Interview by Elena Chernenko originally appeared in Kommersant, reprinted by Carnegie Moscow Center, 1/29/22

ARE WE ON THE BRINK OF AN ACTUAL MILITARY CONFLICT?

In the immediate future, say, the coming month, I think the answer is no. As for the longer term, I have questions for both sides.

A question for the West: Could the government in Kyiv—its constituent parts or some elements it doesn’t fully control, acting in concert with some shadow players—stage a provocation to draw Russia in? The answer to this question is likely negative. This scenario won’t do much good for those standing behind Kyiv. Any such provocation is certain to end with the defeat of Ukrainian forces.

The scale of this defeat for Ukraine may vary. And however high the cost of victory would be for Russia, that wouldn’t make up for the colossal reputational losses the Joe Biden administration would sustain, particularly on the domestic arena. After the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, losing another prominent regional ally would be extremely dangerous for the administration, especially in the domestic political context. In addition, there is the NATO context and the factor of U.S. international prestige. After all, countries like China and Iran have been monitoring the situation closely.

IN OTHER WORDS, YOU BELIEVE THE GEORGIAN SCENARIO TO BE UNLIKELY?

Yes. I believe that the Americans have sufficient control over the Ukrainian government and other elements active in Ukraine [to make a provocation unlikely].

AND WHAT’S YOUR QUESTION FOR RUSSIA?

I have many questions for Russia. I think everything comes down to how the commander-in-chief, the president of the Russian Federation appraises what’s happening right before our eyes. I am talking about all of the latest diplomatic efforts supplemented with military moves and allusions to measures in the military and military technology realm. Indeed, there are many questions here, since we can’t know what exactly is on Vladimir Putin’s mind. What’s his plan? What’s his strategy? What options does he see for various situational scenarios? It’s very hard to judge from the outside.

What’s clear is that the demands that Russia has advanced and describes as imperative cannot be met by the West, at least not as they were framed. And since that’s obvious to everyone, the president certainly knows it too. The question is what his answer will be to the rejection of those demands.

SO YOU ARE RULING OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES COULD IN SOME FORM AGREE TO RUSSIA’S DEMAND TO GUARANTEE NATO NON-EXPANSION?

There will be no legally binding agreement on non-expansion. Nor will there be written political guarantees—as Russia insists—that Ukraine and Georgia will “never ever” be admitted to NATO. The question is how Russia will act when it becomes completely clear that the demands that Russian officials have frequently described as an “absolute imperative” will be rejected by Western states.

WHAT DO YOU SEE AS POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR HOW THE SITUATION MIGHT DEVELOP?

The first scenario is ostensibly a logical one. It will be announced that we actually didn’t expect them to agree to that [NATO non-expansion and other demands – Kommersant]. We are sensible people and understand everything perfectly, but we had to break the impasse, shake up the Western political and diplomatic scene, especially in Washington, and demonstrate our seriousness to them. And we managed to get something out of it. First, they didn’t reject our proposals outright, but started responding. Moreover, they agreed to submit a written response to our proposals, which is a major step. This means that they effectively recognize the seriousness of our concerns and demands.

Second, they agreed to discuss important subjects that they previously ignored, for instance, our proposals for a moratorium on the deployment of INF-range missiles. They previously wouldn’t even hear of it, but now they themselves propose to negotiate. They are also prepared to discuss limitations on military exercises in close proximity to our borders: all those naval and air force training exercises, including the ones imitating nuclear missile launches. We have proposed mutual restraint in this sphere numerous times, but they have only taken heed now. There have been responses to some other Russian initiatives as well.

Russia presented its demands in such a decisive fashion to induce Western powers, primarily the United States, to take action that benefits us from the security standpoint. It was important for us not just to diffuse the situation on our Western borders but, above all, to force the West to finally negotiate with us on issues of European security.

This has already happened: a dialogue is underway. For the first time since talks on German reunification, the West has agreed to discuss European security with Russia. From 1999 to 2021, European security hinged on the goodwill—or its opposite—of the United States, which relied on NATO as its main instrument. Now, just as at the times of the Yalta and Helsinki summits, the United States and NATO have been negotiating European security with Russia, so the security rests on two pillars rather than one.

