Professor Pape: Iran War Not Over, Trump Trapped YouTube link here.

Trump Warned About Israeli Lies Before Iran War YouTube link here.

YouTube link here.

By Gordon Hahn, Website, 3/16/26

We often here that Russians are imperialistic, militaristic, aggressive, expansionist, paranoid in relation to foreigners and foreign states, especially the West; that Russian President Vladimir Putin carried out an ‘unprovoked, full-scale invasion of Ukraine,’ and is engaged in a massive military buildup in preparation for an invasion of Europe: ‘If he wins in Ukraine, he will not stop.’ Commentators refer to Putin’s ‘fortress Russia.’ This is a reference to an intentional government propaganda effort to convince Russians that they are being surrounded by NATO and so the country must hunker down, crush opposition, and maximize its military production and prowess, making the coubntry extremely militaristic and exceptionally aggressive. At the same time, the universal Western meme is that Ukraine is a democracy and a passive victim of that ‘bad Russia.’ Putting aside Kiev’s initiation of a civil war in Donbass in April 2014, Ukraine’s powerful and now well-armed neofascist movement, and its NATO-backed military buildup prior to the February 2022 Russian effort at coercive diplomacy, a global opinion survey shows that Russia is no outlier, even with compared to the ‘alliance of democracies’ with regard to its national secuerity culture, and where it is it is it deviates in a direction counteropposite to expansionism, militarism, and aggressiveness. Ukraine and Ukrainians turn out to be more militaristic and aggressive than Russia and Russians, refuting what the media-academia misinformation complex so tirelessly exclaims.

The Alliance of the Democracies sponsored a global opinion survey this year, the results of which were published in a report called the ‘Democracy Perception Index’ (DPI) It asked numerous questions regarding national security among the populations of almost all countries (https://allianceofdemocracies.org/democracy-perception-index and https://146165116.fs1.hubspotusercontent-eu1.net/hubfs/146165116/DPI 2025.pdf). The survey’s results demonstrate this ‘counter-intuitive’ conclusion, made counter-intuitive by decades of Western propaganda. For example, the survey asked respondents how concerned they were that their country might be invaded. Slightly more than a quarter of Russians answered they were very or extremely concerned about this (DPI, p. 31). Russian President Vladimir Putin’s alleged efforts to create a ‘fortress Russia’ mentality in the Russian populace apparently is not going well. One explanation for the relative lack of concern among Russians is confidence in the Russian leadership and military to handle any foreign challenges that may arise.

On the other hand, Russians are not prone to rely on military power as the key instrument in guaranteeing their country’s national security, according to the DPI. Respondents were given a choice between: (1) military buildup; (2) maintaining or developing nuclear weapons; (3) strengthening ther country’s alliances and partnerships; and (4) implementing or expanding mandatory military service. The option most often chosen by Russians strengthening ther country’s alliances and partnerships—the only non-military response available. By contrast, Ukrainians most often chose ‘maintaining or developing nuclear weapons as a deterrent’; Ukraine was the only country in the world to choose this answer the most. Poland, Turkey, and China were the only countries on the Greater Eurasian landmass to choose military buildup most often. The rest of Europe and all of the Americas, except for Cuba, chose to rely on alliances as the Russians did (DPI, p. 32).

Respondents aged 18-55 were also asked about whether they personaly would be willing to fight if their country were attacked. A little over half in Russia responded positively, while in the US slightly less than half did so. In Ukraine, only a third responded positively. In Europe, the figure falls to 41%, with higher percentages willing to fight found in Norway, Greece, and Sweden. Globally, some of the weakest willingness to fight were France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, where less than a third responded positively. Middle Eastern and North African countries responded positively on an average of 69% — “the highest regional average in the world.” (DPI, p. 33). In sum, Russian society does not register as extremely militaristic or aggressive, and its government propaganda is not yeilding one, regardless of whether it is attmepting to do so or not.

