By Brian McDonald, Twitter, 12/15/24

The fall of Assad and the “loss” of Syria isn’t actually that critical for Russia. Historically, the Soviet Union endured much larger setbacks in the Middle East. For example: Egypt’s sudden shift from a Soviet ally to a US partner in the 1970s.

Despite investing heavily in Egypt through military aid and infrastructure projects like the Aswan Dam, Moscow was blindsided when Anwar Sadat aligned with Washington. Yet, the USSR eventually restored much of its influence in the region through alliances with other Arab states.

This precedent makes a key point: Russia’s geopolitical fortunes in the Middle East aren’t tied to a single leader or country. The region’s fluid power dynamics mean that today’s setback can be tomorrow’s opportunity.

Russia’s approach to Syria, therefore, should be viewed through this broader historical lens. Strategic losses are part of a long game where influence can quickly be regained.

Plus, the rebel leaders have already said they are open to a deal with Moscow. And Russia has quite a bit to offer them. For instance, lots of cheap grain.

***

Interpreting Putin’s Remarks On Syria, Israel, And Turkiye

By Andrew Korybko, Substack, 12/20/24

Putin commented on Syria’s regime change during his annual Q&A session on Thursday. According to him, Russia’s military intervention succeeded in its goal of preventing the creation of an Afghan-like terrorist enclave. The groups that just seized power there, including terrorist-designated and -affiliated ones, have apparently changed their views over the years. That’s why the West wants to establish relations with them. The regime change therefore can’t be seen as a defeat for Russia.

Putin then defended his armed forces’ conduct during recent events by claiming that Russia no longer had any ground troops in Syria. Moreover, the estimated 30,000 Syrian and “pro-Iranian units” that were defending Aleppo surrendered the city to just 350 militants, after which they gave up the rest of the country to them too with few exceptions. He also revealed that Russia evacuated 4,000 Iranian fighters to Tehran while other allied units fled to Lebanon (a reference to Hezbollah) and Iraq without a fight.

As for the future of Russian influence in Syria, Putin claimed that “The overwhelming majority of [the groups that control the situation there] tell us that they would be interested in our military bases remaining”. He then proposed that they could be used to deliver humanitarian aid. The main beneficiary of the latest events is Israel, in his opinion, since they’ve practically demilitarized Syria and expanded their occupation zone in the country. He condemned those moves and hoped that they’d leave someday.

Putin also took the opportunity to condemn Israel’s illegal settlements in Palestine as well as its ongoing military operation in Gaza. These are all consistent Russian positions and nothing new. Observers might have been surprised though that he didn’t also condemn Turkiye. Instead, he explained that “Turkey is doing everything to ensure its security on its southern borders as the situation in Syria develops”, which he said is aimed at returning refugees and “push[ing] back Kurdish formations on the border.”

In connection with that second imperative, Putin expressed hope that there won’t be an aggravation of the situation like some have reported that Turkiye is planning. He also said that “we need to solve the Kurdish problem. Within the framework of Syria under President Assad, this had to be solved, now we need to solve it with the authorities that control the territory of Syria, and Turkey needs to somehow ensure its security. We understand all this.” This basically amounts to giving Turkiye a free pass in Syria.

Putin’s apparent double standard towards the similar issues of Turkish and Israeli military involvement in post-Assad Syria can be explained by Russia’s complex interdependence with the former. They’re closely tied together through nuclear energy cooperation, air defense systems (S-400s), natural gas, trade, and Istanbul’s prior role in mediating between Moscow and Kiev. By contrast, although Israel hasn’t armed Ukraine nor sanctioned Russia, there’s much less trade and no military-technical cooperation.

There are also optics to consider as well. Although Syria is still politically divided and Turkiye does indeed back the UN-designated Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) terrorist group, there’s no denying that many Syrians support Ankara as do many other Muslims in the region. The same can’t be said for Israel, which is universally reviled in Syria, except among some of the Druze that welcomed the self-professed Jewish State’s forces, and fiercely hated by most Muslims in the region.

It’s therefore better for Russia’s soft power interests to criticize Israel for occupying part of Syria while remaining silent about Turkiye doing the same thing. Likewise, considering the domestic and regional mood, it also makes sense for Putin to remind everyone about the pro-Iranian units’ cowardice in giving up cities without a fight and then fleeing abroad. After all, “Russia Dodged A Bullet By Wisely Choosing Not To Ally With The Now-Defeated Resistance Axis”, so it has no reason to sugarcoat what they did.

Altogether, Putin’s remarks on Syria, Israel, and Turkiye show that Russia eschews responsibility for what just happened in Syria, condemns Israel for its ongoing invasion there, and downplays Turkiye’s own. This is a coldly realist and ultra-pragmatic approach to the latest developments that fully aligns with Russia’s national interests as Putin sincerely understands them to be. It also contradicts the expectations that many members of the diverse non-Mainstream Media community had of him condemning Turkiye.

As can be seen, Putin doesn’t really care that Turkiye is a NATO member nor that it patronizes terrorist-designated HTS since he’s always insisted that the most important factor in their contemporary ties is the excellent working relationship that he has with his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The Russian leader sang his praises in October 2022 while speaking at the Valdai Club’s annual meeting when he was asked about whether his views on him had changed over the past two years. Here’s what he said:

“He is a competent and strong leader who is guided above all, and possibly exclusively, by the interests of Turkiye, its people and its economy…President Erdogan never lets anyone get a free ride or acts in the interests of third countries…But there is a desire on both sides to reach agreements, and we usually do it. In this sense, President Erdogan is a consistent and reliable partner. This is probably his most important trait, that he is a reliable partner.”

