By Ted Galen Carpenter, Antiwar.com, 1/10/24

There are multiple indications that members of the foreign policy establishment are increasingly worried that the American people are growing weary of Washington’s strategic overextension and the excessive costs in treasure and blood that role imposes.  Elites show their nervousness through desperate attempts to preserve the policy status quo.  One recent example was the effort in Congress to limit the president’s powers and options regarding NATO.

In December 2023, hawks finally achieved their goal when both the Senate and House approved a provision attached to the National Defense Authorization Act that would bar a president from withdrawing the U.S. from NATO without the approval of two-thirds of the Senate or separate legislation passed by both houses of Congress. Washington Post analyst Meagan Vasquez notes that “the bipartisan attempt to add checks and balances highlights the lengths Congress is willing to go to protect the U.S.-NATO relationship amid ongoing Russian aggression and after years of criticism of the military alliance during Trump’s presidential tenure.”

Yet even the Brookings Institution’s Michael E. O’Hanlon, a prominent establishment foreign policy figure, concedes that Congress is entering uncharted and controversial territory.  He points out “that there is precedent for presidents withdrawing unilaterally from treaties without consulting Congress. A chief executive conceivably could push back on efforts to restrict that [authority] particularly if the treaty addresses the United States’ defense posture abroad.  A “future president might challenge such an effort and invoke the president’s authorities as commander in chief under Article 2 of the Constitution.”

O’Hanlon is probably correct.  Indeed, a congressional-presidential collision is likely to take place even if critics of promiscuous military interventions do not attempt to end U.S. membership in NATO.  Members of the “NATO forever” crowd will react badly even if a president committed to a more restrained foreign policy merely attempts to reduce the U.S. military footprint in Europe.  Such a move would indicate a long overdue willingness on the part of an administration to move beyond burden sharing toward burden shifting with respect to transatlantic security policy.

Even a partial withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe would signal to the European members of NATO that going forward they would need to accept primary responsibility for their own defense and the continent’s security.  NATO partisans would regard such a policy change as undermining continued U.S. dominance of the trans-Atlantic security relationship.  That faction in Congress would almost certainly move to thwart a reformist administration.

U.S. hardliners already have demonstrated a determination to prevent any president from implementing a less interventionist policy elsewhere in the world.  In October 2019, congressional hawks led by neo-conservative Rep. Liz Cheney (R-WY) secured a resolution condemning President Donald Trump for even considering a partial withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria.  Fears that Trump might remove U.S. forces from Europe during a second term have become widespread in Washington.  Indeed, those worries on the part of America’s stodgy foreign policy elite were a major reason why Congress passed the new bi-partisan measure to prohibit the president from unilaterally exiting NATO.

It is notable that Congress has afforded presidents a great deal of latitude both with respect to the general handling of foreign policy and specifically in the use of U.S. forces on the world scene.  Yet that restraint seems to apply only when a president is willing to continue Washington’s interventionist foreign policy.  When merely a theoretical possibility of a less belligerent policy emerges, congressional hawks are prepared to severely restrict the president’s role as commander-and-chief of the military.

The controversy over whether the president has the authority to withdraw U.S. membership in NATO reflects a broader problem with U.S. foreign policy.  The core feature of Washington’s long-standing insistence on U.S. global primacy is a NATO under permanent U.S. dominance. That determination has been evident for decades.  Even when the Soviet Union disintegrated, there was vehement opposition from members of the foreign policy blob to dissolving an alliance whose overriding purpose was to counter Soviet power in Europe.  Clearly, that mission was no longer needed since the Soviet Union no longer existed.

Instead of accepting and adjusting to that existential change, the blob’s reaction was to find alternative missions for their sacred, but now obsolete, alliance.  Suggested new missions even included promoting student exchanges and coordinating environmental policies, measures for which a military alliance is not needed.  Worse, NATO enthusiasts sought to expand the alliance into Eastern Europe, thereby threatening non-Communist Russia’s security zone.  Such provocative actions eventually poisoned the West’s relations with Moscow.  The war in Ukraine and the resulting NATO-Russia confrontation is the alarming result.