Some might retort that I myself have written that Russia has a security vigilance culture, suspicious of external and internal national security threats emanating from the West [Gordon M. Hahn, The Russian Dilemma: Security, Vigilance, and Relations with the West from Ivan III to Putin (Jefferson: McFarland, 2021)]. This is true, but security vigilance has little to do with militarism and agressiveness, and might devolve into them only in response to a deep, existential crisis to the Russian nation or state. To the extent Russians seems ‘aggressive’ and its government ‘militaristic’, this is a misperception of Russia’s historically learned defensiveness. Moreover, the security vigilance culture is situational, born by historical experience and heightened by concrete contemporary circumstances impacting the level of national security and Russian perceptions thereof. It waxes and wanes, becomes dominant or recessive within Russia’s security and political cultures to the extent threats emerge from the West.

The DPI’s results reflect all of this. Russians are moderately conscious of the threat environment and do not uniformly fear invasion no less exhibit some irrational paranoia. Russians prefer building alliances to massing arms. They are willing to fight for their country but not inordinately so. This is because they perceive the security environment as a result of centuries of Western lessons on invasion, intervention, domestic interference, and manipulative, ontologically threatening cultural influence. If Russians see their government takes the required measures to address potential and kinetic threats, they are less inclined to succumb to militarism and aggressiveness and more inclined to hold to a more or less healthy patriotism and security vigilance.

By Sylvia Demarest, Substack, 4/5/26

PLEASE NOTE: The effects of this war and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz are already being felt in Asia and parts of Europe with shortages and rationing. When the war started tankers were in route from the Middle East to Asia, the EU, and the US. The last of these tankers will unload in the next 10 days.

Newsworthy Items

On Easter morning, our President delivered this threat to Iran:

“Tuesday will be Power Plant Day and, and Bridge Day, all wrapped into one, in Iran. There will be nothing like it!!! Open up the Fuckin’ Strait you crazy bastards or you will be living in hell—JUST WATCH! Praise be to Allah. President DONALD J. TRUMP”

Did you get that? Tuesday will be a day when US war crimes against Iran will expand from bombing schools, hospitals, police stations, civilian homes and neighborhoods, the Pasteur Institute, and universities, to the destruction of Iran’s civilian infrastructure.

Pope Leo delivered his Easter message:

“Brothers and Sisters, this is our God, Jesus -King of Peace who rejects war who no one can use to justify war. He does not listen to the prayers of those who wage war but rejects them saying ‘even though you make many prayers, I will not listen. Your hands are full of blood.’”

Earlier this week, the president’s spiritual advisor Paula White-Cain. “advised” that American Christians should tithe their gross incomes and give 10% of their money to Israel to avoid “disobeying God.” At a lunch at the White House later in the week she also compared Jesus Christ with Donald J Trump.”

On Good Friday, it has been alleged, that the “Secretary of War” Pete Hegseth, ordered a “Protestant only” mass at the Pentagon and instructed the organizers to prohibit the attendance by Catholics. Signs were posted to that effect outside the gathering. According to a Friday report from HuffPost, Defense Secretary PeteHegseth’s Pentagon held a Protestant-only Good Friday service at its in-house chapel, with no Catholic Mass scheduled for one of Christianity’s holiest days.

“WE GOT HIM!” President Trump Announces Rescue of 2^nd Airman

The president reported that a US special forces raid and aerial operation had recovered the second crew member from the F-15E jet, shot down in Iran on Saturday. US officials have also confirmed that the downed pilot has been “recovered” in Iran following a “heavy firefight” – according to Al Jazeera, Axios, and others.

The good news—President Trump says we rescued the A-15 officer. The bad news we lost several aviation assets in the process. US losses: 1) The initial downed F-15 Strike Eagle. The F15 was downed by what Western sources say was s Sayyad-4B missile, fired from the Bavar-373 air defense system; 2) an A-0 Thunderbolt II. The A10 was apparently hit over the Strait probably by a Project 358 loitering missile; 3) 2 HC-130J Combat King II. The Iranians say they knocked them down—the US says the US destroyed them. 4) 2 MQ-9 Reapers We have now lost at least 14; 5) A Hermes 900; 6) 2 UH-60 Black Hawks; 7) 2 MH-6 Little Birds.

The operation cost at least $1 billion. The Americans say there were no US casualties but 100s of Iranians were killed. The Iranians disagree saying there were US casualities. Bottom line—it does not appear that we have air supremacy over Iran.

