By Patrick Armstrong, Website, 6/18/24
On this day, 18 June, in 1935, the Anglo-German Naval Agreement was signed. The two sides agreed that the German Navy’s total tonnage would be fixed at 35% of the Royal Navy’s tonnage. Not, when you think about it, a very intelligent agreement from London’s perspective. One of the causes of the First World War had been British concerns about the size of the German Navy and yet where did they think this one-third-as-big navy would be based? Obviously in the North Sea; the British, with their world-wide empire, would have most of their ships elsewhere, In short, London was agreeing that the Germans could have near-parity in the waters closest to it.
But worse. The agreement was the first violation by a great power of the Versailles conditions and had been done without consultation with any of Britain’s allies. It was the first, and therefore legitimating, agreement made by a great power with Hitler’s Germany.
(Unless you count Poland as a “great power” as the Polish government certainly did. It had signed a non-aggression pact with Hitler’s Germany eighteen months before. A French diplomat remarked that he saw a repetition of a pattern of Polish history: overestimate your power, step too far, be divided up by your neighbours.)
Soon after Hitler’s takeover in Germany, Moscow (which is to say Stalin) understood four things: 1) there was no possibility of returning to the previous good relations (Rapallo) 2) Hitler was a threat to all around him 3) Hitler would break any agreement as soon as he felt strong enough to 4) the only possible response was an alliance/coalition/agreement of Germany’s neighbours to block him. This became the Soviet Union’s principal foreign policy; as a Soviet diplomat put it to a French colleague, Soviet policy was very simple: “It is dictated by the fact that all that reinforces Germany we are against, and all that reinforces France, we are for”. Soviet diplomats were dismayed when they told their interlocutors that Hitler had plainly stated his intentions in Mein Kampf and received flippant answers like that’s just a ten-year old book and nobody ever does what he said he would when he gets in power. A ten-year old book given to every newlywed couple and soldier; definitely not something to ignore.
Many agreed with Stalin – President Roosevelt for example, in conversations with Litvinov, even proposed a US-Soviet non-aggression pact. In the UK in particular, the affable Soviet Ambassador, Ivan Mayskiy had found agreement on these four points with Robert Vansittart, the senior civil servant in the Foreign office, with Lord Beaverbrook, the powerful press baron, and even with the arch anti-Bolshevik Winston Churchill. Mayskiy discussed the world situation with the three many times, agreeing that the biggest threats to peace were Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia and that the coalition proposed by Moscow was the only hope of avoiding another great war. But Vansittart did not make policy, Beaverbrook could only push the line in his newspapers and Churchill was very far from power. Similar attempts in France failed, despite the support of General Weygand and other important officials, because of the instability of French politics and the effective opposition of Pierre Laval. And Poland was a constant worry: how close to Hitler was it getting? The smaller countries weren’t going to move without France or Britain. But many people in many countries agreed with Stalin and were working towards an anti-Hitler coalition.
The Anglo-German agreement was a shock to these hopes. London had given recognition to Hitler’s coup d’etat, made a bad agreement with him, ignored its allies and tossed Versailles overboard. Encouraging to Hitler and dismaying to his opponents.
Following his policy of pushing another step while professing eternal peace, Hitler re-occupied the Rhineland, demilitarised by Versailles, in March 1936. London and Paris did nothing and, once again, Hitler’s assessment proved out. How much did the naval agreement make him think he had the measure of London’s firmness of purpose? Do you think he would have done it had there been a USSR-France-UK plus Romania and Czechoslovakia alliance?
And, just as Stalin predicted, Hitler repudiated the naval agreement in spring 1939 along with the 1938 Munich agreement on Czechoslovakia and the 1934 pact with Poland. Moscow continued with its efforts to create an anti-Hitler force but with less and less hope. The final flicker was the abortive Anglo-French-Soviet military talks in late 1939. Giving up, Stalin accepted Hitler’s offer, signed a pact with him and the overconfident Poland was again eaten by its neighbours. (“‘We do not fear, [Józef Beck, Polish Foreign Minister] was reported to have said, [in 1934] ‘attacks on the part of Germany’.”)
The stock Western story remembers to forget this. Instead the story is 1) Munich (and for the neocons the time is always September 1938 and the place is always Munich) and 2) Hitler and his soulmate Stalin allying. Even so, every now and again the corporate media forgets to forget it: “Stalin ‘planned to send a million troops to stop Hitler if Britain and France agreed pact’”. And here we have a perfect example of the customary “forgetfulness”: for this historian the Soviet-German clock stopped in early 1933 and started up again in late 1939 :
The Rapallo Era ended nine months after Hitler assumed power in 1933 and, at his orders, the secret facilities closed one by one. While mistrust pervaded Soviet-German relations over the next six years, ties were never completely severed, Johnson writes. In spring 1939, both Stalin and Hitler proved open to renewing cooperation and in August, the country’s two foreign ministers signed a treaty of nonaggression, known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
Evidently we’re supposed to believe that absolutely nothing (well, a teensy-tiny bit of “mistrust” if you insist) happened in Soviet-German relations over nearly seven years. (But to fill in the gap would spoil the simple story of Hitler, Munich, Stalin-Hitler wouldn’t it?)
“History is indeed little more than the register of the crimes, follies, and misfortunes of mankind.” Hitler could have been stopped.
Once again I am indebted to Michael Jabara Carley’s work. I have just read his Stalin’s Gamble. This, the first in a trilogy, details the dismal story from Hitler’s coup until early 1936. Because of his three decades of labours in the archives of the principal countries, he has seen the notes taken by everyone of every meeting and diplomatic event; he can therefore tell us all sides of the issue It’s a dismal story because, hard as it may be for many in the West to accept, Stalin’s take was completely accurate. All his four points, which he had formulated by the end of 1933, came true. And the tragedy is that the foreign officials who agreed with him could never quite push their countries over the finish line. And so the alliance that could have deterred him never happened and only in the disaster of a great war did it eventually form.