Intellinews: Putin orders creation of buffer zone along Ukrainian border

Intellinews, 5/22/25

Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a buffer zone to be set up along the border with Ukraine on May 22.

Following his visit to the Kursk region, which has been partially controlled by Ukrainian troops for months , Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the creation of a “buffer zone” that will run “along the border.” Putin said the decision had been made at a government meeting via video link.

He initially declined to say exactly where the zone would extend, how long it would be, or how deep into Russian-occupied territory in Ukraine it would extend. “Our armed forces are in the process of solving this task; enemy firing points are being actively suppressed; work is underway,” he said.

The Russian press framed the plan as a rehabilitation zone for Russian regions that had been damaged by escalating cross-border drone attacks. Putin ordered the rapid development of a comprehensive restoration programme for border regions affected by Ukrainian strikes, instructing officials to ensure sufficient financial and logistical support for reconstruction efforts.

Putin directed the Ministry of Economic Development, in coordination with the Presidential Administration, to lead the initiative targeting the Kursk, Belgorod and Bryansk regions, all of which have faced repeated shelling and drone attacks since the escalation of cross-border hostilities.

“I task the Russian Ministry of Economic Development in cooperation with colleagues from the Presidential Administration to prepare at the earliest possible time the programme for comprehensive restoration of affected districts of Kursk, Belgorod and Bryansk regions,” the president said, according to TASS.

Putin emphasised the importance of ensuring the programme is fully resourced. “The programme must be provided with required financial and material resources,” he noted, adding that additional machinery and personnel, including experts from other regions, would be mobilised to assist.

The three regions, which share borders with Ukraine, have reported increasing attacks in recent months, including strikes on civilian infrastructure. Local authorities have declared states of emergency in several districts and implemented evacuations in response to the growing threat.

While Moscow has accused Kyiv of targeting border areas to destabilise Russian territory, Ukrainian officials have largely refrained from confirming cross-border operations, maintaining a policy of strategic ambiguity regarding long-range strikes.

The Kremlin’s move to launch a formal reconstruction initiative underscores the political and logistical challenges posed by the conflict’s spillover into Russian territory. It also reflects a broader attempt to reassure local populations and bolster administrative control in regions facing direct impacts from the war.

No timeline has been announced for the completion of the restoration programme.

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Will Russia’s Latest Buffer Zone Plan Be More Successful Than The Last?

By Andrew Korybko, Substack, 5/23/25

Putin warned in March 2024 that Russia might set up a “security zone” inside Ukraine in response to cross-border strikes and raids, which it then began to do two months later that May after Russian troops made a fresh push into Kharkov Region at the time. Regrettably, the incursion didn’t penetrate too deeply, and later that summer Ukraine launched a sneak attack against Russia’s Kursk Region. It was only earlier this year that Russia finally expelled all Ukrainian troops from there with North Korean assistance.

Nevertheless, Putin just announced late last week that “a decision has been made to create a buffer security zone along the Russian border” with Belgorod, Kursk, and Bryansk Regions, thus meaning inside the corresponding Ukrainian regions of Kharkov (once again), Sumy, and Chernigov. Unlike last year’s attempt, this latest one might be more successful due to the very different context within which it’s being pursued, particularly as regards the conflict’s new diplomatic and military dynamics.

Regarding the first, “The Devil’s In The Details As Trump Announced ‘Immediate’ Russian-Ukrainian Ceasefire Talks” right after his latest call with Putin, the details of which readers can learn more about from the preceding hyperlinked analysis. Its relevance to Putin’s newly announced buffer zone plan is that his declaration might initially be intended as a form of pressure upon Zelensky to coerce him into having Ukraine finally comply with Russia’s demanded concessions for politically resolving the conflict.

As for the second, it was assessed in mid-March that “Russia Might Expand Its Ground Campaign Into Sumy, Dniepropetrovsk, And/Or Kharkov Regions”, with Dniepropetrovsk being mentioned instead of Chernigov since Russian forces are approaching its border from Donbass after going around Pokrovsk. Crossing that administrative frontier into a region that Russia doesn’t (yet?) claim as its own could circumvent Ukraine’s formidable defenses in central Zaporozhye and lead to that region’s swift capture.

