By Oliver Boyd-Barrett, Substack

10/11/26:

U.S. President Donald Trump has announced an immediate “energy ceasefire” between Russia and Ukraine on October 11, 2026, claiming both sides had agreed to stop targeting each other’s energy infrastructure.

There is no concrete evidence that a functional energy truce is in effect, and both official statements and field events contradict the claim.Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that the announcement “came as news” to him, though he noted Ukraine would be ready to comply if Russia officially agreed to a reciprocal halt and clarified the terms. Combatants have continued hitting energy-related targets on both sides despite the announcement. For instance, Russian forces launched large waves of drone and missile strikes into Ukraine, while Ukrainian forces have maintained long-range strikes against Russian oil infrastructure and refineries (such as facilities in Syzran).

While the Kremlin has previously expressed general openness to the concept of pausing energy strikes, Russian officials have tied any agreement to broader demands, including the lifting of Western sanctions on Russian seaborne energy exports. Independent think tanks and analysts describe the proposed arrangement as largely symbolic or non-existent in practice.

President Trump made a similar claim in September 2026 that both nations had agreed to halt energy attacks, which also broke down immediately as strikes persisted.

As for the diesel deal, there is a growing chorus of expert opinion in favor of the view that the deal will do relatively little to boost diesel production, and it is the shortage of production, not the hiccups of war distribution, that is the major factor behind rising prices.

See Matt Randolph on Forbes: The Art Of The Tiny Deal: Trump’s Diesel Deal With Putin Does Nothing (Randolph), and Larry Johnson on Sonar21: The Other Hormuz Shocks: LNG and Helium. Economic effects of the Persian Gulf cutoff, from first-order to tertiary (Johnson).

10/10/26:

The main challenge to and opportunities for the US-Russia diesel agreement announced by President Trump yesterday center on: the reactions of Ukraine and Europe, damaged Russian refinery infrastructure, severe legislative and political backlash, and domestic market scale limitations.

Zelenskiy has already howled his disapproval, as one would expect, and he has confirmed that he will continue the renewed Ukrainian onslaught on Russian refineries that had picked up again from October 1 (unless Russia agrees to stop its strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure). This, of course, raises the question as to where all this Russian diesel that is destined for the US is going to come from in the event that there is insufficient Russian refining capacity. Russia recently halted diesel exports because it wanted to protect – to continue to be able to supply at reasonable prices – Russia’s domestic market. If Russia is unable to boost its refining capacity very significantly it runs the risk that it will not be able to supply the US, after all, or that it may have to allow domestic prices to rise significantly, or that it will have to send more crude to countries like India for refining there, and this too would likely have a negative impact on prices. If could also simply send crude oil to the US, since Russian oil is more favorable for refining into diesel and aviation fuel than much of US shale oil, but I understand that US refineries are already working close to capacity, fed from, among other things, more oil from Venezuela.

The total amount of diesel that the deal envisages being sent to the US is 4.8 million metric tons, according to CNBC. The Atlantic Council says this is not enough to resolve global fuel shortages. Bloomberg has issued a calculation that puts the total amount being talked about at 13.5 million metric tons.

Ukraine will likely find support for its intransigence from Europe, but that support will be increasingly insincere, given that Europe is also short of diesel and needs to see a boost to global diesel availability and is coming dangerously close to the end of the possibility of Europe continuing to shoot itself in the foot by adopting policies that merely increase its fuel difficulties (such as planning to terminate all imports of Russian fuel, even LNG, by January). Why has it been doing this? Because it thought that that was what the US wanted it to do, because it has desperately wanted to see the US return in a full-blooded way to the battlefields of Ukraine, because Europe has wasted hundreds of billions of dollars supporting Ukraine and buying its weapons from US arms manufacturers and because this generation of European leaders are phenomenally brainwashed, inexperienced and stupid.