UNDER THIS SCENARIO, SHOULD WE EXPECT THE WEST AND PRIMARILY THE UNITED STATES TO PUT MEANINGFUL PRESSURE ON UKRAINE TO COMPLY WITH THE MINSK AGREEMENTS [AIMED AT ENDING THE CONFLICT IN EASTERN UKRAINE]?

I really hope so but wouldn’t count on it at this time. The Minsk Agreements are a Russian diplomatic victory that followed on from the military victory that the Donbas militia and its supporters scored against the Ukrainian military in February 2015. I am not sure that the United States realizes that the key to diffusing the situation around Ukraine is complying with the Minsk Agreements, although this is certainly the case.

Essentially, these agreements can still be implemented. Donbas can return to Ukraine under the terms of the Minsk Agreements, which would guarantee the rights of those living in the area and preserve Ukraine’s territorial integrity within Russia-recognized borders. But for the time being, I don’t see willingness from Washington to pressure Kyiv into complying with the Minsk Agreements.

The lack of resolution in the Donbas conflict is the best formal pretext for continuing to put pressure on Moscow. In recent years, U.S. policies have been aimed at intensifying pressure on Russia, and Ukraine is but one element of that. If I understand the Western strategy correctly, this pressure will peak when the transfer of power in Russia gets underway. Amid its confrontation with China, the United States needs a more compliant Russia. But that’s a long-term goal.

OKAY, THAT’S THE FIRST SCENARIO. WE’VE SHAKEN THINGS UP, AND WE SETTLE FOR WHAT THEY GIVE US.

Yes. In this regard, we could also remember that politics is the art of the possible, as well as a host of other arguments in support of this scenario.

As for the second scenario, it assumes that things have actually gotten way too serious, and we’ve reached the point when new politics have come to replace the old ones in Russia. In my book The New Balance of Forces, I wrote that Russia’s foreign policy—both under Yeltsin and Putin, including the Medvedev presidency—rested on the shoulders of Gorbachev’s policies. In one way or another, Russia continued integrating into the West, finding its place there, searching for a certain balance of interests in relations with the United States and other Western countries, with an emphasis on cooperation.

But what if this course is being radically overhauled now? This relates not only to foreign policy, but Russia’s general direction. What if we are distancing ourselves from the period in which the main goal was to integrate into the world at large, albeit on our own terms? What’s more, what if the severance from the West that President Putin talked about in response to the prospects of U.S. “sanctions from hell” becomes reality? What if Russia eventually embarks on a completely different foreign and domestic policy course, which would also include the economic, social, and ideological spheres?

Perhaps a separate “Russian project” is already being constructed, and it no longer anticipates integration into the world where the West still plays a leading, though not dominant, role. Given its rupture with the West, Russia may establish much closer and even de facto allied relations with key non-Western states, primarily with China, as well as Iran and U.S. adversaries in the Western hemisphere: Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Under this scenario, Russia may conduct a significantly more active foreign policy. Moscow may start doing the very thing that the West has so often accused it of doing.

ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT CREATING SPHERES OF INFLUENCE?

Both spheres of influence and the right to use force to overthrow unwanted regimes. For instance, the United States overthrew a dictatorial regime in Iraq. True, they found no weapons of mass destruction there, but, on the whole, the West believes that it did a good thing by eliminating a dictator.

I’ve noticed now that Russian diplomats and the foreign minister have been increasingly using the term “regime,” especially when talking about the Ukrainian government. Regime is something illegitimate, at least from a moral standpoint. And if the government is illegitimate, why not help the forces of good to overthrow it?

I have a feeling that Russia has been looking for a new starting point around which to reassemble territories in the post-Soviet space. A variety of options could be employed here. For instance, Russia could expand on the concept of the Union State [which currently consists of Russia and Belarus] by incorporating new territories into it. Loosely speaking, if the Russian authorities come to the conclusion that it’s impossible to get the Minsk Agreements implemented, they may recognize the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk republics as one or two states and incorporate them into the Union State of Russia and Belarus. Hypothetically, that entity may also include Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

This will happen if Russia decides to destroy what it dislikes and use force since it can’t get what it wants nicely. The United States most likely won’t be able to do much about it. It won’t engage in a direct confrontation with Russia.