Putin wasn’t playing “5D chess to psyche out Turkiye” like some members of the diverse non-Maisntream Media community imagined at the time but was candidly sharing his views about Erdogan. Those who took his words seriously therefore knew better than to expect him to condemn Turkiye for its actions in Syria. Putin’s responsibility is to ensure Russia’s national interests, not conform to his online supporters’ fantasies about him spewing this or that talking point, which requires maximum flexibility.

“Non-Russian Pro-Russians” and even some Russians might be disappointed with his position towards recent events in Syria, but they should at least understand the reasons behind it. Russia couldn’t stop what just happened, which was the result of the Syrian Arab Army’s and pro-Iranian units’ cowardice in the face of the foreign-backed terrorist-driven blitz, and it won’t go to war with Turkiye over this either. By adapting to this new reality, Putin now has the best possible chance of advancing Russian interests.

It doesn’t mean that he’ll succeed, but there’s no guarantee of failure as would have been the case had he criticized Turkiye after being unable to stop it and unwilling to go to war with it afterwards. Even if things don’t work out like he envisages, Russia’s mutually beneficial bilateral ties with Turkiye won’t be jeopardized, nor will his country’s soft power be damaged since it’s not opposed to the outcome that the domestic and regional majority support. Putin’s pragmatic hedging therefore preserves Russian interests.

***

Putin Thinks Al-Qaeda in Syria Is Reformed Too

By Joe Lauria, Consortium News, 12/20/24

Russian President Vladimir Putin said Russia’s goal to defeat jihadism in Syria had actually succeeded because the rebranded al-Qaeda force that seized power on Dec. 8 has put its extremist past behind it. 

Putin said this in answer to a Western journalist at a Moscow news conference (video) on Thursday:

“Those who pay your salary would like to present the current developments in Syria as Russia’s defeat. I assure you that this is not the case, and here is why. We came to Syria ten years ago to prevent the creation of a terrorist enclave there, like the one that we saw in some other countries, for example, Afghanistan. We have achieved that goal, by and large.

Even the groups that were fighting against the Assad regime and the government forces back then have undergone internal changes. It is not surprising that many European countries and the United States are trying to develop relations with them now. Would they be doing this if they were terrorist organisations? This means that they have changed, doesn’t it? So, our goal has been achieved, to a certain degree.”

The remark aligns Putin with Western nations who claim that Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) — which was al-Nusra Front and before that al-Qaeda in Syria — is no longer a terrorist group and is fit to rule Syria. 

This conclusion, after less than 10 days of HTS in power, puts a spin on events that seeks to benefit both Russia and the West.  Both sides now need to portray the militants as reformed extremists.   

Putin is right to say that at least one of Moscow’s goals in Syria in 2015 was “to prevent the creation of a terrorist enclave there.”

(Other goals appeared to have been to save Russia’s Mediterranean bases in Syria, which they may still do, and to protect gas sales to Europe at the time — now lost to sanctions —  against a rival pipeline project through Syria to Europe led by Qatar, which necessitated overthrowing Bashar al-Assad, who opposed it.) 

Putin told the U.N. General Assembly from the podium in New York on Sept. 28, 2015 — days before Russia intervened in Syria at the governments’ invitation — that Moscow’s aim was to defeat jihadism there lest it spread, threatening regional and Russian security. 

Russia had to that point already fought Western-backed jihadists in a 30-year struggle against encroachment into its sphere of influence by militant Islamism.

The support the U.S. and Gulf Arab nations gave these terrorist groups opened a three-decade Western rift with Russia that began in Afghanistan and ran across the Northern Caucasus to the Balkans and then into Syria.

Russia was opposed to regime change in Syria not only on principle, analysts and diplomats at the U.N. told me in June 2012, but because the likely new regime would be headed by an Islamist government inimical to Russian interests.

In his 2015 U.N. speech, Putin appealed to the U.S. to join Russia in a military campaign against the common enemy of ISIS, al-Qaeda and other jihadists, the way the U.S. and the Soviet Union had fought together against Nazism.

The Obama administration arrogantly rejected the proposal out of hand with some American commentators calling it “Russian imperialism.” But it would be odd to invite your adversary to join your imperial adventure. 

In fact the United States was in alliance with al-Qaeda and other jihadi groups trying to overthrow al-Assad and did not want to fight them. Putin understood that the U.S. had long supported Islamist extremists.

He pointed this out at the U.N. in 2015:

“The situation is extremely dangerous. In these circumstances, it is hypocritical and irresponsible to make declarations about the threat of terrorism and at the same time turn a blind eye to the channels used to finance and support terrorists, including revenues from drug trafficking, the illegal oil trade and the arms trade. 

It is equally irresponsible to manipulate extremist groups and use them to achieve your political goals, hoping that later you’ll find a way to get rid of them or somehow eliminate them. … the people you are dealing with are cruel but they are not dumb. They are as smart as you are. So, it’s a big question: who’s playing who here? … 

Relying on international law, we must join efforts to address the problems that all of us are facing, and create a genuinely broad international coalition against terrorism. Similar to the anti-Hitler coalition, it could unite a broad range of parties willing to stand firm against those who, just like the Nazis, sow evil and hatred of humankind.”  [Emphasis added.]  