The American people need to firmly rebuff the ongoing effort to make the current U.S. posture toward NATO permanent.  A smart foreign policy must be agile and willing to adjust to important changes in the international system.  The place to begin such badly needed policy reform is by rejecting the out-of-touch foreign policy establishment’s escalating campaign to freeze NATO in place.

Ted Galen Carpenter, Senior Fellow at the Randolph Bourne Institute, is the author of 13 books and more than 1,200 articles on international affairs. Dr. Carpenter held various senior policy positions during a 37-year career at the Cato institute. His latest book is Unreliable Watchdog: The News Media and U.S. Foreign Policy (2022).

By Andrew Korybko, Substack, 1/15/24

Former Ukrainian MP Andrey Derkach dropped a bunch of bombshells about Biden’s corrupt dealings in Ukraine in a recent interview with Italian-American journalist Simona Mangiante. The takeaways can be read here, but they basically boil down to bribes and money laundering, among other crimes. While they might boost the Republicans’ impeachment efforts in the House where the opposition has a slim majority, their lack of a two-thirds majority in the Senate means that he won’t be removed from office.

Even so, these new allegations can still have an important impact on events, one that might be much more significant than his superficial impeachment by the House. Proceedings at that level have become politicized as proven by the Democrats’ witch hunt against Trump, which isn’t to say that the Republicans are carrying out their own against Biden, but just to emphasize that impeachment by the House has no tangible significance. At most, it’ll strengthen both parties’ efforts to get out the vote in November.

Where the actual importance of these latest allegations lies is in the larger context of the Ukrainian Conflict, which began to wind down late last year following the failure of Kiev’s counteroffensive and the consequent dwindling of Western aid. The Republicans already made their agreement on any more such deals contingent on robust border security reforms, but they might now also include the additional condition of a comprehensive joint investigation with Ukraine into Derkach’s bombshells about Biden.

If the opposition makes such a proposal, then there’s no way that the Democrats would agree, thus capsizing the possibility of any compromise on this issue until next year after November’s elections, which could shake up the congressional dynamics and potentially lead to Biden’s ouster as well. Furthermore, Zelensky’s regime can’t be counted on to assist any theoretical joint investigation in good faith since leading figures are also implicated in this corruption per Derkach’s revelations.

That particular point adds a curious twist to this scandal since it suggests that they might also be able to blackmail the Biden Administration, which provides a new layer of understanding to why the incumbent and his team have been so gung-ho about perpetuating NATO’s proxy war on Russia through Ukraine. Zelensky knows that any outcome short of the maximalist victory that he fantasizes about would kill his political career so he has self-interested reasons in wanting to turn this into a so-called “forever war”.

The US’ objective national interests aren’t served by depleting even more of its stockpiles and therefore reducing its ability to flexibly respond to foreign crises as they arise, or rather might even be provoked by America or its partners, hence why it’s become popular to talk about freezing the conflict. Former NATO Supreme Commander Admiral James Stavridis’ Korean-like “land-for-peace” armistice proposal last year could be a starting point but only if the West agrees to Russia’s security guarantee requests in Ukraine.

They’ve been reluctant to do so, however, hence why no progress has been made on this. One reason behind the US’ recalcitrance might not just be that it’s concerned about “losing face” upon reaching a pragmatic series of mutual compromises with Russia, but that Zelensky is blackmailing the Biden Administration that he’ll spill the beans if they dare to pursue this policy. Given his prior “godlike” status in the Western media, any corroboration of Derkach’s claims might be widely believed by Westerners.