YOU HAVE DESCRIBED TWO VERY DIFFERENT SCENARIOS. TO DRAW A CHESS ANALOGY, THE FIRST ONE IS А SHREWD GAME WITH DELIBERATE MOVES AND CALCULATED RISKS. IN THE SECOND, ONE OF THE PLAYERS SIMPLY OVERTURNS THE CHESSBOARD AND ALL THE PIECES ON IT. SO WHICH OF THE SCENARIOS IS BEING IMPLEMENTED NOW?

I don’t know. Only one person in our country can answer this question. It’s impossible to figure out his answer from the outside. Russia has the capabilities to implement both scenarios. The Russian state and its armed forces will be prepared to accomplish any task assigned to them.

Both scenarios come at a certain cost and involve known risks. In the first case, we are talking about reputational losses, both internationally and domestically. If Russia abandons its demands, which it declared to be an “absolute imperative,” it may be accused of bluffing. Great powers don’t bluff. If Russia is bluffing, it’s descending to some other level in terms of its global status. But even if some sections of the population view this negatively, it’s no big deal overall. The government’s position at home is quite strong. It will be more of a blow to its international reputation: Russia may be taken less seriously in the future. But we can live with this too.

The second scenario, which entails the use of force, calls for a very serious rupture in relations, including within Russia itself. It would destroy the hopes of a small but influential part of the Russian elite that still hopes that relations with the West will be normalized someday. In the radical form described by some Western think tanks— the “Ukraine occupation” scenario—it would also test broader segments of the Russian population.

THIS WILL HAPPEN IF RUSSIA GOES BEYOND RECOGNIZING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE DONETSK AND LUHANSK PEOPLE’S REPUBLICS?

Yes, if the Russian authorities decide that the only guarantee of Ukraine not joining NATO and not having American missile bases on its territory is Russia’s direct control over Ukraine or establishing a friendly regime in Kyiv. In any event, the use of force scenario won’t be similar to what happened in Crimea, where not a single shot was fired, and there were no casualties.

DO YOU BELIEVE THIS [USE OF FORCE] SCENARIO TO BE AT ALL PROBABLE?

I think it’s unlikely. It’s fraught with many negative consequences, and great human and financial losses.

Read full interview here.

Fyodor Lukyanov is Chairman of Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, the oldest Russian NGO providing expertise in the foreign policy field, and editor-in-chief of the Russia in Global Affairs journal published in Russian and English with the participation of Foreign Affairs. As head of Russia in Global Affairs since its founding in 2002, he greatly contributed to making this journal Russia’s most authoritative source of expert opinion on global development issues. He is also research director at the International Valdai discussion club, and a member of presidium of Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). Fyodor Lukyanov is research professor at Higher School of Economics in Moscow.

Thomas Graham is a distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is a cofounder of the Russian, East European, and Eurasian studies program at Yale University and sits on its faculty steering committee. He is also a research fellow at the MacMillan Center at Yale. He has been a lecturer in global affairs and political science since 2011, teaching courses on U.S.-Russian relations and Russian foreign policy, as well as cybersecurity and counterterrorism. Graham was special assistant to the president and senior director for Russia on the National Security Council staff from 2004 to 2007, during which he managed a White House-Kremlin strategic dialogue. He was director for Russian affairs on the staff from 2002 to 2004.

By Sarah Lazare, In These Times, 1/27/22

….The statements come from leaders of an industry that exerts tremendous influence in Washington, employing an average of 700 lobbyists per year over the past five years, or more than one lobbyist per member of Congress, according to Brown University’s Costs of War project. 

Raytheon, Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics are also funders of the influential think tank, Center for Strategic and International Studies, which has been encouraging the United States to take immediate action, including militarily, in the event of a Russian invasion.

“Everyone in D.C. knows that weapons manufacturers are helping skew U.S. policy towards militarism, but they usually try to be less obvious,” Erik Sperling, executive director of Just Foreign Policy, an anti-war organization, told In These Times. ​“They are cashing in on tensions over Ukraine as the U.S. pours weapons into the region.”

Read full article here.

Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s answer to media question, Russian Foreign Ministry, 1/27/22

Question: You have received the Americans’ response to Russia’s security guarantee proposals. What does it say? What is their reaction? Antony Blinken has said that they are against releasing the document publicly. What has Russia decided on this score?

Sergey Lavrov: I believe that the general public will know the essence of this document soon. As our American colleagues have said, although they would like to keep this document confidential so as to provide space for confidential talks, they have coordinated it with their allies and with Ukraine. Are they sure that it will not be leaked very soon?

As for the essence of the document, the responses offer grounds for serious talks only on matters of secondary importance. There is no positive response to the main issue, which is our clear stand on the continued NATO enlargement towards the east and the deployment of strike weapons that can pose a threat to the territory of the Russian Federation, which we consider unacceptable. This stand did not appear out of the blue. As you may know, the issue of NATO’s non-enlargement or enlargement, however you put it, has a long history. In the early 1990s, or more precisely in 1990, when Germany was reunified and the issue of European security was raised, they solemnly promised that NATO would not expand even an inch eastward beyond the Oder River. These facts are well known and have been included in many memoirs by British, US and German officials. But now that this issue has become a matter of fierce debates, we have been told that the promises were only verbal. When we mentioned the memoirs, our Western partners responded that they were not serious and that their words were misinterpreted. They chose a rather immature way to explain the reckless expansion of the alliance.

But now that we have cited the promises made not in word but in the form of documents signed by the leaders of all OSCE states, including the US President (the 1999 Istanbul Declaration and the 2010 Astana Declaration), our Western partners have to find a way out of a very serious situation. The point is that both declarations set out the participating states’ commitment to the principle of indivisible security and their pledge to honour it without fail. This principle was formulated very clearly. It includes two interconnected approaches. The first is the freedom of states to choose military alliances. The second is the obligation not to strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other states. In other words, the freedom to choose security arrangements is conditioned by the pledge to respect the security interests of any other OSCE state, including the Russian Federation.

It is indicative that now when we propose coordinating legally binding security guarantees in the Euro-Atlantic region, our Western colleagues respond by urging us to respect the coordinated principles of security guarantees in that region. After saying this, they add that this means that NATO has a right to expand, and nobody can prohibit it from considering any country’s request for joining the alliance. The principle according to which no state may strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other states is being deliberately ignored. Our Western partners make no mention of the Istanbul or the Astana declarations during the ongoing discussions on European security. They are keeping away from this matter. We cannot accept this. They explained their failure to honour the non-enlargement promises in the 1990s by the absence of written obligations, but such promises were given in writing later. They have been reaffirmed within the OSCE framework several times, including at the top level. We will now focus on getting clarity regarding this hypocritical position of our Western partners.

During my talks with Antony Blinken in Geneva, I asked him to explain why they regard the obligations made within the OSCE as a menu from which they are free to choose the dishes that taste good to them, and why they are disregarding or talking round their pledge to honour the interests of other countries. Mr Blinken did not reply to my question. He only shrugged his shoulders, and that’s it. I told him, just as I have told our other colleagues, that we would shortly send them an official request for an explanation why they choose only one of their commitments and disregard the other commitments on which its implementation depends. It will be an official request sent to all countries whose leaders signed the Istanbul and Astana declarations. I hope that it will not take them long to explain the Western position.

Other than that, we are analysing the Americans’ response. As Antony Blinken has said, they have coordinated it with Ukraine and with the other Western countries, with US allies. We have also received NATO’s response from Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. We are analysing these two documents as a package, because they have been provided in response to the draft treaty and draft agreement we proposed in December 2021. After an inter-agency coordination of our conclusions, we will submit them to President Vladimir Putin, who will make a decision on our further actions.

(Note: Emphasis above mine – Natylie)

By Ted Snider, Antiwar.com, 1/25/22

Western media and Western governments are all telling us one thing. But, suddenly, the actual players are all telling us another. Is it possible that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky pushed an opportune situation too far and is now afraid of what he has unleashed?

On September 1, 2021, Zelensky met with Biden at the White House. In setting the agenda, he said that he “would like to discuss with President Biden here his vision, his government’s vision of Ukraine’s chances to join NATO and the timeframe for this accession.” He also walked away with a pledge for millions more in US money for security assistance.

