By Gordon Hahn, Russian & Eurasian Politics Blog, 10/9/23

There is a growing danger that Ukraine’s now imminent rout on the battlefield at the hands of a far better-trained and better-equipped Russian force will lead to a period not unlike the Ruin that occurred in the latter half of the 17th century on Ukrainian territory and temporarily split Cossackdom into two several entities divided between Poland and Russia. The great Ruin involved a series of wars conducted by foreign powers — most notably Poland and Russia, but also the Ottoman Empire and Crimean Tatar Khanate — and internecine fighting and social unrest, which decimated a good part of Cossack territories, including many of those now being destroyed by NATO-Russia Ukrainian war.

With the failure of Ukraine’s counter-offensive, high attrition and increasingly low morale among its fighting forces, declining political and military support from the West, the coming onset of winter and a possible, massive Russian offensive, the stage is being set for potential catastrophe. An all too possible path to a new Ruin could now be open and take the following course: the Ukrainian army’s collapse, a subsequent coup in Kiev, resulting in civil war, chaos and, as I have written before, the possible formation of Ukrainian guerrilla resistance forces fighting Moscow’s occupation.

COLLAPSE OF THE UKRAINIAN ARMY

The failure of Ukraine’s counteroffensive has major implications for the further course of the war, in particular the health and internal stability of Ukraine’s military establishment. First and foremost, the counteroffensive has brought the Ukrainian army perhaps as many as 70,000 casualties, nearly exhausted the army’s reserves, depleted its short- and medium-range artillery capabilities, led to the destruction of perhaps more than 5,000 pieces of military equipment. There is growing discontent in the middle-officer ranks and among the rank-and-file as a result of bad strategic and tactical operation of the counteroffensive, which led to throwing small wave after small wave along the same difficult, often heavily mined terrain without air cover and artillery suppression against far superior force in order to take and re-take small patches of territory and insignificant, depopulated, and almost completely destroyed villages.

Psychologically, Ukrainian soldiers are demoralized because of the high casualties and insignificant gains they brought on the background of the leadership’s claims that Western military equipment and training would lead to a successful counteroffensive as demoralized Russian forces would be routed and retreat as they did in Kharkiv and Kherson last year. Ukrainian society has been treated to this spectacle, exposure of wide-scale corruption in civilian and even military leadership circles, brutal forced recruitment tactics contrasted against the privileged party life abroad enjoyed by government officials, oligarch, and these elites’ sons and daughters. If the army comes from society and a demoralized army meets an outraged society, the will of both the army and society to keep up the fight cannot but be shaken.

These trends wll be made even more powerful, as the war leads to greater militarization of society. One manifestation of such a development that will intensify politicization in the military is the recruitment of military personnel, including officers, by political parties. Reports suggest that Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelenskiy is preparing to jettison his now exceedingly corrupt and thus unpopular ‘Servants of the People’ Party and form a new one which will be based largely on those who served in the military (https://t.me/rezident_ua/19475). Other Ukrainian parties are likely to follow this example, further militarizing society and politicizing the army.

As the position of Ukraine’s army deteriorates along the 600-mile front, the likelihood of a military insurrection and/or popular revolt becomes quite high.

KIEV COUP

Wars tend to politicize militaries, and there can be nothing worse for civil-military relations in any country than a mix of the collapse or even just the failure of a military campaign run by a civilian leadership along with a failing but increasingly politicized military. As the civilian leadership continues to flail in the running of the war, with Zelenskiy’s less than competent leadership and his alienation of allies, the issue of its replacement by a military leadership or a new civilian one brought to power by the military cannot but appear on the agenda. Chief of the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Gen. Valeriy Zalyuzhnyi was opposed to the timing of this summer’s failed counteroffensive but was careful to publicly point the finger only at Ukraine’s Western allies for pushing the counteroffensive without providing Ukraine’s army the necessary weapons for artillery and air support for carrying out. But there should be no doubt that he also blames the civilian leadership for succumbing to such pressure, overpromising the results of such a hasty and poorly thought out offensive, and perhaps even for Zelenskiy’s failure to resist the West’s pressure to continue the war rather than conclude the March 2022 Istanbul talks for an agreement that would have avoided the disaster now hanging over Kiev. There can also be little doubt that many other military officers as well as rank-and-file soldiers fell the same way.