So the question is, has the HTS and lesser extremist groups in Syria really changed their stripes? Have they really transformed from Jihad to Jefferson?

The U.S., the U.K. and the EU are in the process of dropping HTS’ terrorist designation and the U.S. in lifting the $10 million bounty on its leader’s head.

But it seems too early for Putin to say that the HTS — in nominal charge in Damascus — are no longer terrorists because the West would not be “developing relations” with them “if they were terrorist organisations.”  It belies what he knows to be true, that the U.S. has had relationships for decades with some of the most notorious terrorists on the globe to achieve short-term strategic objectives.

Putin may be saying they aren’t terrorists anymore as a way to get out of admitting Russia likely failed in Syria to prevent terrorists from taking over. He did not cite Russian intelligence saying these are reformed killers, but said they must be reformed because otherwise the West would have nothing to do with them, when he knows full well the West has had plenty to do with them when they were openly terrorists. 

This may just be Putin trying to find a creative way out of the fact that Assad’s overthrow appears to have been a Russian defeat unless the HTS are truly reformed. And if they are reformed, still very much uncertain, the U.S. and Turkey would have been behind it, not Russia.   

A commenter on this article on X suggested Putin was just making fun of the journalist. Perhaps he was employing sarcasm but it was on the record and people take Putin seriously. 

What happens in Syria over the coming months will tell the rest of this story. Will Alawis, Christians and other minorities be left alone to live as they please?

Or will the HTS reanimate as terrorists to go after are these vulnerable peoples? Will the HTS serve the interests of stability in Syria and the region as Putin seems to think?

Or will they revert to what they have long been, especially now that they have power?

By Ted Snider, Antiwar.com, 12/9/24

There was a time, just before and just after the war began, that Ukraine might have lost no territory but Crimea and few lives. But America said no.

In December of 2021, Putin presented the U.S. and NATO with a proposal on security guarantees. Then NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has said that the “promise [of] no more NATO enlargement… was a pre-condition for not invade Ukraine.”

The U.S. was not then, nor are they yet, willing to offer NATO membership to Ukraine. Ukraine was then willing to abandon its pursuit of NATO membership, as signaled by both Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and by his advisors. According to polls, only 24%-39% of Ukrainians even wanted NATO membership. But the U.S. said no.

That “no,” that could have brought peace to Ukraine, instead brought the “military-technical” response that Putin promised a “no” would bring.

The U.S. sacrificed Ukraine for the principal that NATO had the right to enlarge wherever it wanted to go: even up to Russia’s border. But still, in the first days after Russia’s invasion, peace was still possible.

In the days after the invasion, Russia and Ukraine were engaged in direct bilateral negotiations that led to an initialed draft agreement. Even then, Ukraine could have maintained its prewar territory and, perhaps, even more in a return to the idea of an autonomous Donbas still as part of Ukraine.

Once again, Ukraine could have lost few lives and little land. But the United States, Britain, Poland and their NATO partners said no. Instead of encouraging and nurturing the talks and the diplomatic path that could have quickly saved Ukrainians from the horrors of the war that were to come, the West dissuaded Ukraine from pursuing that path and pushed them down the path of war with promises of whatever they need for as long as they need it.

Twice, once in the weeks before the start of the war and once in the days after the start of the war, the U.S. declined the opportunity to negotiate a peace for the people of Ukraine, prioritizing its own foreign policy objectives over the goals and interests of Ukraine. Russia is surely to blame for starting the war with Ukraine. But from the moment the U.S. and Britain blocked the promising peace talks, they shared responsibility for the suffering of Ukrainians that was to come.

As the possibility of negotiations and a diplomatic settlement faded into the past and the full horror of war came to Ukraine, U.S. officials would, once again, make decisions and encourage policies and strategies that they knew would bring suffering and loss of life to Ukraine.

Perhaps the turning point in the war was the failed Ukrainian counteroffensive of the summer of 2023. The last best hope for stopping Russia from winning the war was a devastating failure for Ukraine. It gained them no land and cost them many lives.

The U.S. encouraged and pushed Ukraine to launch the counteroffensive. They told Ukraine and the world that the Ukrainian armed forces could win. U.S. Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin told a Senate Armed Services Committee that Ukraine now had a “significant advantage” over Russian forces that had suffered “significant losses” and that had “depleted their armoured vehicles in a way that no one could have ever imagined.” He told them that “Ukraine will have a very good chance for success” in the coming counteroffensive.

That’s what he said. It’s not what he knew. Privately, military officials knew that Ukraine was ill prepared to take on Russia in a counteroffensive. According to reporting in The Wall Street Journal, “When Ukraine launched its big counteroffensive this spring, Western military officials knew Kyiv didn’t have all the training or weapons – from shells to warplanes – that it needed to dislodge Russian forces.” Incredibly, military officials were prepared to count on “Ukrainian courage and resourcefulness.”

The Ukrainian soldiers were courageous and resourceful. But courage is no shield against Russian weapons and troops when you lack training and weapons of your own.

At the start of the war, the U.S. pushed Ukraine off the path of peace and diplomacy and onto the path of war. In the middle of the war, they pushed them to launch a counteroffensive that they knew they lacked the training and weapons for. Both times, the U.S. used Ukrainian soldiers to pursue its own foreign policy interests, and hundreds of thousands of those Ukrainian soldiers were killed or wounded.