If Ukraine and Europe together plan on continuing to destroy Russian oil refineries (and we have to remember that it has not just been Ukraine doing this by itself, but Ukraine aided and abetted, significantly, by NATO, including US satellite intelligence and navigational support), then that will likely force the US – incredibly – to reenter the war on Russia’s side (!) or, in another TACO, to give in, again, to Zelenskiy and the Europeans.

This thought is as striking as an idea proposed by Professor Geoffrey Roberts to the effect that Ukraine may now consider that it’s best future ally will be Russia! This view has some merit in as far as, in additon to Trump’s most recent turn against Zelenskiy, the road for Ukraine into NATO is now blocked – everyone agrees – and the prospects for its passage into the EU look very shaky, while emerging problems in the relationship that Ukraine has with some neighboring countries such as Poland and Romania may also begin to reignite cultural affinities between Ukraine and Russia. These latter were always there, of course, especially so far as eastern Ukraine is concerned. I have less confidence to think there could ever be a reconciliation between Russia and western Ukraine, given the neo-Nazi and monist nationalist conceptions (backed by the US in 2014, leading to the coup d’etat that year). But one has to recall that the population is only half the size it once was and that half of the remaining population is made up of pensioners or near-pensioners.

But, back to the US and Russia, perhaps the US doesn’t need to reenter the war on Russia’s side. Perhaps it just has to do nothing – or, rather, more “nothing” than the “nothing” it has recently been doing – given that under Russian general Surovikin’s leadership in charge of the bombing of Dnieper bridges, together with ever more sustain Russian attacks on Ukrainian ports, energy facilities, warehouse, weapons production facilities, etc., Russia will simply win the war. Benefitting from an additional $4 billion dollars of revenue from diesel sales to the US, Russia will have plenty of motivation to do whatever needs to be done.

There is the little matter of the temporary general license issued by the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control directly clashes with the newly enacted Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, which was designed to cut off revenue sustaining Russia’s war in Ukraine., My understanding is that this merely gives Trump the capability of imposing Graham’s “bone-crushing” sanctions, but does not require him so to do. But there will be backlash from neocon lawmakers from the substantial warmongering elements of both parties – including members of the Congressional Ukraine Caucus – that have condemned the pivot as a reversal of pressure on Moscow, though the administration relies on executive waiver and licensing authorities to bypass immediate statutory blocks. It appears that Russia has already been granted a six-month waiver from US sanctions. The Treasury Department confirms that the Office of Foreign Assets Control had issued General License 135, authorizing the purchasae, shipment, and importation of Russian-origin diesel into United States and global markets through April 7, 2027. Russia is lifting its own ban on diesel exports with immediate effect.

The main opportunities.

The immediate influx of 300,000 tonnes of diesel, followed by an additional 500,000 tonnes in November, is aimed directly at reducing soaring global fuel prices. President Trump highlighted that bringing down diesel costs is an explicit priority to lower operating expenses for American farmers, truckers, and ranchers. The sudden deal is heavily leveraged by the Republican Party to ease voter frustration over the high cost of living just weeks before the critical November midterm elections.

Beyond energy flows, the Kremlin has noted that the phone call between President Trump and Vladimir Putin devoted “significant attention to the prospects of resolving the Ukrainian crisis”. The deal coincided with active talks involving U.S. envoys to negotiate an end to the war. The opening of energy dialogue acts as a doorway to address other highly sensitive international flashpoints, including the current situation surrounding Iran and broader bilateral state relations.

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Authorities in Irkutsk oblast claimed an “all-clear” after nearly 5,000 laboratory tests found no dangerous pathogens following the death of lab employee

Russia Matters, 10/9/26

Authorities in Irkutsk oblast claimed an “all-clear” after nearly 5,000 laboratory tests found no dangerous pathogens following the death of Darya Shipilova, a 28-year-old employee of the Anti-Plague Institute in this Siberian province. Officials said she died from community-acquired pneumonia, was vaccinated against the infections she studied and was not involved in a laboratory accident. Monitoring of contacts has ended, after approximately 200 people were initially quarantined. Authorities said no plague cases or wider outbreak were identified, although the exact cause of death had not been definitively established. This follows from reporting by Bloomberg, Meduza and The Moscow Times.