Zelensky has been demanding, and receiving, money and arms from everyone. Only Germany has not joined the US, Canada, the UK, Europe and even the Baltic States in sending Zelensky the gift of weaponry.

But as the arms pour in, as the US focuses more on long talks than real solutions, and as Ukraine finds itself in the middle of something potentially scary, suddenly Zelensky is calming things down instead of heating things up.

After asking everyone to send money, arms and troops, on January 25, Zelensky suddenly turned down the volume. Everything is “under control,” he calmly reassured. There is “no reason to panic.” In fact, nothing is happening at all. Ukraine’s foreign ministry joined the new Zelensky choir, saying that, “In fact, there have been no radical changes in the security situation recently: the threat of new waves of Russian aggression has remained constant since 2014.” Zelensky actually “does not think there’s any remotely imminent threat to Kyiv.”

Ukrainian Minister of Defense Oleksii Reznikov added the not trivial contribution that the Russian troops near his border have not formed battle groups, “which would have indicated that tomorrow they would launch an offensive.” And just to make sure everyone was singing their part in the new Zelensky choir, Oleksiy Danilov, the secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, added that the activity of Russian troops near the Ukraine border “is not news.” Not news? Then why are Biden and Blinken threatening war with Russia?

The US, UK, Germany and Australia have recently recalled their embassy staff from Ukraine because of the imminent danger of Russian invasion and war. On January 25, Canada joined them. But the EU did not. Why? Because, Josep Borrell, the chief EU diplomat said, “we don’t know any specific reasons.” He went so far as to call closing embassies dramatizing the situation. Ukraine agrees. The Ukrainian foreign ministry called it “premature.” Zelensky broke with the US and actually thanked the EU, saying, he was “grateful” to countries “whose diplomats remain in our country and support us in our work.”

Zelensky and other Ukrainian officials now seem to be closer to what Russia has been saying. Putin has consistently denied that Russian troops are near the Ukrainian border for offensive rather than defensive reasons. Putin’s press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, again told a US media audience that Russian troops are positioned as they are in response to NATO threats. He added, in case no one has been listening to Putin, “[W]e’re not speaking about military action. This is – you have to understand, no one is threatening anyone with military action. This will be just a madness to do that.”

And it is not only Russia, Ukraine and the EU who are speaking in a way that is not consistent with the way the situation is being constantly hyped by the US government and media. It is also the US. CIA Director Burns maintains that “We don’t know that Putin has made up his mind to use force.” So, “U.S. intelligence agencies haven’t concluded that Russian President Vladimir Putin will invade Ukraine.” And, as the Ukrainian Minister of Defense has said that the Russian groups have, at least not yet, formed into battle groups that would indicate an invasion, so US intelligence says Russian troops have not done what they would expect if they intended an invasion. US intelligence had expected that, if Putin was planning to invade Ukraine, there would be a surge in the number of Russian troops near the Ukraine border, and the hostile presence would swell to 175,000. No such surge has occurred.

In 2008, the US, having been stymied by Germany and France in its attempt to accelerate Ukraine’s ascension into NATO, stated that, “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agree today that these countries will become members of NATO.” In 2014, the US set up and supported a coup in Ukraine that was intended to pull Ukraine closer into the NATO and European security sphere. Ukraine’s President Zelenski has been pressing the gas pedal on NATO membership, and the US and NATO have intensified the pressure on Russia, pushing NATO and weapons right up to its borders.

Russia finally drew the line. Prior to 2014, Russia had accepted its subordinate role to the West and compromised on all disagreements with the US. At Ukraine, Putin drew the line. He refused to accept the US’s hegemonic rules and stood up to the unipolar world. He defended Russia’s interests and asserted itself as a balancing pole in a multipolar world. That is why the US is so threatened by Russia’s demands for security assurances. It is not about Ukraine: it is about the line over which the battle to maintain the US led unipolar world will be fought.

Zelenski may have exploited this situation to advance his NATO ambitions. But having called for weapons and troops, he now finds his nation in the middle of a potential war in which his country will become the battle ground. Perhaps that is why he is may now be attempting to disarm the situation.