By Anatol Lieven, Responsible Statecraft, 2/18/25

European summits are not usually the stuff of poetry, but the latest one in Paris was worthy of Horace: Patrturiunt montes; nascetur ridiculus mus — “Mountains will be in labour; and give birth to a ridiculous mouse.”

President Macron of France called the summit in response to what he called the “electroshock” of the Trump administration’s election and plans to negotiate Ukraine peace without the Europeans. The result so far however appears to have been even less than a mouse — in fact, precisely nothing.

Macron presumably hoped that the leaders of the other major European states would rally behind his own proposal of French and European peacekeeping troops for Ukraine (an idea already categorically rejected by Moscow). Keir Starmer of the UK did indeed make such an offer, only shortly afterwards to say that no European guarantee of Ukrainian security would be credible without what he called a US “backstop.”

Since Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth had already publicly ruled out any such U.S. guarantee, Starmer thereby implicitly admitted that his offer of British troops was empty. British parliamentarians have also demanded a vote on the dispatch of British troops. In the meantime, on leaving the Paris meeting, Chancellor Olaf Scholtz of Germany said that a discussion of European troops for Ukraine is “completely premature” and “highly inappropriate” while the war is ongoing. Prime Minister Donald Tusk of Poland (one of Ukraine’s strongest supporters) ruled out Polish troops altogether:

“We do not plan to send Polish soldiers to the territory of Ukraine. We will … give logistical and political support to the countries that will possibly want to provide such guarantees in the future, such physical guarantees.”

Macron has also emphasized something that makes much more sense: namely that the Europeans need to build up not only their own armed forces, but also the military industries that supply them. In an interview with the Financial Times, he said that:

“We must also develop a fully integrated European defense, industrial and technological base. This goes far beyond a simple debate about spending figures. If all we do is become bigger clients of the US, then in 20 years, we still won’t have solved the question of European sovereignty.”

This is indeed extremely necessary — though it is clear that Trump expects that higher European military spending will be spent on U.S. weaponry, and is prepared to bring pressure to bear to make sure this is the case. But Macron’s interview also brought out the acute difficulty of such European integration. He urged European countries to buy the SAMP-T air defense system, which he said is better than the U.S. Patriot missiles system that several countries are presently using.

For all I know, he may be right about that; but it is surely no coincidence that the SAMP-T is made in France and Italy. The real proof of Macron’s commitment to the integration of European military industries would be if — for example — he agrees to give up production of France’s Leclerc main battle tank in favor of buying Germany’s Leopard tanks for the French army.

The UK exemplifies this problem. With one of the very few professional fighting armies in Europe, it is critical to any independent European defense. But while it has excellent soldiers, its weapons systems have been plagued with breakdowns and deficiencies, largely because the wider British industrial base is now too limited to support an efficient military sector. On the other hand, precisely because British industries have shrunk so far, military industry is critical to maintaining what is left of British technological expertise. Give this up to the Germans? Really?

The kind of radical increases in military spending being demanded by the Trump administration and advocated by Macron and Starmer will also require some combination of increased taxes and savage cuts to social welfare, health and infrastructure budgets, at a time when these are already under intense pressure from economic stagnation, and as a result the discontent of ordinary people is rising steeply.