In connection with these dynamics, RT chief Margarita Simonyan clarified that the Russian delegation in Istanbul didn’t threaten that their country would claim an additional Ukrainian region if Ukraine doesn’t withdraw from the four disputed ones, but four more for a total of eight regions (not counting Crimea). These could conceivably be all or part of Chernigov, Sumy, Kharkov, and Dniepropetrovsk Regions given Russia’s latest buffer zone plan unless Ukraine agrees to its demanded concessions before then.

With that plan in mind and seeing as how those four regions, Kiev, Cherkassy, and Poltava are either entirely or partially east of the Dnieper, Russia might add to its list of demands by calling for the creation of a totally demilitarized “Trans-Dnieper” region controlled by non-Western peacekeepers. This could either complement its original demand for demilitarizing the entirety of Ukraine or be presented as a compromise in exchange for letting Ukraine do whatever it wants on the other side of the river.

Regardless of whether that proposal is put forth, Putin’s newly announced buffer zone plan shows that Russia is expanding its goals, which makes sense considering that it’s winning and that Ukraine still refuses to comply with its demanded concessions for politically resolving the conflict. The longer that Ukraine refuses to agree to peace on Russia’s terms, the more land that it stands to lose, which might ultimately be much more than anyone expects if the US soon abandons Ukraine in order to cut its losses.

Paul Goble: In 2024, Many Ukrainians who had Switched to Using Ukrainian have Shifted Back to Using Russian, according to Kyiv’s Language Ombudsman

Paul Goble, Website, Website, 5/2/25

Staunton, May 2 – The “powerful impulse” which led Ukrainians to stop using the Russian language has slowed and in some areas been reversed, according to a detailed, 341-page report by the Ukrainian government’s language ombudsman Taras Kremena. And in some regions and cities, the situation is becoming extremely unsatisfactory.

The report is available online at mova-ombudsman.gov.ua/storage/app/sites/14/Звіт 2023/zvit-2024-1.pdf and is summarized at https://ehorussia.com/new/node/32554). For a Moscow commentary thrilled by this development, see fondsk.ru/news/2025/05/04/khotyat-li-zhiteli-ukrainy-chtoby-ikh-deti-uchili-russkiy-yazyk.html.

According to the Ukrainian experts, this trend reflects the tendency of younger Ukrainians to follow the behavior of their parents rather than to be informed by government efforts to promote the use of Ukrainian. And they urge the government to do more to ensure that ever more Ukrainians will identify Ukrainian as their native language.

Gilbert Doctorow: Travel Notes: installment four

By Gilbert Doctorow, Website, 5/7/25

In this installment I turn attention to what was always a mainstay of my reports on visits to Russia since the onset of the Special Military Operation: the household shopping basket and, more broadly, how the consumer is faring in a country subject to the world’s most severe sanctions and in the midst of a war that has placed military production at the center of economic planning while disrupting traditional supply chains.

Food

Put simply, most any food item you would find in any given niche (economy, upper middle class or elite) of the supermarkets in Belgium is available in the counterpart category retailer here in Russia, though sourcing is usually very different.

The difference in provenance is most apparent in fruits and vegetables. High quality leaf lettuce, pre-packed mixtures of baby spinach and other young shoots, cucumbers and cherry tomatoes are grown locally in greenhouses year round. Green celery comes from Iran. Persimmons, summer quality watermelons and other fruits arrive these days from Azerbaijan. The quality of these imports is premium.

In addition there are chains of small food shops spread out across the urban residential communities selling specialty items that are specific to Russian consumer taste like fresh, non-sterilized salmon caviar in the Fish and Caviar network or fragrant giant strawberries delivered from Greece to your corner green grocer. Parenthetically I note that such strawberry sourcing does not work within the EU, where Spain seems to have a monopoly for its less glamorous fruit.