And now, the U.S. wants Ukraine to throw even more soldiers into a war they know Ukraine has lost.

The war has not gone well for Ukraine. Already a year ago, on November 1, 2023, a close aid to Zelensky had complained that, even if Ukraine had all the weapons they needed, they “don’t have the men to use them.” One year, and thousands of deaths, injuries, amputations and desertions later, the manpower situation is much worse.

At the end of November, the Biden administration began to pressure Kiev to lower the draft age from 25 to 18. “The pure math,” one senior Biden official said, is that Ukraine needs to draft more soldiers to replace its battlefield losses. The U.S. may can send more weapons, but now “manpower is the most vital need,” White House National Security Council spokesman Sean Savett said. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said “getting younger people into the fight, we think, many of us think, is necessary. Right now, 18- to 25-year olds are not in the fight.” And National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said, “In fact, we believe manpower is the most vital need they have. So, we’re also ready to ramp up our training capacity if they take appropriate steps to fill out their ranks.”

Asking Ukraine to throw more soldiers into a losing war is a lot. Asking them to send 18-25 year old soldiers is a lot more. Through death and emigration, the war has decimated Ukraine’s population. But there is a special problem with asking Kiev to send in 18-25 year olds.

Ukraine is in a precarious position that it does not have enough of that generation. That means both that there isn’t a sufficient pool of 18-25 year olds to draw on and that losing large numbers of them on the battlefield will leave a void in the workforce and create a challenge to the future population of the country. The U.S. wants Kiev to throw young people at the Russians to win the war and risk losing Ukraine: and the former, they know, is hopeless. As The New York Times puts it, “Ukraine must balance the need to counter a relentless Russian offensive by adding more troops against the risk of hollowing out an entire generation.”

At the collapse of the Soviet empire, economic hardships led to plummeting birth rates in the newly independent Ukraine. Birth rates dropped from 1.9 per woman to 1.1 in the first year. The small number of children born then are the 18-25 year old cohort now. And many of them are either serving already, have been killed or injured, have left Ukraine or are exempt, making the small pool even smaller.

The looming population threat created by the lack of a generation has already been made worse by the war. In addition to the millions who have died or left Ukraine, the birth rate had dropped by nearly half by 2023 compared to the year before the war.

At the start of the war, the U.S. discouraged Ukraine from negotiating a diplomatic settlement, ushering in a war that has cost Ukraine so much in land and lives. In the middle of the war, the U.S. pushed Ukraine into a counteroffensive it new it was ill prepared and under armed to fight, leading to the loss of tens of thousands more lives. And now, at the end of the war, with no living chance of victory, the U.S. is pressing Zelensky to send its anemic generation of young people to prolong the war in service of the wishful thinking that it will preserve the current lines for the inevitable negotiations. Of course, the current lines could be preserved by just starting talks currently.

One day, when after all the death and debility, Ukraine negotiates a peace with Russia that it could have negotiated in the first days of the war minus all the vast land it has lost since then, Ukrainians may come to hate the States for blocking the peace, pushing the counteroffensive and sacrificing a generation of young people.

Ted Snider is a regular columnist on U.S. foreign policy and history at Antiwar.com and The Libertarian Institute. He is also a frequent contributor to Responsible Statecraft and The American Conservative as well as other outlets. To support his work or for media or virtual presentation requests, contact him at tedsnider@bell.net.