They know that Zelensky isn’t a so-called “Russian agent” and have convinced themselves that he’s a “democratic freedom fighter” so it would be very damning to the incumbent Democrats’ reputation if he engaged in a “limited hangout” by sharing some relevant information. He of course wouldn’t implicate himself or his most loyal allies, but he could take down a couple less politically reliable officials in that event (perhaps as part of a purge) while possibly dooming Biden’s re-election and flipping the Senate.

Republican control of the White House and Congress coupled with what many regard as the right-leaning Supreme Court could lead to the Democrats’ worst nightmare of their opponents reversing most of Biden’s policies. Meanwhile, Zelensky’s worst nightmare is that Biden bows to the popular sentiment among Americans to scale back their country’s participation in this proxy war and coerce him to resume peace talks with Russia, so each can therefore keep the other in check through this mutual blackmail.

The legitimacy of both the Biden Administration and Zelensky’s regime is therefore dependent on each of them staying silent about their corruption scheme, but one or the other could at least in theory reveal some details about this if they begin to distrust the other or want to get rid of them. For instance, the Biden Administration could leak some information about Zelensky’s corruption to pro-Democrat media to pressure him into resuming peace talks or to pave the way for a “government of national unity”.

That proposal was pushed by a member of the influential Atlantic Council think tank last month in an article for Politico and could credibly be interpreted as a signal that the Biden Administration is beginning to get fed up with Zelensky. As for the Ukrainian leader, it was already explained that he might be the first to leak certain details about this scheme if he feels that the Democrats’ support for this proxy war is faltering, which could be one of his “nuclear options” in that case alongside a major false flag.

Circling back to Derkach’s latest corruption allegations, their impact in terms of the Ukrainian Conflict is much more important than the possibility of them aiding the Republicans’ efforts to impeach Biden in the House since they can’t remove him due to a dearth of support in the Senate. The Republicans could make support for more Ukrainian aid conditional on a joint investigation into these claims and/or the Biden Administration or the Zelensky regime could leak evidence if the other doesn’t do their bidding.

Link here.

January 31, 2024 – The United Nations’ top court on Wednesday mostly rejected Ukraine’s claims that Russia was financing “terrorism” in eastern Ukraine, saying only that Moscow had failed to investigate alleged breaches. Fernande Van Tets, FRANCE 24’s correspondent in the Netherlands, reports from The Hague on why this ruling is such a victory for Russia.

By Ben Aris, Intellinews, 1/14/24

Russia is preparing for a potential massive legal battle with the West to thwart any attempt by the US or Europe to seize the Central Bank of Russia’s (CBR) frozen $300bn of frozen assets and give them to Ukraine, Bloomberg reported on January 12.

Officials in Moscow have been analysing the prospects of asset seizures, after the White House started pressuring its European partners in December to start the process of seizing the assets as a way of continuing to fund Ukraine’s fight against Russia.

Western financial and military aid has become snarled in internal wrangling and some $110bn of funding for Ukraine has been tied up as a result at a time when Ukraine is running out of money and ammunition.

On January 11, the US said it had sent its last military aid package and its funds for Ukraine are now exhausted. At the same time, several bills have been presented to give the US government the legal authority to seize the CBR’s money. However, the US only has some $5bn in frozen Russian assets whereas the bulk, some $210bn, is in Europe.

Western governments have the ability to freeze the money, but thanks to Western property rights technically the money remains the property of the Russian government. The only way Western can seize the money under current rules is if the West declares war on Russia.

The Bank of Russia is preparing to take the West to court should any of its assets be seized. The CBR is on the verge of finalising agreements with international law firms to safeguard the country’s interests in the event of a court confrontation, Bloomberg reported.

The Russian authorities have sought expert opinions on relevant foreign legislation and examined precedents in other countries like Iran and North Korea to bolster their position. Central Bank reserves have never been seized before and are generally regarded as sacrosanct; however, the international agreements governing their status are vague and incomplete.

The White House seems increasingly keen on seizing the assets as it has to contend with a mushrooming number of military clashes. It has been trying to coordinate this move with its G7 allies, but Europe remains reluctant, afraid of the damage it could do to Europe’s financial system and the euro.