By Ted Snider, The American Conservative, 9/2/26

One day, the war in Ukraine will be over. When that day finally arrives, Ukraine may find itself transforming from the country that everyone fought over to the country that nobody wants to be burdened with. Ukraine has been caught in a tug of war, pulled between two sides that covet it: the United States and its European and Canadian allies to the west and Russia to the east. But after the war, Ukraine may find itself alone, abandoned by and disappointed in the West and with bitter memories of and animosity against the east.

In 2014, Ukrainian nationalists came to the conclusion that elections could no longer be trusted to deliver their monist vision of Ukraine in which the language, culture, and religion of the country’s ethnic Russian citizens had to be erased. So, for the first time in Ukraine’s history, they reversed an election with a coup. The central goal of that coup was to end Ukraine’s multivector foreign policy that balanced relations with Europe and Russia.

Reorienting toward the West meant economic cooperation with Europe and membership in the European Union. That political and economic goal was twinned with the security goal of membership in NATO. Membership in both was promised to Ukraine, and the West encouraged Ukraine to go on fighting Russia after its 2022 invasion, rather than negotiating a peace, in defense of its right to pursue those memberships. The war, the U.S. State Department explained at the beginning of the invasion, is “bigger than Russia, it’s bigger than Ukraine.” It is about “core principles,” specifically, 

the principle that each and every country has a sovereign right to determine its own foreign policy, has a sovereign right to determine for itself with whom it will choose to associate in terms of its alliances, its partnerships, and what orientation it wishes to direct its gaze.

Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian lives have been destroyed in pursuit of those promises and goals. When the war finally ends, Ukrainians will have to rebuild their lives and rebuild their country. But the odds are good that their country will not be in the EU nor in NATO. If Ukraine faces west, they will find themselves abandoned and alone.

Russia long ago dropped its objection to Ukraine joining the EU, yet the path has not truly been cleared because the EU has refused to drop its own objections. Though most European leaders say they “strongly support” Kiev’s accession to the European Union, numerous problems including Ukrainian corruption and the country’s democratic deficit have thrown up roadblocks to membership.

Dreams of fast-tracking Ukraine’s EU membership have been dashed. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s demands for membership by 2027 have been revised to more realistic targets like 2035. Proposed compromises like “membership light” or “reverse enlargement” have gone nowhere. France and Germany have blocked them, and the plans never had the support of most member states.

Relations between Ukraine and Poland continue to deteriorate over Ukraine’s insistence on honoring its ultranationalist element, whose lineage traces back to groups that participated in the mass killing of Poles in the Second World War. Hungary, even after the ouster of its populist Prime Minister Viktor Orban, continues to block Ukraine’s accession over its treatment of Hungarian minorities.

Promises of NATO membership lie even more shattered. “Irreversible paths” and bridges have been promised to Ukraine, but walking the path has been prohibited and the bridge has never been built. Presidents Joe Biden and Donald Trump have both denied Ukraine membership in NATO. Biden said that “the likelihood that Ukraine is going to join NATO in the near term is not very likely” and that “Ukraine isn’t ready for NATO membership.” Trump said there would be “no going into NATO by Ukraine.” Ukraine’s European friends have said the same. Germany’s then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz said that the question of Ukraine’s NATO membership is “not even on the agenda.” Point number seven of Trump’s 28-point peace plan states that “Ukraine agrees to enshrine in its constitution that it will not join NATO, and NATO agrees to include in its statutes a provision that Ukraine will not be admitted in the future.” 

Zelensky long ago said “it must be acknowledged” that Ukraine “cannot enter” the “supposedly open” NATO door and that, though “publicly, the doors remain open,” in reality, Ukraine is “not going to be a NATO member.” 

At the end of the war, Ukraine will be left to face a West that has grown reluctant to fund its economic reconstruction and that declines to extend an invitation to join its political and security unions. Ukraine, at that point, may turn to an unlikely option: Russia.