Brief Status Report on Standoff Weapons

Given how many JASSM-ER missiles were used in the first four weeks of the war, only about 425 are estimated to remain available globally, with roughly another 75 considered unserviceable. The Pentagon has issued orders to move missiles from other regional stockpiles, including the Pacific, to US Central Command bases and the UK’s Fairford base to sustain the fight.

Lockheed Martin’s scheduled production rate for 2026 is 396 units, although it can be scaled up to 860. Replacing the expended inventory will take several years.

The situation is much the same for the balance of US standoff weapons and for interceptors. Once the supply of these weapons is exhausted the US will have to use B-2’s, B-26’s and other bombers who will have to fly over Iran to deliver “dumb bombs”. This is when we will find out if the US and Israel has achieved “air supremacy” over Iran’s skies.

The Two-Week Window That Could Break Global Commodity Markets

From Oil Price

Below is the entire article–time is running out.

• Markets appear stable on the surface, but underlying stress is building across interconnected commodity chains—oil, gas, petrochemicals, fertilizers, helium, and logistics—raising the risk of a systemic breakdown.
• The key shift is from pricing risk to deliverability and access risk, with supply chains losing flexibility and physical shortages beginning to emerge beneath still-functioning paper markets.
• The next two weeks are critical: if disruptions persist, cascading failures could trigger inflation, supply shortages, and a broader global economic shock.

The familiar assumption used by markets remains in place, at least according to financial analysts: what has been priced is what matters. Oil is still elevated but not yet showing a disorderly pattern. LNG is tightening but still trading within a recognizable or conventional range. Freight rates are rising, insurers are repricing risk, and policymakers continue to signal control. On the surface, all these signs are showing a stressed but functioning system.

The coming weeks will reveal which systemic risks-such as chain desynchronization or supply chain coupling-policymakers must prioritize to prevent cascading failures, guiding targeted proactive measures.

The real situation in the market has clearly shifted from disruption to early-stage system strain. Recognizing how oil, gas, naphtha, fertilizer, and helium are interconnected will help policymakers and analysts feel the system’s fragility and the risk of a widespread shock.

This coupling of commodity chains could lead to widespread economic impacts, including inflationary pressures and supply shortages, emphasizing the urgency for stakeholders to prepare for systemic disruptions.

For media and most analysts, oil and gas are the visible front line. Physical flows have not recovered to pre-crisis levels, while, much more importantly, confidence in their stability has eroded and will continue to do so. Even where volumes are partially moving, the market is treating them as unreliable. That distinction matters, as it will shift behavior from trading to securing.

Until now, an illusion has been in place, holding markets together over the past weeks: cargoes in transit, delayed physical impact, and the expectation of rapid stabilization. This will be fading as refiners begin to adjust intake assumptions. LNG buyers are moving from portfolio optimization to a clear new strategy: outright procurement urgency. Strategic reserves are being discussed not only as precautionary tools but also, given the facts on the ground, as potential necessities.

The divergence between paper and physical markets is widening. Benchmarks still reflect liquidity and sentiment. When looking at physical cargoes, there is clearly scarcity and risk. This gap is a precursor to dislocation and should already be recognized.

Shipping is accelerating this transition. War-risk insurance constraints are tightening further. It has also been changing as behavioral risk is rising. Owners are not only reacting to premiums; they are also slowly but steadily reassessing their exposure entirely. The result of this change is that there is a reduction of available tonnage in practice, even where fleets exist on paper. For all, deliverability, not production anymore, is the central constraint.

Oil and gas, however, are only the entry point.

The second chain, showing early signs of stress, is naphtha. Petrochemical margins have become increasingly compressed due to feedstock uncertainty and rising costs. It is not yet a full disruption, but the shift is visible: reduced operating rates, cautious procurement, and early signs of pricing pass-through.

The naphtha situation is critical as it sits at the core of industrial transformation. Plastics, chemicals, packaging, and solvents all depend on the availability of stable feedstocks. While there will not be an immediate shock, it will create a broad, creeping constraint across manufacturing systems.

And it is beginning.