From the other side of Ukraine’s political spectrum on this issue, the ultra-nationalists and neo-fascists who comprise the vanguard of the ‘war party’ in Kiev form a good part of the Ukrainian army, though surely many have perished in the fighting over the past 19 months. This element has less commitment to the rule of law, and many of the so inclined have long asserted that the Miadan revolt was just the first phase of Ukraine’s ‘national revolution’, which needs to be completed by the final neofascist takeover. On this background, the risk of a palace and/or military coup runs high. Forces such as Right Sector, Azov, the Ukrainian Volunteer Corps, and a host of smaller ultranationalist and neofascist parties and organizations, with access to arms could return to Kiev and seize power in tandem with some moderate military officers. After all, these elements have been a source of political violence, mass disturbances, and protests of neofascist intimidation for a decade or more. Indeed, they played the lead role in transforming the peaceful Maidan demonstrations, motivated by European aspirations and distaste for corruption, into a violent false flag terrorist attack that targeted protesters and police, sparking the outrage that led to fall of President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014. There is no reason why they cannot convert a new cycle of upheaval, even chaos into a new overthrow of the political leadership.

A military coup or military-backed coup could also come about as a result of the disintegration and isolation of one or more large Ukrainian military contingent, which manages to set up a separate or even separatist enclave, for example in western Ukraine or parts thereof, under the patronage and leadership of a local politician, oligarch and/or military commander establishing himself as warlord. In this way and others political schism could spark internecine warfare and civil war.

CIVIL WAR

Any successful coup in Kiev or separatist entity could generate an opposition, sparking civil war. Along with the breakup of the army or simply given the ubiquity of weapons in Ukraine, such a rejection of the coup leadership by one or more forces would almost certainly lead to internecine violence. Ukrainian culture is touted by many in the West as essentially a Western one, characterized by values of freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. This is inaccurate. Ukrainian political culture is equally dominated by an anarchic democracy, which can confound republicanism and the rule of law. The various neofascist, ultranationalist, moderate nationalist, national democratic, and liberal democratic elements in Ukrainian culture and society have not been successful in forging a political and cultural consensus over the course of thirty post-Soviet years. Although the separation of the pro-Russian and Soviet nostalgic east and Crimea eliminated one of the points around which conflict swirled in Ukrainian state and society, the others noted above remain and are incompatible with each other. To be sure, the war consolidated Ukrainian society in the first year of the war, as the rise of Zelenskiy’s catastrophic approval ratings at the time demonstrated. However, the ‘bump’ from the shock of the war’s onset has largely dissipated, and defeat at the front is likely to return Zelenskiy’s ratings to their pre-war low. Zelenskiy’s new face and fresh energy temporarily consolidated Ukrainian society and dampened its schismatic, conflictive, and anarchic cultural elements. Now, however, deep divisions, high political tensions, internecine violence, and the threat of civil war are being revived. The threat of civil war raises the specter of chaos and quagmire.

THE POTENTIAL OF A UKRAINIAN QUAGMIRE FOR RUSSIA

There is real potential for any internecine conflict or civil war to devolve into political and social chaos and state breakdown or failure. In a failing or failed war-torn, even civil war-torn Ukraine, we could see one or more remnants of the army, one or more guérilla or partisan armies carrying out combat, sabotage, and terrorist attacks against any Russian occupying force. The farther west Russian forces move and attempt to occupy and annex territories, the likelihood of the emergence of an underground partisan army in the tradition of the Ukrainian Partisan Army of World War II and post-World War II anti-Soviet resistance grows. Even in the Russia-annexed southern regions of Kherson and Zaporozhe — where there is considerable, though likely not majority pro-Russian sentiment – pro-Russian administrations have been plagued by assassinations of their officials and other cases of support for Kiev. Underground resistance to Russian rule also likely would emerge in Mikolaev and Odessa in the south, Kharkov, Sumy, and Chernigov in the north, as well as in central, not to mention in very anti-Russian western Ukraine.

Depending on how the war plays out, Russia may be forced to send forces into one or more of these areas, crossing the Dnepr around Kiev and moving further west would guarantee the Russians a difficult occupation. If Ukrainian armed factions are roaming and fighting, growing millions of refugees and general chaos, the Russians could find themselves in a situation like that which faced the US and NATO forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, contending with a long, drawn out armed guerrilla insurgency, underground terrorism, and nation-building.

But it is not just Russia that will feel the repercussions of such developments. Belarus, Moldova, and Europe’s NATO and EU states will see an even greater influx of Ukrainian refugees. Poland will simply be inundated, and with great mutual antagonism lying just below the surface of Polish-Ukrainian relations, there would be potential for Ukrainian political violence in Poland. 

CONCLUSION

The above is no longer an unlikely scenario; several of its elements are beginning to shift over into the likely category. For Russia, a quagmire would lengthen and raise the costs of Russia’s involvement in Ukraine. Moscow cannot let a new anti-Russian regime to emerge in Kiev or allow chaos and state collapse to persist on its border. Russia could end up facing a second Afghanistan, with all the domestic political risks such a development would be fraught. Imagine a scenario in which Moscow has been saddled with Ukrainian conflict, chaos, and state-building for 5-10 years and Putin’s health begins to wane or fails. Not a preferred scenario, you would agree.