Russia Matters, 12/20/24

1. “I would like to emphasize from the very beginning that the outgoing year has been crucial in achieving the goals of the special military operation,” Vladimir Putin told an expanded annual meeting of the Russian Defense Ministry Board on Dec. 16. He then claimed during his annual call-in show on Dec. 19 that Russian forces were moving toward achieving their “priority goals.” Russia is yet to establish full control over the four Ukrainian regions it has annexed since the beginning of its re-invasion of Ukraine in February 2022,¹ but Vladimir Putin is already seeking to shape the narrative so that he can present his gains in Ukraine as a victory next year, while his planning horizon for the five Ukrainian regions Russia has already claimed as its own stretch as far as 2030.*
2. “He [Zelenskyy] should be prepared to make a deal. That’s all,” Donald Trump asserted on Dec. 16 at his first post-election victory press conference. Trump is already planning to send his special envoy for the Ukraine war Keith Kellogg to Kyiv, along with London, Paris and Rome after his inauguration, and Kellogg, a retired general, is also open to visiting Moscow, according to Bloomberg. Meanwhile, Putin is sending conflicting signals on whether he would agree to a ceasefire instead of pursuing a peace deal. “I didn’t reject it,” Putin said during his Dec. 19 call-in show with regard to Viktor Orban’s proposal for a Christmas truce, according to Meduza. At the same time, however, Putin told the annual call-in-show that “we don’t need a truce; we need peace.” When asked during the call-in show about Russia’s conditions for negotiations with Ukraine, Putin reiterated that negotiations can begin without preliminary conditions, but at the same time they must be based on what he has described as “agreements in Istanbul” that Ukrainian and Russian negotiators discussed during the early weeks of the war, and negotiations must also take into account “the realities that are taking shape on the ground today.” He added that any treaty could only be signed with a “legitimate government.” In his turn, Volodymyr Zelenskyy rejected a return to the Istanbul agreements because he claimed that there were none. At least one of the drafts of the agreement Ukrainian and Russian negotiators discussed in Spring 2022 would have designated Ukraine as a “neutral” state that would not join NATO, but could join the EU and could seek security guarantees from other countries. On top of that, Putin—who insists Zelenskyy’s presidential powers have expired—continues to demand regime change in Kyiv by stressing that he can only negotiate with a legitimate government of Ukraine. 
3. In the past month, Russian force have made a net gain of 204 square miles (an area roughly equivalent to 1/3rd of the total area of London), according to RM staff’s estimate that was published in the Dec. 18 issue of the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card, and that is based on data provided for that period by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). One sign of how worried the Ukrainian leadership has become about Russian advances in this eastern province of Ukraine, where Russian troops have reached the outskirts of the key town of Pokrovsk this week, is the replacement of the commander of the Ukrainian forces there less than a month after replacing the commander of Ukraine’s ground forces. As NYT has observed, “On the battlefield, the situation has not looked this desperate for Ukrainian troops since the start of the invasion.”
4. The commander of Russia’s Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Defense Forces Lt. Gen. Igor Kirillov has been killed in an bomb blast, which was allegedly set up by an Uzbek national on the orders of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU). The SBU claimed the Russian military’s NBC chief—whom it had accused of ordering the use of chemical weapons against Ukrainian troops—was a legitimate target, but even inside Ukraine some questioned the wisdom of the assassination. Joe Biden’s NSA Jake Sullivan disapproved of the hit, arguing that “we do support and enable Ukraine to defend itself and to take the fight to Russian forces on the battlefield, but not operations like this,” while Keith Kellogg, Donald Trump’s nominee for special envoy for the conflict, called the assassination “not a very good idea.” Moreover, Ukraine’s forces are steadily losing ground on the battlefield and assassination won’t improve their war effort, analysts and Western officials told NYT. The Russians will find a replacement for that general, a Ukrainian special forces officer told NYT, predicting that as a condition of any peace settlement, Russia would insist not only on a cessation of military operations, but also of secret operations that kill their generals. As for the Russian reaction, it went beyond threats of retaliation, with Vladimir Putin offering a rare criticism of his special services. “Our security services allowed a serious terrorist act to happen. Such grave failures cannot be tolerated,” Putin said during his call-in show one day before it was revealed that the head of the FSB’s Military Counterintelligence Department Nikolai Yuryev resigned. Such a public criticism of Russia’s secret services by Putin, an ex-KGB officer and former head of the FSB himself, occurs rarely and could be a sign of what Russians call “organizational conclusions.”
5. Vladimir Putin flaunted Russia’s nuclear forces during his Dec. 16 address to the expanded annual meeting of the Russian Defense Ministry’s Board yet again. “The army and navy are being re-equipped with up-to-date weapons and equipment at an accelerated pace. For example, the share of such weapons in the strategic nuclear forces has already reached 95%. Meanwhile, we have specified the fundamental principles for the use of nuclear weapons envisaged in the updated Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence. Let me stress once again, so that no one accuses us of trying to scare everyone with nuclear weapons: this is a policy of nuclear deterrence,” he said. He also flaunted the purported capabilities of the Oreshnik MRBM yet again both in the Dec. 16 address to the MoD board and during his Dec. 19 annual call-in show. During the latter, he proposed a “21st-century high-tech duel,” in which Russia would field the Oreshnik and the West deployed a system in Ukraine that Western experts think can intercept that MRBM. This week also saw Putin threaten to stop complying with the INF Treaty, which he claims to be complying with in spite of the legal death of that treaty, while also having the chief of his Strategic Missile Forces Sergei Karakayev participate in nuclear saber-rattling, including a claim that Russia may automate nuclear retaliation. In his interview to the RF MoD’s Red Star this week, Karakayev also implied Russia may have disclosed to the U.S. the area the Oreshnik was to target in Ukraine prior to the Nov. 21 launch of this MRBM.
6. On Dec. 16, Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov told an expanded meeting of his agency’s board that one of the priorities for the Russian armed forces is “ensuring full readiness for a possible military conflict with NATO in the next decade… The first among the priority areas is victory in the special military operation,” he said.
7. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Syria has conceded that it will probably allow Russia to keep some or all of its bases, and it is likely to respect Russia’s lease at Tartus port, according to The Economist.

By Geoffrey Roberts, Brave New Europe, 12/8/24

1. What do you think of Trump’s nomination of General Keith Kellogg as Ukraine special envoy and his plan for ending the war?

Trump’s nomination of General Kellogg shows he is serious about achieving peace in Ukraine. Kellogg has made an effort to understand the Russian perspective on the war and has identified ending the Ukraine conflict as a key American interest. Kellogg may be tempted to use hardball negotiating tactics to force Putin to accept an early ceasefire, but the US has leverage over the Ukrainians, not the Russians. By the time Trump becomes President again, Russian forces may well have conquered all, or nearly all, of Donets, Kherson, Lugansk and Zaporozhe – the four provinces that Putin incorporated into the Russian Federation in October 2022. In those circumstances the key issue to resolve before agreement on a ceasefire would be Putin’s demand that Ukraine becomes a neutral state. Kellogg has suggested a long-term moratorium on Ukraine’s membership of NATO. That is a good starting point for negotiations and there may be room for a compromise between Kellogg’s proposal and Putin’s demand for a declaration from Kiev that Ukraine will not join NATO, providing Putin can be satisfied that Russia’s future security is protected from further NATO threats and encroachments.

2. What should we expect from Moscow? Is Putin planning escalation or the opposite? Will he sit at the negotiating table? What will be his conditions for ending the war? Where will his territorial claims in Ukraine stop?

