I first came across Benjamin Abelow’s analysis of the Ukraine war as a lengthy article published on Medium in May. I found the depth and thoroughness of his article impressive and complimented him on it. When he told me that he’d expanded it into a short book, I was intrigued and offered to review it. I was not disappointed.
Abelow’s overall argument as expressed in the overview of the book is that in the world in which we live, countries that are able, will use the means they have available to defend what they perceive to be their national security interests, including force. This includes deterring or repelling hostile countries from encroaching on their border and near abroad. The prime defender of this concept for itself is the U.S. as reflected in the Monroe Doctrine and its defense during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Monroe Doctrine, as stated by U.S. officials in recent years, is still considered to be in full force. But U.S. officials refuse to recognize that other countries with the means will react similarly.
In the introduction, Abelow lays out the narrative of the war in the U.S.-led west, how that narrative is distorted and why that is so consequential. He argues that there have been many double standards and provocations by the U.S./NATO (the west) and that this has been omitted or obscured by the mainstream media and politicians, which leads average news consumers in the west to a misunderstanding of how the conflict started and evolved. More importantly, this makes it difficult, if not impossible, to end the conflict.
In the following chapters, Abelow describes many of the provocations that led up to February 24th, including those that I’ve enumerated elsewhere, like the provision of offensive weapons to Ukraine, various military exercises that Ukraine and NATO participated in near Russia’s borders, and the installation of missile sites in Romania and Poland with nuclear offensive capability. However, there are a couple of actions listed by Abelow that even many people who have followed events closely may have missed. An example is two important agreements signed by the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Defense Department with their counterparts in Ukraine in the summer/autumn of 2021:
[I]n August of 2021, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the Ukrainian Minister of Defense signed the U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Defense Framework. This framework translates the NATO pronouncement [in Brussels in June of 2021 that reiterated Ukraine would join NATO] into a bilateral (U.S.-Ukraine) policy decision to change the military facts on the ground starting immediately, regardless whether Ukraine is a NATO member or not. And nine weeks after that signing, the U.S. Secretary of State and the Ukrainian foreign minister signed a similar document, the U.S.-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership. This document, like the one signed by the Defense Department, referenced NATO’s declarations of 2008 and 2021, and it operationalized those statements bilaterally, starting immediately, regardless what happened with NATO (p.22).
The author also points out how the justification for U.S. involvement in the conflict since 2/24/22 has shifted from helping Ukraine defend itself (“a limited humanitarian effort’) to weakening Russia (p. 3). There is a contradiction between a “limited humanitarian effort” which implies a goal of limiting death and destruction and weakening Russia which requires prolonging the war. My thought as I read this is that if one is familiar with the Wolfowitz Doctrine, promulgated by Neoconservative Republicans and Zbigniew Brzezinski’s Grand Chessboard strategy which was influential among Democrats, this shouldn’t be surprising as both state a goal of preventing Russia (or any other country in Eurasia) from even aspiring to potentially be a competitor to U.S. unipolar power.
Abelow asks the important question of whether U.S. politicians have thought through their strategy of weakening Russia – if indeed it were successful – to its logical conclusions? One threat from this strategy is the potential use of nuclear weapons if the Russian state were existentially threatened as perceived by its leadership. Another is the likelihood of regime change – clearly desired in Washington – resulting in a pliable pro-western leader. The chances of the latter are practically nil. The U.S .political class doesn’t seem to accept that Yeltsin and the 1990’s was an historical anomaly unlikely to ever occur again. It reflects the extent of magical thinking in Washington along with the sense of being in a time warp, assuming that circumstances are the same as they were in the 90’s. I have read and heard enough of what many U.S. advisors on Russia and national security issues think and many seem to be mentally stuck in the immediate aftermath of the demise of the Soviet Union.
Another problematic aspect of the narrative on this conflict is that Putin is an irrational imperialist. This assertion omits any historical context and conveniently renders the U.S./NATO as innocent and obviating any need to look at their actions for any cause-and-effect relationship. This makes diplomacy and negotiation the equivalent of appeasement.
Abelow outlines how this distorted narrative underpins a dangerous and irresponsible set of policy decisions and reactions to the events of February 24th, arguing that it is necessary to understand Putin and the Russian government’s decisions and what led to them, though understanding does not necessarily equate to agreement.
If you’re looking for a concise little book to point people to who might be open to a more balanced view of this war, Abelow’s book – with arguments soundly made in 62 pages – is it.