When questioned about potential Western actions, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov emphasised that Russia would challenge such measures in court and warned of possible retaliation. Peskov said: “This will entail very serious judicial and legal costs for those who make such decisions,” highlighting the Kremlin’s readiness to contest any seizure in a court case that could go on for decades.

The legal route has long been considered by top Russian officials, with central bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina expressing preparedness to challenge the freeze in July. In a December interview, she criticised it as a violation of basic reserve security principles.

Officials engaged in discussions believe that pursuing the case in courts would thwart any transfer of funds to Ukraine, even if Russia doesn’t regain control of the money. They argue that the West faces slim chances in court and lacks legitimate grounds for seizure based on post-freeze legislation.

Russia’s state-backed Roscongress Foundation recently released a report on the prospects of taking up the case in court, which suggested that the “real risks” of seizing Russian central bank reserves remain low. It found that attempts to seize the assets would rely on the domestic laws of states imposing sanctions on Russia, providing grounds for legal challenges that could go on for decades.

One question that would need to be resolved is which court could hear such a case, as there is no pre-eminent global court of appeal in a case like this. And if fought at sovereign level, the existence of mutual investment guarantee treaties will also play a crucial role.

Russia’s potential legal avenues include appealing to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, the US District Court for the Southern District of New York and the EU’s Court of Justice in Luxembourg, according to Sergey Glandin, a Moscow-based partner specialising in compliance and sanctions law, Bloomberg reports.

By Prof. Richard Sakwa, Canadian Dimension, 1/11/24

Was a positive peace possible after the end of the Cold War in 1989? The Cold War had been characterized by a negative peace in Europe, the management of conflict rather than its resolution, whereas a positive peace is based on the cooperative resolution of common problems, including those facing humanity as a whole. This is the question that has intrigued and puzzled observers in recent years, and with added force after the return to interstate war in Europe and the reimposition of an Iron Curtain across the continent. Why did all the promises of friendship, ‘strategic partnership’ and the like in the euphoria of those days between 1989 and 1991 end not just in failure but in a catastrophic reversion to a cold war, which in certain respects is far deeper and more intractable than the original version?

With the end of the ideological conflict between communism and capitalism, between the Soviet Union and the collective West, a more positive peace order appeared attainable. With Cold War divisions overcome, the vision of a more collaborative peace order was in prospect. The United Nations-based Charter international system established in 1945 could at last come into its own. Cooperation between the former adversaries in reversing the seizure of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, under the aegis of the UN, in 1990-91 appeared to be an augury of things to come. It did not quite work out that way, and divisions over the post-communist wars in Yugoslavia culminated in outright conflict over the West’s bombing of Serbia in 1999. However, this confrontation was a symptom rather than the cause of a broader failure.

The auguries of peace built on a long process that in the end transcended Cold War divisions. In the Soviet Union, the new political thinking that shaped Mikhail Gorbachev’s approach to transcending the Cold War had been taking shape in various institutions of the Soviet Academy of Sciences since at least the 1970s, accompanied by broader changes in societal attitudes. In the US, there was a long and hallowed tradition that understood the wastefulness of the Cold War arms race, beginning most eloquently with President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s ‘Chance for Peace’ speech of April 1953. He argued “Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed.”

The sentiment was reiterated by President John F. Kennedy in his still-evocative commencement address at the American University in June 1963. He talked of “peace as a process,” but “What kind of peace do I mean? What kind of peace do we seek? Not a Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war. Not the peace of the grave or the security of the slave. I am talking about genuine peace—the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth living—the kind that enables man and nations to grow and to hope and to build a better life for their children—not merely peace for Americans by peace for all men and women—not merely peace in our time but peace for all time.” American leadership at the end of the Cold War was unable to rise to this level, but it was nevertheless ready to offer a vision of peace.