In dairy products, the departure of Danone from the Russian market has had very little impact on what is on your breakfast table. In virtually the same plastic containers and with very similar labeling you can find your Activia equivalent. Despite all the political posturing against Russia, the Finnish cheese maker Valio maintains a respectable presence in the dairy fridges. Otherwise, if you put branded cheeses aside, the product assortment in this category is as good or better than it ever was.

In beverages, Russians who cannot live without Evian or San Pellegrino water can buy their fill in upper middle class supermarkets. Many leading Scotch whiskeys are here at prices comparable to Belgium even if the shelves give much more space to no-name whiskeys at a fraction of the cost. And even niche items like Campari liqueur or Baileys are on sale, though the Baileys is selling at a 30 per cent premium to the Belgian retail price.

The selection of imported canned or bottled beers can be astonishing. To be sure, the overall volume of beer imports is down substantially from before the war, but those who must have their Belgian or German white beer or triple strength monastery brews are still spoiled for choice in our neighborhood.

As for wines, the Italian, French, Chilean, South African and even Australian producers remain well represented. The big ongoing change is the presentation on store shelves of high quality Crimean ‘estate bottled’ red wines in the 8 to 10 euro range, though those in search of prestige bottles will find Russian wines also in the 20 or 30 euro price category in ordinary supermarkets, not only at specialized wine merchants where prices can be multiples of the aforementioned. For lovers of dessert wines, the port varieties on offer from the Crimean producer Massandra present in every supermarket are a must: for 5 euros you get a product that would cost 5 times that if it were labeled Portuguese and sold in Brussels.

As for nonfood items in supermarkets,most brands familiar to US and European consumers remain stocked on the shelves. Tide detergent is here. Regarding many other products, if the producer has left the Russian market his production lines remain active in the hands of the Russian acquirers, selling the same goods under a new name.

Having said all that and only mentioned price a couple of times above, I can now address the question of price inflation: whereas in past reports I said that prices were fairly stable, on this trip it became clear that prices have risen appreciably. Just how much depends on the given product and given producer’s market leverage.

The inflation since my visit 5 months ago is uneven across product categories, reaching perhaps 30% on some items like Russian farmed lake trout or salmon from the Karelia region, which have risen to above Belgian levels. This is noteworthy when wild fish like flounder caught off Murmansk are selling at prices three times lower than in Europe. Yet, in fairness, it must be said that prices on most products that I examined have risen only in the single digits. Still, overall the price rises will be felt in family budgets.

Electronics

We cannot live without our electronic gadgets and this is as true of Russia as anywhere else. Accordingly, I spent some time at the DNS shop closest to my home. DNS is the country’s largest electronics retailer. It was formed several years ago following a market consolidation. I not only looked but also purchased there a new smart phone and new notebook computer.

There can be no question that their product assortment has changed dramatically from what it was before the start of the Special Military Operation, when many of the world’s major manufacturers were represented here. Even on my last visit there were some Western notebook computers from old stock still available for purchase. Not now. Nearly all their computers, telephones and related paraphernalia are produced in China. The leading Chinese international brands like Huawei left this market under threat of U.S. secondary sanctions. So DNS is selling goods supplied by less known companies that are virtually unknown in the West. Are they good? No doubt, otherwise DNS would not offer a money-back one year guarantee. But it is unlikely they are as good as the Hewlett Packard or Alcatel products they replace.

As regards computers, I said above ‘nearly all’ are Chinese. The DNS store had two notebooks on offer priced at half the cheapest Chinese entries and looking very good. These, the salesman told me are made to DNS order on assembly lines in Russia and Belarus and are sold under the DEXP brand name. They run on Intel Celeron chips, have the Microsoft Operating System installed at the factory and are loaded with the Microsoft 365 version Word and Excel software. The all-in price was 220 euros and they come with the aforementioned one year money-back guarantee which can be extended to two years for a modest fee.

I will not bore readers with the hard disk Gigabyte capacity and the like. Suffice it to say that the performance characteristics of this entry level product is sufficient for the needs of your average journalist, myself included.