The third chain, fertilizer, has already entered its critical window as gas-linked production economics deteriorate. At the same time, producers have begun adjusting output expectations. At present, the market is not yet recognizing all of it, as it is still treating fertilizer as a secondary risk because physical shortages have not yet materialized.

That is the mistake.

The fertilizer risk is already delayed and will remain that way for weeks or months. It needs to be recognized that production decisions made now will determine availability weeks and months ahead. All signs are already on red, with tightening margins, cautious production, and early signs of reduced forward supply becoming visible by the day. Once this translates into agricultural input shortages, the system will have very limited ability to respond.

Food inflation will not start today. But the conditions for it are being set now.

Helium, the fourth chain, has already made some headlines. It is moving quietly but decisively into risk territory. Gas processing disruptions are beginning to ripple through helium availability, with early signs of supply tightening in specialized markets.

Policymakers and analysts should understand that the industries that are exposed to this development, such as healthcare, semiconductors, and advanced manufacturing, are not marginal economic sectors; they are critical. And they do not have easy substitutes.

The fifth chain, logistics, has moved to the forefront; it is no longer a background variable. Its role as a primary driver of system stress should make industry leaders and policymakers aware of the urgent need for action to maintain supply flexibility and prevent disruptions.

This is the shift markets are still underestimating.

The system is not only losing supply. It is losing flexibility.

Multiple risks are now moving to reality, no longer a theoretical background noise. As oil and gas constraints increase energy costs and uncertainty, it directly feeds into naphtha and fertilizer production. Due to this system stress, petrochemical and agricultural systems begin to tighten. The total at the same time is amplified by logistics constraints, which limit response capacity.

Each chain does not fail independently. Each one accelerates the stress in the others. The result is not a series of shocks, but a system that loses its ability to absorb them.

At present, markets are still anchored in linear thinking, so no pricing for this situation is evident. Recognizing the coupling of these chains and their thresholds is crucial; delays could lead to rapid, uncontrollable shifts, urging policymakers and analysts to act now rather than wait for confirmation.

Markets and policymakers should understand that waiting for confirmation is the most expensive strategy. When all five chains show clear signs of disruption, an adjustment will already be underway, as prices will have moved, availability will be constrained, and decision-making will shift from optimization to allocation.

Looking at the system at present, there are clear signs that this shift is already in place in parts of it.

Looking at the impact of this total shift, the regional implications are becoming clearer as this transition unfolds.

When looking at Europe, it is clear that the continent is entering a renewed phase of exposure. It is directly placed in the path of a multi-chain stress situation due to its reliance on global LNG markets and its industrial sensitivity to petrochemicals and fertilizers. At present, the ARA hub remains a critical buffer, but it is increasingly functioning as a balancing mechanism rather than a stabilizing one.

While the media will focus on immediate shortages, the real risk for Europe is progressive constraint. Europe’s industrial users will have to face rising input costs and potential supply uncertainty. Southern Europe, however, is particularly exposed due to its greater import dependence and limited flexibility. Taking the option of tightening multiple chains simultaneously, the continent will face a scenario in which inflation returns alongside an industrial slowdown.

Asia’s behavior is already shifting, as seen in more aggressive procurement strategies, especially among major importers. In Asia, the transition from price sensitivity to security-driven buying is underway. It not only increases competition for available cargoes but also pushes the system toward fragmentation. The real risk for emerging Asian economies is sharper, as these countries are not only exposed to higher prices but to reduced access. Demand destruction, power shortages, and industrial curtailment are no longer hypothetical but emerging risks.

At the same time, and largely forgotten, North Africa is being pulled into the system from both sides. Import-dependent countries are facing rising costs and growing exposure to fertilizer and energy constraints. Egypt, already dealing with reduced Suez Canal flows, is under increasing economic pressure. Regional producers, however, are also seeing increased demand from Europe, which creates an opportunity. Still, most of this is, however, constrained by infrastructure, domestic needs, and geopolitical risk. North Africa is not insulated; it is being integrated into the stress.

Overall, what should be recognized without delay is a persistent mismatch between system dynamics and policy framing. Responses are still focused on price, on reserves, on diplomatic signaling. These are tools designed for cyclical disruptions.