 The Biden Administration’s final gambit seems to be to provoke Putin into an escalation of the war that will make it difficult for Trump to pursue peace in Ukraine. But Russia is winning the war decisively. Putin has no reason to snatch defeat from the jaws of the Russian army’s many victories on the battlefield. His actions in response to Western and Ukrainian provocations will be moderate and restrained.

Putin’s terms for peace were spelt out last June: Ukraine’s neutrality and concession of Crimea and the four provinces – Donets, Kherson, Lugansk and Zaporozhe – that have already been formally annexed by Russia. In addition, he will demand protections for the millions of pro-Russian Ukrainians that will remain under Kiev’s control, and a deal with the West about the return of its frozen foreign assets and the ending of Western sanctions against Russia.

However, if the war drags on, Putin may feel impelled to grab an even bigger chunk of Ukrainian territory as part of his military strategy and to enlarge the buffer zone between Russia and NATO. 

       3.      Will negotiations and the end of the war be an indirect defeat by Russia of Ukraine and the West?

 Peace negotiations will only begin when there is an armistice i.e. a ceasefire based on prior concession of Putin’s demands for Ukrainian territory and neutrality. Such an armistice would be a terrible defeat for Ukraine and for NATO’s proxy war with Russia. But continuation of the war can only lead to even greater disaster.  The war has been a catastrophe for Ukraine. An imposed neutrality will restrict its sovereignty but it can survive as a free and independent state, much like Finland did after World War II.

Russia’s defeat of Ukraine and the West will be no great victory for Putin. It has been a costly and highly dangerous war for Russia. The damage done to Russia’s relations with the West has been huge. Russia has reoriented to developing partnerships with global South countries but, in the end, Russia’s prosperity and security requires good relations with the West, especially its European neighbours, as well as with China, India and other members of BRICS. The war has not changed the facts of geography and history or the reality that culturally and identity-wise Russia is a European country.

         4.       Which are the prospects for Ukraine once Donald Trump takes office?

 Much better than they are at present, assuming Trump can help broker a peace deal for Ukraine. The slaughter of Ukraine’s people will stop and its economy and society can begin to recover from the ravages of war. Defeat by Russia will be a very bitter pill to swallow but most Ukrainians now believe that even a bad peace will be better than the continuation of a disastrous losing war.

         5.      What will be Europe’s role in the negotiations to end the war in Ukraine and for the country’s future?

 The main external role in the negotiations will be played by the Americans. Europe may exercise a degree of influence but the Russians have lost all respect for most European political leaders. Europe’s role in Ukraine’s recovery from the war is, potentially, far greater. Frankly, Europe has a moral obligation to do all it can to aid Ukraine’s postwar reconstruction, given its role in encouraging Ukraine to fight on  rather than accept the relatively benign peace deal offered  by Russia in Istanbul two and half years ago.

 I’m not very optimistic about Ukraine’s prospects for entry into the EU. Putin has signalled he has no in -principle objection to Ukraine joining the European Union, though, as the Russians point out, the EU is increasingly a military-political organisation as well an economic union, but when the war is over, the fine words spoken by the EU’s leaders will dissipate and negotiations about Ukraine’s membership will inevitable bog down in years of technical discussions. 

       6. Who will protect European soil in a future attack? NATO? EU defence alliance? Can Moscow be a future threat?

 There is no such danger or threat from Russia. NATO will continue and the United States will stay involved in Europe, even under Trump. 

 Putin’s ambitions are limited to Ukraine. The is no evidence, he will threaten or attack any other country, with the possible exception of the Baltic States and Moldova, should Moscow see the Russian minorities in those states being persecuted even more than at present. The only country that will require additional security after the war is Ukraine. Agreement on an international security guarantee for a neutral and disarmed Ukraine will be central to any final settlement of the Ukrainian conflict. Putin has indicated he is amenable to such a guarantee. It’s not impossible that NATO could be a partner of that guarantee, but Putin won’t risk any deal that could provide cover for Ukraine, with Western help, to rebuild its military power.

       7.    What about Trump and Russia?

Trump says he wants a good relationship with Putin and competitively he is focussed on China. But the same was true during his first presidency and in practice relations with Russia deteriorated even further, not least because the United States built up Ukraine’s military. True, Trump was dogged by the Russiagate controversy and influenced by the many Neocons in his administration. His second presidency be may well turn out differently because it will contain fewer Neocons and more America First Trump Loyalists, people like Kellogg. In any event, loyalty to Trump will be the defining characteristic of the members of his second administration and he will call all the shots in relation to Ukraine.

 Putin will remain sceptical of Trump but open to an improvement in Russia’s relations with the US, especially if the Ukraine war comes to a suitable conclusion.

       8.    One  more question: what is Putin’s goal for the position of Russia in the world after the Ukraine war?

Putin is a visionary whose overarching goal  is to end American global hegemony and usher in a new, post-Western system of international relations – a multipolar system of sovereign states based on diversity, equality and common security. It is not an empire that Putin is seeking to build, but a new world order that will safeguard the long-term security of Russia and its civilisational values. Defeating Ukraine and winning Russia’s proxy war with NATO are necessary preconditions, but Putin has his eye on an even bigger prize and he needs a stable peace to realise his historic ambitions to transform global politics.

