Novorossiya is only part of the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions. The main issue here is the land connection with Crimea. If my observations are correct, it is possible to draw a more concrete picture that will allow us to say that the military operation has been completed and its goals have been achieved.

8. It should be stressed that in recent months there has been a clear change in the Russian leadership’s assessment of the nature of Ukrainian statehood. This is the main difference from February 2022. Today, Moscow recognizes that a significant number of Ukrainians voted for the current government, consider themselves Ukrainians, and do not want to see a future with Russia. In this way, the Kremlin recognizes the state of Ukraine. When the West promotes the narrative that Moscow wants to destroy Ukraine as a state, this is an obvious contradiction, given today’s realities. Moreover, it is this narrative that allows Western politicians to claim that by destroying Ukraine, Russia will move further into Europe – into Poland and the Baltic states.

9. Speaking of possible negotiations, the West fails to mention the question of the legitimacy of Vladimir Zelensky’s signature in Putin’s eyes. They say it is obvious because Zelensky is flying around the world with his ‘peace plan’. I would warn Western partners against simplistic interpretations of Putin’s remarks and his concern that the Ukrainian Constitutional Court might later rule that Zelensky had not properly renewed his credentials and that his signature was therefore invalid. ‘Cheated, deceived, hoodwinked, and then deceived again’ is something that won’t be allowed to happen again. The level of mutual trust is not even at zero. Total mistrust now makes it necessary to have full negotiating powers in terms of the legal certainty available.

10. It seems that the issue of a new international order that provides equal security for states is equally relevant today for the critical majority of countries in the world – in the West as well as in the East. The main question is whether it will be possible to create a new international legal framework for peaceful coexistence. Let us remember that the worlds of Versailles and Yalta-Potsdam were born on the ruins of the catastrophes of the First and Second World Wars. The situation is different now. But hopefully humanity has learned something.