This is not a cyclical disruption.

When using strategic reserves, it should be understood that they can only alleviate short-term oil shortages. They will never address LNG competition, petrochemical feedstock constraints, fertilizer production risks, or helium supply. SPRs are also not solving logistics. They do not restore flexibility.

The next fourteen days are therefore not just another period of volatility, but a first and dangerous compression phase.

If nothing fundamental changes, such as stabilizing flows, easing logistics, and the return of confidence, the total system will move from stress into breach conditions. Not everywhere at once, but across enough chains to alter overall behavior. In such scenarios or realities, markets will soon stop clearing through price alone; they will clear through access. It is a fundamentally different system.

For companies, these implications will be immediate. Exposure to Hormuz-linked flows is no longer a scenario but an operational risk. Supply chains need to be reassessed, logistics secured, and contingencies activated. Waiting for clarity on all is no longer a neutral choice but will be a cost.

The warning is now sharper than it was even days ago.

Five chains are moving, not in isolation, but together. Buffers are eroded. The system still appears stable because those buffers have not yet fully run out. In the coming days, they will be running out.

When this happens, the adjustment will not be gradual, but abrupt, non-linear, and difficult to reverse. It should be understood that, in systemic risk, the most expensive moment is the one just before recognition. This is when signals are clearly visible, but no action is taken.

That is where the market stands now. In the next two weeks, it will be determined whether this remains a severe disruption or, if the signals are there, a systemic break.

How long can Iran hold out

Iran did not start this war. The Iranian people are being bombarded daily by the full force of the US and Israel. Iran’s cities and heritage are under attack. The US has gone from claiming to want to “rescue the Iranian people from a brutal regime” to threatening to bomb the country back to the stone age. Putting aside the illegality and complete immorality of this war and the US/Israel “leadership” behind it, it is time to ask: how are Iranians doing?

The example of Ali Larijani a PhD scholar, philosopher, military officer and Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council assassinated by Israel on March 17^th as he visited his daughter. He did not try to hide–but neither did the Ayatollah. The Israel’s wiped out an entire neighborhood to kill him, including women and children.

Larijani’s estate has been settled. He had a small house, an old car, and virtually no savings. Contrast this to the US/Israeli elite, most of whom use their office to enrich themselves–do I need to give examples?

One of the objections to war in the west is that our leaders and our elite never suffer from war. The US and Israel have killed dozens of Iranian leaders often wiping out entire neighborhoods to kill them. The Iranian leadership elite have suffered along with Iranian citizens.

I recently saw a tweet of a sign on the door of a supermarket–the sign said, “take what you need, you can repay me after the war.”

When the time comes–and it will come, how will we act?

Sociologist Mohammad Ali Senobari’s account of the war days 20 March 2026, 02:01 Tehran time. “For years we have spoken of the “social resilience” of the Iranian people, a concept which, until recently, remained abstract for many, confined to sociological theories. But these days, on the streets of Tehran, this concept is no longer theoretical; it is alive and visible in everyday life.”

“When I leave the house in the morning, the first thing that catches my attention is not the distant sound of explosions, but the queues for bread: people standing there as always, exchanging jokes and everyday conversation. It almost seems as though life itself has decided not to give up. Even amidst reports of air strikes and the pressures of war, a large part of the population remains in the capital, striving to preserve a sense of normality and rushing, almost enthusiastically, to do their shopping for Nowruz (the New Year festival, according to the Persian calendar, ed.).”

“On the streets, taxis are full, shops are half-open and cafés still serve tea and coffee until late at night. Perhaps there are fewer customers, but even this minimal presence carries a profound meaning: “life goes on”. In sociological terms, this is what we call “everyday resistance”.”

“At night, the atmosphere in the streets and squares becomes even more evocative. From early afternoon until almost dawn, the city’s main avenues and iconic squares fill with private cars. Families, waving the tricolour flag of the Islamic Republic of Iran, form long convoys of cars.”

“When they reach the central squares, people get out of their cars, forming massive gatherings – tens of thousands in every square – waving flags and singing epic hymns in unison. I am now 43 years old and I remember the eight-year Iran-Iraq War (1981–1988), yet I have never witnessed scenes like these. From 28th February 2026, when, in an unprecedented and criminal act of terrorism, my country’s Supreme Leader was assassinated, until tonight, 19th March 2026, millions of people across the country have supported this movement of passion and unity every single night.”