The option of a new kind of positive peace was fostered by what at the time became known as globalization. Time and space would be conquered by new communication technologies, a thickening web of personal and business contacts, and cheap air travel that would take citizens to the ends of the earth. The interdependence fostered by trade and financial ties would finally, as prematurely anticipated before the First World War, make war unthinkable—although not impossible. A global middle class based on similar patterns of consumption would put an end to the narrow nationalism of the past. Citizens would become consumers, glued to their screens rather than devoted to political screeds.

So, why was the peace lost? What was the missing ingredient that provoked failure? This is where the missing piece can begin to be inserted. The ideology of globalization implies a certain automaticity—processes that develop beyond the control of mere humans. This accelerated the already marked trend towards depoliticization, the view that certain developments are beyond human control, and indeed, should not controlled by humans. Above all, political actors should not interfere with the working of the market, let alone with the financialization that was beginning to shape post-industrial economies.

In turn, this neoliberalism was reflected in the non-negotiated character of the end of the Cold War. The period was accompanied by endless summits, conferences and declarations, but there was no holistic and integrated event, like a peace conference, that would have established the rules of the road for the new era. This is why in certain respects 1979 was a far more important date than 1989. The latter year saw the Berlin Wall dismantled, the Soviet bloc crumble, and the Cold War effectively brought to an end, but all of this represented little more than the culmination of processes begun in the 1970s.

There were plenty of events between 1989 and 1991, but in the end they did not amount to a transformative moment. The course of history certainly changed, but the logic underlying that history did not change. The endless crises in the end did not add up to a krisis in the Greek sense—a moment of reflection in the life of the community.

Instead, patterns established earlier were applied, adapted and modified for the new conditions. In the security sphere, the Helsinki Final Act of August 1975 was given new expression in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of November 1990. The contradictory formulation of the earlier document was repeated and reinforced: ‘freedom of choice,’ for states to choose their own security, was accompanied by ringing declarations asserting the ‘indivisibility’ of security. Oceans of ink have been spilled defending one or other of these formulations, but tragically, very little on how to find mechanisms to render them compatible. The endless debate on what was or was not promised over NATO enlargement at the time of German unification in 1990 is secondary to this larger question. The debate does, however, demonstrate once again the effectively non-negotiated character of the end of the Cold War. Gorbachev failed to incorporate in treaty form the promises of his Western interlocutors.

In the sphere of geopolitics, the attempt to endow the end of the Cold War with a specifically European character failed dismally. Gorbachev’s idea of a common European home echoed Gaullist themes of an earlier era, of a Europe proudly standing for itself and acting as a third force in global affairs. Later, François Mitterrand (admittedly, half-heartedly, like so many French initiatives in the post-communist era) took up the idea in the form of a Confederation of Europe. Vladimir Putin, with not much greater consistency, reinterpreted the common European home idea in the form of proposals for a ‘greater Europe,’ but the details remained vague.

Instead, the idea of a “Europe whole and free” formulated by President George H.W. Bush in his speech in Mainz in May 1989 came to dominate. It was explicitly designed to repudiate the common European home idea, and thus to advance the American notion of a Europe whole and free under US tutelage—which by definition is neither whole nor free. Atlanticism triumphed over pan-continental Europeanism, thus structurally marginalizing Russia. Europe was once again divided, leading to consequences far worse than anything seen during the original Cold War.

The peace in Europe has been lost, decisively and for our generation almost certainly irrevocably. As always, a peace lost here has global consequences. Equally, there was nothing predetermined about its loss. It was the result of decisions and calculations that in the end undermined the underlying rationality. The outcome from every possible perspective was irrational, setting in motion processes that would engulf the continent in war, division, enmity and ruin. Only agendas centred on Europe, made by Europeans from across the continent, and implemented by all Europeans of good will, can insert the missing piece, and thus make the continent genuinely whole and free. Only in this way can the lost peace be regained.