Russia Matters, 2/18/25

1. Senior American and Russian officials agreed on Feb. 18 to establish high-level teams to work toward ending the war in Ukraine and finding a path toward normalizing relations, in the most extensive bilateral negotiations in more than three years, according to NYT. After the 4.5 hours of talks, U.S. Secretary of State Rubio described a three-step plan for what the U.S. and Russia planned to do next, NYT reported. First, he said, both countries would negotiate how to remove restrictions placed on each other’s embassies in Moscow and Washington. In addition, he said, the U.S. would engage with Russia about “parameters of what an end” to the Ukraine war would look like. “There’s going to be engagement and consultation with Ukraine, with our partners in Europe and others,” Rubio was quoted by NYT as saying. And finally, he said, Russia and the U.S. would explore new “historic” partnerships, both in geopolitics and in business.¹
   1. After the talks, Trump’s national security adviser Waltz suggested Ukraine’s government would have a say, calling it “common sense” that “if you’re going to bring both sides together, you have to talk to both sides,” according to CBS. “We are absolutely talking to both sides,” Waltz said.
   2. After the talks, Trump’s envoy Witkoff said the U.S has consulted Zelenskyy and Macron, and that the EU was “going to have to be at the table at some point because they have sanctions as well that have been imposed.” But the Russian foreign ministry ruled out a role for Europe in the Ukraine talks and demanded NATO rescind an open-ended 2008 invitation to Kyiv, as it said Moscow was “categorically opposed” to a European peacekeeping deployment, NYT reported.
   3. After the talks Ushakov, Putin’s foreign policy adviser, said the discussions were “not bad,” NYT reported. Ushakov said the exact date of the meeting between Putin and Trump has not yet been determined, but it is unlikely to be next week, according to TASS.
   4. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov stated that the parties “not only listened, but heard each other,” according to Republic.ru. Lavrov also announced that Russia-U.S. consultations on Ukraine would now be held regularly. Lavrov also said  that he was unaware of a reported U.S. peace proposal for Ukraine that includes agreeing to a ceasefire, holding elections and signing a final peace deal. The so-called “three-stage peace plan” was allegedly proposed by both the United States and Russia, Fox News White House correspondent Jacqui Heinrich reported, citing unnamed foreign diplomatic sources.
   5. The Russian Foreign Ministry said: “agreements were reached on establishing a dialogue to agree on ways to resume cooperation in the economy, including energy, space and other areas of mutual interest.” “The parties agreed to resume communication channels on other international issues, taking into account the special responsibility of Russia and the United States in matters of peace and security as nuclear powers,” the ministry said.
   6. Russian deputy foreign minister Grushko said the Kremlin was “categorically opposed” to European troops deploying to Ukraine “no matter what their role is.” He added that such a move would be “a step towards escalation,” according to FT.
   7. Kremlin spokesman Peskov said any deal should “take into account the possibility of disputing Zelenskyy’s legitimacy” after the Ukrainian president’s term expired last year, according to FT.
   8. Pro-government Russian political analyst Markov claimed that the talks produced “no results” and that “all assessments are abstract,” according to Republic.ru. He noted that a Putin-Trump meeting has not been scheduled and that “it cannot yet be said that Russia and the U.S. are moving closer.”²
2. “A strong transatlantic relationship remains as critical today as it has for the past 75 years,” but “the way the transatlantic partners confront common challenges must change,” according to a newly-released report by the Belfer Center Task Force on Building a European Pillar within the Transatlantic Relationship, which is co-chaired by Ivo Daalder, Camille Grand and Daniela Schwarzer.³ “For Europe—and for NATO—the territorial defense of the continent will be the top priority for years to come,” the task force’s report, entitled “Transatlantic Bargain: The Case for Building a Strong European Pillar,” argues. “Under a new and sustainable transatlantic bargain, Europeans need to augment their defense capabilities and contributions significantly to take much greater responsibility for the defense of the continent.” As for the United States, it “needs to proactively help Europe build a strong and capable European pillar both by advocating better burden sharing and facilitating a shift in responsibilities to Europe, and reducing roadblocks to European defense investment and collaboration with U.S. defense industry,” according to the report, which was published as the Munich Security Conference took place. One of MSC’s Feb. 15 panels featured Ian Bremmer, Fiona Hill, Dmytro Kuleba, Meghan O’Sullivan and David Sanger; and focused on “Adversarial Alignment.” See a summary of this panel’s analysis and recommendations below.*
3. “If Europe wants to be at the negotiating table rather than being on the menu, it is time to act with unity and clarity, rather than continuing to act surprised, divided and embarrassed,” Camile Grant writes in a commentary for ECFR. First, Europeans need to make clear that their support for Ukraine is not conditioned on continued U.S. support and can be increased.⁴ Second, Europeans need to clarify what they are ready to offer in terms of security guarantees, such as deployment of troops to Ukraine. Finally, “Putin, who probably celebrates his new status as a special negotiation partner of Washington, has not shown any signs of an openness to compromise or closing a deal soon. This creates an opportunity for Europe to shape—even partially—the terms of the deal,” according to Grand.⁵

***

Summary of February 18th Meeting of American and Russian Diplomats in Saudi Arabia

By Brian McDonald, Twitter, 2/18/25

Lavrov & Rubio agree to create negotiation groups on Ukraine and a mechanism to ease tensions in US-Russia relations (Reuters).