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By Prof. Glenn Diesen, Substack, 11/26/24

For almost three years, NATO countries have boycotted diplomatic contacts with Russia, even as hundreds of thousands of men have died on the battlefield. The decision by diplomats to reject diplomacy is morally repugnant as diplomacy could have reduced the excess of violence, prevented escalation, and even resulted in a path to peace. However, the political-media elites skilfully sold the rejection of diplomacy to the public as evidence of their moral righteousness.

This article will first outline how NATO planned for a long war to exhaust Russia and knock it out from the ranks of great powers. Second, this article will demonstrate how the political-media elites communicated that diplomacy is treasonous and war is virtuous. 

NATO’s Long War

To exhaust Russia in a long war, the goal was to ensure that the Russians and Ukrainians kill each other for as long as possible. The US Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin outlined the US objective in the Ukraine War as weakening its strategic adversary: “We want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine”.[1] In late March 2022, Zelensky revealed in an interview with the Economist: “There are those in the West who don’t mind a long war because it would mean exhausting Russia, even if this means the demise of Ukraine and comes at the cost of Ukrainian lives”.[2]

The Israeli and Turkish mediators confirmed that Russia and Ukraine agreed to the terms of a peaceful settlement in Istanbul, in which Russia would withdraw its forces and Ukraine would restore its neutrality. However, why would the US and its allies accept that Ukraine return to neutrality, when the alternative was to use the powerful proxy army they had built in Ukraine to bleed and weaken Russia?[3]

The Turkish Foreign Minister acknowledged that there are “NATO member states that want the war to continue—let the war continue and Russia gets weaker. They don’t care much about the situation in Ukraine”.[4] The former Israeli Prime Minister also confirmed that the US and UK “blocked” the peace agreement as there was a “decision by the West to keep striking Putin” to destroy a strategic rival.[5] The retired German General, Harald Kujat, a former head of the German Bundeswehr and former chairman of the NATO Military Committee, also argued that this was a war deliberately provoked by NATO, while the US and UK sabotaged all paths to peace “to weaken Russia politically, economically and militarily”.[6] Interviews with American and British leaders in March 2022, revealed that a decision had been made for “the conflict to be extended and thereby bleed Putin” as “the only end game now is the end of Putin regime”.[7]

Chas Freeman, the former US Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs and Director for Chinese Affairs at the US State Department criticised Washington for the objective to prolong the fighting to “fight to the last Ukrainian”.[8] Republican Senator Lindsey Graham argued that the US was in a favourable position as it could fight Russia to the last Ukrainian: “I like the structural path we’re on here. As long as we help Ukraine with the weapons they need and the economic support, they will fight to the last person”.[9] Republican leader Mitch McConnell was similarly explicit:

“the most basic reasons for continuing to help Ukraine degrade and defeat the Russian invaders are cold, hard, practical American interests. Helping equip our friends in Eastern Europe to win this war is also a direct investment in reducing Vladimir Putin’s future capabilities to menace America, threaten our allies, and contest our core interests”.[10]

Senator Mitt Romney argued that financing the war was “the best national defense spending I think we’ve ever done” as “We’re diminishing and devastating the Russian military for a very small amount of money” and “we’re losing no lives in Ukraine”. US Congressman Dan Crenshaw also celebrated the proxy war as “investing in the destruction of our adversary’s military, without losing a single American troop, strikes me as a good idea”.[11]

Retired US General Keith Kellogg similarly called for extending the war in Ukraine as knocking out Russia would allow the US to focus on China: “if you can defeat a strategic adversary not using any US troops, you are at the acme of professionalism”. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg shared this logic as he argued defeating Russia on the battlefield will make it easier for the US to focus on China. Stoltenberg also noted that “if Ukraine wins, then you will have the second biggest army in Europe, the Ukrainian army, battle-hardened, on our side, and we’ll have a weakened Russian army”.[12]

Diplomacy as Treason and War as Virtue

When the decision had been made for a long war, the politicians and media began to construct narratives and a moral case for a long war, which would convince the public that diplomacy is treasonous, and war is virtuous.

Presenting the world as a struggle of good versus evil lays the foundation for effective war propaganda, as perpetual peace can be achieved by defeating the evil opponent while negotiations entail sacrificing indispensable values and principles. To this end, the Hitler analogy is very effective as diplomacy becomes dangerous appeasement while peace requires military victory. Reminiscent of George Orwell’s “war is peace”, Stoltenberg argues that weapons are the path to peace.

The Western public was reassured that fuelling the war was required to push Putin to the negotiation table, however, during almost three years of war the West never proposed negotiations. Reading the Western media, one gets the impression that Russia would not negotiate. However, Russia never opposed diplomacy or negotiations, it was the West that shut the door. So-called “peace summits” were held to give the public the impression that governments pursued peace, although Russia was not invited and the stated purpose was to mobilise public opinion and resources against Russia.

In November 2022, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley argued for starting negotiations with Russia. Ukraine had just captured large swaths of territory in Kherson and Kharkov, and General Milley argued Ukraine would not be in a better position to negotiate a peace deal. General Milley was correct in this assessment, yet he neglected that the principal objective of the war was to keep it going to bleed Russia. General Milley had to walk back his statements that threatened to end the war.[13]

The EU almost always advocates for immediate diplomacy and negotiations in conflicts around the world. In Ukraine, the EU’s foreign policy chief at the beginning of the war, Josep Borrell, argued that the war would be won on the battlefield.[14] The incoming foreign policy chief of the EU, Kaja Kallas, rejected any need for diplomacy during the war: “Why talk to him [Putin], he is a war criminal”.[15] Diplomacy now entails sitting in a room with people who agree with you, and pat each other on the shoulder for having isolated the adversary. The EU has completed its transition from a peace project to a geopolitical project.