Obviously, a Russian quagmire in Ukraine will offer opportunities for the West to continue attempting to exact costs on Russia for its actions in Ukraine. Washington, Brussels, London and Warsaw could supply and fund anti-Russian partisan and terrorist activity. A recent U.S. strategic plan for the future of Ukraine being discussed in the wake of Kiev’s failed, ill-conceived counteroffensive already proposes creation of a “national level resistance plan,” that, according to Politico, “could allude to ordinary Ukrainians fighting back if Russia gains more territory” and about which “(t)he State Department official would not clarify that point” (www.politico.com/news/2023/10/02/biden-admin-ukraine-strategy-corruption-00119237). It cannot be excluded that in tiring of Zelenskiy’s less than competent, increasingly erratic, and unpopular leadership the West may back a coup plot against him. After all, Washington for its part has a long track record of doing so. In any civil war scenario, the West likely would attempt to ensure that pro-Western, anti-Russian Ukrainians came to power, arming and funding one or another group as has now become the tradition. Most disturbingly of all, a scenario of social chaos and state failure will heighten the fog of war and politics to a peak of uncertainty in which the risk of miscalculation by Russia and/or the West becomes even greater than it is now. This risks the spread of the Ruin scenario beyond Ukraine’s borders to the detriment of Russia, the West, and perhaps all the rest of us.

Link here.

By Dave DeCamp, Antiwar.com, 10/30/23

One of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s closest aides has told Time Magazine that the Ukrainian leader has deluded himself into thinking Ukraine can win an ultimate victory against Russia after the failed counteroffensive and amid waning support for the conflict in the West.

The report said that despite the setbacks, Zelensky “does not intend to give up fighting or to sue for any kind of peace. On the contrary, his belief in Ukraine’s ultimate victory over Russia has hardened into a form that worries some of his advisers. It is immovable, verging on the messianic.”

The aide said Zelensky “deludes himself,” adding, “We’re out of options. We’re not winning. But try telling him that.” The report said that the idea of negotiating peace or a temporary truce with Russia remains taboo to Zelensky.

“For us it would mean leaving this wound open for future generations,” Zelensky told Time. “Maybe it will calm some people down inside our country, and outside, at least those who want to wrap things up at any price. But for me, that’s a problem, because we are left with this explosive force. We only delay its detonation.”

A senior Ukrainian military officer told the magazine that the armed forces has had to second guess orders that came from Kyiv’s political leadership, including an order to capture the Donetsk city of Horlivka. “They don’t have the men or the weapons,” the officer said. “Where are the weapons? Where is the artillery? Where are the new recruits?”

Ukraine is not just running low on weapons to fight the war but also manpower. One of Zelensky’s aides said even if Ukraine’s Western backers supplied all the arms they need, “we don’t have the men to use them.”

The report also detailed the corruption in the Ukrainian government that led to Zelensky’s recent move to sack former Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov. The author of the Time story, Simon Shuster, said he naively thought a Ukrainian official would think twice before taking a bribe, but an adviser to Zelensky told him otherwise. “Simon, you’re mistaken,” the adviser said. “People are stealing like there’s no tomorrow.”

By Kyle Anzalone, Libertarian Institute, 10/9/23

A recent poll found that the number of Ukrainians who want to fight Russia until the end of the war has fallen to 60%. President Volodymyr Zelensky has tight control over media in Ukraine, and his regime has targeted dissenters against fighting the war. 

The Gallup survey results released on Monday shows support for “fighting until the war is won” has fallen to 60% from 70% last year. The number of Ukrainians wanting to seek a diplomatic resolution has increased from 25% to 31% over the past 12 months. Support for finding an end to the war is strongest in the regions where fighting is ongoing. 

The waning approval of fighting comes as Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive resulted in substantial casualties and minimal territorial gains. Kiev’s Western backers knew the military operations were unlikely to succeed and would result in high casualties. In August, the Washington Post reported the counteroffensive’s failures had blunted morale.

The slipping support for Zelensky’s pledge to retake the Donbas and Crimea through military means comes as Kiev has tight control over Ukrainian media. Shortly after the start of the war, Zelensky nationalized the media and only allowed outlets to operate with state licenses. Additionally, Ukrainian police have rounded up citizens who expressed dissatisfaction with the war. 

Approval of aiding the war in Ukraine is shrinking in the US as well. A Reuters/Ipsos poll found 41% of Americans support sending more arms to Ukraine, while 35% oppose further military assistance. When the same survey was conducted in May, 46% of Americans backed sending arms, while 29% were opposed.

If Ben Aris is finally admitting this, there must be something to it. – Natylie

By Ben Aris, Intelllinews, 10/26/23

I lead today with Hungary’s refusal to ratify Sweden’s access to Nato, despite Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s decision to go ahead with it.