🕊️ Three-stage peace plan on the table: Ceasefire ➡️ Elections in Ukraine ➡️ Final agreement (Fox News).

💼 Economic ties back on the agenda – Russia & US agree to cooperate on investment & energy prices post-settlement (Reuters).

🏛️ Embassy staffing to be restored in Moscow & Washington – a major thawing move (Rubio).

📢 State Dept: One meeting won’t solve Ukraine, but Riyadh was an “important step forward.”

💬 Zelensky fumes – says talks without Kyiv are just bilateral Russia-US agreements, not peace talks.

🔮 Trump & Putin both believe Zelensky’s re-election chances are slim (Fox News).

By Tatiana Stanovaya, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2/13/25

Three weeks after U.S. President Donald Trump’s inauguration, he had a much-anticipated phone call with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin. Both sides have kept a diplomatic silence over who initiated the call, but the very fact that it took place and lasted almost an hour and a half looks like a major win for the Russian leader. Effectively, the long-awaited negotiations between Moscow and Washington on the fate of Ukraine have been launched in the format that best suits Putin.

In addition, the Russian president is entering into a dialogue at a time when negotiations appear desirable but by no means necessary for Russia to achieve its goals in its war against Ukraine. For Putin, this is a window of opportunity that he would of course like to make the most of, but virtually any outcome will be a good result for Moscow.

There’s certainly no guarantee that Trump will accept all of the Kremlin’s many demands and agree to a full-scale “deal.” But there are plenty of other possible outcomes that will still benefit Russia, such as the erosion of Western unity, Ukraine being forced to accept what the Kremlin terms “reality” (territorial losses), and a reduction in Western support for Kyiv.

Even the very attitude and approach of Trump and his team to potential negotiations is playing into Putin’s hands. Hours before the phone call took place, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said publicly that a return to Ukraine’s 2014 borders is unrealistic, and so is the country’s bid to join NATO. While similar conclusions have been expressed behind closed doors, it was the first time they had been acknowledged at such a senior level, drawing new lines within Western debates on Ukraine.

For now, the prospect of a full-scale “deal” looks unlikely: the U.S. and Russian positions are too far apart. Putin’s key goal remains a “friendly Ukraine,” which is not about territorial divides or the security of the contact line, but about guarantees that Ukraine as a whole will turn away from the path of Western development upon which it has embarked.

In practical terms, that would mean persuading the West to withdraw from Ukraine in every sense. Russia’s deputy foreign minister has already said the Kremlin would require “cast-iron guarantees” that Ukraine will not join NATO. It would also mean annulling Ukraine’s existing bilateral security agreements with Western countries, not to mention a change in the country’s political leadership, the rewriting of the Ukrainian constitution, and much more.

Russia also requires guarantees that there will be no full-fledged army, Western weapons, or military bases in Ukraine. Trump’s position, meanwhile—mineral resources in exchange for Washington’s support, and European peacekeepers on the contact line—appears to have little in common with Moscow’s vision. In addition, it’s not just a question of what Trump wants, but what he can actually do. A full-fledged deal that would be acceptable to Russia would require the active participation of other Western countries and, of course, Ukraine itself.

At the same time, Moscow is clearly not prepared to soften its demands too drastically. Putin has repeatedly made it clear that he believes Russia can achieve its goals in Ukraine without any U.S.-brokered deal. As far as he is concerned, Moscow simply needs to wait until Ukraine falls apart of its own accord, after which the Russian army will crush any remaining resistance among the Ukrainian army.

Trump’s attempts to force Ukraine to start negotiations with Russia and to make Europe “own responsibility for its own security” are only helping Moscow advance toward its own goals in this war. For Putin, therefore, talks with Trump are a secondary issue, eclipsed by what is nothing less than an existential goal for him: ensuring a “friendly Ukraine.”

The Kremlin’s most basic task right now is to keep Washington in a constructive mindset toward Russia. That in itself is already facilitating the achievement of Putin’s goals in Ukraine, so the Russian leader is prepared to pay a certain price to preserve this conducive atmosphere.