Anyone suggesting to restore diplomacy or start negotiations is immediately smeared as a far-left or far-right pro-Russian stooge. It is hardly original to present the opposition to war as taking the side of the adversary, yet the accusation of treason is a powerful instrument to crush dissent. The Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban travelled to Ukraine, Russia, China, and the US (to meet with Trump) to explore the possibility of charting a path to peace. The EU responded by punishing Hungary and the political-media elites sought to delegitimise him as a puppet of Putin. The same script is applied to anyone suggesting to end the war.

Arguing against the dangerous precedent of “rewarding” Putin’s aggression with territory has been another seemingly moral argument against peace negotiations. However, this argument is based on the false premise that the war began as a territorial dispute. As we learned from the Istanbul peace agreement, Russia agreed to pull back its troops in return for Ukraine restoring its neutrality. Furthermore, the proxy war has been lost and Ukraine will only lose more men and territory with each passing day.

NATO’s continued insistence that Ukraine will become a member state after the war is presented to the public as a moral sign of support for Ukraine, although in reality, it has the effect of obstructing a political settlement. Ending NATO expansionism must be the cornerstone of any lasting peace agreement as this was the source of the war.

The Coming Backlash

As the Ukrainian frontlines collapse and their causalities subsequently intensify, the Americans are pushing Ukraine to lower its conscription age as sacrificing the youth could keep the war going for a bit longer. The Ukrainian public no longer wants to fight, desertions increase drastically, and “recruitment” consists of grabbing civilians off the streets and throwing them into vans that take them almost directly to the front lines. A recent Gallup poll found that there is not a single oblast in Ukraine where the majority support continuing the war.[16]

Oleksyi Arestovych, the former advisor to President Zelensky, predicted in 2019 that the threat of NATO expansion would “provoke Russia to launch a large-scale military operation against Ukraine”. NATO would then use the Ukrainian army to defeat Russia: “In this conflict, we will be very actively supported by the West—with weapons, equipment, assistance, new sanctions against Russia and the quite possible introduction of a NATO contingent, a no-fly zone etc. We won’t lose, and that’s good’.[17]

The war did not go as planned and Ukraine is being destroyed, and Arestovych recognises the folly of continuing the war. There is a growing realisation in Ukrainian society that NATO sabotaged the peace to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian. Ukrainians will resent Russia for decades to come, although there will also be hatred against the West. The war propagandists in the Western media will then surely act bewildered and blame Russian propaganda.

---

[1] G. Carbonaro, ‘U.S. Wants Russia ‘Weakened’ So It Can Never Invade Again’, Newsweek, 25 April 2022.

[2] The Economist. ‘Volodymyr Zelensky on why Ukraine must defeat Putin’ The Economist, 27 March 2022.

[3] The Minsk Peace Agreement was never intended to be implemented but used as an opportunity to build a large Ukrainian military, which both German and France have admitted.

[4] R. Semonsen, ‘Former Israeli PM: West Blocked Russo-Ukraine Peace Deal’, The European Conservative, 7 February 2023.

[5] N. Bennett, ‘Bennett speaks out’, YouTube Channel of Naftali Bennett, 4 February 2023.

[6] Emma, ‘Russland will verhandeln!’ [Russia wants to negotiate!], Emma, 4 March 2023.

[7] N. Ferguson, ‘Putin Misunderstands History. So, Unfortunately, Does the U.S.’, Bloomberg, 22 March 2022.

[8] A. Maté, ‘US fighting Russia ‘to the last Ukrainian’: veteran US diplomat’, The Grayzone, 24 March 2022.

[9] A. Maté, ‘US, UK sabotaged peace deal because they ‘don’t care about Ukraine’: fmr. NATO adviser’, The Grayzone, 27 September 2022.

[10] M. McConnell, ‘McConnell on Zelenskyy Visit: Helping Ukraine Directly Serves Core American Interests’, Mitch McConnell official website, 21 December 2022.

[11] L. Lonas, ‘Crenshaw, Greene clash on Twitter: ‘Still going after that slot on Russia Today’’, The Hill, 11 May 2022.

[12] T. O’Conner, ‘So, if the United States is concerned about China and wants to pivot towards Asia, then you have to ensure that Putin doesn’t win in in Ukraine’, Newsweek, 21 September 2023.

[13] K. Demirjian, Milley tries to clarify his case for a negotiated end to Ukraine war, The Washington Post, 16 November 2022.

[14] Foreign Affairs Council: Remarks by High Representative Josep Borrell upon arrival | EEAS, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/foreign-affairs-council-remarks-high-representative-josep-borrell-upon-arrival-1_en

[15] “Why talk to Putin? He’s a war criminal” Estonian PM Kaja Kallas,

https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/DG1IbMP7SR4?rel=0&autoplay=0&showinfo=0&enablejsapi=0

[16] B. Vigers, Half of Ukrainians Want Quick, Negotiated End to War, Gallup, 19 November 2024, Half of Ukrainians Want Quick, Negotiated End to War

[17] A. Arestovich, ‘Voennoe Obozrenie’ [Military Review], Apostrof TV, 18 February 2019.