The US/NATO have long been planning to use Ukraine as a means to weaken/destroy Russia. The evidence is readily available, fully elaborated in the RAND Corporation policy paper of 2019. But of course it is questionable who is actually interested in facts and evidence.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3063.html
Having said that, it is quite apparent that Putin has made some major miscalculations/assumptions along the way which have led us to this very dangerous moment. It is pretty clear that Putin and his team never imagined such a fight back from the Ukrainians, who have proved to be a far more formidable foe than anticipated, of course thanks to the massive infusion of weapons and advanced intelligence assistance. And this was all made possible due to the second assumption, namely that the West would not be able to unite sufficiently to deal with the Russian assault, specifically that the EU would not let the US lead unconditionally. On the contrary, Biden has been able to herd the cats and create a unified NATO response, with Germany of all countries playing a leading role–even if this response is at the expense of the EU economies and will lead to extreme hardship this winter. Perhaps Putin and his team are playing the long game, thinking that time is still on his side and he can outlast both the Ukrainians and the EU (e.g., recent large demonstrations in the Czech Republic calling for neutrality). It’s a very dangerous, risky calculation, with dire consequences should it all go haywire
–which cannot be ruled out.
thx for this review.
A long note however about “appeasement”, since it is constantly being brought up by a certain party in this conflict:
Appeasement is considered a term to describe how the cultivated Western powers of the 1930s were too soft and naive towards the evil Hitler.
The problem is, as should be clear to any sane reader of historic texts – this narrative very obviously is of the same quality as a fairy-tale.
Matter of fact, pushed mainly by the British establishement – (here Churchill once made a noteable exception by warning of Hitler early on, however for reasons that had nothing to do with human rights) – German rearmament and expansive politics were in the interest of the West.
Which should not be surprising considering the hostility Western governments and the industrial leadership had developed against the Bolshevik Russian regime from 1917 on.
The strategy behind letting Germany being built-up is pretty obvious. As late as 1937 the relationship between British intelligence and Gestapo was described as “cordial” when it came to hunting “Communists”.
The records of Munich 1938 clearly show that London was very well aware of the things going on and put pressure on the Czech government to go along quietly and submit itself.
Thus it should not be surprising that just when the war was winding down, plans, theoretical as they may have been, were worked out, to eventually wage war against the Russians and together with what was left of the German Army march against Moscow.
“Operation Unthinkable” is only one example for this continuation of anti-Russian roll-back strategy by the West.
General Patton´s hatred is another. Just shortly before his untimely death he in fact visited German former SS-units with the intention to include them into a divison for a war against Russia.
This was not in the cards for Eisenhower but Patton was certainly no a solitaire in the military apparatus.
Another example for this pre-Cold War Russophobia were German attempts for separate peace after the turning point Stalingrad with the West, feared by Stalin.
No wonder, thus that assassination plots against Hitler by German conservatives well before the war broke out were tacitly ignored by the British.
Available in Canada on Kobo platform.
Natalie, maybe it’s not so hard to bring any book onto the Kobo platform, I guess it depends on if one was careful with the first license with Amazon.
Thanks for reviewing this book Natylie! I hope it is widely read.
Regarding the question whether Putin thought the SMO would be easy and made a major miscalculation: I suggest people who think this to go back and re-read his speech of Feb 24. Putin compared the situation to WW2 with an aggressive Germany. He vowed not to make the same mistake of tring to appease the aggressor. There was no suggestion that de-militarization and de-nazification would be easy. Just the opposite. See the speech here:
https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/vladimirputinrussianmilitarycampaignukraine.htm
Wow, the first chapter had 5 assertions claimed as facts. No facts were presented to back up the assertions. I will give some allowance, and I do intend to return with my notes from my reading, however it’s pretty apparent this guy is doing his best to not be cancelled (or worse be put on US State Departments’ proxy Ukraine’s murder/hit list) while trying to present a case he doesn’t really want to make. This will be fun.
In addition to the two important agreements signed by the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Defense Department with their counterparts in Ukraine in the summer/autumn of 2021, there is one other critically important event at exactly the same time that many have failed to connect to the plans for proxy war against Russia. Namely, the US pullout of forces and resources from Afghanistan in August 2021 and ending that 20-year military occupation. There was no way the US could continue with that war and the drain it placed on its resources (hardware, intelligence services, etc.) and carry out the proxy war in Ukraine. The billions of $$ spent every month in Afghanistan in materiel, intelligence services, training, etc. would now be transferred to the battlefield in Ukraine. Connecting all the dots is essential if one is to understand the elaborate and extensive planning that went on for years by the US, starting with the coup in 2014 and updated in the RAND Corporation’s policy paper in 2019, to provoke the conflict which today threatens to engulf the world.