That price could take the form of what are effectively hostage exchanges (even if the equivalence of the most recent exchange is dubious), the release of Ukrainian prisoners of war, and perhaps even in the future, suspending hostilities temporarily or sending someone not too senior to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, whose legitimacy Putin does not recognize.

It will be a lengthy bargaining process in which Moscow is ready for any outcome, from limited agreements to ending all dialogue and even military escalation. The Russian leadership will try to avoid that last option—but not at any cost.

Now that the first substantial telephone conversation has taken place, the tricky business of preparations for a meeting between the two presidents begins. Washington has made a concession by distancing Special Representative for Ukraine Keith Kellogg from direct contact with Moscow: there is reason to believe that Trump himself has cooled toward Kellogg’s approach to the issue in recent weeks in favor of greater pragmatism.

It is not yet clear who will represent Russia in any negotiating delegation, but it’s unlikely to be a figurehead like Vladimir Medinsky, whom Putin named as his chief negotiator in the conflict back in 2022. Putin may well use him in negotiations with Kyiv, however, if necessary.

Figures such as the Ukrainian-born Kirill Dmitriev, CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund; the oligarch Roman Abramovich; and former Kremlin chief of staff Alexander Voloshin are often mentioned as informal intermediaries in establishing the current contacts, and each of them can indeed play a certain role in communications. But their influence should not be exaggerated. Anything of any real importance either has Putin’s approval or happens at his instigation.

Of course, much in the negotiations will be determined by external, rapidly changing circumstances: above all, by the state of play at the front, and in Ukrainian domestic politics. Russia is sorely tempted to try simply waiting for Ukraine to become more vulnerable—both in military and political terms—and then ramp up the pressure, radically improving its negotiating position. Especially since right now, negotiations with Washington will not give Moscow what it wants anyway. For now, therefore, it is enough for Russia to keep Trump in a positive mindset, and that’s something Putin does well.

By Lyle Goldstein, Responsible Statecraft, 1/31/25

Donald Trump is once again the president and there is no greater foreign policy challenge he has promised to tackle than how to resolve the Russia-Ukraine War.

In the frenzied rush to save Ukraine from Russian aggression, there has been scant attention paid to the origins of the conflict. However, an important memoir published in 2024 by John Sullivan, who served as the U.S. ambassador to Russia from 2020 until 2022, could provide some answers.

Ominously titled “Midnight in Moscow” the book shows just how belligerent towards Russia the Biden administration was at a fraught moment — and how little key American diplomats seemed to think of real diplomacy.

A careful study of Sullivan’s account reveals he was the wrong man at the wrong place at the wrong time. Sullivan had prior experience as an attorney and this helped shape his sheriff-like, good-versus-evil worldview. The result was an escalatory spiral in U.S.-Russia relations that ended in catastrophe for Ukraine.

Every U.S. ambassador to Moscow likes to compare himself to George Kennan — one of America’s most famous and far-sighted diplomats — and Sullivan is no exception. But whereas Kennan was a genuine scholar of Russia, Sullivan seems to have made misstep after misstep. The best that can be said is he does appear to have done his utmost to protect American citizens unjustly held in Russia. He also attempted to improve the U.S.-Russia relationship in certain ways, for example in seeking to renew the important START agreement on strategic nuclear weaponry.

Nevertheless, the many grave errors made during Sullivan’s tenure cannot be ignored. By far, the most important revelation from his memoir is that the Ukraine issue was hardly even discussed at an important Geneva summit in June 2021 between Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin. This is both bizarre and depressing, particularly as this was clearly the best chance Washington had to head off the escalation that eventuated in the Russia-Ukraine War.

The responsibility, of course, lies not only with Sullivan but other senior Biden administration officials, who neglected their duty by apparently not realizing the dangers that had been building in the Ukraine context. Of course, to make progress on that issue also would have required an inclination toward diplomatic compromise — one part of an ambassador’s job description that Sullivan seems to have missed.

Two more interesting facts emerge in this memoir regarding that key summit. First, Sullivan explains that the meetings were to consist of two sessions, planned for a total of about five hours. However, Biden proposed significantly truncating the meeting down to about three hours.