“What strikes me most, however, as an observer, is how people react to the “sound of war”.”

“A few evenings ago, around sunset, an explosion rang out in the southern part of the city. There was a brief pause – not the silence of fear, but a momentary pause, like a comma in a sentence. Then life resumed. No one ran away, no one screamed. People turned their heads, perhaps muttered something under their breath, and then carried on with what they were doing.”

“In my writings I have always maintained: “Fear is a social phenomenon, not merely a psychological one”. Now I see how a society can learn to manage fear. In Tehran today, fear exists, but panic does not. Anxiety is present, but there is no collective psychological breakdown.”

The charge of the light brigade

In 1854 during the Crimean War Lord Cardigan led a calvary charge, “the Light Brigade” against Russian cannons in the Battle of Balaclava. I visited “the valley of Death” when I went to Crimea in 2017. This battle marked the end of one form of war and the beginning of war marked by cannons, repeating rifles, tanks, artillery, and ultimately by aircraft, aircraft carriers, and missiles. Horses and mounted units became obsolete. Are we witnessing another shift in how war is conducted today?

The Ukraine war has been characterized by the use of drones making any concentration of troops and equipment suicidal. Drones were also used to destroy tanks, personnel carriers and even aircraft. This is one reason the Ukraine war has lasted so long. Has the US adapted to these changes? It has been said that the U.S. is fighting a 19th Century war, with 20th Century weapons, against 21st Century Powers. True or false? If this war does not end soon, we will find out. Below is a poem written by Lord Alfred Tennyson about the Battle of Balaclava and the Charge of the 600.

The Charge of the Light Brigade

BY ALFRED, LORD TENNYSON

Half a league, half a league,

Half a league onward,

All in the valley of Death

Rode the six hundred.

“Forward the Light Brigade!

Charge for the guns!” he said.

Into the valley of Death

Rode the six hundred.

“Forward, the Light Brigade!”

Was there a man dismayed?

Not though the soldier knew

Someone had blundered.

Theirs not to make reply,

Theirs not to reason why,

Theirs but to do and die.

Into the valley of Death

Rode the six hundred.

Cannon to right of them,

Cannon to left of them,

Cannon in front of them

Volleyed and thundered;

Stormed at with shot and shell,

Boldly they rode and well,

Into the jaws of Death,

Into the mouth of hell

Rode the six hundred.

Flashed all their sabers bare,

Flashed as they turned in air

Sab’ring the gunners there,

Charging an army, while

All the world wondered.

Plunged in the battery smoke

Right through the line they broke;

Cossack and Russian

Reeled from the saber stroke

Shattered and sundered.

Then they rode back, but not,

Not the six hundred.

Cannon to right of them,

Cannon to left of them,

Cannon behind them

Volleyed and thundered;

Stormed at with shot and shell,

While horse and hero fell,

They that had fought so well

Came through the jaws of Death,

Back from the mouth of hell,

All that was left of them,

Left of six hundred.

When can their glory fade?

O the wild charge they made!

All the world wondered.

Honor the charge they made!

Honor the Light Brigade,

Noble six hundred!

Happy Easter- -pray for peace

---

By Uriel Araujo, InfoBrics, 3/30/26

With the prospect of war involving Iran, Western analysts have rediscovered the South Caucasus, now rebranded as a “strategic bridge” linking Europe to Asia. The narrative is simple enough: as instability engulfs the Middle East and relations with Russia remain frozen, Europe can bypass both by investing in a so-called Middle Corridor through Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia.

This vision, however, is arguably less a strategy than a projection of necessity: what is presented as a corridor is, in fact, a geopolitical fault line of sorts.

To begin with, this Middle Corridor rests on quite fragile foundations: the South Caucasus is notably a region marked by unresolved tensions and shifting alignments. The shadow of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict still haunts the region, even after Azerbaijan’s military victory and the mass displacement that followed. Peace processes, occasionally encouraged by NATO and the EU, remain highly uncertain.