I was saying yesterday that Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban is starting to look like Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko by playing bad boy and he has continued in this vein. It gives him real leverage, something that Erdogan also understands by placing himself in the middle between Europe and Russia with enormous success.

Erdogan was playing a similar game after he called Hamas “liberators” yesterday, tearing up two years of diplomacy to improve ties with Israel, which will not take those words kindly.

Orban is also getting chummy with the new PM in waiting in Slovakia, Robert Fico, who campaigned on an anti-Ukraine platform. I don’t think you can read too much into that. Orban needs all the friends he can get but Slovakia is simply too small to make much difference and Fico’s party doesn’t dominate his coalition so actually he will have a lot less say in foreign policy. Slovakia is simply too dependent on EU grants, Brussels’ main enforcement tool, which it is using on Orban by holding back €13bn of post-COVID relief money.

Erdogan’s decision to tear up relations with Israel is a dramatic move. He has thrown in his lot with the Arab world, his backyard. Queen Raina of Jordan gave a very eloquent interview to CNN’s Christiane Amanpour (who is of Persian origin) yesterday calling out Western double standards. One of her most telling points was that the West was outraged by Hamas’ slaughter of Israeli children, but it has failed to condemn the death of over 2,500 children in Gaza in the last week with anything like the same passion.

Putting aside all the emotional arguments on the cause of the war and who is the real villain here, the point of the comments is that the Queen expressed very clearly how the Arab world sees this conflict and it clearly sees it in terms of Western double standards. Last week over 800 of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s staff complained about her partisan pro-Israel position, which is more grist for the mill.

US President Joe Biden’s comments addressed the need to defuse the Palestinian issue when he was in Israel last week, and there was a very good speech by UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres who said Hamas attacks “did not happen in a vacuum” and openly called Israel’s bombing of Gaza “collective punishment” but stopped short of calling that a war crime, which it is.

Biden’s efforts to smooth the waters with his necessary comments on the Palestinian woes will count for little with the Arab world. Erdogan will earn credits for coming out against Israel. The leverage the whole Arab world has is increased as the US’ unflagging support of Israel is only weaking it in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.

Taking all this in, now step back and consider how China and Russia view this. Chinese President Xi Jinping has yet to say the word “Hamas” and Putin is playing the statesman, condemning Hamas’ terrorism, but coming out very firmly for a Palestinian state. The difference here is the Arabs believe Putin is sincere, while dismissing Biden’s comments out of hand.

The strength of the Sino-Russia axis was very clearly on display at last week’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) anniversary in Beijing last week. I continue to think driving Moscow into the arms of Beijing was a major strategic blunder by the White House, especially as in my conversations with senior Kremlin officials in the years before made it very clear they wanted to move closer to the EU as Moscow is just as scared of Beijing dominating it as everyone says it should be.

But what was a bipolar axis has been developing. Iran has thrown in its lot with fellow sanctionee Russia and Putin has made deep inroads into the Middle East. One of the other emerging axes that is not much talked about is the rapidly growing cooperation between Russia and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA).

Riyadh used to have very close ties with Washington, but since the US went from net importer of oil to exporter following the shale revolution, Riyadh and Washington are now rivals to the extent that OPEC and Russia have cooperated to cut production and drive up prices to the point where the oil price cap sanctions on Russia cease to work. We recently described oil sanctions as a spent cannon.

And now the Middle East is splintering, which will benefit Russia. Turkey remains an ally and KSA will be driven back towards Moscow as an ally against the US’ continued backing of Israel. KSA was a surprise addition to the BRICS+ in August, but two weeks later during the G20 summit it teamed up with India for a new transport corridor from KSA via India to Europe that was seen as an olive branch by Riyadh to Washington and an Indian-backed rival to the BRI. However, that route made heavy use of Israeli ports like Haifa to complete the last step into Europe. Seems that plan is now dead only a month after it was born.

The bottom line is the fractured world is looking a lot more broken up as the conflicts heighten an increasingly extreme and diverse set of national interests. Hungary, Turkey, Russia, KSA, China, the US and the EU are all increasingly butting heads and any solution to any of their problems will be international arbitration. The addition of the six new countries to BRICS with more set to join next year and the expansion of the G20 to include the African Union has seen the rapid growth of non-aligned institutions that hope to challenge the G7 in the long run. Even in the US, the election of Mike Johnson as speaker yesterday undermines America’s internal unity and he has voted against Ukraine in every vote bar the first one. Ukraine’s funding for the war is now in more doubt than ever.

And that is what Putin has been after all along. The US’ power to dictate to the rest of the world has been dramatically undermined. It clearly is no longer in charge. The unipolar setup is already giving way to a multipolar one.