For those among you who will look for high performance Western computers, Russia today has an answer to your needs but not in the mass market retailers like DNS which must have high volume and regular product deliveries to keep all their shops across the country well stocked. This niche is satisfied by stand-alone computer and electronics shops that buy their products via parallel trading in one-off import lots. A mark-up, of course, is added for this service, but the customers are price-proof and get what they want.

As I said, I also purchased a medium performance Chinese smart phone sold under the HONOR brand name. We are now using it and are very satisfied with our 110 euro outlay.

DNS stores also stock home appliances like dishwashers, refrigerators, washing machines, stoves and the like. Here the Western manufacturers remain present though Chinese and Russian brands are predominant. Here again, any consumer who is ready to pay the equivalent of the purchase price of a small car to get a prestige stove or refrigerator to impress fellow oligarchs can find what he or she needs in stores offering imports from parallel trading.

CARS

Not a great deal has changed in the car market since my visit 5 months ago. Chinese market penetration of new car sales had already reached and passed the 50% mark then. At that time, when more and more Chinese manufacturers entered the market and were setting up distribution, their ability to supply spare parts in a timely way was under question.

Accordingly, on this visit I asked one taxi driver about his Geely, and he said he had no problems with the car or with servicing and spare parts.

There are, of course, a lot of cars on the road in Petersburg that were bought before the imposition of Western sanctions. When I asked the owner of the Peugeot taxi which was taking us downtown how he was faring with spare parts, he said he had no problems. To his knowledge all spares for his car were being sourced in China which is not only reseller but also for some items is an original manufacturer of Peugeot parts. If he is right then the Chinese have stepped into the void left by Western carmakers for maintaining their own vehicles.

Russia Matters: Russia Continues Advance in Ukraine, But Gains Constituted 1% So Far In 2025

Russia Matters, 5/23/25

  1. In the week preceding May 20, 2025, Russian forces gained 55 square miles of Ukrainian territory (just over 2 Manhattan islands), a notable gain over its 33-square mile advance over each of the previous two weeks, according to the May 21, 2025, issue of the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s armed forces lost 1 square mile of their control in Russia’s Kursk and Belgorod regions, leaving them with a total of 9 square miles, according to the card, which analyzes ISW data. In the past month (April 22–May 20, 2025), Russia gained 135 square miles, according to that data. According to RM’s analysis of data posted by Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group, the total amount of Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia increased by 0.9% so far this year. See Table 1 for more estimates.*
  2. Donald Trump’s May 19 call with Vladimir Putin yielded no breakthrough on the Russia-Ukraine war, with Putin rejecting an unconditional full ceasefire again and Trump asserting that, going forward, Moscow and Kyiv will need to negotiate conditions directly, perhaps in the Vatican, in what Financial Times reporters interpreted as a signal that Washington is “stepping back from a role as a mediator.” While the White House did not explicitly confirm Trump’s disengagement publicly, the U.S. leader did observe after the call with Putin: “This isn’t my war.” When briefing European leaders by phone on the outcome of his conversation with Putin, Trump said that Putin isn’t ready to end the war in Ukraine because he thinks he is winning, according to the Wall Street Journal.1 Since the call, Russia has a rejected the Vatican as a venue for further talks while advancing to “final stages” the “memorandum” on its terms for a future peace treaty, which Putin promised to come up with during his call with Trump and which his diplomats intend to discuss with their Ukrainian counterparts in Istanbul.
  3. Ukrainians should not bet on some kind of “white swan” event that would “bring peace to Ukraine in the borders of 1991 or 2022,” ex-commander of Ukraine’s armed forces Gen. Valerii Zaluzhnyi said at a recent public forum in Ukraine. Ukraine needs to transform the nature of the current war from that of attrition to one that minimizes the expenditure of Ukraine’s human and economic resources, he said. Given the “huge deficit of human resources and a catastrophic economic situation,” “we can only talk about a high-tech war for survival, where a minimum of human resources, a minimum of economic means are used to achieve maximum benefit,” according to Zaluzhnyi.2

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