It will not be easy or smooth. But Geoffrey Roberts, professor emeritus of history at University College Cork, has recently suggested that, after the war,

the best friend that Ukraine is going to have is Russia and the Russian people. That is where Ukraine’s ultimate future lies: in reconstructing its relationship with Russia. While immensely difficult, it represents the only viable long-term path for the Ukrainian people.

Russia has continued to frame the Ukrainian people as a brotherly nation and not a people to be devastated or destroyed. Acknowledging that fact is not to excuse Russia’s invasion nor the devastation it has caused. It is to suggest that Russia’s goal may have been to stop Ukraine from being used as a military bridgehead on Russia’s border and that, to do this, Russia focused on the Ukrainian armed forces and not the Ukrainian people.

Nicolai Petro, professor of political science at the University of Rhode Island, tells the unexpected story that, during direct negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, “to the astonishment of the Europeans present” the Russian and Ukrainian delegates “started to make jokes and to get along. Because essentially, they understood each other better—far better—than either of them understood the Europeans.” 

Any turn to the east will take time. But Ukraine’s natural future may lie in repaired relations with Russia. That may be necessitated by closed doors to the west and smoothed by shared language and family ties as well as commonalities of religion, culture, and history with Russia.

Two factors could determine if this reconstructed relationship is possible. The first is the trajectory of the war. Ukraine and Russia are unlikely to mend relations if “the war is fought to a finish, involving Ukrainian societal as well as military collapse, including large-scale civilian casualties,” Roberts told The American Conservative. But relations between the two countries could recover if “a negotiated settlement saves Ukraine’s statehood, provides for its future security, and supports its postwar reconstruction.” That recovery could be hastened and strengthened if Russia becomes a primary partner in reconstruction and if future trade relations are built into a settlement. 

The second factor is who leads Ukraine after the war. After nourishing the people of Ukraine throughout the war with maximalist promises of recovering all of its territory and gaining membership in NATO, Zelensky may find it difficult to sign a peace deal that accomplishes none of that and, moreover, allows the possibility of warmer relations with Russia in the future.

But polls suggest that Zelensky may not be the leader after Ukraine is able to hold presidential elections. And both his two main rivals, Valeriy Zaluzhny and Kyrylo Budanov, may be more likely to negotiate such a peace. Budanov has said recently that he is “ready for any step that will end the war,” and in office he maintained dialogue with Igor Kostyukov, the head of the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency.

At the end of the war, a devastated Ukraine will need somewhere to turn. With the long-promised door to the west closed, the badly-frayed but natural connection to Russia may be the only viable direction in which Ukraine can turn.

By Brian McDonald, Substack, 9/4/26

On Thursday [9/3], Russia analyst Anton Barbashin asked on X: “Do some journalists really have access to people from the Russian president’s inner circle? Why would such sources share sensitive information with the foreign press? Is this always manipulation?”

The answer to the first question is yes, and the answer to the second is that the people with the best access are generally the people least inclined to shout it from the rooftops.

There are a handful of journalists at Kommersant, RIA, Vedomosti, RBC and the major state broadcasters who genuinely know people in and around Putin’s inner circle and while nobody leaves them unattended with the filing cabinets, they know enough to recognise what’s really going on around the place.

Alexei Venediktov is an interesting case because, despite being designated a foreign agent, as Barbashin is too, incidentally, the former Echo of Moscow boss quite obviously still speaks to people at the top, but the difference is that the arm holding him at arm’s length has become considerably longer. So is the BBC’s Steve Rosenberg, who has become less a correspondent than a recurring character in Moscow’s political pantomime (and, to be fair to him, he seems perfectly aware of the part he is playing).

Then there are the journalists who remain inside the tent and, here Kommersant’s Andrey Kolesnikov is a good example, as his reports are often ironic and surprisingly sharp, but he knows where the limits lie. Thus, what he doesn’t do is claim that Putin privately told the Security Council Russia will be invading Armenia next Thursday, or write about the private lives of officials.