And whereas the Ukraine topic was hardly broached, Sullivan explains that the approaching U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan was talked about quite extensively during the Geneva Summit. Apparently, the United States made clear that it was actively seeking an alternative base for its counterterrorism operations in the region. Putin then brought up the possibility of the U.S. using a Russian base in Tajikistan — a country bordering Afghanistan.

While this was clearly an attempt by the Russian leader to find common ground, Sullivan dismissed the overture as “utterly improbable” and failed to follow up.

It’s part of a dismaying pattern for Sullivan, who claims he is “not a Russophobe,” yet asserts with pride that he took this tough diplomatic post in order to “study an adversary up close.”

That may relate to another of Sullivan’s candid admissions: that he was almost fired by Trump in 2018 for authorizing sanctions against Russia. This move “incensed” Trump, who believed “the ‘deep state’ was acting without his approval to subvert his relationship with Putin and Russia.” Sadly, at nearly every turn, Sullivan, under both Trump and later Biden, opted to escalate tensions with Russia rather than seeking diplomatic solutions.

An obvious example of Sullivan’s failure to seek compromise was his evident support for Washington’s poorly thought-out dispatch of Victoria Nuland to Moscow in October 2021 as Biden’s top emissary to negotiate on the matter of Ukraine. Nuland is reviled and indeed sanctioned in Russia for her notorious role in the 2014 Euromaidan protests in Ukraine. This choice demonstrated an evident desire to rub salt in Russian wounds rather than achieve necessary compromise.

Somewhat predictably, Sullivan concludes his book with a call to arms, urging Americans not to shrink from their “responsibility” to support Ukraine and bear the burdens of the new cold war. We can only wonder how history might have turned out if Washington still had diplomats who actually engaged in diplomacy rather than insults and escalations.

This whole sad story is only underlined by the pathetic fact that Biden’s top diplomat, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, hardly even spoke with his Russian counterpart after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. It’s a nearly unparalleled feat of diplomatic malpractice.

RT, 2/14/25

The Kremlin has requested clarification from the US after Vice President J.D. Vance suggested American troops could be sent to Ukraine if Russian President Vladimir Putin does not agree to a peace deal ensuring Kiev’s long-term independence. Moscow says it has asked Washington for an explanation.

Vance made the comments in an interview with The Wall Street Journal on Thursday, saying that Washington had “economic” as well as “military tools of leverage” to pressure Russia into a peace deal. He added that the possibility of sending American troops to Ukraine remained “on the table” if Moscow refused to engage in good-faith negotiations.

“These are new elements of the [US] position; we have not heard such statements before, they were not voiced,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters on Friday. “During upcoming contacts [with the US administration] we expect to receive further clarification,” he added.

Vance’s remarks contrast somewhat with earlier statements by US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. Speaking at a gathering of Kiev’s supporters in Brussels this week, he ruled out sending American forces to Ukraine following any security agreement. Hegseth stressed at the meeting that military support for Kiev should primarily come from European countries.

The US vice president also told the Journal that the results of a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine could be surprising. “I think there is a deal that is going to come out of this that’s going to shock a lot of people,” he told the WSJ. He added that Washington would prioritize its interests in negotiations with Russia and that “things that are very important to Ukrainians” may need to be sacrificed.

A meeting between Vance and Ukrainian leader Vladimir Zelensky is planned to take place at the Munich Security Conference. US President Donald Trump announced that “high-level” US representatives would meet their Russian counterparts at the event on Friday to discuss a resolution to the Ukraine conflict. Russian officials have not attended the Munich Conference since 2022, and Moscow has yet to confirm its participation this year or announce the composition of its delegation.

Putin and Trump spoke for nearly 90 minutes by phone on Wednesday, marking the first known direct interaction between the Russian and US heads of state since the escalation of the Ukraine conflict in February 2022. On Thursday, Trump said the phone call had paved the way for further direct contacts between American and Russian officials. The Kremlin described the conversation as “constructive,” with both leaders agreeing to meet soon in a third country.

Following his call with Putin, Trump spoke with Zelensky, after which the US president reaffirmed that Kiev is prepared to seek an end to the conflict with Russia.