And yet, European policymakers increasingly treat it as a given. The logic is easy to spot: as ties with Russia deteriorate, alternative routes for energy and trade become a strategic priority. Azerbaijani gas, transported via the Southern Gas Corridor, has thus been elevated to near-mythical status in Brussels. Europe Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen has described it as a “backbone” of EU energy security. But this pivot is structurally insufficient, for a number of reasons: for one thing, Azerbaijan’s production capacity is limited, and its export infrastructure cannot realistically replace Russian volumes. As a matter of fact, Europe’s “diversification” has largely meant swapping relatively cheap pipeline gas for more expensive LNG — often sourced from the United States, with all the strategic dependencies that implies.

No wonder, that murmurs about re-engagement with Moscow persist. As I have argued elsewhere, energy remains the most obvious entry point for a recalibration. Reports of quiet contacts over the possible reactivation of pipelines such as Nord Stream suggest that, despite political taboos (and technical challenges), economic realities are harder to ignore: politics, like pipelines, can indeed be repaired when incentives change.

It is precisely this contradiction that lies at the heart of Europe’s approach to the South Caucasus. The continent basically seeks to bypass Russia while still implicitly relying on the stability that Russian power historically provided. For decades, Moscow functioned as the ultimate security guarantor in the region, freezing conflicts and deterring escalation. Even its limited peacekeeping role after the 2020 ceasefire helped prevent a wider war.

Today, however, that stabilizing presence has decreased, not least due to the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War. The result is not a newfound opportunity but heightened volatility instead. In this context, Europe’s attempt to instrumentalize the South Caucasus as a substitute corridor risks exacerbating the very instability it seeks to circumvent.

The situation becomes even more precarious when viewed through the prism of the current war with Iran. Far from enhancing the region’s role as a neutral transit hub, such a conflict should likely militarize it. The South Caucasus would transform into a frontline buffer zone, with increased intelligence activity, military deployments, and geopolitical competition. Regional actors such as Turkey — a NATO member with its own ambitions — and Russia would inevitably feel pressured to assert themselves, while Western involvement would deepen under the guise of “security support”.

Under these conditions, the notion of a “stable corridor” becomes untenable, to put it mildly. Infrastructure always requires political order. And order, in the South Caucasus, has always been contingent on a delicate balance among larger powers, including Iran itself. To imagine that this balance can be bypassed or engineered away is to misunderstand the region’s very nature.

Armenia’s recent trajectory offers a telling case in point. Disillusioned with Moscow after the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, Yerevan has explored closer ties with the West, including NATO and the EU. Yet, as I have previously argued, this pivot risks undermining Armenia’s strategic position rather than enhancing it. The Caucasus has never rewarded rigid alignments, and a small, landlocked country cannot afford to alienate both Russia and Iran while betting on uncertain Western guarantees.

Indeed, even Azerbaijan has avoided such a one-sided approach, maintaining a multi-vector foreign policy that tries to balance relations with Moscow, Ankara, and Western capitals. This pragmatic strategy has so far allowed Baku to maximize its leverage — something Europe’s “corridor” narrative tends to overlook.

The broader picture is therefore one of systemic transition. The rise of BRICS and the gradual reorientation of Eurasian trade flows — through initiatives such as the International North-South Transport Corridor — point toward a multipolar order in which Western Europe is no longer the central node. In this emerging landscape, the South Caucasus matters less as a bridge to Europe than as a component of wider Eurasian integration processes.

Paradoxically, then, the region’s growing “importance” is not really a sign of opportunity but a symptom of a crisis. It reflects Europe’s failed attempt to decouple from Russia, its exposure to Middle Eastern instability, and its uncertain position within a shifting global order. The more Brussels insists on bypassing Moscow, the more it is forced to rely on precarious alternatives — thereby increasing pressure on a fragile enough region.

In the end, the South Caucasus is not becoming more stable or more central in any straightforward sense. It is potentially becoming more contested, more militarized, and more unpredictable. The safe corridor that Western strategists envision exists largely on paper. On the ground, what we see instead is a fault line of sorts — one that runs through the heart of Eurasia and reflects the deeper fractures of our time.