Which brings us to the Western press. When the FT, Economist, Bloomberg, New York Times or Wall Street Journal announces that somebody in Putin’s immediate circle has anonymously revealed what the Russian president secretly thinks, scepticism is generally the most advisable reaction.

People familiar with Moscow’s media world can often make a reasonable guess at who these mysterious interlocutors are and some may indeed be “close to the Kremlin”, though in approximately the sense that a man drinking in a pub near Clarence House is close to the King.

They know people who know people, but knowing a man who knows a man who once spoke to a man isn’t quite the same thing as sitting beside Putin, and they also evidently haven’t heard my erstwhile Irish editor’s maxim of “believe a quarter of what you hear, and half of what you see.”

Yet something miraculous happens during the journey west, as the further information travels from the Kremlin, the closer its source seems to get to Putin.

Since 2022, most Western organisations have closed or drastically reduced their Moscow operations, meaning that the correspondent who might once have met somebody over coffee or beer inside the Garden Ring is now sitting in Berlin, London, Riga, Tbilisi or New York, and operating online.

And here Barbashin’s second question becomes much more interesting, because let’s suppose you really were close enough to Putin to know the secrets routinely attributed to anonymous sources, well, why, in Russia in 2026, would you secretly transmit them to a foreign newspaper?

The paradox is therefore rather delicious, in that the more sensitive the supposed revelation, the more senior the source must be in order to know it, which naturally means his decision to leak it becomes even more puzzling.

There is, however, another explanation for some anonymous briefings, and it’s considerably less romantic. Sometimes the Kremlin wants the information published, but when it does, it hardly needs a trembling conspirator smuggling secrets through Checkpoint Charlie.

The Presidential Administration contains Alexei Gromov, Andrei Tsybulin, Sergei Kiriyenko and Alexander Smirnov alongside Dmitry Peskov, and they haven’t spent decades dealing with journalists without discovering how journalists work.

Reuters has often been an important conduit for anonymous signalling of this sort, with CNN and AP sometimes occupying similar territory.

Whether Reuters retains precisely the same position is now worth watching. Its Moscow bureau leadership is changing this week, with Kommersant suggesting that outgoing bureau chief Guy Faulconbridge’s departure followed dissatisfaction that his Russia coverage was too objective for contemporary British tastes.

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Russia Matters, 9/21/26

Ukrainians find domestic corruption more damaging than Russian bombs: A corruption scandal involving Serhiy Kropyva, an official linked to Ukraine’s  ousted prosecutor general, has intensified Ukrainians’ anger during wartime, according to NYT. Anti-corruption investigators allegedly recorded Kropyva discussing kickbacks for protecting a phone-scam network. The revelations reportedly helped topple Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko, but also deepened distrust in institutions. The scandal is damaging because Ukraine faces severe wartime funding shortages, connecting corruption to battlefield resilience and national survival, according to NYT. A 2025 summer Kyiv poll found that a majority of Ukrainians considered corruption more damaging to the country than Russian bombings.  

By Leon Vermeulen, Substack, 9/24/26

The EU’s latest attempt to gain control of Russia’s frozen reserves does not eliminate the legal liability. It transfers that liability from Belgium to the whole European Union—including countries that may vote against the plan.

Ukraine needs more money.

The European Union’s €90 billion financing package for 2026 and 2027 is no longer considered sufficient. Kyiv says it needs an additional €27 billion for defence in 2026, with another substantial shortfall expected in 2027.

The approximately €210 billion in frozen Russian Central Bank assets held within the EU have therefore returned to the political agenda. Most of the money is administered by Euroclear, the Belgian financial institution responsible for safeguarding and settling trillions of euros in international assets. Belgium has consistently resisted attempts to use the Russian principal. It fears litigation, Russian retaliation, damage to Euroclear and a broader loss of confidence in the euro.

Brussels has now been presented with a possible solution: move the Russian accounts out of Euroclear and into a new EU institution.

Three former senior officials proposed the idea in August. A cross-party group of 122 members of the European Parliament has subsequently called for its urgent consideration. The transfer, they argue, could be authorised under Article 122 of the EU treaties, which permits emergency economic measures without requiring the unanimous support of all member states. The new EU institution would become the custodian and assume “all legal obligations to the Central Bank of Russia.”

That language tells us almost everything we need to know.

Moving the liability

The proposal does not establish that Russia has ceased to own the assets. On the contrary, it acknowledges that Russia retains a legal claim.

Euroclear currently records the Russian money as a liability. If sanctions are eventually lifted, the Central Bank of Russia can demand repayment. Euroclear is presently prohibited from paying Russia, but the debt itself has not disappeared.

Normally, Euroclear could not simply transfer that obligation to someone else without the creditor’s consent. Russia would hardly volunteer to have its claim moved into an EU-controlled vehicle created to finance Ukraine.

Brussels must therefore use legislation to compel the transfer, remove the liability from Euroclear and place it on the European Union. That may reduce Belgium’s immediate exposure. It does not solve the underlying legal problem. It merely shares that problem among the 27 member states.

If the EU institution held the assets intact, it might reasonably be described as a new custodian. But that would produce no money for Ukraine.

If it lent or spent the principal while leaving Russia with a theoretical promise of eventual repayment, the arrangement would become confiscation in everything but name. A custodian safeguards another party’s property. It does not consume that property and replace it with a politically conditional promise.

The legal doubts have not disappeared

At the end of 2025, the European Central Bank refused to provide a financial backstop for an earlier €140 billion reparations-loan proposal. It concluded that such involvement would breach the EU prohibition on monetary financing.

ECB President Christine Lagarde later described a revised proposal only as coming “closest” to compliance with international law. That was not confirmation of legality. It was a carefully qualified warning that the legal boundary had nearly—but not certainly—been reached.

Belgium remained unconvinced. So did Euroclear.

Euroclear’s chief executive, Valérie Urbain, warned that anything resembling confiscation could violate the international-law protections applying to sovereign assets. She even declined to rule out legal action against EU institutions if Euroclear’s legal and fiduciary duties were compromised.

The latest proposal does not produce a favourable court judgment or create a newly recognised exception to sovereign immunity. It constructs another institutional route to the same money while moving the resulting liability elsewhere.

Brussels may call this legal innovation. International investors may call it circumvention.

Who pays if Russia wins?

This is the question that must be answered before any vote takes place. Suppose the EU transfers the assets to its new custodian and then lends or spends the money. Years later, a competent court rules that the assets must be returned to their legal owner.

Who produces the €210 billion?

Ukraine is extremely unlikely to repay it. Euroclear is supposed to have been released from the liability. Belgium is supposed to have been protected. The new EU custodian will have no independent reserve large enough to satisfy the judgment because the money will already have been used.

The bill would therefore return to the European Union.

The EU would have to recapitalise the custodian, draw upon member-state guarantees, use the EU budget or borrow additional money. Whichever mechanism was chosen, the ultimate burden would fall upon member states and their taxpayers.

This risk is not hypothetical speculation. During the debate in December 2025, one draft offered Belgium and other countries holding Russian assets unlimited protection against successful Russian claims. It proposed “unconditional, irrevocable and on-demand” guarantees ensuring that the Russian Central Bank could be repaid if necessary.

Several governments objected precisely because the guarantee was uncapped.

The Commission therefore understood the problem. If the assets were used and a court later required their restitution, somebody would have to replace the money.

The proposed change of custodian does not eliminate that liability. It moves it from Euroclear’s balance sheet to Europe’s public balance sheet.

Outvoted when the money is taken—charged when it must be returned

Article 122 introduces an even more troubling issue. Because a decision under Article 122 does not require unanimity, member states opposing the transfer could be outvoted. But once an EU regulation has been validly adopted, it normally binds the entire Union.

A government voting against the use of the Russian assets would not necessarily escape the financial consequences. Unless the final legislation specifically exempted dissenting countries, they could still be required to contribute through the EU budget, national guarantees, higher future contributions or repayment of additional EU borrowing.

Hungary, Slovakia, Belgium or another opposing state could therefore be outvoted when the assets were taken—and later charged for returning them. This is not merely a legal curiosity. It is a serious question of democratic and fiscal legitimacy.

A qualified majority could impose a contingent liability approaching €210 billion upon every member state, including those that explicitly refused to accept the risk. National taxpayers might inherit an obligation that their own governments opposed and their national parliaments never approved.

Article 122 may allow the Council to make an emergency economic decision. It cannot make €210 billion appear if the courts eventually order repayment.

Nor is it certain that the EU can use the same qualified-majority procedure to obtain unlimited national guarantees or raise whatever new resources would then be required. The authority to assume a liability and the authority to collect the money needed to satisfy it are not necessarily the same.

Europe could therefore discover that it was relatively easy to authorise the spending but politically and constitutionally much harder to finance the consequences.

Investors will understand the message

The EU urgently needs investment. It wants hundreds of billions of euros for defence, energy infrastructure, industrial renewal, digital technology and economic competitiveness. Europe cannot finance all of this from taxation and public borrowing. It requires international capital and continued confidence in euro-denominated assets.

Yet, at precisely this moment, it is debating how to gain control of assets entrusted to Europe’s own financial institutions.

EU officials will say that Russia is an exceptional case. Russia invaded Ukraine, and international law requires an aggressor to pay reparations. They will emphasise the differences between immobilisation, collateralisation and confiscation.

Foreign governments and international investors may reach a simpler conclusion: when political relations deteriorate, assets held in Europe can become political instruments.

They do not have to remove every euro tomorrow. They need only place less of their next investment in Europe. Central banks can increase their holdings of gold, diversify their reserves, use different custodians and conduct more trade through payment systems outside Western control. Each decision may be small. The cumulative effect could be enormous.

Financial trust is built slowly and lost quickly. Once governments begin questioning whether assets held in Europe remain beyond political reach, no regulation from Brussels can order them to forget the precedent.

Spending Europe’s negotiating leverage

The Russian assets are also more than a potential source of money. They are one of Europe’s few substantial bargaining instruments in an eventual peace settlement.

Donald Trump understands their value. His reported 28-point peace proposal treated $100 billion of frozen Russian assets as capital for American-controlled reconstruction projects, with the United States receiving half the profits. Other funds could support future Russian-American ventures.

Washington therefore views the assets not simply as compensation for Ukraine but as negotiable capital.

Using the money now might prevent Washington and Moscow from determining its future without Europe. But it would also eliminate Europe’s own leverage. Once spent, the assets could no longer be exchanged for reparations, security arrangements, sanctions concessions or Russian recognition of a wider settlement. Europe would have consumed one of its few remaining cards to cover another temporary financing shortfall.

And the demands would continue. The €210 billion is finite; the cost of sustaining Ukraine is recurring. Using the assets might postpone the next financial crisis, but it cannot permanently finance the war.

The real cost

Brussels may succeed in constructing an EU institution capable of taking over the Russian accounts. It may distribute the liability so widely that Belgium and Euroclear no longer stand alone. It may even prevail before European courts.

But success within the EU legal system would not restore international confidence. The world would still have watched Brussels redesign its arrangements until it found a mechanism capable of reaching assets whose legal ownership it continued to recognise.

And European taxpayers would be left carrying the risk. If the courts eventually ordered restitution, the same governments that told their citizens the Russian assets would finance Ukraine could be forced to explain why those citizens must now finance Russia’s repayment.

That lesson could last much longer than the money.

Brussels may devise a mechanism allowing a qualified majority to spend Russia’s assets today. It cannot guarantee that a future court will uphold that decision—and it cannot prevent Europe’s taxpayers from receiving the bill tomorrow.